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General Chairman’s Message 
On behalf of the Langley Formal Methods Team, I welcome you to Lfm97, the Fourth 
NASA Langley Formal Methods Workshop. The primary purpose of our workshops has always 
been to bring together leading formal methods researchers and practicing engineers in an 
environment in which each group can learn from the other. The three previous workshops were 
limited to invited presentations, but we expanded this year’s workshop to include 17 submitted 
papers. We believe that the program has something to offer to everyone, from those interested in 
the theoretical aspects of formal methods to those interested in the practical application of 
formal methods to help solve real problems. I hope that you will agree, and that you will find 
your time at Lfm97 both interesting and useful. 
Many of the slide presentations that will be given at the workshop will be available on the 
World-Wide Web at <http://atb-www.larc.nasa.gov/Lfm97/>. Information on the NASA 
Langley formal methods program is also available on the web at &ttp://atb- 
www.larc.nasa.gov/fm.html>. 
I look forward to meeting you during the workshop. Please let me know if there is 
anything that I can do to help you while you are here. 
C. Michael Holloway, Lfm97 General Chairman 
E-mail: c.m.holloway @larc.nasa.gov 
Postal Address: Mail Stop 130, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton VA 23681-0001 
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Why Are Formal Methods Not Used More Widely? 
John C. Knight Colleen L. DeJong Matthew S. Gibble Luis G Nakano 
(knight I cld9h I mg7y I nakano)@virginia.edu 
Department of Computer Science 
University of Virginia 
Charlottesville, VA 22903 
Abstract 
Despite extensive development over many years and 
significant demonstrated benefits, formal methods 
remain poorly accepted by industrial practitioners. 
Many reasons have been suggested for this situation 
such as a claim that they extent the development cycle, 
that they require difficult mathematics, that inadequate 
tools exist, and that they are incompatible with other 
software packages. There is little empirical evidence 
that any of these reasons is valid. The research presented 
here addresses the question of why formal methods are 
not used more widely. The approach used was to 
develop a formal specification for a safety-critical appli- 
cation using several specification notations and assess 
the results in a Comprehensive evaluation framework. 
The results of the experiment suggests that there remain 
many impediments to the routine use of formal methods. 
1 Introduction 
For many years, academics have claimed that the use of 
formal methods in software development would help 
industry meet its goals of generating a better software 
process and increasing software quality. The benefits 
that have been cited include finding defects earlier, auto- 
mating checking of certain properties, and decreasing 
rework. Despite their popularity in academia and these 
claimed benefits, formal methods are still not widely 
used by commercial software companies. Industrial 
authors have expressed frustration in trying to incorpo- 
rate formal technologies into practical software develop- 
ment for many reasons including: the perception that 
they add lengthy stages to the process; they require 
extensive personnel training; or they are incompatible 
with other software packages. Experts in formal meth- 
ods have tried to analyse the situation and provide sys- 
tematic insight into the reasons for this lack of 
acceptance [4,7,9]. 
The goals of the research presented here are to 
investigate this disparity between research and industry, 
and to determine what steps might be taken to increase 
the benefits realized by industry from formal methods. 
The initial hypothesis for the relative lack of use of for- 
mal methods was that industrial practitioners were 
reluctant to change their current methods and hence they 
overlooked the benefits that formal methods could pro- 
vide. However, upon attempting to apply several formal 
techniques to a significant application in a case study, 
several shortcomings that are actually well-known 
impeded progress dramatically right at the outset. 
Examples of the difficulties encountered were that a sin- 
gle specification language could describe only a rela- 
tively small part of the system, and necessary tools were 
either not available, not compatible with other develop- 
ment tools, or too slow. 
A new hypothesis was formulated in response to 
these findings. This second hypothesis was that formal 
methods must overcome a number of relatively mun- 
dane but important practical hurdles before their bene- 
fits can be realized. These practical hurdles arise from 
the current state of software-development practice. 
While the methods used in industry are rarely formally 
based, they are reasonably well-developed and under- 
stood. In order to be incorporated into industrial prac- 
tice, formal methods must meet this current standard. 
After formulating this second hypothesis, we set 
out to characterize these practical hurdles. A variety of 
evaluations have appeared in the literature written 
largely by researchers and with conclusions that tend to 
praise formal methods. However, further investigation 
of the evaluations found them lacking. The criteria used 
for evaluation tended to be vague and ambiguous. They 
were often derived from the author’s experience with a 
particular project, with little substantiation that the list 
of criteria was in any sense complete or even applicable 
to a range of projects. In addition to defects in the crite- 
ria themselves, the methods of evaluation were subjec- 
tive. All of this resulted in little insight into the general 
characteristics or utility of the formal method. 
In this paper we summarize an evaluation frame- 
work for formal methods and present results of applying 
the framework to several formal techniques. The com- 
plete framework provides a comprehensive list of evalu- 
1 
ation criteria together with the rationale for each. The 
basis of the evaluation framework is the need for any 
software technology, including formal methods, to con- 
tribute to one overriding goal-the cost-effective devel- 
opment of high-quality software. The results come from 
the development of formal specifications in several 
notations for a safety-critical application together with 
the application of a theorem-proving system to the 
application. 
In the next section we summarize previous work 
both in the use of formal methods in software develop- 
ment and their evaluation. Then we present a summary 
of our evaluation framework, and we follow that with a 
summary of the results of its application in a case 
study'. Finally, we present our conclusions. 
2 Previous Work 
2.1 Formal Specification 
Formal methods have made some inroads into industrial 
practice. A fairly large number of projects have been 
undertaken using formal specification in notations such 
as 2, VDM, PVS, and Statecharts. The most comprehen- 
sive report on such work is the well-known study by 
Craigen, Gerhart, and Ralston [2]. 
iLogix gives summaries of some of the industrial 
applications in which the Statemate family of tools has 
been used [121, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., a unit of 
Guidant Corp., used Statemate to speed up development 
of defibrillators and pacemakers. Animations of the 
Statechart models allowed them to examine interactions 
between features before building a prototype and to 
receive feedback on the design from physicians. AOA 
Apparatebau used Statemate to design a new waste sys- 
tem for the Airbus A330 aircraft. Animation of the sys- 
tem allowed them to easily test single and multiple 
failures. Boeing used Statecharts in the development 
and validation of electrical, mechanical, and avionics 
systems as well as in their integration [ 141. 
The Hursley Park laboratory of IBM UK has used 2 
in two major projects involving CICS [ 1 I]. The first of 
these was the development of a new release of the sys- 
tem and this release showed quality improvements cor- 
responding to the sections which were formally 
specified. The second project was the formal specifica- 
tion of the application programming interface. 
SCR is a formal method developed at the Naval 
Research Laboratory during an effort to re-engineer the 
flight control software for the A-7 aircraft [8]. Since its 
1. A complete report of the research can be found 
elsewhere {3,6]. 
introduction, the SCR methodology has been expanded 
and more formally defined. It has been used on several 
industrial projects, such as a submarine communications 
system [ 101 and the certification of the shutdown system 
for a nuclear generating station [2], but never without 
the involvement of research or academic experts. 
2.2 Forma1 Verification 
Sone industrial applications of formal verification have 
been reported using tools such as HOL, Nqthm, EVES, 
and PVS. Despite the large number of research projects 
that have used formal methods, the number of industrial 
projects that have utilized formal verification is quite 
small. Of the industrial projects that have taken place, 
the majority are research projects as opposed to actual 
practice producing real products. 
By far the largest application of formal verification 
has been in hardware verification. Although hardware 
verification is not the subject of this paper, we note that 
successful application to hardware design is a strong 
indication that similar success with software is possible. 
Specification analysis is the area within the soft- 
ware domain where theorem provers are being used. 
Lutz and Amp0 applied mechanical analysis tools, spe- 
cifically PVS, to the requirements analysis of critical 
spacecraft software [13]. This project consisted of spec- 
ifying and analyzing the requirements for portions of the 
Cassini spacecraft's system-level fault-protection soft- 
ware. This project was more of an experimental study 
examining the applicability of formal methods and 
mechanical analysis to industrial software practices. 
2.3 Evaluation of Formal Methods 
Various authors have proposed evaluation criteria for 
formal methods and used them in a variety of ways. 
Rushby introduced some ideas intended to help practi- 
tioners select a verification system and also offered a set 
of evaluation criteria for specification notations [ 151. 
Faulk also proposed a set of evaluation criteria for spec- 
ification notations [SI. 
A comprehensive approach to evaluation and some 
results were presented by Ardis et a1 [I]. In this work, a 
set of criteria was established for the evaluation of for- 
mal specification notations and the set was then applied 
to several notations. The evaluation was performed on a 
sample problem from the field of telecommunications. 
2 
3 Evaluation Framework 
3.1 Framework Basis 
Our objective was to evaluate formal methods in a sys- 
tematic manner, and an evaluation framework enabled 
us to generate a clear and complete set of evaluation cri- 
teria. The alternative was merely to develop a list of 
seemingly relevant criteria, but such an ad hoc list, 
though it might appear useful, leaves three important 
questions unanswered: 
Where did the criteria on the list come from? 
* Why are the criteria on the list considered important? 
Is the list complete? 
Questions such as these are not answered readily 
from a list of criteria. An investigation of the develop- 
ment of the criteria could answer these questions, but 
the framework summarized here provides a defendable 
list of criteria for the evaluation of specification lan- 
guages and mechanical analysis tools. 
The basis of our evaluation framework is sofrware 
development and the associated sofrware lifecycle. In 
other words, we seek to discover how formal methods 
contribute to software development and how they fit 
into the software lifecycle. The criteria used for an eval- 
uation of formal methods should ultimately return to the 
question, “How will this help build better software?”, 
where the definition of better is not restricted to a cer- 
tain set of goals. There are two aspects to this ques- 
tion-first,’ what is needed to build software and, 
second, how can the use of formal methods augment the 
current development practices of industry to help build 
“better” software? 
The question of what is needed to build software 
leads us to examine current practice. Current methods of 
software development divide the activities into lifecycle 
phases. Such a division focuses the developers’ atten- 
tion on the tasks that must be completed. But the lifecy- 
cle alone is not sufficient to describe the current process 
of building software since development is guided by 
program management activities. These activities con- 
tinue throughout the lifecycle, monitoring and directing 
it. 
An evaluation of formal methods technologies must 
examine their compatibility with current practice and 
the actual benefits they realize over the entire lifecycle. 
In order to be accepted by industrial practitioners, for- 
mal methods have to meet certain objectives: 
They must not detract from the accomplishments 
achieved by current methods. 
They must augment current methods so as to permit 
industry to build “better” software. 
9 They must be consistent with those current methods 
with which they must be integrated. 
They must be compatible with the tools and tech- 
niques that are in current use. 
A further difficulty is that each project has different 
practical requirements. For instance, if the goal of a 
project is to be the first commercial vendor to develop a 
certain networked Java application, the reliability is less 
important than the speed of production. In this context, 
“better” software would probably imply a faster time to 
market, whereas in a safety-critical system, “better” 
would refer to greater reliability of the software. 
We present here only a sample of the framework 
because of space limitations. The complete framework 
is in two major parts-one for formal specification and 
the other for mechanical analysis techniques. The 
framework is structured by the six phases of the soft- 
ware lifecycle-requirements analysis, requirements 
specification, design, implementation, verification, and 
maintenance-and for each phase a set of criteria that 
must be met have been identified and documented along 
with the rationale for each. 
As an example of the way in which the framework 
operates, consider the oft-cited criterion that a formal 
specification language must be “readable”. In practice, 
this is completely inadequate as a criterion because it is 
imprecisely defined and is untestable. In practice, a for- 
mal specification is read by engineers with different 
goals, skills, and needs in each phase of the lifecycle. 
What is readable to an engineer involved in developing 
a specification is not necessarily readable to an engineer 
using the specification for reference during implementa- 
tion or maintenance. Thus, there are in fact many impor- 
tant criteria associated with the notion of a readable 
specification-the criteria are determined by the lifecy- 
cle phase and their relative importance by the product 
goals. 
A selection of the criteria used for formal specifica- 
tion in the framework is presented in the next subsec- 
tion. For brevity here, they are not broken down by 
lifecycle phase. In addition, they were chosen for illus- 
tration and are in no sense complete. In general, we use 
criteria for illustration that have not been noted by oth- 
ers, and we include the rational for each. 
3.2 Criteria for Formal Specification 
Coverage. 
Real systems are large and complex with many 
aspects. For a specification notation to serve well, it 
must either permit description of all of an application 
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format. There will almost always be the need for a 
printed version of the specification. It should be easy 
to print the entire specification, including comments 
and non-functional requirements, in a straightforward 
manner. The formal method technology must be 
suited to the larger working environment. 
Every software project involves more than one per- 
son. During the development of the specification, it 
must be possible for several people to work in paral- 
lel and combine their efforts into a comprehensive 
work product. This means that any specification tech- 
nique must provide support for the idea of separate 
development-a notion equivalent to that of separate 
compilation of source programs in languages such as 
Ada that have syntactic structures and very precise 
semantics for-separately compiled units. 
A specification is not built in one effort and then set 
in concrete; it is developed and changed over time. 
The specification technology must support the logical 
evolution of specification and ease its change. 
Incompleteness must be tolerated. Functionality such 
as searching, replacing, cutting, copying, and file 
insertion must be provided. Modularity and informa- 
tion hiding must be facilitated, so that for example a 
change in a definition is automatically propagated to 
every usage of it. Large scale manipulations must 
also be supported, such as moving entire sections or 
making them subsections. 
The ability to locate relevant information is a vital 
part of the utility of a specification. The ability to 
search, for example with regular expressions is valu- 
able, but not sufficient. The specification is intended 
to serve as a means of communication. Annotating 
the specification with explanations, rationale, or 
Group development. 
8 Evolution. 
* Usability. 
or be designed to operate with the other notations that 
will be required. 
A specification is not developed in isolation, but 
rather as part of the larger software development pro- 
cess. Any specification technology must integrate 
with the other components of this process, such as 
documentation, templates, management information, 
and executive summaries. Often a system database 
and version control system are used. A part or all of 
the specification might be inserted into another docu- 
ment, so the specification must have a common file 
and access, and it must be linked to a part of the spec- 
ification, so that changes effect the corresponding 
annotation. The formal method should also provide 
structuring mechanisms to aid in navigation since the 
specification document is likely to be large. In a natu- 
ral language document, the table of contents and 
index assist in the location of information; many tools 
allow them to be generated automatically from the 
text. Another useful capability seen in text editing is 
the use of hypertext links to a related section or glos- 
sary entry. Formal methods must address the usability 
of the resulting specification documents. 
A very strong relationship exists between the specifi- 
cation of a system and its design, therefore the tools 
should also be closely related. It should not be neces- 
sary  for the designer to re-enter parts of the specifica- 
tion that are also part of the design. Either the 
specification tool must also fully support the design 
phase or it must be compatible with common design 
tools. 
Integration with other components. 
Compatibility with design tools. 
8 Compatible with design methods. 
Just as the specification technology must be the same 
as or compatible with popular design tools, it must 
also be compatible with popular design methods. A 
difficult transition from a formal specification to say 
an object-oriented design is an unacceptable lifecycle 
burden. 
Communicate desired system characteristics to 
designers. 
In order to design the system, the designer must be 
able to read and understand the specification. Natu- 
rally, the specification should describe the normal 
operating procedure, any error conditions and the 
response that is appropriate, and non-functional 
requirements. The specification has to answer every 
question raised about the system by the designer 
(who is not likely to be an author of the specifica- 
tion). 
The more easily a design can be developed from the 
specification, the better. The use of a formal methods 
could speed up the design process by describing the 
system clearly and precisely. The designer must take 
the abstract description in the specification and 
describe how a real system is going to implement the 
specification. Information hiding must be maintained 
and the ability to view the system at varying levels of 
abstraction must be provided. 
Facilitate design process. 
assumptions is important for both the use of the spec- 
ification in later phases and for modifications of the 
specification. This annotation must be easy to create 
- Implementation performance. 
Implementation is hindered by any lack of clarity in 
the specification (and design) and misunderstandings 
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that cause rework. The more complete, precise, and 
detailed the specification and design are, the more 
smoothly implementation will go. An improvement 
in implementation efficiency is expected, therefore, 
from the use of formal specification because of its 
ability to achieve clarity and precision. This effi- 
ciency improvement is a critical element in the over- 
all cost effectiveness that is realized by introducing 
formal specification into the lifecycle. 
Support for  unit testing in implementation phase. 
A precise, complete, and accurate specification can 
greatly aid in the formulation of a unit test suite, per- 
haps through automatic generation. It should also 
minimize rework, since the requirements are well 
defined and unambiguously stated in the specifica- 
tion. Again, this expected benefit is a critical element 
in the overall cost effectiveness argument. 
4 Maintenance comprehension. 
An engineer responsible for maintenance should be 
able to study the specification and gain either a broad 
or detailed understanding of the system quickly. The 
documentation of non-functional requirements and 
design decisions is vital to a complete understanding 
of the system. The specification should be easy for 
the maintainer to navigate, accurate, complete, and 
easy to reference to find answers to questions. Struc- 
ture, support for information hiding, and the ability to 
view the specification at different levels of abstrac- 
tion are essential. 
Maintenance changes. 
When a change is made to an operational software 
system, the specification, the design, the implementa- 
tion, and the verification must be changed. This is 
clearly facilitated if the different work products are 
carefully linked together so the changes needed in the 
code, for example, are very similar to those in the 
specification. In many current developments the 
specification is changed as an afterthought or not at 
all. Ideally the specification should be changed first 
to examine the effects of the change on the system. 
This requires that the specification be easily changed 
and that the document remains well-structured. Once 
changed, formal methods could allow static analysis, 
animation, or even the establishment of proofs of 
properties on the new specification before the change 
is propagated to the code. Clearly both validation and 
verification of a maintenance change are important 
and lifecycle support is required. 
4 Experimental Evaluation 
To evaluate the utility of a formal technique in industrial 
practice with any degree of statistical rigor, the tech- 
nique must be tested in a large number and variety of 
projects. The projects chosen for study should encom- 
pass a wide range of application areas with a variety of 
goals. The population of engineers involved should con- 
sist of experienced industrial software practitioners, 
including clients, managers, designers, developers, tech- 
nical writers, and maintainers. Finally, projects should 
be followed from conception through a period of main- 
tenance, and measurements of productivity and product 
quality made before and after the addition of formal 
methods to the development process, so that a compari- 
son can be made. 
Unfortunately, a study with these characteristics 
would require many years, the cooperation of thousands 
of people, and is beyond the scope of this endeavor. The 
study reported here is quite modest and the results corre- 
spondingly modest. What we report: (a) is based on a 
single application of a particular type; (b) comes from a 
single development activity; (c) involves specifications 
that have not yet proceeded to implementation; and (d) 
is based on specifications that were not developed by 
experts. 
We have applied the evaluation framework to a 
small but realistic safety-critical application in order to 
obtain assessments of various formal techniques. The 
application is the University of Wrginia Reactor 
(UVAR), a research reactor that is used for the training 
of nuclear engineering students, service work in the 
areas of neutron activation analysis and radioisotope 
generation, neutron radiography, radiation damage stud- 
ies, and other research [ 161. 
The experimental evaluation was conducted by first 
developing three separate specifications for part of a 
control system for the reactor in three specification lan- 
guages-Z, PVS, and Statecharts-and establishing 
proofs of safety properties of the PVS specification 
using the PVS system. During the creation of these arti- 
facts, various observations and measurements were 
made by those involved in the development. Once the 
artifacts were complete, a second set of observations 
and measurements were made by the developers, com- 
puter scientists not involved in the development, and 
nuclear engineers and reactor operational staff. 
4.1 The Case Study Application 
The W A R  is a “swimming pool” reactor, Le., the reac- 
tor core is submerged in a very large tank of water. The 
core is located under approximately 22 feet of water on 
an 8x8 grid-plate that is suspended from the top of the 
5 
Safety Rods Regulator Rod 
Pool 
Sensor Data 
‘ Reactor Core 
I I Header \ - 
Pump 
Fig. 1. - The University of Virginia reactor system. 
reactor pool. The reactor core is made up of a variable 
number of fuel-elements and in-core experiments, and 
always includes four control rod elements. Three of 
these control rods provide gross control and safety. They 
are coupled magnetically to their drive mechanisms, and 
they drop into the core by gravity if power fails or a 
safety shutdown signal (known as a “SCRAM’) is gen- 
erated either by the operator or the reactor protection 
system. The fourth rod is a regulating rod that is fixed to 
a drive mechanism and is therefore non-scramable. The 
regulating rod is moved automatically by the drive 
mechanism to maintain fine control of the power level 
to compensate for small changes in reactivity associated 
with normal operations [ 161. 
The heat capacity of the pool is sufficient for 
steady-state operation at 200 kW with natural convec- 
tion cooling. When the reactor is operated above 200 
kW, the water in the pool is drawn down through the 
core by a pump via a header located beneath the grid- 
plate to a heat exchanger that transfers the heat gener- 
ated in the water to a secondary system. A cooling tower 
located on the roof of the facility exhausts the heat and 
the cooled primary water is returned to the pool. The 
overall organization of the system is shown in Fig. I .  
The evaluation that we undertook involved the 
development of formal specifications for the following 
three components of a proposed new digital control sys- 
tem: 
the alarm system that alerts the operator of conditions 
needing attention; 
* the logic associated with shutting the reactor down in 
the event of a possible safety problem (the SCRAM 
logic); and 
the activities undertaken by the operator to start the 
reactor operating. 
For the sake of brevity, we only summarize the 
results of the study’ in the following subsections. The 
first subsection address the specific evaluation criteria 
outlined earlier and reflect the experience of the devel- 
opers. The next subsection itemizes specific results 
obtained from the nuclear engineers. The last subsection 
documents results obtained from computer scientists 
4.2 Specification Assessment By Developers 
Coverage. 
Our experience with the UVAR specifications is simi- 
lar to that of others-many things that have to be 
1. Further details can be found elsewhere [3.6].  
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specified are not covered by any of the notations we 
are using. A particularly significant example is the 
user interface. For systems like the WAR, the user 
interface is complex, absolutely critical, and must be 
formally specified. Even though a model-based spec- 
ification notation, like 2 for example, is not really 
suitable for such specification, its integration with 
other notations is essential. 
9 Integration with other components. 
There is a complete lack on compatibility of the tools 
for the three notations with common text preparation 
systems. It is remarkably difficult, for example, even 
to get a printed copy of a specification in any of these 
notations. Worse is the fact that non-formal elements 
of a specification cannot be included in a specifica- 
tion and manipulated in a consistent way. A complete 
specification is more than the formal part. In the 
WAR specification, for example, extensive technical 
background material has to be included. 
Group development. 
Statemate offers some support for version control and 
access control but neither Z nor PVS provide either. 
The latter is actually preferable because artifacts 
using the notations can then be handled by existing 
tools. The Statemate approach to projects and users is 
completely inconsistent with that which large 
projects are likely to be using for other purposes. 
Support for separate development (akin, as noted 
above, to separate compilation of source code in lan- 
guages like Ada) is completely absent from all three 
notations. 
Evolution. 
The structure of both standard 2 and the PVS specifi- 
cation notation offer no support for building specifi- 
cations with any structure that facilitates evolution. 
Even the elementary notion of information hiding is 
absent. Statecharts offer some limited support using 
the hierarchical chart facility. In the UVAR specifica- 
tion, for example, there is extensive material related 
to physical devices that might change over time. Sim- 
ilarly, since the digital system is experimental, the 
concepts it includes are subject to change. 
Usability. 
Both the structure and the tool support associated 
with these three notations provide essentially no sup- 
port for navigation and searching of a specification. 
The PVS specification for the UVAR, for example, 
defines literally dozens of identifiers. Reading, navi- 
gating, and changing a Specification of even the 
W A R S  moderate size is difficult and error prone. 
Compatibility with design tools and design methods. 
Although Specification and design are supposed to be 
separate activities, there is always a lot of overlap. 
The SCRAM logic for the WARi for example, is a 
significant part of the specification and a clear imple- 
mentation structure is implied by the basic function- 
ality required. Despite this, neither Z nor PVS 
provides a systematic link to any design methods or 
tools, nor do they explicitly avoid doing so in an 
effort to support generality. Statemate, on the other 
hand, embeds the notion of data flow diagrams into 
the basic specification structure and thereby biases 
designs towards structured design, an approach that is 
not universally preferred. 
4.3 Specification Assessment By Nuclear 
Engineers 
The following results were obtained by interview. For 
each of the specification notations, the notation and the 
asscciated specification were presented to a nuclear 
engineer and then the engineer was asked a series of 
questions derived from the evaluation framework. This 
process was repeated twice for each notation (making a 
total of six interviews in all). 
The presentation of the notation was informal and 
brief, intended only to permit the nuclear engineer to 
understand the subsequent presentation of the specifica- 
tion. The presentation of the specification was intention- 
ally very much like an inspection. As a result, we were 
able to get very specific information about how under- 
standable the specifications were to domain experts. 
This is an important issue since, for the most part, 
human inspection is the primary vehicle for specifica- 
tion validation. 
The results were quite unexpected and the detailed 
discussion resulting from the interviews was more 
enlightening than the specific answers to the framework 
questions. The majority of the following are observa- 
tions that resulted from these discussions. The first three 
points are general and the remainder are language spe- 
cific. 
The role of the specification has to be understood. 
Communicating with people from a different field of 
expertise is always difficult. In this experiment, a par- 
ticularly troublesome issue was the role of the speci- 
fication in software development-the nuclear 
engineers were not familiar with this role. One of the 
participants considered one of the specifications to be 
source code and wanted to see the execution to check 
correctness. Another considered it a summary that 
should be easy to read and not contain many details. 
The lesson learned was that it is vital that application 
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engineers understand the role of a specification 
before trying to read or manipulate one. 
guage they could never be sure that the words were 
not just copied down with little understanding of the 
system. While they would have liked some natural 
language to accompany the formal specifications, 
they wanted to retain the formalisms. 
Direct and indirect influence on the system are dis-  
cult to distinguish. 
A common difficulty for the nuclear engineers in 
understanding the specifications was with the differ- 
ence between direct and indirect influence on the 
state of the system. The nuclear control system is 
reactive-it is constantly making alterations in 
response to input received from sensors. A change in 
the height of a rod causes changes in the sensor val- 
ues. The height of the rod can be altered directly by 
the system, but the sensor values change indirectly as 
a result of the movement of the rod. 
The formal specification notations designate parts of 
the system that can be influenced directly differently 
than those that cannot, for example 2 uses primed 
identifiers to indicate items that are changed directly 
by operations. These designations were a constant 
source of questions because, along with the changes 
in the system from direct influence, there are 
expected indirect changes in the state of the system. 
By no means is this an argument to abolish the sepa- 
rate designations for items that can be directly influ- 
enced, rather to point out a difficulty in understanding 
these notations that is forgotten once the notation is 
familiar. 
9 The use of symbolic constants is problematic. 
An interesting anecdote involves the use of constants. 
It is customary, in fact preached, in computer science 
that constants should be defined in one place and 
given symbols so that no “magic” numbers are used 
throughout the rest of the system. The reasons are 
first that the numbers are unexplained, and second 
that every location of use has to be found if the con- 
stant is changed. To most of the nuclear engineers, 
this organization was clear and desirable since they 
did not have the constants memorized and the values 
would have to be checked against other documenta- 
tion in an effort separate from the general perusal of 
the specification. However, one participant was con- 
fused by the use of constant identifiers rather than 
numbers because the specific values have important 
meanings in the context of the application. - There is no road back to natural language speccjica- 
tion. 
Once the nuclear engineers had experience with one 
or more of the formal specification notations, they 
said they would never trust a natural language speci- 
fication again. They were impressed by the level of 
understanding of the system that was required to 
write the specifications and felt that with natural lan- 
4.3.1 Z 
Effective for communication. 
The Z specification was described as meaningful and 
useful for communication by the nuclear engineers. 
One participant felt comfortable with the notation 
after a short period of time, no longer needed full 
translations of the schemas, and began to find errors 
in the specification. This participant felt that, after a 
few iterations of discussion and correction of the 
specification, he would feel that there was a mutual 
understanding of the system. 
Mathematical notation is not familial: 
A surprising discovery was that the mathematical 
notation used in Z was not familiar to the nuclear 
engineers. One participant expressed the desire for a 
glossary of symbols, including for all, there exists, 
and implies. Another asked why words, which are 
universally understood, were not used in place of the 
symbols. 
Validation by inspection was effective. 
In this case, the presenter of the Z specification was 
no1 the author, but another computer scientist familiar 
with the project, and the process of explaining the 
specification to the nuclear engineers uncovered 
errors. This helps to substantiate the generally 
accepted view of the community that inspection is 
valuable and cost effective. 
4.3.2 PVS 
Looks like source code. 
The first impressions of the PVS specification were 
that it looked like source code, it was too long, and 
there was too much text. One participant said he did 
not even want to try to read it. Another criticism from 
another participant was that there were too many 
variables leading to confusion. 
Validation by inspection was effective. 
Although one of the participants was not comfortable 
reading the PVS notation, a detailed explanation of 
the specification facilitated useful discussions that 
identified errors in the specification and in the speci- 
fiers’ understanding of the system. One way that this 
occurred was that the nuclear engineer asked ques- 
tions to check the model. He identified a misunder- 
standing of the power levels of the reactor that 
necessitated the redesign of a section of the specifica- 
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tion. If this error had not been found until the system 
had been implemented, it would have been impossi- 
ble to increase the power level of the reactor above 
about half of the value at which it is licensed to oper- 
ate. The use of meaningful variable names was key to 
the understanding of the specification. 
In addition to errors found by the nuclear engineers, 
presenting the specification caused the specifier to 
discover an error in his own specification. 
4.3.3 Statecharts 
Eflective for communication. 
After less than an hour of introduction to the State- 
charts notation and specification, one participant was 
no longer intimidated by the notation and was able to 
understand the specification without assistance. The 
graphical notation was appealing, as well as the obvi- 
ous flow of the system following the arrows. The cli- 
che ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’’ was used 
repeatedly. The structure of the specification was 
much more evident in Statecharts than the other two 
notations because of its hierarchical nature. 
Difficult to search and navigate. 
In a very detailed examination of the specification, 
participants complained of the dificulties of knowing 
the state of the whole system at once and of identify- 
ing the results of actions since the actions could affect 
any page of the specification. Whenever the details of 
a state were included in the diagram of that state 
rather than being saved in another file, the lack of 
abstraction seemed to be confusing. 
Easy to Learn. 
Within two hours of discussion of the specification, 
the participants displayed the desire to learn the syn- 
tax Df the notation in order to understand the subtle- 
ties of the specification. A large number of errors 
were identified during the discussion of the specifica- 
tion and the need for additional robustness was evi- 
dent. The participants found the specification easy to 
understand with the explanation from the specifier 
and felt that they could then continue to study it 
alone. They also felt comfortable enough with the 
notation that, if there were changes to be made to the 
system, they felt they could write Statecharts of the 
proposed changes. 
Specijication is superior to existing documentation. 
The participants from the nuclear reactor staff felt 
that the specifiers understood the system better than 
most of the operators. They felt that they could even- 
tually come to an agreement that the Statechart speci- 
fication correctly described the system and did not 
feel that they would have the same confidence with 
an English document. They said that this specifica- 
tion had the potential to be used in the training of 
their operators and perhaps even to replace their S A R  
which describes the control of the nuclear reactor. 
These are significant comments. 
4.4 Specification Assessment By Computer 
Scientists 
The participants in this portion of the study were seven 
computer science students. There was one undergradu- 
ate, four students working toward or finished with a 
master’s degree, and two Ph.D. candidates. Two partici- 
pants had a year or less work experience developing 
software, three had one to five years experience, and 
two had more than five years of work experience. All 
had knowledge of the C programming language. 
Regarding their experience with formal specification 
methods, four had no experience prior to this study, two 
had a segment of a course, and one had an entire course. 
All had some, but not extensive, knowledge of basic sci- 
ence and engineering and little to no knowledge of 
nuclear reactors. 
4.4.1 2 
Fairly easy to understand, navigate, and search. 
The Z specification was generally well-structured and 
this aided the participants in understanding and 
searching the specification. However, one participant 
expressed difficulty locating the definitions of types 
since they are not defined near their use and another 
suggested that the specification would be easier to 
search, navigate, and use for reference if there were a 
table of contents. The participants felt strongly that 2 
would aid communication about the system, however 
they considered it only average for use in the mainte- 
nance phase as an introduction to the system and as a 
reference document about the system. Familiarity 
with logic symbols, the smallness and simplicity of 
the notation, and the natural language descriptions 
aided the participants in understanding the specifica- 
tion. 
Reasonably easy to learn. 
None of the participants felt very confident in their 
ability to use Z after this short introduction. A few of 
the participants felt that 2 was harder to learn than a 
programming language, but most felt that it was as 
easy or easier to learn. Difficulties in learning Z were 
attributed to the mathematical notation, the unusual 
delimiters of inputs and outputs, and the unfamiliarity 
of the notation in general. No one thought that 2 was 
too large a notation and almost everyone thought the 
complexity of the notation was appropriate for speci- 
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fication. 
Implementable. 
After a thorough inspection of the description of the 
SCRAM logic in the specification, everyone saw 
ways that it could be implemented. No one was sure 
that the description was complete, however. Some 
participants found errors in the specification. Upon 
quick perusal of the rest of the specification, almost 
everyone felt that all the features of the notation were 
implementable. It was practically unanimous that 2 
provided the appropriate level of detail about the sys- 
tem for a specification. 
4.4.2 PVS 
Diflcult to understand, navigate, and search. 
Although PVS is structured a lot like source code in 
C (of which all participants claimed a lot or extensive 
knowledge), it received low ratings in the areas of 
structure, understandability, and searching. One par- 
ticipant cited the formatting as hindering understand- 
ing. It was deemed average to bad for use during the 
maintenance phase as an introduction to the system or 
as a reference document. The answers were widely 
varied as to whether PVS would aid communication 
between people involved in the software develop- 
ment process. 
Ease of learning mixed. 
None of the participants felt confident using PVS 
after this short introduction. Most felt that PVS was 
as easy or easier to learn than a programming lan- 
guage, but a few felt that it was harder to learn. No 
one thought that the PVS notation had too few fea- 
tures and most people thought that it had the appro- 
priate amount of complexity, while a few felt that it 
was too complex. Difficulties in learning the notation 
were attributed to the size and complexity of the nota- 
tion and the difficulty in understanding the keywords 
and constructs. However, some participants felt that 
the keywords and constructs were easy to learn and 
PVS was similar to other notations with which they 
were familiar. 
* Implementable. 
After examining the scram logic in the PVS specifi- 
cation, everyone saw ways that it could be imple- 
mented, but a few saw some problems. No one was 
certain whether the description of the scrams was 
complete. After a quick inspection of the rest of the 
specification. the participants felt that everything was 
implementable. There was a wide range of responses 
when asked whether PVS provided the appropriate 
level of detail for a specification. 
4.4.3 Statecharts 
* Easy to understand. 
Statecharts was described as well-structured and this 
aided the participants in understanding the specifica- 
tion. Difficulties in understanding the specification 
were attributed to the global nature of events and the 
division of the specification over many pages. The 
responses indicated strongly that Statecharts would 
aid communication between people in the develop- 
ment of a software product. 
* Difficult to navigate and search. 
The structure of Statecharts aided in searching, but 
one participant noted that the specification would be 
easier to navigate? search, and use as reference, if it 
had a table of contents. It was deemed average for use 
in the maintenance phase as an introduction to the 
system and as a reference document. 
The participants did not feel confident in their ability 
to specify a system using Statecharts at this point. 
Difficulties in learning Statecharts were attributed to 
the notation being unlike any notation they had seen 
before and the constructs being difficult to under- 
siznd. However some people felt that Statecharts was 
easy to learn because the notation was familiar, 
graphical, small and simple, and the constructs were 
easily understood. Most of the participants thought 
that Statecharts was as easy or easier to le& than a 
programming language. 
After studying the scram logic described in the State- 
charts specification, everyone saw ways to implement 
it, however no one was certain the description was 
complete. After a quick survey of the specification, 
almost every participant thought that all the features 
of the notation were implementable. It was almost 
unanimous that Statecharts provided the appropriate 
level of detail about the system. Most of the partici- 
pants thought that Statecharts notation contained the 
appropriate level of complexity. 
* Fairly easy to learn. 
Implementable. 
4.5 Mechanical Analysis With PVS 
The PVS specification was subjected to limited analysis 
with the PVS theorem-proving system. The purpose was 
to evaluate the difficulties involved in dealing with this 
modest sized specification and to learn what the practi- 
cal issues might be that are limiting the wide-spread 
application of mechanical theorem proving. This part of 
the study was performed by the authors. 
The conclusions from this part of the study fall into 
two basic categories. The first concerns the "method" 
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part of formal methods. Devising the requisite theorems 
and developing a proof strategy for them proved to be a 
significant challenge and there is no real “method” that 
can assist the specifier. 
The second category of conclusions is in the area of 
tool performance. Although the PVS system is very 
powerful, this power is difficult to use. Some of the dif- 
ficulties with the tool are the following: 
Syntax and type checking are laborious because the 
system reports errors individually. 
The specification interjace is very awkward to use 
since, for example, it does not permit many display 
items to be customized, does not provide status infor- 
mution conveniently, and lacks expressivity. 
Navigation through a specification using the toolset 
is extremely labored. 
The variation in delays that occur with different user 
actions makes interactive use very dificult. 
The theorem prover interjace is awkward to use 
since, for example, information is not displayed con- 
veniently during proof attempts, proofs are re-dis- 
played afrer invalid commands, and certain 
commands generate an overabundance of output. 
These and many other observations lead us to con- 
clude that the practical adoption of mechanical theorem 
proving by industrial practitioners is being severely lim- 
ited by one major problem-the difficulty of determin- 
ing what should be proved to gain confidence in a 
specification, and one relatively minor problem (or at 
least a problem that should be minor)-the relatively 
poor usability of the toolset. 
5 Conclusions 
Our assessment of the formal technologies that we used 
is that there are many practical barriers to their routine 
use in industrial software development projects. In most 
cases, this will not be “news” either to the developers of 
the techniques or the community at large. In fact, some 
developers have been quite open in their discussion of 
the pragmatic weaknesses of their technologies. Thus, 
we offer little specific new information. However, the 
accumulation of all the different criteria in our frame- 
work together with their systematic development pro- 
vides a clear picture of what is needed to achieve 
success in industrial applications. It is important to keep 
in mind that the criteria are not sufficient, merely neces- 
sary. 
Several of our results are surprising but two are 
repeated here because of their significance. Both of 
these comments arose during the interviews with the 
nuclear engineers: 
They felt that they could eventually come to an 
agreement that the Statechart specification 
correctly described the system and did not feel that 
they would have the same confidence with an 
English document. 
Once the nuclear engineers had experience with 
one or more of the formal spec@cation notations, 
they said they would never  trust a natural 
language specification again. 
These are very positive comments although when read- 
ing them it must be kept in mind that the nuclear engi- 
neers involved had been exposed to this technology for 
only a short time. However, these remarks provide 
strong motivation for continued work in the area of for- 
mal methods. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn 
from this work is that the framework provides a detailed 
research agenda for workers in this field. The potential 
is tremendous but unless the criteria in the framework 
are met by specific formal methods, their chance of 
widespread acceptance is remote at best. 
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Abstract 
Formality will eventually become the norm in soft- 
ware development. It will happen for the same rea- 
sons that formality has become the norm in every 
other engineering discipline: Quality, confidence, 
objectivity, and even cost only make their greatest 
strides when mathematics becomes the basis for a 
discipline. 
The theory of software formality has matured 
greatly in the last ten years. Enough is now under- 
stood to make formality useful not just to academia 
but also to industry. The main impediment to wide- 
spread adoption is financial: as formal methods are 
typically applied, they cost their users more than they 
pay them back. Nobody gets career credit for “doing 
the right thing” to the detriment of their company. 
Thus, formality will only be adopted when it pays 
its own way. This is already happening on a few 
projects. Achieving payback requires treating the 
software lifecycle as an integrated whole of which 
formality is just one aspect. 
The formal methods available at present share 
similar strengths and weaknesses. An effective for- 
mal process takes advantage of those strengths and 
compensates for those weaknesses. Compensation 
comes through integration ... using other methods and 
approaches to “fill in” where formal methods are 
weak, while allowing their strengths to continue to 
shine. 
In such a context formal methods have proven, on 
real industrial projects, they can benefit everyone and 
become the best business option. Adoption then fol- 
lows without a need for further cajoling or coercion. 
This paper will explore the use of formality in a 
practical and self-justifling way, in the realistic in- 
dusmal setting. The principles given will be illus- 
trated from Boeing North American’s development 
of the Brimstone missile system, and other programs. 
1 Philosophical Foundations 
Practicality always boils down to economics. If a 
method is so unpleasant or difficult to use that work- 
ers resist it or simply never become proficient, pro- 
ductivity suffers and money is lost. If a method re- 
quires such expensive tooling that resource costs can 
never be recouped before technology evolution has 
obsoleted the tool, and if productivity gains from that 
tool’s use are less than the capital loss, again there is 
no net benefit. 
Therefore, the “gatekeeper” for adoption of for- 
mality is that the benefits from its use must exceed its 
costs. The challenge is to find ways of using formal- 
ity which maximize benefits and minimize costs until 
breakeven is achieved. As one would expect, the 
benefits of formality come from its strength&, while 
the costs come from its weaknesses. 
The strengths of formality are already benefiting 
users regularly. They are well known and under- 
stood: assurance of internal correctness, consistency, 
completeness, traceability and so forth. Much work is 
ongoing to further improve these stren-ds. 
The weaknesses of formality are also well known. 
They include labor intensiveness, poor communica- 
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bility to others than formalistr lack of scaleability to 
handle large problems, and poor efficiency in the 
face of system change. 
These weaknesses typically receive somewhat 
less attention than do the stnms$hs, perhaps because 
we assume that little can be done about them for now 
(placing our hopes on hhue breakthroughs in formal 
technology to somehow reduce the problems). How- 
ever, the assumption of present helplessness is incor- 
rect. 
Since significant benefits are already being ob- 
tained from the strengths, most of the challenges in 
making formality practical are currently found in 
ameliorating its weaknesses and thus reducing its 
costs. Not only are the weaknesses reducible, they 
have on occasion been effectively overcome to make 
formality a net contributor to project financial suc- 
cess. 
In industrial process en-eieering, one combines 
differing methods, tools or procedures so the 
strengths of some will always be offsetting the weak- 
nesses of others. The goal is to yield products of 
higher quality and better profitability than could have 
been obtained through the use of any of the methods, 
tools or procedures in isolation. 
When formal methods are incorporated into the 
industrial software development process, the formal 
methods chosen must either be those whose weak- 
nesses are most easily ameliorated, or those which 
possess weaknesses to the least degree. 
Then synergies must be found with non-formal 
(at least, for now) methods or approaches to offset 
the formal-method weaknesses. The formality must 
be “framed” in such a way that, despite its low scale- 
ability, large programs can still be created. Since 
change is a primary characteristic of most product 
developments, formal methods must be couched such 
that system change propagates as little as possible 
and thus has minimal effect on formal product ele- 
ments. And so on. 
This is the approach being taken on significant 
portions of Boeing North American’s development 
on the Brimstone missile system, as well as the ap- 
proach taken on the mission software- of the Lock- 
heed Martin C-13OJ airlifter (in which the author also 
participated [ 11). Resonance with aspects of this 
viewpoint have also been found on certain other 
projects, primarily the N W s  (Naval Research Labo- 
ratory) A-7 Avionics Upgrade Program [2], Allied 
Signal’s TCAS system [3], and Rockwell Avionics 
and Communications Software Requirements Engi- 
neering Project [4]. 
methods conference can give the impression that the 
rationale for creating such an approach is to bring 
formal methods into the software development 
mainstream. Nothing could be krther from the truth. 
The rationale is to make industry more productive 
and competitive. Formal methods are of interest to 
industry only inasmuch as they contribute to that 
goal. Ultimately, the ability of formal methods to 
now do so is one of the best things that has ever hap- 
pened to the discipline of formality. 
Discussing these principles in a paper for a formal 
2 Process Guidelines 
There are two overarching guidelines for creation of 
a software lifecycle which supports the goal of indus- 
try, i.e., that increases productivity and competitive- 
ness. Those guidelines are: 
correctness by construction 
verification-driven development 
2.1 Correctness by Construction 
Software errors are one of the biggest cost drivers 
in industry. Sofiware errors have many kinds of 
costs. Verification, with its associated activity of cor- 
rection, is almost always the most costly and time- 
consuming activity in software development. 
cost in finding, removing, and confuming removal of 
them. Errors also cost in lost customer confidence 
and good will, creation of an adversarial relationship 
with regulators and government, and in the fallout 
from failures in fielded systems. And since it is in 
general impossible to detect all errors in a program, 
the more errors injected as the code is produced, the 
more that will remain at delivery. 
Industry has  historically assumed that error crea- 
tion was unavoidable. This assumption is no longer 
valid. Errors can be largely avoided through a 
‘‘comectness by construction” development process. 
“Correctness by construction” means that the 
process must create software that, to the maximum 
extent practical, is inherently caused and constrained 
to be correct by the development processes used. 
Without formality, this would be impossible. With 
The more errors there are present, the greater the 
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formaliry alone, it is unaffordable. Only by an inte- 
,mted lifecyle of formal and other (currently non- 
formal) methods, tools and procedures can correct- 
ness by construction be implemented in the industrial 
setting. 
Experience has shown that such a lifecycle need 
be no more expensive than the typical lifecycle; in- 
deed. it has provided productivity above industry 
norms on industrial programs like the Lockheed 
MartinC-1305 [5].  
The selection and synthesis of complementary 
lifecycle methods will be examined shortly. 
2.2 Verification-Driven Develop- 
ment 
In the ideal world, a software development proc- 
ess which reliably prevents any errors from being 
injected into its developed systems need not spend 
anything on verification. Since no real-world process 
will anain such perfection, some errors will continue 
to be found in newly-developed software.Therefore, 
verification will continue to be required even in a 
“correctness by construction” lifecycle. 
Unfortunately, the nature of verification is not 
changed by the correcmess approach. Verification 
continues to the most expensive task in the software 
lifecycie. Correctness by construction simply lessens 
the number of correctionheverification cycles re- 
quired (which is nevertheless a great productivity 
bOOSrer). 
Verification therefore becomes the other great 
opponunity to reduce costs. Formality is a great en- 
abler €or such savings, by playing a role in the effi- 
cient static analysis and testing of software. The life- 
cycle is then optimized to enable efficient “end- 
game- verification, while not ignoring other concerns 
such as execution efficiency. 
Verification is so seldom addressed as part of 
lifecycle process planning, that a little attention early 
on can have dramatic effects late in the project. 
While the remainder of this paper will give process- 
wide steps which implement this guideline, smaller 
thing can also make a great difference. For instance, 
restricting the coding standards to make the produced 
code compatible with the best formal and test tools is 
very important. 
3 Principles of Practicality 
We will now explore some principles for integrating 
formality into the industrial software lifecycle, and 
thus economically implementing correctness by con- 
struction and verification-driven development. 
These principles are presented without any claims 
either that they are exhaustive or that they “the only 
way” to use formality practically. However, these 
principles have been proven to enable the rather ex- 
tensive use of formality in real industrial programs 
while yielding some very commercially significant 
benefits: greater software productivity than tradi- 
tional, non-formal development (by approximately a 
factor of two), and much higher resulting software 
quality (by a factor of ten fewer anomalies, which 
includes both errors and inconsistencies). 
These principles will be illustrated by naming 
methods which support them, as well as examples 
from industry. 
The principles we will discuss are: 
m 
0 Change-driven design 
Closed-loop formality 
Factorization of product and process 
3.1 Factorization 
The main principle for dealing with formality’s 
scale-up limitations is factorization. Factorization is 
defmed here as the decomposition of both product 
and process into small, relatively self-contained ele- 
ments that are of an efficient scale for both individual 
human effort, and for use with formal methods. Fac- 
torization applies to both the product and process. 
The primary method used for product factoriza- 
tion is domain engineering. Domain analysis allows 
factoring a large problem space into relatively small, 
manageable and naturally interrelated collections of 
requirements. 
CORE (Consortium Requirements Engineering) 
method combines formal requirements specification 
with mechanisms for factoring the problem space as a 
result of domain analysis [6]. Few formal require- 
ments methods support factoring so directly. 
trial setting. Requirements are recorded essentially in 
The SPC’s (Software Productivity Consortium) 
CORE has other advantages in a practical indus- 
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an algebraic format whose use is easily learned, and 
whose representation is easily understood even by 
non-users. CoRE shares this characteristic with the 
NRL (Naval Research Laboratory) SCR (Software 
Cost Reduction) method [7], and the T-VEC method 
originated at Allied Signal. 
captured in the syntax of a Cadre Teamwork control 
specification table. 
The “abstracted output” is a discontinuous func- 
tion of the “abstracted inputs” (actually, it is literally 
a relation, though the distinction is not critical to the 
purposes of this paper). Therefore the output must be 
defined across all combinations of subranges of the 
inputs. Each row in the table (besides the top label 
row) defmes the function across one combination of 
subranges. All rows together fully define the output. 
The breaks between rows represent the points of dis- 
continuity, often called ‘‘boundaries’’ in the testing 
arena. 
Some other common formal requirements meth- 
ods, such as 2 and VDM, lack support for factoring 
and general communicability. This makes their use in 
the industrial setting more problematic. Other ame- 
lioration straregies would need to be found to over- 
come their weaknesses in these areas. 
An architecture should be factored according to 
the nature of the solution domain, and not, in general, 
the problem domain (as frequently happens in object 
orientation). Problem-domain factorization leads to 
systems inefficient to develop and to execute. 
verification of a system into a sequence of steps. 
Figure 1 shows an example CoRE requirement, 
Process fictorization divides the analysis through 
Each step produces its own well-defined product ac- 
cording to very strict rules of production, with the 
assistance and rule enforcement of software tools 
tailored for the purpose. Because the steps are small, 
confirmatory Verification and Validation (V&V) can 
be performed for each step in an economical manner. 
In an overall soha re  lifecycle, these rules of 
production can not as yet always be completely for- 
mal. This is due primarily to the current immaturity 
of early-lifecycle formal methods. In all cases, how- 
ever, the production rules should be specified as rig- 
orously as is practical, primarily to preserve the 
quality of products as they pass from phase to phase. 
Additional factoring of the process can be ob- 
tained through means such as a spiral lifecycle proc- 
ess (as in the SPC’s ESP or Evolutionary Spiral Proc- 
ess [8]). 
typical waterfall of T’ lifecycle, is narrow-slice 
development. In narrow-slice development, during 
each lifecycle phase an example of the products of 
the next phase is developed using the planned proc- 
ess (not via an ad-hoc “prototype” approach). The 
narrow slice takes a “trial run” at the development 
process, and works out its problems “before the herd 
arrives“ to do the main work of that phase. This ap- 
proach detects many blind alleys or simple he%- 
ciencies that may hidden in the process (especially in 
an unfamiliar formal process) before much effort has 
been expended, and thus improves the overall efi- 
ciency and mitigates the risks of adopting formality. 
A variation on this theme, that fits within a more 
figure I :  Example CORE Requirement 
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3.2 Change-Driven Design 
Formal methods are exceptionally sensitive to 
changes. A mathematical approach will often take 
longer to pedorm than a traditional heuristic one, at 
least in the initial definition activity and in activities 
like theorem proving. These costs can be more than 
recouped during the other lifecycle activities as long 
as the costly activities need not be repeated too often. 
However, in real industrial projects change is the 
rule. It is typically frequent, and often extreme. The 
only way to retain the advantages of formality with- 
out being overwhelmed by its weaknesses in this area 
is to strictly limit the propagation of change through 
the system ... so that when change occurs, it affects 
only the absolute minimum portion of the system 
inherently necessary to implement the change. 
by constructing “change scenarios” ... identifying 
across the expected lifecycle of the product and its 
variants every type of change that could plausibly 
occur. This should include changes likely to occur as 
part of the initial development cycle. 
Then different architectural organizations can be 
postulated to attempt to encapsulate those changes as 
severely as possible. The goal is to achieve an archi- 
tecture which will only need to be changed in one 
place (ideally,-one subprogram or data structure) for 
each individual “change stimulus.” 
behind certain domain design approaches (e.g., 
SPC’s Synthesis approach [9]). 
For instance, a class structure could be con- 
structed to encapsulate changes likely to occur in a 
system that must communicate significantly with 
other devices, systems or its environment, e.g., via 
data bus, and must transform such information to 
perform its tasks (a fairly generic type of processing). 
At the highest level of abstraction, most of what 
such a system does could be covered by three classes 
(this is the approach planned for portions of Boeing 
Worth American’s development on the Brimstone 
program, and which also was used on the Lockheed 
Martin C- 1303 mission software). 
One class could handle the translation of bus- 
encoded data into more abstracted information suit- 
able for use by the system being developed, and vice 
The propagation of change can be strictly limited 
This approach is consistent with the philosophy 
versa, from abstracted system information into low- 
level bus data. 
Another class could provide read-only access to 
the abstracted information which would represent the 
state of the outside systems or environment. 
The third class would perform the transformations 
of abstracted information about current state of the 
external environment, into abstracted information 
about the desired effect upon the external environ- 
ment. Note the similarity of this class’s charter and 
the components of a CoRE table (Le., abstracted in- 
puts, abstracted outputs, and discontinuous functions 
relating them). This similarity is exploited in a way 
which wit1 be described shortly. 
The three classes work together to form a com- 
plete processing engine. There would be a group of 
three instances, one of each class, for each external 
system to which the system under design was inter- 
faced. 
These three classes could be called “device inter- 
face,” “device current state,” and “device control,” 
respectively. This is illustrated in figure 2, in a vari- 
ant of Buhr notation. Note that dashed outlines of 
classes (outer box) or methods (inner boxes) indicate 
there can be multiple instances thereof. 
There are several plausible change scenarios for 
this type of system. Most of them distill to two basic 
patterns: The external systems or environmental in- 
terfaces could change, or the purposes of the system 
could change. In the fust case, change will usually 
be limited to the instance of the device interface class 
for the system which changed. In the second case, 
change will usually be limited to a single procedure 
in the control class. 
Another design criteria, with benefits not just as 
change occurs but also for traceability and testing, is 
to localize the implementation of each formal (e.g., 
CoRE) requirement to a single method in an object of 
the control class. This takes advantage, noted earlier, 
of the similarity between the nature of CoRE re- 
quirements and the charter of the control class. 
This approach is in contrast to the typical design 
decomposition process, which “smears our” individ- 
ual requirements across many design artifacts. Expe- 
rience has shown that this approach is valid even on 
large programs (>lo0 KSLOC, e.g., like the C- 1305): 
appropriate domain-oriented factorization is the key 
to making this possible. 
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& w e  2: Change-Tolerant Class Structure 
In this type of design structuring, changes to a 
single requirement affect, in general, just one sub- 
program. Tests of a single requirement become unit- 
level tests(using the rows of the CORE table as the 
specifications for individual test cases!). Traceability 
of requirements to design to code to test cases be- 
comes trivial. All these factors dramatically decrease 
costs. 
By creating a class structure which reflects the 
inherent repeatabilities in the solution domain, one 
can craft a “synrax” for design. Each type of class 
becomes a “part of design,” just as nouns, verbs and 
adjectives are “parts of speech.” As the English lan- 
guage includes strict syntactic rules for how its parts 
may interact with one other to express meaning, so 
also a strict set of syntactic rules can be constructed 
between the classes. In general, this approach is 
cailed an ADL or “Architecture Design Language” 
[lOl- 
If the choice of the “parts of design” for such a 
syntax is directed by a domain design methodology, 
the result will be both factored and change-driven. 
Such an ADL can be called a DSDL or ”Domain- 
Specific Design Language.” 
This is a “semi-formal“ method in the sense that 
syntax is often considered a mathematical construc- 
tion, and can be subjected to mathematical verifica- 
tion arguments. Further, tools (homegrown or com- 
mercial, e.g., Rational Apex subsystems and views) 
can enforce the restrictions on interactions between 
the classes, and thus prevent the introduction of many 
types of errors. 
Finally, identification of change-driven classes 
allows one to create “implementation templates.” 
These templates provide the final implementors (e.g., 
detailed designedcoden) with the required structure 
of their portion of the system. The pre-defined allo- 
cation of formal requirements to detailed-design ele- 
ments makes implementation much simpler, verifica- 
tion much quicker (against the pre-defined 
allocation), and control of unwanted interactions 
between code elements easier (the “universe” of 
possibilities has been strictly limited by the tem- 
plates). 
3.3 Closed-Loop Formality 
Formal requirements provide benefits even when 
used in isolation. However, the added costs of using 
formality make it imperative to obtain every possible 
benefit of formal requirements. The remaining 
benefits come only through using formality in an 
integrated way throughout the lifecycle. 
Formality throughout the lifecycle must apply the 
strong mathematical foundation provided by the for- 
mal requirements to facilitate every lifecycle activity: 
design, code, static analysis, and testing. By eliminat- 
ing much of the “guess work” typically in these ac- 
tivities, lifecycle formality increases their efficiency. 
The relationships between formal requirements 
and formality in the rest of the lifecycle are illus- 
trated in figure 3. 
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FORMAL SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT 
figure 3: Formal Requirements and LifecrcIe Formality 
Formal development takes advantage of formal 
requirements, the DSDL syntax and associated tem- 
plates, and the previously-mentioned architectural 
strategy of implementing each formal method in a 
specific procedure in the software, to simplify and 
speed implementation. If the software is then coded 
in a formal language like the SPARK Ada subset 
[ I  I], the code will largely be correct as constructed. 
Formal verification begins with static analysis. 
With formal requirements and formal code, static 
analysis of correctness is more efficient than tradi- 
tional unit testing. Thus, static analysis is performed 
fmt, any errors found are corrected, and the code is 
then submitted to test This also “closes the loop” of 
code back to requirements. 
Formal testing remains necessary because of in- 
complete formalization of the software product, the 
need to verify target-compiler correctness, and hard- 
ware issues (e.g.. was the original software specifica- 
tion based on a correct understanding of the hardware 
environment). 
Formal testing derives the test cases from the 
formal requirements. This provides very high state- 
ment and path coverage compared to typical non- 
formal requirements-based testing. Since require- 
ments-based testing is often the most efficient testing 
approach, high confidence is provided at relatively 
low testing cost. 
If the CORE (or SCR) method is used to specify 
requirements, black-box testing is as simple as setting 
up the abstracted input values in a given table row, 
and comparing the result to the abstracted output for 
that row. If the architecture has applied the heuristic 
of LLone r quirement to one procedure,” white-box 
testing of the most semantically-significant modules 
in the software system will also be directly driven 
from the formal requirements. This too has proven to 
be highly efficient. 
Conclusion 
Formal methods are the future of software devel- 
opment. The sheer number of failed software systems 
is proof of the need for more robust means of pro- 
duction. Failed systems are intolerable in business; 
mathematics provides the needed robustness. Busi- 
ness and mathematics are a mamiage made in heaven; 
they will meet 2ain in software as they have so often 
before in other disciplines. 
Business will not, however, embrace mathematics 
to its own loss. Mathematics has always provided net 
benefits in other endeavors, and must do so now in 
software.. This requires that the software theorist at 
least consider the business perspective; i.e., asking 
“ w f y  are companies developing software?” The an- 
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swer almost invariably reduces to "for the sharehold- 
ers." 
Re-examining formality's role in such a purpose- 
ful software lifecycle leads to principles of practical- 
ity. As those principles are identified and refined, 
formality will take an ever-increasing role in for- 
profit software development. And this, in the end, 
will benefit everyone; the industrialist, by improving 
the bottom line, the consumers and public, by provid- 
ing them with more reliable and affordable systems, 
and the theorists, by providing more compelling rea- 
sons, a sharper focus, and a ready outlet for their 
creativity and research. 
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Accident reports are produced by regulatory and 
commercial authorities, such as the UK Air Accident 
Investigation Branch [l] and the US National 
Transportation Safety Board [ 171, in response to most 
major accidents. They, typically, contain accounts of 
the human and system failures that lead to major 
accidents. These descriptions are then used to 
identify the primary and secondary causes of the 
failure. Finally, recommendations are made so that 
the operators and regulators of safety-critical systems 
can avoid future accidents. Unfortunately, it is often 
difficult for readers to trace the way in which 
particular conclusions are drawn from many hundreds 
of pages of evidence. Natural language arguments 
often contain implicit assumptions and ambiguous 
remarks that prevent readers from understanding the 
reasons why a particular conclusion was drawn from a 
particular accident. This paper argues that 
mathematical proof techniques can be used to support 
the findings of accident investigations. These 
techniques enable analysts to formally demonstrate 
that a particular conclusion is justified given the 
evidence in a report. Conclusion, Analysis and 
Evidence diagrams can then be used to communicate 
the results of a formal analysis. The intention is not 
to replace the natural argumentation structures that are 
currently used in accident reports. Rather, our aim is 
to increase confidence that particular conclusions are 
well supported by the evidence that is presented within 
a report. 
1 Introduction 
Accident reports are intended to ensure that major 
failures do not recur. They are produced by a wide 
range of national [4,6] and international bodies [23]. 
Typically. these documents begin by providing a brief 
synopsis of the events leading to an accident. The 
synopsis is then followed by a number of expert 
analyses. These identify and prioritise the failures 
leading to the accident. Finally, conclusions are 
drafted from the experts' findings. These form the 
basis of any actions that companies or regulatory 
authorities might take to prevent future failures. 
1.1 ConventionaI Reporting 
Techniques 
Unfortunately, it is not always easy for readers to 
understand the justifications that support particular 
conclusions [8]. Accident reports are often many 
hundreds of pages in length. The evidence that 
supports a particular line of analysis may be lost 
amongst the paragraphs of contextual detail. A 
further problem is that natural language can be 
ambiguous. For example, accident reports often refer 
to situations of 'high workload' and 'operator error' 
without explaining the precise meaning of these terms 
[20]. Many accident reports are also inconsistent in 
the sense that the same term is used to refer to several 
different objects or people [14]. Later sections of this 
paper will argue that these problems create 
considerable confusion for the reader and may even 
lead them to doubt the accuracy of the final report. 
1.2 Formal Methods and 
Accident Analysis 
Formal proof techniques can be used to avoid the 
ambiguity and inconsistency of natural language [2]. 
A number of authors have also used these techniques 
to support the design of dynamic, interactive systems. 
For example, Dix [SI has used an algebraic notation to 
reason about high level properties of multi-user 
systems. Paterno, Sciacchitano and Lowgren [I91 
have used the LOTOS notation to examine interaction 
with complex multimedia applications. Palanque and 
Bastide [18] have applied Petri Nets to examine safety 
and liveness properties of distributed systems. None 
of this work has been applied to reason about accident 
reports. In particular, there has been no attempt to use 
mathematical techniques to prove that conclusions are 
well-founded with respect to the analysis that is 
presented in an accident report. 
2 The Case Study 
This paper focuses upon an accident report that was 
produced by the United States' Coast Guard in 
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response to a collision between the passenger vessel 
Noordam and the bulk carrier Mount Ymitos [22]. 
We are interested in this case study because it typifies 
the many different operator errors and organisational 
failures that exacerbate accidents with complex, 
interactive systems. The remainder of this section 
brief outlines the course of the accident. The 
Noordam collided with the Mount Ymitos at 20.42 
(Central Standard Time) on November 6th, 1993. 
The accident occurred two miles south of the 
Southwest Pass Entrance Light Buoy in the Gulf of 
Mexico. The exact location was recorded as 28 
degrees, 50.0 minutes North and 89 degrees, 25.7 
minutes West. Both ships were damaged in the 
collision but there was no loss of life. 
The Mount Ymitos was outbound from the 
Mississippi River en route to St Petersburg, Russia. It 
had cleared the Southwest Pass out of the River when 
the Third Officer noticed an inbound passenger vessel 
using their binoculars. At this stage, he estimated that 
the vessel was approximately six miles from the 
Ymitos. He did not immediately report his 
observation as the Captain was busy with the Pilot 
who was preparing to leave the Mount Ymitos. The 
watch-standers re-established visual contact when the 
Noordam had closed to two miles from the Mount 
Ymitos. The Captain reduced their speed to dead 
slow and expected the Noordam to alter its heading. 
At this point the ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting 
Aid) showed that the closest point of approach was 
under six hundred feet. The Captain made several 
attempts to alert the Noordam. At 2040.08 the Coast 
Guard logged a Channel 16 VHF call: 'Passenger 
Vessel, Passenger Vessel, Go to South Pass'. At 
20:4050 they logged 'Passenger Vessel Going to 
South Pass, I Turn Hard Starboard'. The third officer 
then attempted to communicate the warning using an 
Aldis lamp. No response was received. 
The Noordam was en route to New Orleans from 
Cozumel, Mexico. At approximately 20:0000, 
Second Officer Smit called the Pilot Station and 
learned that two other vessels were also in-bound 
towards the Mississippi and could be overtaken. The 
Pilot did not alert the Noordam to the presence of any 
outward bound vessels. Quartermaster Salyo was the 
designated lookout He left the bridge on two separate 
occasions during the approach. Shortly after 20:00:00 
he left, with the permission of Second Officer Smit, to 
make sandwiches and coffee for the bridge crew. At 
20:1000 he unlashed the anchors in preparation for 
entering port. He returned at 202000 but did not 
detect the Mount Ymitos until immediately prior to 
the collision. A scheduled watch change took place at 
203000. Second Officer Smit performed navigation 
checks using the radar, together with Chief Officer 
Broekhoven, before handing over to Third Officer 
Veldhoen. Veldhoen, in turn, handed over to the 
Chief Officer at 20:3600 when an 'end of sea voyage' 
was declared. This is a point of convenience 
determined by the watch officer and represents the 
point at which the Chief Officer assumes control for 
the manoeuvring watch prior to arrival in port. In 
order to complete this hand-over Veldhoen had to fix 
the vessel's position, complete the log and notify the 
engine room. As the Noordam changed course to 
enter the final leg of the approach, Fourth Officer 
Kuiper, who was on the bridge but who was not on 
duty, saw the lights of the Mount Ymitos and 
immediately issued a curse. The manoeuvre was 
halted while the crew determined the course and 
position of the vessel that they had seen, 
Approximately one minute before the collision, Chief 
Officer Broekhoven ordered left full rudder to pull 
away from the danger. 
The Coast Guard's report argues that the principle 
reason for the collision was the failure by the 
Noordam's crew to keep an adequate watch. 
Unfortunately, the report does not provide a detailed 
explanation of why this failure occurred. The reader is 
left to infer the causal relations that link the 
observations about the accident and the conclusions 
that are listed at the end of the document. The 
following pages, therefore, show how formal 
techniques can be used to explicitly link the findings 
of an investigation to the account of an accident. 
3 Formalisation of the Accident 
In order to reason about the findings of an accident 
report, it is fxst necessary to model the events leading 
to the failure. The first stage in this process is to 
identify the critical operators, tasks, roles, 
communications, systems and locations that helped to 
shape the course of the accident. 
3.1 Critical Components 
A limitation with natural language approaches to 
accident reporting is that it can be difficult to identify 
critical information from a mass of background detail. 
For example, the Coast Guard's report into the 
Noordam collision includes the following account 
"Fourth Officer Daniel Kuiper, who was not on 
duty, was the first to notice the lights of a vessel off 
the starboard side of the Noordam. This was 
between one and two minutes before the time of 
collision. He saw a red light that he estimated was 
approximately 2 points off the NOORDAM's 
starboard bow - a point being 11.25 degrees of arc. 
First Officer Kuiper uttered a curse word that 
attracted the attention of others on the bridge. Third 
Officer Veldhoen, upon looking to starboard, also 
saw lights.'' [Paragraph 421 
Additional information, such as the conversion 
between points and degree of arc, is included to help 
the reader form a picture of the accident. 
Unfortunately, such details may actually obscure the 
underlying causes of operator 'error' and system 
'failure'. Our previous work on accident analysis has, 
however, identified a number of categories that can be 
used to identify critical components in an accident: 
22 
operators. It is necessary to represent the people 
involved in an accident so that readers can follow 
the way in which operator intervention affects the 
course of system failures; 
roles. It is important to distinguish particular 
individuals from the roles that they perform during 
an accident. For example, a number of individuals 
performed the tasks associated with the role of 
watch-stander during the Noordam collision; 
tasks. It is necessary to identify the tasks that 
operators were or should have been performing 
during accidents if readers are to understand the 
ways in which human intervention safeguarded the 
system or exacerbated any key failures; 
speech acts. It is vital to represent 
communication between the operators that are 
involved in an accident. Misunderstandings have a 
profound impact upon the safety of many 
applications; 
information and control systems. This type of 
information is included because the quality of 
information that is available to system operators is 
often determined by the channel that is used to 
support their observations. For instance, ARPA 
radar provides more detailed and arguably less 
reliable information than direct visual contact; 
physical locations. It is necessary to represent 
the place in which an accident occurs because the 
location of a failure can have a profound impact 
upon an operator's ability to respond to an accident 
[111. 
Paragraph [42]. cited above, can be used to identify 
physical locations, such as the Noordam and the 
Mount Ymitos. It is also possible to identify 
operators such as Veldhoen and Kuiper who perform 
the roles of First and Fourth Officers respectively. 
We can identify observation channels; in this case the 
visual observation of the Ymitos' lights as well as 
critical speech acts such as Kuiper's curse. Table 1 
shows the results that can be obtained by extending 
this analysis throughout the Coast Guard's report. In 
formal terms, the elements of this table define the 
types that model the Noordam accident. The process 
of building such a table helps to strip out irrelevant 
detail that obscures critical properties of major 
accidents. 
Table 1: Critical Entity Table for the Noordam 
Accident 
3.2 Axioms for the Accident System 
The identification of operators, roles, tasks, speech 
acts, information systems and locations is of little 
benefit if analysts cannot represent and reason about 
the relationships that exist between these components. 
The following section uses a simple form of temporal 
logic to demonstrate how t h i s  might be done for the 
Noordam case study. 
3.2.1 Operators and Roles 
The previous sections argued that it is important to 
identify the critical roles that operators play in an 
accident. This affects the range of tasks that operators 
are expected to perform. For example, Broekhoven 
was the Noordam's Chief Officer during the incident, 
Smit was the First Officer:, Veldhoen was the Third 
Officer and Salyo was the lookout 
role(chief-oflcer, broekhoven). (1) 
role first-oficer, smit). (2) 
role(third-oflcer, veldben). (3)  
role(lookout, salyo). (4) 
Such clauses gather together information that is, 
typically, scattered throughout conventional, natural 
language documents. The roles performed by key 
individuals in the Coast Guard's report are listed in 
paragraphs [13, 16, 25, 30, 37, 421. Such a 
formalisation is also important if an individual's role 
changes during the course of an accident. For 
example, the officer in charge of the watch on the 
Noordam changed at 20:30 hrs: 
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at(role(watch-oficer, smit) ,2029). (5) 
at(role(watch-oficer, veldhoen) ,2030). (6) 
The previous clauses exploit a simple form of 
temporal logic in which the binary at operator takes a 
proposition and a term denoting a time such that at(p, 
t )  is true if and only if p is true at t. A number of 
technical problems surround the general application of 
this simple extension to propositional logic. In 
particular, the philosophical issue of reification forces 
analysts to clearly state the relationship between 
particular terms and objects over time. This 
theoretical problem is less of an issue for our purposes 
because we are always referring to definite entities at 
specific times during an accident. We, therefore, 
retain this simple temporal framework rather than the 
more elaborate temporal languages in our previous 
work [7, 10.211. 
3.2.2 Operators and Communications 
Communications problems exacerbate many major 
accidents. It is, therefore, important to represent and 
reason about this source of 'error'. During the 
accident, Smit requested and received specific 
information about the Captain Veniamis and the 
Pacific Trident that were inbound towards the 
Mississippi: 
3 t: at(message(pi1ot-station, smit, 
3 t: at(message(pi1ot-station, smit, 
inbound-capt-veniamis), t). (7) 
inbaundgacific-*ident), t). (8) 
The existential 3 quantifier (read as 'there exists') is 
used because the accident report does not represent the 
precise times associated with each of these individual 
communications. The following clause shows how 
the same approach can be adopted to represent a lack 
of communication. Smit did not receive information 
about outbound traffic from the Pilot Station: 
V t: not at(message(pilot-station, smit, 
outbound-mount_ymitos), t). (9) 
The universal V quantifier (read as 'for all') is used 
because it was never the case that Smit received 
information from the Pilot Station about the Mount 
Ymitos. Similar clauses can be used to represent more 
complex verbal exchanges. For example, Kuiper fmt 
observed the Ymitos' lights and issued a curse which 
was heard by Veldhoen and Broekhoven. 
Broekhoven then requested that Veldhoen take a 
bearing on the lights. Veldhoen responded that the 
lights were moving right. The following clauses 
represent these individual speech acts: 
3 t, t' : at(message(kuiper, 
[veldhoen, broekhoven], curse), 2040) 
A at(message(broekhoven, 
veldhoen, take_bearing_on_lights), t )  
broekhoven, lights-moving-right), t') 
A at(message(veldhoen, 
A afier(2040, t )  A afier(t, t'). 
(10) 
It is important to note that the preceding clauses do not 
represent the precise verbal components of each 
speech act. This information could be introduced if it 
were available, for instance through studying cockpit 
voice recordings. In the case of the Noordam there 
was no such record. Place holders, such as curse, are 
used to capture the recollected sense of the 
communication without specifyiig its exact form. 
3.2.3 Operators and Locations 
It is important to consider the physical location of 
system operators during major accidents. For 
example, the lookout left his position on the bridge at 
critical moments during the lead-up to the Noordam 
collision. Clause (1 1) states that salyo was in the 
galley at 2000hrs. Similarly, clauses (12) and (13) 
describe Salyo's subsequent movements from the 
galley back to the bridge at 20: 10 hrs and from the 
bridge down to the decks at 2 0  15 hrs. They do not 
specify when Salyo moved from each of these 
locations because the report does not provide accurate 
journey times: 
at(position(salyo, galley(noordam)). 2000). ( 1 1) 
at(position(salyo, bridge(noordam)), 201 0). (I. 2) 
at(position(salyo, decks(noordam)), 2015). (13) 
The previous clauses do not specify the relative 
position of the galley, bridge or decks. Such 
information can be introduced by formalising a three- 
dimensional co-ordinate scheme [l I]. This was not 
done because clauses (1 Ll2.13) reflect the level of 
detail in the Coast Guard's report. This illustrates an 
important benefit of the formalisation. Logic 
provides an explicit representation of the level of 
abstraction that is considered appropriate for the 
readers of the report. They do not need to know the 
relative positions of the galley, bridge and decks in 
order to understand the events leading to the collision. 
Such decisions are extremely important. Too much 
detail and readers will be swamped amongst a mass of 
contextual information. Too little detail and it will be 
difficult for them to reconstruct the flow of events 
leading to disaster. Clauses, such as ( 1 1,12,13), can 
be used to represent and reason about appropriate 
levels of abstraction. This helps to avoid the ad hoc 
decisions that frequently seem to be made about the 
amount of location information that is included in 
accident reports [ 141. 
3.2.4 Operators and Tasks 
The Coast Guard's report contains the following 
paragrapk 
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"Between 2030 and 2036, Broekhoven and 
Veldhoen checked the radars occasionally, using the 
six mile scale. Broekhoven was planning the turn 
from 325 degrees to 000 degrees to coincide with 
bringing the Racon 'T platform abeam, at 1.5 miles 
to port. Both Veldhoen and Broekhoven used the 
10-centimetre and centimetre radars to check the 
distance of the domino platforms, and particularly 
the bearing and range of the Racon T. They were 
not using the radars for collision avoidance and 
observation of moving targets, and did not attempt 
to correlate every fixed target contact in the radar 
with fixed platforms observed visually to see if any 
were any underway contacts rather than fixed 
platforms." [Paragraph 391 
From this it is possible to extract two critical 
observations about the operation of the Noordam. 
Firstly, that between 20:30, and 20:36 both 
Broekhoven and Veldhoen were performing 
navigation radar checks. Secondly, that during this 
interval they did not correlate radar targets with visual 
observations. The following clauses introduce a 
during operator such that during(p, t )  is true if and 
only if the situation denoted by p occurs at sometime 
during the interval denoted by t. Formally, this can be 
given as follows: 
Vt : duringfp ,t) ($ 
3 t' : at(p, t') A before(t', end(t)) A 
before(begin(t), t'). (14) 
This assumes that before(?, t') is true if t' occurs at 
some time aftg t or at the same instant as t. The 
following clauses also introduce the operator, in, such 
that in(?, t', t") is true if t is wholly contained within t' 
and t". This can be formalised in a similar manner to 
during. In contrast, the following clauses formalise 
the observations made in paragraph [39] of the 
accident report 
3t : during(per$orm(broekbven, 
navigation-radar-check), t) 
correlate-radar-targets), t )  
A not during(per$m(broekhoven. 
A in(t, 2030,2036). (15) 
3t : during(per$orm(vercUoen, 
A not during(per$orm(veldhoen, 
A in(t, 2030,2036). (16) 
navigation-radar-check). t)  
correlate-r~r-targets), t )  
An important benefit of the formalisation process is 
that clauses, such as (15) and (161, can be translated 
back into natural language sentences; between 2030 
hrs and 20:36 hrs Broekhoven and Veldhoen 
performed navigation radar checks but did not 
correlate radar targets. The formalisation process 
helps analysts to focus upon critical aspects of an 
accident, such as operator tasks. This benefit might 
be obtained using a conventional task analysis 
technique such as TAKD [15]. Later sections will, 
however, argue that formal reasoning techniques can 
be used to prove properties of accident reports. W s  
provides the additional degree of assurance that is 
demanded by bodies such as NASA and the UK 
Ministry of Defence [2]. 
The previous example describes a relatively simple 
set of observations about operator tasks. Typically, 
the co-ordination of group activities is more complex. 
For example, Veldhoen declared an 'end of sea voyage' 
between 2034 and 2038. This procedure handed 
over control of the watch to the First Officer 
Broekhoven. He was responsible for navigating the 
Noordam into port. This change was not, however, 
announced to the lookout: 
3t : during(per$orm(vercUroen, 
declare-ed-of-voyage), t )  
ofleer-change), t) 
A not during(message(broekhoven, salyo, 
A during(role(watch-oflcer, broekhoven), t )  A 
A in(?, 2034,2038). (17) 
The failure to inform the lookout was impolitant 
because the task of declaring the 'end of sea voyage' 
involves the watch officer in a number of sub-tasks 
that reduce the amount of time that they have available 
for navigation and collision avoidance: 
V t: during(per$onn(velen, 
declare-end-of-voyage), t )  
u during(per$orm(veldhoen, 
&-vesselgosition), t) 
A during(per$orm(veldhoen, complete-log), t )  
A during(message(veldhoen, engine-room, 
end-of-voyage), t). (18) 
Such clauses illustrate how the products of 
hierarchical task analysis might be introduced into 
formal models of major accidents. The higher order 
task of declaring the 'end of sea voyage' is comprised 
of three sub-tasks: fixing the vessel's position; 
completing the log and notifying the engine room. 
3.25 Operators and Observations 
The entities that were identified in Table 1 are generic 
in the sense that operators, roles, tasks, speech acts, 
information systems and physical locations are central 
to all of the accidents reports that we have examined 
[8, 9, 141. This does not mean that the list is 
exhaustive. A related point is that the significance of 
individual entities will vary from accident to accident. 
For example, automated control systems did not have 
a significant impact upon the course of the collision 
between the Ymitos and the Noordam. In contrast, 
information systems played a critical role in the 
observations that operators made during the accident. 
Veldhoen made visual observations of the ship but did 
not use an azimuth circle to verify his observation: 
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3t : at(observe(veldhoen, 
Vt : not at(observe(veldhoen, 
mountymitos, visual}, t). (19) 
mountyitos. azimuth), t). (20) 
As before, the existential 3 quantifier is used in clause 
(1 9) because the accident report does not identify the 
particular interval when Veldhoen made his 
observation. All we know is that there exists a time at 
which Veldhoen made a visual observation of the 
Ymitos. The universalv quantifier is used in clause 
(20) because Veldhoen did not use an Azimuth circle 
at any time in the accident. This shows how an 
analysts concerns can direct the formalisation process. 
Clause (20) represents something that the officer did 
not do. If it had not been formalised then readers 
would not have been aware of this omission. In fact, 
Veldhoen's failure to verify his visual observations 
reinforced Broekhoven's judgement that the ships 
would pass smboard to starboard. He had seen a 
green (starboard) light shortly after the initial 
observation ma& by Kuiper: 
k : at(observe(broekhoven, 
green-light(mountymitos), binoculars), t). (21) 
It was only when Broekhoven saw a red light that he 
realised the imminent possibility of a collision with 
the Mount Ymitos and took evasive action: 
at(observe(broekhoven, 
A at(message(broekhoven, 
red-light(mount_rmitos), visual), 2041) 
engine-room, lefijLll-rudder), 2041). 
(22) 
This section has used temporal logic to formalise the 
events leading to an accident. This formalisation 
process helps to strip out the contextual detail that 
hides critical observations in the many hundreds of 
pages that form conventional reports. We have not, 
however, shown that this approach can be used to 
reason about the conclusions that are drawn from an 
accident report. 
4 Reasoning About 
Accident Reports 
This section argues that formal methods can be used to 
establish the relationship between the evidence 
presented in an accident report and the conclusions 
which boards of enquiry use to draft future legislation. 
Unless this can be done, it will be difficult for 
commercial organisations to understand the reasons 
why particular sanctions may be imposed in the 
aftermath of major accidents [8]. For example, the 
Coast Guard enquiry made the following observation 
about the collision between the Noordam and the 
Ymitos: 
'The proximate cause of the casualty was the failure 
of Chief Officer Broekhoven, the person in charge 
of the watch on the NOORDAM at the time of the 
casualty, to maintain a vigilant watch in that he did 
not detect the presence of the MOUNT YMITOS 
visually or on radar until the MOUNT YMITOS 
was less than 1 mile away, less than 2 minutes 
before the collision.' [Conclusion 11. 
Such findings create a number of problems for 
organisations that must prevent the recurrence of 
future accidents. In particular, it does not explain the 
reasons why Broekhoven failed to spot the Mount 
Ymitos. Readers are left to piece together or infer 
these justifications from the evidence presented in the 
many previous pages of analysis. This can have 
extremely serious consequences. Two readers might 
easily infer two different reasons why Broekhoven 
failed to keep an efficient watch. Each might, 
therefore, adopt quite different strategies for avoiding 
future failures [ 203. 
Formal proof techniques can be used to demonstrate 
that a conclusion is valid given the evidence that is 
presented in an accident report. For instance, the 
following clause is derived from Conclusion 1 in the 
Coast Guard report 
V t: not during(vigilant(broekhoven), t)  
mountymitos, visual), t) 
mountyitos, arpa-radar),t)) 
e not( during(observe(broekhoven, 
v during(observe(broekhoven, 
A before(t, 2040). (23) 
We can re-write this clause as follows: 
e not during(observe(broekhoven, 
A not during(observe(broekhoven, 
A before(t, 2040). 
mountymitos, visual), t )  
m o u n t y  itos, arpa-radar),t) 
[DeMorgan's Law (2311 (24) 
w (not during(observe(broekhoven, 
mount_ymitos, visual), t)  A before(t, 2040)) 
A (not during(observe(broekhoven, 
mount_ymitos, arpa-radar), t )  A before(t, 2040)). 
[A Identity (2411 (25) 
In order to justify Conclusion 1 we must consider two 
different cases. The first concerns the reasons why 
Broekhoven failed to make visual contact with the 
Mount Ymitos. The second addresses the failure to 
detect the Ymitos using the ARPA radar. In order to 
establish the connection between the conclusion and 
the evidence presented in the body of the report it is 
necessary for analysts to explicitly state the reasons 
supporting particular findings. For example, one of 
the reasons why Broekhoven failed to observe the 
Mount Ymitos was that he used the radar for 
navigation and not for collision avoidance: 
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V t: not during(observe(broekhoven, 
mountjmitos, a?pa-radar), t )  
e= during(pe$orm(broekhoven, 
navigation-radar-check), t )  
A not during(pe$orm(broekhoven, 
correlate-radar-targets), t). (26) 
We can now prove that the second part of our 
formalisation of Conclusion 1 is satisfied by the 
evidence in the accident report. This can be done by 
applying the following inference rule to (15) and (26). 
Vt: P(t) * Q(t), 3 t': P(t') 
Informally, this argument can be expressed as follows. 
From clause (26), we conclude that Broekhoven failed 
to observe the Mount Ymitos using the ARPA radar 
during any interval in which he was performing a 
navigation radar check and did not correlating radar 
targets. From clause (15) we know that know that 
Broekhoven was performing a navigation radar check 
and was not correlating radar targets between 2030 
and 2036. Clause (27) tells us that if, we have clause 
(26) and clause (15) we can infer that Broekhoven 
failed to observe the Mount Ymitos using the ARPA 
radar during the interval between 2030 and 2036. 
The previous proof illustrates a weakness in the 
accident report. Our formalisation of Conclusion 1 
stated that Broekhoven did not observe the Mount 
Ymitos using the radar until 2042. Our model has 
been used to prove that Broekhoven was pre-occupied 
with navigation checks between 20:30 and 2036. 
This leaves at least six minutes unaccounted for. 
During that time, Broekhoven began turning the 
Noordam to the North. The accident report makes no 
reference to the use of the ARPA during this interval. 
The reader has to assume that the system was not used 
during this or subsequent operations prior to the 
collision at 20:42. Such findings are significant 
because they have important consequences for the 
recommendations that might be drawn from the report. 
For example, it is normal practice for officers to 
correlate radar targets when approaching an unfamiliar 
port. In the interval from 20:30 to 2036 we can 
clearly see that navigation problems explain why 
Broekhoven did not perform these checks. We 
cannot, however, explain the omission during the fmal 
six minutes before the collision. 
The second part of Conclusion 1 states that 
Broekhoven did not make any visual observation of 
the Mount Ymitos until 2042. The justification for 
this finding can be found in a subsequent conclusion, 
rather than in the body of the accident report 
The number of personnel (both watch-standing and 
non-watch-standing) on the bridge of the 
NOORDAM between 2020 and the time of the 
collision may have raised the complacency level and 
lowered the attentiveness of the bridge watch- 
standers with regards to maintaining a dedicated 
visual and radar watch.' [Conclusion 51. 
3 t': Q(t') (27) 
The evidence for this conclusion can be found in 
paragraph [41] which states that 
'There were seven other persons on the bridge of the 
NOORDAM at this time (2037hrs) in addition to 
the chief officer, who was in control of the vessel - 
three other licensed officers (one on duty, and two 
off duty), one cadet, two quartermasters and the 
chief officer's wife' Paragraph 411. 
This led to considerable confusion during our analysis 
of the report. We initially identified eight, and not 
seven, other individuals on the bridge in the final 
minutes before the collision. This confusion arose 
because Salyo was identified both by his name and by 
his role as Quartermaster In order to form this 
association, the reader must remember the allocation 
of responsibilities that was introduced in paragraph 
[25] when reading paragraph [41]: 
V t: not during(observe(broekhoven, 
mount_ymitos, visual), t )  
e= during(position(kuiper, 
bridge(noordam)), t )  
nduring(posi t ion(vel ,  
bridge(noordam)), t )  
A during(position(hehman, 
bridge(noordam)), t )  
A during(position(chief-oficers-w$e, 
bridge(noordam)), t)  
A during(position(quartermaster-I , 
bridge(noordam)), t )  
A during (position(quartermaster-2, 
bridge(noordam)), t )  
A during(position(cadet, 
bridge(noordam)), t )  
A during(position(broekhoven, 
bridge(noordam)), t). (28) 
Paragraph [411 suggests that there were nine people on 
the bridge at 2037: 
at(position(kuiper, 
at(position(veldhoen, 
at(position(helmsman, 
at(position(chief-oflcers-w$e, 
at(position(quartermaster-I , 
at(position(qwtermaster-2, 
at(position(cadet, 
at(position(broekhoven, 
bridge(noordam)), 2037). 
bridge(noordam)), 2037). 
bridge(noorah)), 2037). 
bridge(noorah)), 2037). 
bridge(noordam)), 2037). 
bridge(noordam)), 2037). 
bridge(noordam)), 2037). 
bridge(noordam)), 2037). 
We can apply our definition of during, given in clause 
(1 4), to re-write each of the clauses from (29) to (36) 
in the following form: 
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3 t: during(position(kuiper, bridge(noordam)),t) 
A before(2037, end(t)) A before(begin(t), 2037). 
(37) [Application of (14) to (29)] 
By repeating the application of (14) in the manner 
described above, we obtain the following: 
3 : during(position(kuiper, 
bridge(no0rdam)). t )  
A during(position(ve&en, 
bridge(noordam)), t)  
A during(position(helmsman, 
bridge(noordam)), t )  
A during(positwn(chief-oflcers-w$e, 
bridge(mrdam)), t )  
A during(position(quartermaster-I, 
bridge(n0ordam)). t )  
A during(position(quartermaster-2, 
bridge(noor&m)), t )  
A during(position(cadet. 
bridge(noordam)), t )  
A during(position(broeWroven, 
bridge(noordam)), t)  
A before(2037, end(t)) 
A before(begin(t), 2037). 
[Introduction of A 
from application of (14) to (29..36)] (38) 
Finally, by applying inference rule (27) we get the 
following clause which corresponds to the second 
condition in Conclusion 1. In other words, the 
derivation of fhe following clause formally proves that 
our conclusions are consistent with the information 
contained in the body of the report 
3t : not during(observe(broekhoven, 
A before(2037, end(t)) 
A before(begin(t)). 2037). 
mountjmitos, visual), t)  
[Application of (27) to (28) using (38)] (39) 
This proof helps to identify a further problem with the 
Coast Guard report We have previously cited 
Conclusion 5 which states that the number of 
personnel on the bridge between 20:20hrs and the time 
of the collision may have lowered the attentiveness of 
Broekhoven with regards to maintaining a visual and 
radar watch. Our formal analysis reveals that the 
evidence for this assertion only applies to the interval 
from 2037hrs until the time of the collision. This 
poses a number of problems. We do not know why 
Conclusion 5 mentions 2020hrs rather than 2037hrs 
as stated in the body of the report. It can only be 
speculated that a number of people arrived on the 
bridge at this time earlier time. Alternatively, if 
additional crew members gradually were arriving from 
some time before 2020hrs then we do not know why 
this was chosen as the critical moment at which 
collision avoidance tasks were impaired. 
5 Communicating the Results of 
Formalisation 
Unfortunately, mathematical analysis provides non- 
formalists with an extremely poor idea of the 
argumentation processes that support particular 
conclusions. It is diffkult for people without some 
mathematical background to understand the various 
proof rules that are applied during the formal 
derivation of particular conclusions. This section, 
therefore, describes how literate specification 
techniques can be extended from the field of software 
engineering to support the formal analysis of accident 
reports. 
5.1 Literate Specification 
Communicating the results of mathematical analysis is 
a general problem for the application of formal 
methods. It affects the techniques described in this 
paper. It also affects the development of safety 
-critical systems. For example, designers might use 
the following clause to specify that a control system 
automatically removes a warning at some time after a 
failure has occurred. This is an important requirement 
if users are not to be over-whelmed by obsolete error 
messages. Unfortunately, it is not easy for non- 
formalists to understand the natural language 
requirement from its formal statement. A related 
point is that the formal expression of the requirement 
provides no clues as to the motivation or justification 
behind the requirement. In other words, it describes 
what the system should do, it does not describe why it 
should do it 
Y t ,3 t': at(automatical1y-remove-warning( 
.e= at(state(blow-back, failed), t )  
A at(display(b1ow-back-error-icon), t )  
A at(sys-cancel(blow-back-error_icon), t') 
blow-back-error), t') 
A before(t, t'). (4) 
In previous papers, we have addressed these problems 
by developing literate specification techniques [ 12, 
131. This approach uses the semi-formal 
argumentation of design rationale to support the use of 
formal methods during the systems development. 
Figure 1 illustrates this approach. Rank Xerox's 
Questions, Options and Criteria (QOC) notation is 
used to document the reasons why the previous clause 
might be adopted within the design of a particular 
system. QOC diagrams are built by identifying the 
key questions that must be addressed during the 
development of an interactive system [3]. 
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C. automatic cancellation of 
the warning reduces the 
burdens on the operator 
Q How should the- 0: (blow-ba&-error) blow back failure 
warning be cancelled? - .  
+/ 
/ 
aotomatically_remove-warning 
C: the automatic cancellation 
of the warning increases the 
designers' confidence that the 
operator has observed 
waming 
Figure 1: Literate Speckfication for the Warning Cancellation. 
A Broekhoven failed to make a visual 
observation of the Ymitos because 
of the number of people on the bridge. 
(Clause 28) [Conclusion 51 
E there were seven other people 
on the bridge at 2037hrs 
(Clause 38) paragraph 411 / c: Broekhoven failed to 
maintain an adequate watch. 
(Clause 25) [Conclusion 11 
EBroekhoven and Vddhoen were 
both preoccu ied with navigation 
tasks from 2830 to 2036hrS. 
ABroekhoven didn't detect the Ymitos 
using ARPA because radar was used for 
navigation and not collision avoidance. 
(Clause 26) [Paragraph 391 
\ 
(Clause 15) Paragraph 391 
Figure 2: Conclusion, Analysis, Evidence (CAE) Diagram for the Noordam Collision 
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The options that answer a particular question are 
then linked to it using the lines shown in Figure 1. 
Finally, options are linked to the criteria that 
support them, using solid lines, or weaken them, 
using broken lines. In Figure 1, the question of 
how to cancel blow-back warnings is answered by 
the design option that is specified by clause (40). 
This is justified by the criteria that the automatic 
cancellation of warnings reduces burdens on 
system operators. This does not help the operator 
to observe the warning. 
The diagram shown in Figure 1 is relatively 
simple in that it only shows a single option for the 
design question. In practice, these diagrams tend 
to show a number of alternative clauses each of 
which represents a different design option for the 
problem being considered. The interested reader is 
directed to Johnson [13] for more detail on the 
application of this approach. 
This blend of formal and semi-formal notations can 
also support the formal analysis of accident reports. 
Natural language annotations of the Questions and 
Criteria provide non-formalists with an entry-point 
into the clauses that represent particular Options. 
In literate specification, these annotations provide 
the justifications for and against formal design 
requirements. In accident analysis, they link 
source material to the clauses that describe the 
relationship between evidence and conclusions. 
5.2 Conclusion, Analysis and Evidence 
(CAE) Diagrams 
The Questions, Options and Criteria notation can be 
translated into a form that directly supports the formal 
analysis of accident reports. Instead of using 
questions to represent critical design issues, diagrams 
can represent the conclusions that are presented in a 
report. The options of a QOC diagram correspond to 
alternative interpretations of the events leading to a 
conclusion. Criteria can be compared to the evidence 
that supports or weakens the interpretation of an 
accident. Figure 2 presents a Conclusion, Analysis 
and Evidence (CAE) diagram for the Noordam 
collision. Broekhoven failed to maintain a vigilant 
watch. This is supported by [Conclusion 13 in the 
report and is formalised in clause (25). The 
conclusion relies upon an analysis which suggests that 
the number of people on the bridge prevented 
Broekhoven from visually detecting the Mount 
Ymitos. This is supported by the analysis in 
[Conclusion 51 of the report and is formalised in 
clause (28). The analysis rests upon evidence 
presented in [Paragraph 411 of the report. The 
conclusion also depends upon an analysis of the way 
in which Broekhoven used the radar. In this analysis, 
he was preoccupied with navigation rather than 
collision avoidance, from [Paragraph 391 represented 
in clause (26). This is supported by evidence in 
There is an important difference between 
Conclusion, Analysis and Evidence diagrams and the 
Question, Options and Criteria notation. Options 
represent alternative design choices in QOC. In 
contrast, the analysis components of a CAE diagram 
support a single conclusion. They are not mutually 
exclusive. It should also be noted that the evidence 
shown in Figure 2 supports the analysis. It is possible 
to use dotted lines and I-’ signs to indicate evidence 
which might contradict a particular line of enquiry. 
CAE diagrams are not intended to replace the 
formal proof techniques that are used in their 
construction. The vernacular labels that represent the 
conclusions, analysis and evidence are open to the 
same problems of inconsistency and mis- 
interpretation that weaken the use of natural language 
in accident reports. For instance, it is perfectly 
possible to link a conclusion to a line of analysis that 
has little or no relationship to the conclusion. The use 
of formal proof techniques helps to ensure that this 
does not happen. It should also be emphasised that 
none of the techniques presented in this paper are 
intended to replace the use of natural language in 
accident report. Our use of discrete mathematics is 
similar to that of forensic scientists who frequently use 
continuous mathematical models, for instance of 
combustion. Both sorts of model can be used to 
represent and reason about the events leading to 
failure. 
The United Kingdom Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council has recently funded a three 
year investigation into the integration of formal 
reasoning and Conclusion, Analysis and Evidence 
diagrams for accident reports. We are particularly 
concerned to provide tool support for these 
techniques. For example, Figure 3 illustrates how 
CAE diagrams can be extended to represent the 
clauses that are used within the proof of a conclusion. 
This illustrates the mathematical relationship between 
the underlying evidence, at the bottom of the diagram, 
and the higher level conclusions. The task of 
constructing and maintaining such diagrams for 
complex accidents clearly requires some form of tool 
support, especially when one realises that key 
components of the proof, such as clause (27), are not 
shown. This problem could be addressed by 
exploiting hierarchical, graphical representations of 
formal proofs, such as tableaux . Hypertext display 
strategies might also be used to filter out the 
associated prose, or conversely, the mathematics at 
different stages during the analysis [ 131. 
[Paragraph 391. 
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C: The proximiate cause of the casually was the failure of Chief Officer Broekhoven. the person in charge of the 
watch on the NOORDAM at the time of the casually, to maintain a vigilant watch in that he did not detect the 
presence of the MOUNT YMITOS visually or on the radar until the MOUNT YMITOS was less than 1 mile 
away and less than 2 minutes before the colliiion. [Conclusion I] 
forall t: not during(vigilant(broeWraten, 1) iff 
n o t ( d w i n s l o b s e r v e ~ r ~ ~ e n .  mountyizos. visual), z), b@ore(z, 2040)). 
notldurhg(obseme(brocwloven. mountyitos, arpa-r&), t), beforeft, 2040)). (25) 
I I 
A.The number of personnel (both watchstanding and 
non-watchstanding) on the bridge of the Noordam betwem 
2020 and the time of the collision may have raised the 
complacency level and lowered the attentiveness of the 
bridge watchstanders with regards to maintaining a 
dedicated visual and radar watch. [Conclusion 51. 
forall t: 
not during(observe@roekhoven, mountqrmitos, visual), t) 
iff during(position(kuiper, bridge(noordam), t), 
. 
I 
I A: Between 2030 and 2036. .__ Veldhoean and Broekhoven 
used the IO-centimeter and centimeter radars to check the 
distance to the domino platforms, and particularly the bearing 
and range of the Racon 't'. They were using the radars for 
collision avoidance and observation of moving targets, and did 
not attempt to correlate every fixed target contact in the radar 
with fixed platforms observed visually to see if any were 
underway contacts rather than fixed platforms [Paragraph 39) 
forall 1: 
during(perfonn(bmkhoven, navigation-radar-check, 1). 
not(during(perform(broeWloven, correlate-radar-taregts, t) (26) 
10-centimeter and centimeter radars to check the distance to the 
domino platforms, and particularly the bearing and range of the 
Racon 't'. They were using the radars for collision avoidance and 
observation of moving targets, and did not attempt to correlate 
every fixed target contact in the radar with fixed platforms observ 
visually to see if any were underway contacts rather than fixed 
platforms [Paragraph 391 
exists t: 
during(perfrom(broekhoven, navigation-radar-check. t), 
not during(perfonn(broekhoven, correlate-radar-targets, t), 
in(t, 2030,2036) (1 5 )  
Figure 3: Conclusion, Analysis and Evidence diagram Integrating Formalisation and Informal Material 
6 Conclusions and Further Work 
This paper has argued that formal methods can support 
the use of natural language in accident reports. In 
particular, we are concerned to demonstrate that the 
recommendations of a report can be justified in terms 
of the events that are described in these documents. 
6.1 Identifying Missing Information 
A key point in this paper has been that informal 
argumentation is weakened by the omission of critical 
information. For example, the Noordam report did 
not explicitly state the reasons why Broekhoven failed 
to perform collision checks using the ARPA radar 
between 20:36 and 2042. Similarly, it did not 
explain why 2020 was cited as the critical moment 
when other crew members impaired operations on the 
bridge. Some of this detail can be inferred from other 
sections of the report. This is dangerous because 
incorrect inferences may lead readers to form 
inappropriate conclusions. For example, it would be 
wrong to assume that the number of crew members on 
the bridge at 2020 should be used as a limit to the 
number of people allowed on the bridge of another 
ship [la]. Formal methods can be used to avoid such 
problems. We have shown how proof techniques can 
be used to establish that an accident report contains all 
of the evidence that is needed to support particular 
conclusions. 
6.2 Structuring Critical Information 
An additional benefit from the application of formal 
proof techniques is that they help analysts to present 
supporting evidence in a coherent format. By this we 
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mean that there is a clear distinction between the 
axioms that model the accident and the theorems that 
represent the conclusions which can be made from that 
model. This is critical because many accident reports 
mix these two different types of information. For 
instance, the Noordam case study presents evidence 
about the number of people on the bridge in the body 
of the report [Paragraph 411. It also presents further 
evidence about this in the closing sections of the report 
[Conclusion 51. This gradual presentation of 
information forces the reader to piece together the 
events leading to the accident over the hundreds of 
pages that, typically, form an accident report. Formal 
proof techniques can help with this because they 
require that the model is built before inferences can be 
drawn. 
6.3 Avoiding Ambiguity. 
Natural language argumentation structures frequently 
make effective use of ambiguity. This is useful when 
it is difficult or impossible to provide exact 
information about particular events during an accident. 
For instance, the Coast Guard report does not 
represent the particular words that were uttered by 
Kuiper when he first observed the lights on the Mount 
Ymitos. It is important to note that this form of 
ambiguity can be modelled through the abstraction 
mechanisms of formal languages. Terms such as 
curse can be used in place of the precise words uttered 
by an operator. However, there are times when 
unnecessary ambiguity can have disastrous 
consequences- for an accident report. A detailed 
analysis of the Noordam case study has shown 
considerable problems in identifying the seven 
individuals who were present on the bridge of the 
Noordam immediately before the collision [paragraph 
411. We initially identified eight people who 
contributed to the events leading up to the accident. 
This inconsistency can be explained in terms of the 
ambiguity of roles, such as quartermaster. They are 
ambiguous in the sense that they cannot easily be 
matched against the names of the individuals involved 
in the accident, such as the lookout Salyo, from 
lengthy natural language accounts. Formal analysis 
helps to avoid this problem by forcing analysts to 
explicitly represent the relationships between the terms 
of Table 1. 
6.4 Defining Relevance 
A final benefit from our formalisation is that it helps to 
define a notion of relevance for the material in an 
accident report. Information must be included if it is 
necessary in explaining the conclusions that are 
reached in the report. This is not to say that any 
details which are not called upon in the conclusions 
ought to be omitted. Much of the detail in an accident 
report helps to establish the context of failure rather 
that just the events that led to the accident. In the 
Noordam, this includes detailed consideration of the 
'rules of the road' for maritime navigation. In 
contrast, we argue that information must be included if 
it supports the conclusions that are drawn from an 
investigation. This does not just relate to factual 
information, such as the missing timings mentioned in 
Section 6.1. It also refers to the supporting inferences 
that help to link the factual analysis to the conclusions. 
For example, in order to prove Conclusion 1, we were 
forced to explicitly state the reasons why Broekhoven 
failed to maintain a vigilant watch, see clause (23). 
Unfortunately, our work has shown that readers are 
often expected to infer the arguments that support the 
conclusions in accident reports. 
6.5 Future Work 
The techniques that are described in this paper can be 
applied to represent and reason about the bias that is 
often embodied in accident reports. This is achieved 
by examining the factual information and the 
inferences that are presented in each account. Formal 
analysis can then be used to identify the impact that 
factual omissions have for the reader. For example, 
very different interpretations might have been 
produced if the Coast Guard's report had removed 
information about the number of people on the bridge 
of the Noordam. Such an omission not only affects 
the timeline of events leading to failure, it also restricts 
the valid inferences that can be made about an 
accident. For instance, readers would have been 
forced to find alternative explanations for 
Broekhoven's failure to visually observe the Mount 
Ymitos. Formal analysis can identiQ these differences 
because it would no longer be possible to prove 
theorem (23). We have already demonstrated that this 
approach can be used to identify 'biases' in the 
reporting of nuclear power accidents [21]. It remains 
to be seen whether these techniques can be applied to 
accident reports from other domains. An important 
pre-requisite for this work is the tool support 
mentioned in the previous section. CAE diagrams 
quickly become unmanageable for the more complex 
proofs that are required to demonstrate the impact of 
bias between different accident reports. 
It is important to emphasise that CAE diagrams and 
formal proof techniques are not intended to replace the 
natural language presentation of accident reports. In 
contrast, our intention is to provide a clear and 
coherent structure for the argumentation in accident 
reports [20]. This additional degree of precision is 
required if companies are to use these documents as a 
means of guiding future development and investment 
decisions. 
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Abstract 
The formalization and analysis of an air traffic control 
separation minima serves in this paper as an 
illustration of an approach that uses formal 
operational semantics to drive the automated analysis 
of specifications. This contrasts with the approach of 
translating one notation into the input format for an 
analysis tool, or hard-coding the semantics of a 
particular notation into the implementation of an 
analysis technique. 
The semantic functions capture the structure of the 
specification and can be directly evaluated to map a 
notation to a rigourous mathematical foundation. This 
work contributes to a greater appreciation of how the 
structure of a specification (e.g., the organization of a 
table), not just .the semantics, is an important input to 
many analysis functions. Building upon a common 
mathematical foundation, different notations can be 
combined to support an integrated approach to the 
analysis of a formal specification. A related issue is 
the importance of being able to reverse the effect of the 
semantic functions so that analysis results are 
provided to users at the same level of abstraction used 
in the input specifications. 
The formalization of the separation minima combines 
the use of a tabular style of specification with predicate 
logic. This paper discusses how automated analysis 
functions were applied to the specification to check for 
the properties of consistency, completeness and 
symmetry. The benefit of doing this analysis is 
demonstrated by the discovery of an ambiguity in the 
separation minima. 
1. Introduction 
This paper describes work carried out at the University 
of British Columbia in collaboration with Hughes 
International Airspace Management Systems to 
formalize and validate a specification of the separation 
Jeffrey J. Joyce, Geny Pelletier 
{jjoyce,gpelletier} @ccgate.hac.com 
Hughes International Airspace Management Systems 
1395 1 Bridgeport Rd, 
Richmond, BC, Canada V6V 156 
minima for aircraft in the North Atlantic (NAT) 
region. Our formalization is based on a description 
provided in a source document published by Transport 
Canada on behalf of ICAO’. This document describes 
the official North Atlantic Separation Minima as 
published by ICAO. This description provides 
guidance to air traffic controllers managing the region 
of oceanic airspace between Europe and North 
America. It is also used as the basis for the 
development of software based systems that support 
the management of the NAT region. For example, it 
would be used during the planning of a flight from 
New York to London to check whether the route is 
free from separation conflicts with other aircraft 
expected to be in the NAT region at the same time. 
This collaboration has directly involved domain 
experts (not just formal methods experts) in the 
process of developing and analyzing a formal 
representation of a complex “real” description. The 
source document is an informal specification that has 
been scrutinized by the NATSPG (NAT Systems 
Planning Group) members who are ATC specialists 
from the NAT countries, and most of them maintain 
and use automated systems that implement these rules. 
Our formal representation of these separation minima 
is given in a mixture of a tabular style of specification 
and a variant of higher order logic called “S’ Ell]. 
‘This document, “Application of Separation Minima 
for the NAT Region” (3rd edition, effective December 
1992), was published by Transport Canada on behalf 
the ICAO North Atlantic Systems Planning Group. 
ICAO is the International Civil Aviation Organization 
with headquarters in Montreal, Canada. This 
separation minima document was developed by the 
COMAG (Communications and ATM Automation 
Group), now called the CADAG (Communication, 
Automation and Data Link Applications Group). 
35 
Combining multiple notations makes it possible to 
choose the notation best suited to the various parts of 
the specification. The tabular style was chosen 
because the rules consist of complex decision logic 
describing predicates and functions. To unite the 
various parts, including environmental assumptions, 
in a common framework for analysis, the tables are 
considered a “style” of specification in the S notation. 
A “style” of specification includes associated semantic 
functions for the constructs that are introduced, which 
makes it possible to capture the structure of the 
specification and give meaning to the notation. 
Once in a common environment, the specification can 
then be analyzed for various properties. These range 
from “style” independent properties, such as 
typechecking and symmetry, to properties particular to 
the notation being used. This paper describes the 
analysis of the completeness and consistency of the 
tabular specifications. Symmetry is a particularly 
desirable property of the separation minima, so we 
also describe how the same analysis mechanisms used 
for completeness and consistency are used to do this 
check. The most significant result of the analysis was 
the discovery of two tables in the specification with 
inconsistencies, where, for the same scenario, the 
specification indicated two different amounts of 
aircraft separation. 
The formal specification and related analysis results 
Can be found on-line at 
http://www.cs.ubc.ca/spider/day/Research/ 
SeparationMinima/SeparationMinima.html . 
This work tests the doctoral thesis hypothesis of the 
first author, Day. This hypothesis is that explicit 
definitions of the operational semantics of a notation 
can be used directly in the analysis and that this 
method retains the domain knowledge captured by the 
structure of the specification, which can be exploited 
in analysis. This structure can be used to help convert 
the specification to a finite model and to determine 
the correct level of abstraction for presentation of the 
results of analysis. This paper outlines the framework 
for using operational semantics for analysis. We have 
implemented this framework, including the analysis 
techniques described in this paper in a tool called 
Fusion. The overall goal of this work is to make it 
possible to perform fast, automatic, lightweight checks 
to streamline the validation of specifications. The 
automated checks do not provide absolute assurance, 
but they isolate details that can be reviewed 
independently. The individual analysis checks 
described here usually took about 1 second of 
execution time on a Pentium-120 with 1 6 . m  running 
Linux. 
2. Related Work 
2.1 Notation 
Since the separation minima is a specification of 
combinations of conditions that produce different 
outcomes, a tabular style of specification seemed 
suitable. Previous successful efforts of using tables 
provide a good precedent for the readability of a 
tabular style of specification. These efforts include the 
AND/OR tables of the TCAS 11 project[l2] and the 
Software Cost Reduction (SCR) notation used in the 
A-7 aircraft Operational Flight Program[9]. Initially, 
we considered using either AND/OR tables, or the 
style of tables presented by Parnas [16]. SCR tables 
are typically for system specifications that involve 
‘‘modes” of operation and the separation minima does 
not have this characteristic. 
An AND/OR table consists of a series of rows labeled 
by predicates. The columns to the right of the label 
contain “T“ for true, “F” for false, or I‘.” for “don’t 
care”. The cell is meant to represent the case where 
the condition given by the label is true or false. A 
“don’t care” value means that the cell could contain 
either true or false. The .table represents a predicate 
that is true if the conjunction of the cells in any 
column results in true. 
A difficulty with AND/OR tables is that they only 
represent predicates. In the separation rules, sets of 
conditions are used to describe cases for different 
return values of functions. 
The other approach considered was the tabular style 
presented by Parnas E161 which allows for the 
grouping of related conditions along a row. Grouping 
is achieved by allowing each different argument of the 
predicate (or function) represented by the table to have 
its own dimension. Hence, this style is best suited for 
capturing functions of a small number of dimensions 
which is not the case for the tables we expected to 
construct in our formal representation of the NAT 
separation minima. 
2.2 Analysis 
In the TCAS 11 specification, a table can be used to 
describe the condition for taking a transition in a state 
machine. - In the completeness and consistency 
analysis carried out by Heimdahl and L,eveson[6], the 
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specification is considered complete if a transition is 
always enabled from a state. It is consistent if the 
specification is deterministic, i.e., if no two transitions 
can be enabled at the same time. 
In the TCAS 11 AND/OR tables the cells in the rows 
can contain only true, false, or “don’t care”. In the 
analysis, a Boolean variable is associated with each 
row label. The meaning of each cell in the row is the 
condition of whether this Boolean variable is true or 
false. This allows for an efficient implementation 
using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [2]. 
Completeness analysis checks that the disjunction of 
the columns of all the tables used to describe 
transitions from a given state is a tautology. 
Consistency analysis checks that there is no overlap in 
the conditions between multiple tables describing 
transitions from the same state, Le., the conjunction of 
the meaning of two tables is a contradiction. 
Checking if the BDD representation of an expression 
is a tautology or a contradiction takes constant time. 
A difficuity with AND/OR tables is that related 
conditions such as “x c 280” and “x > 450” are listed 
on separate rows and therefore the structure of the 
table does not capture the relationship between these 
terms. Related conditions are associated with different 
Boolean variables. This can result in the analysis 
producing false negatives. For example, it might 
return a bogus result indicating that no table covers 
the case where both the conditions “x<280” and 
“x>450” are true. The tool created by Heimdahl and 
Leveson catches false negatives with respect to 
enumerated types, but not those arising from the use of 
mathematical functions. They are investigating 
linking their analysis with a theorem prover [6]. 
Although SCR tables are not applicable to the 
separation minima, their analysis techniques are 
relevant. Heitmeyer, Jeffords and Labaw [7,8] 
describe work on checking the completeness and 
consistency of condition tables given in the SCR 
notation. They also define completeness as a coverage 
property - that the disjunction.of the conditions in a 
row is a tautology. Currently, they limit themselves to 
conditions ranging over Boolean values or those that 
have been converted by hand to Boolean variables. 
Expressions involving relations are also converted 
manually into Boolean variables. They are working on 
techniques to reason about conditions involving 
mathematical functions. Their analysis of the 
condition tables for the Operational Flight Program of 
the US Navy’s A-7 aircraft found 17 legitimate errors 
in 36 tables with a total of 98 rows. Two false errors 
were found due to their strictly Boolean interpretation 
of the specification. Given the manual encoding to 
Boolean variables, these results must have been 
mapped by hand back to the correct level of 
abstraction for interpretation. 
Both of these previous examples are control-oriented 
systems. In systems that contain a great deal of data 
complexity, such as these separation minima, it 
becomes more important to capture and utilize the 
relationships among data values. 
Our work is similar to that carried out by Owe, 
Rushby, and Shankar where they have added a table 
construct to the PVS theorem prover[l4,15]. The 
theorem prover is used to address some of the 
deficiencies of a strictly BDD-based approach. They 
follow the same approach as us of semantically 
embedding decision tables within higher order logic. 
The checks for completeness and consistency are 
carried out by proving type correctness conditions for 
the tables. This requires minimal theorem proving 
effort when the tables are complete and consistent but 
it appears that some effort is required to extract the 
cases not covered or the inconsistent cases. 
Our effort documented here also attempts to address 
the difficulties of a strictly BDD-based approach while 
staying within the realm of lightweight, fully 
automatic techniques. In particular, we show how the 
structure of the table often can be utilized to eliminate 
the need for a more heavyweight tool such as a 
theorem prover. Our approach to executing the 
semantic definitions using symbolic functional 
evaluation as is done in functional programming 
languages also differentiates this work. Finally we 
demonstrate the value of including environmental 
constraints in the analysis process and present a 
simple approach for dealing with quantification to 
make this possible. 
3. Specification Notation 
At the beginning of this project, the first author was 
presented with an interpretation of the separation 
minima expressed as pseudo code (a draft documented 
dated 20 Sept 95). This interpretation was created by a 
third party to provide software developers with an 
algorithmic interpretation of the English text and 
diagrams contained in the NAT region separation 
minima specification. This pseudo code imposed an 
order of evaluation on the conditions as well as other 
implementation details. The imperative 
programming style of specification used involves 
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Figure 1: Vertical Separation 
assignments of default values to variables followed by 
if-then-else statements to modify these variables, as 
well as procedure calls. Most of the conditions of the 
if-then-else statements were expressed in terms of 
English phrases. 
Our goal became to formalize the separation minima 
using a notation that did not impose implementation 
constraints and that was amenable to analysis so we 
could determine which cases were being covered by 
the default values. This effort also required sorting 
out the variety of English phrases used to describe 
various conditions to yield a “dictionary” of primitives 
that were then introduced in the formal representation 
as uninterpreted functions and predicates. 
Our review of previous work using tabular 
specifications led to the use of a variation of AND/OR 
tables. This variation allows related conditions to be 
captured within a row in a style closer to the idea of 
decision tables given in the structured analysis 
methodology of DeMarco 131. A row isolates one 
dimension of the decision and the columns relate the 
different dimensions to produce a case. A table can 
also represent functions through the addition of a row 
of return values. 
Figure 1 is an example of our tabular style of 
specification; this particular table specifies the 
minimum vertical separation (in feet) that must exist 
between two aircraft for them to be considered 
separated in the NAT region. The name of the 
function and the arguments to the function are given 
in the last row of the table which gives the return 
values of the function. Except for the last row of the 
table, the label of a row (the leftmost column) is an 
expression. The cells of the row are predicates that 
can be applied to this label to produce the condition 
that the cell represents. The parameter of the 
predicate is given by the “-” in the cell. A “-” means 
“don’t care”, i.e., the predicate is always true. Then, as 
with AND/OR tables, the conjunction of the cells in 
any column is the case where the function returns the 
value in the last row for that column. 
A semantically equivalent representation in S of the 
function given in Figure 1 is: 
VerticalSeparationRequired(A:flight, B:flight) := 
if (A.FlightLeve1 <= 280) then 1000 
else if (B.FlightLeve1 <= 280) then 1000 
else if ( (A.FlightLeve1 > 450) AND 
(B.FlightLevel> 450) AND 
(IsSupersonic (A) = T) ) then 4000 
else if ( (A.FlightLeve1 > 450) AND 
(B.FlightLeve1 > 450) AND 
(IsSupersonic (B) = T) ) then 4000 
else 2000; 
The arguments A and B represent flights. In S, the 
“dot” notation as used in the expression 
“A.FlightLevel” is merely syntactic sugar for function 
application. “A.RightLevel” is interpreted by an S 
parser as “FlightLevel (A)” to allow for the 
representation of static information about an item in 
the familiar “record” type of notation. 
In addition to standard, “built-in” predicates such as 
“e=” and ‘Y’, the formalization also involved the 
introduction of uninterpreted types and constants. An 
uninterpreted constant has a type but no definition. 
For example, the following S declarations introduce an 
uninterpreted type2 (“flight”), an uninterpreted 
function (“FlightLevel”) and an uninterpreted 
predicate (“IsSupersonic”): 
:flight; 
FlightLevel : flight -> num; 
IsSupersonic : flight -> bool; 
Uninterpreted types are analogous to “basic types” in 
a Z specification[ 171. 
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The use of uninterpreted terms allowed us to phrase 
the specification in domain terminology and to match 
the level of abstraction appropriate for this 
specification. 
The table for vertical separation in Figure 1 specifies a 
function. In the case of a predicate (Le., a function 
that returns a Boolean value) the bottom row of return 
values can be omitted and the cases designated by the 
columns are assumed to return true for the predicate. 
Any other cases are assumed to return false. 
These tables also allowed us to match the modular 
nature of the decomposition of the separation minima. 
For example, longitudinal separation between two 
aircraft that are both turbojet depends on the current 
airspace (MNPS or WATRS3) of the aircraft. These 
cases are given in separate tables. 
Since we were working within the S environment, we 
were also able to use definitions of functions in 
predicate logic rather than tables in some cases. These 
function could reference tables and tables could 
reference functions defined in S. This illustrated the 
benefits of being able to combine multiple notations. 
4. Formalization Process 
Figure 2 illustrates our formalization and analysis 
process. An important element in gaining industry 
acceptance of any formal method is the form in which 
the specification is presented for review to non formal 
methods experts. We chose to use HTML so that 
changes to the specification could be quickly viewed 
by all authors and so that cross references in the 
document between the use and definition of terms 
could be given using hyperlinks. This made it possible 
to give supplementary text to describe the formal 
tables. The top-down presentation given by this 
document also has advantages over the bottom-up 
order (i.e. declaring or defining terms before they are 
used) which is expected by analysis tools. However, it 
was also necessary to have a version of the 
specification that could be input to the analysis tools. 
To eliminate the difficulty of having to maintain 
versions of the specification existing in different 
forms, we created one document that is a mixture of 
HTML and formal notation. We used a preprocessor 
that produces the specification in pure HTML (using 
HTML tables for the formal tables) and automatically 
MNPS is Mininum Navigational Performance 
Specification. WATRS is West Atlantic Route 
System. 
generates links from references to the declarations and 
definitions of terms4. It also produces a separate file 
containing only the representation in formal notation 
in the correct order which is used as input to the 
analysis tool. 
The first draft of the formal specification was created 
by the first author based on a pseudo code 
representation of the separation minima. The first step 
in the formalization process was to determine the 
primitives of the specification and introduce these as 
uninterpreted functions and predicates in S. The 
pseudo code is modular so parts of it can be matched 
to individual tables. For each table, the relevant 
“inputs” were determined and used as the labels for 
the table rows. Columns in each table were then 
created as given by the logical combinations of these 
inputs. Typechecking was used to validate the first 
draft of our formal representation of the separation 
minima. 
The first draft of the specification was handed off to 
the third author who is the domain expert. The only 
explanation of the tables that he was given was one 
paragraph of text with an example at the beginning of 
the document. From this, he edited the HTML, version 
of the document and supplied the first author with a 
revised draft of the specification. This included 
smaller changes, such as terminology, and more 
meaningful changes, such as clarification of 
ambiguous phrases identified by the first author, such 
as, “a portion of the routes of both aircraft are within 
OR above OR below MNPS airspace”. The correct 
interpretation of this phrase is that each aircraft is 
considered independently with respect to MNPS 
airspace, as opposed to both aircraft having to be 
within MNPS airspace or both having to be above 
MNPS airspace, etc. Relationships between various 
primitive terms were also identified. 
This preprocesser was developed in the course of this 
work but is a separate tool that could be used for 
various specification notations. Information is 
available at http://www.cs.ubc.cdsp/spider/day/ 
Research/hpp.html . 
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NAT Separation Minima -. - - - -. I (English and diagrams) 
manual translation Q  mixed HTlMuS format 
S 
(Le., typed predicate logic) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Fusion I 
(analysis functions) I 
............................................................... 
! coreprocess 
I v .............................................. 
pure HTML format input for other tools i 
(for viewing by a browser) (e.g.,PVS,HOL, ...) i 
... ..................................... 
output of analysis 
(e.g., completeness checking) 
Figure 2: Process Overview 
The most notable absence from the pseudo code was 
the top level requirement stating what separation 
means. Two aircraft are separated if they satisfy the 
separation minima for at least one dimension, i.e. 
vertical, lateral, or longitudinal. The criteria for each 
of these is given in different units. The top level 
requirement as stated in S is given in Figure 3. In this 
requirement, ‘‘ABS’’ takes the absolute value of its 
argument. Vertical separation is measured in feet. 
Lateral separation is measured in miles (or 
equivalently in degrees of latitude). Longitudinal 
separation is measured in minutes. Two aircraft on 
opposing tracks cannot be considered longitudinally 
separated during a certain range of time when the 
aircraft are close to crossing. Vertical or lateral 
separation must exist during that time. 
40 
AreSeparated(A:flight,B:flight,t:time) := 
/* A and B are vertically separated based on flight level */ 
(ABS(A.FlightLeve1- B.FlightLeve1) > VerticalSeparationRequired(A,B)) 
OR 
/* A and B are laterally separated based on either position in degrees of latitude or position in miles */ 
(if (LatitudeEquivalent(A,B)) then 
(ABS(A.LateralPosition1nDegrees - B.LateralPosition1nDegrees) >LateralSeparationRequiredInDegre! 
(A,BN 
else 
(ABS(A.LateralPositionInMiles - B.LateralPositionInMi1es) > LateralSeparationRequiredInMiles (A,B))) 
OR 
/* A and B are longitudinally separated based on time, depending on whether the two flights are in the 
(if (AngularDifferenceGreaterThan9ODegr~s(A.Rou~Se~ent,B.RouteSegment)) then 
approximate same or opposite direction */ 
/* opposite direction *I 
NOT (WithinOppDirNoLongSepPeriod(AJ3,t)) 
else /* same direction */ 
ABS(A.TimeAtPosition - B .TimeAtPosition) >LongSameDirSepRequired(A,B)); 
Figure 3: Top level Specification of Separation I 
The addition of the top level requirement pointed out 
that the proper distinction had not made between 
minima for aircraft on opposing tracks and those on 
same direction tracks. The requirement on aircraft 
flying the same direction is a minimum number of 
minutes of separation. The requirement for aircraft 
flying in opposing directions is that some other form 
of separation must exist during the time period when 
the aircraft cross. This change mainly affected the 
statement of the top level requirement. 
The resulting specification consisted of 15 tables, 16 
definitions in S, and 47 uninterpreted constants. The 
largest table consisted of 8 rows and 6 columns. 
5. Analysis 
Our goal was to analyze the completeness, 
consistency, and symmetry of the tables in the 
separation minima specification. Completeness 
checking automatically determines the cases that are 
covered by the default column, or if no default is 
given, the cases that are not covered in the table. 
Consistency analysis returns pairs of columns with 
different return values that both include a set of 
conditions that can be true at the same time. 
Symmetry analysis determines if the table has the 
same meaning when its arguments (the pair of flights) 
are given in the opposite order. 
All of these forms of analysis are based on the possible 
combinations of entries in the rows of the table. They 
cannot determine if some aspect of the decision given 
by the table has been omitted. 
The framework for specification and analysis proposed 
in the thesis work of the first author is illustrated in 
Figure 4. Requirements specifications, possibly given 
in multiple notations are placed within a common 
logical framework using an embedding that closely 
matches the original notation and does not lose the 
structure of the specification. Semantic functions 
define the meaning of the embedded notation in logic. 
The semantic functions also indicate explicit join 
points for how multiple notations fit together, such as 
a predicate table being used to describe the condition 
on a transition in a statechart [5] similar to what is 
done in RSML (Requirements State Machine 
Language) [12].The keywords used in the embedding 
and their associated semantic functions are called a 
“style” of specification in S .  
These semantic functions are executable in the sense 
that they map a structured specification, such as a 
table, into an expression in logic. The expression in 
logic is called the semantic representation in the 
diagram. One method of executing these semantics is 
to use rewrite rules within a theorem prover. 
However, this is a more general mechanism than is 
needed for functions known to be executable. 
Drawing on techniques from functional programming 
language implementations, Fusion includes a symbolic 
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Figure 4: Specification and Analysis Framework 
functional evaluator which can execute statements in 
S ,  stopping when it reaches uninterpreted constants. 
This engine carries out evaluation in place for 
efficiency, as is done in the implementation of a 
functional programming language. 
Separately, clues given in the structure of the 
specification can be used to help determine 
simplifications to map the semantic representation 
into a finite mbdel that can be efficiently represented 
using BDDs and analyzed using automatic means. 
Sometimes the simplification implied by the structure 
is not a valid abstraction. If the tool can not determine 
the validity of the simplifications these are stated to 
the user as “assumptions”. This serves to the reduce 
the review process to one of evaluating isolated 
assumptions. 
The results of the analysis map the simplifications 
back into the terms of the specification for the user to 
examine. 
S language where the textual specification of the table 
in S is structurally close to the tabular presentation. 
Figure 5 shows the S representation of the table for 
“VerticalSeparationRequired” given in Figure 1. Our 
preprocessor turns this representation into an HTIVL 
table. 
The keyword ‘“Row” is a semantic definition that 
substitutes the label of each row into the list of 
predicates. The ‘‘-” describing the parameter of the 
predicate in the HTML version is given by a lambda 
variable. “DC’ is a predicate that always returns the 
value true. This takes the place of the “.” in cells in 
the HTML representation. “TRUE” is a predicate that 
states that its parameter must have the value “true”. 
The result of applying the “Row” function is a list of 
elements with Boolean values. 
The keyword “Table” gives meaning to the table, 
matching the conjunctions of values in the columns 
with return values. These semantic functions are 
defined in S and given in Appendix A. 
We regard tables to be a “style” of specification in the 
VerticalSeparationRequired (A,B) := Table 
[Row (A.FlightLeve1) [*.x e= 280); DC; 0X. x > 450); 0X.x > 450)]; 
Row (B.FlightLeve1) [ DC; 0 . x  <= 280); c\x. x > 450); 0X.x > 450)]; 
Row (IsSupersonic (A)) [ DC; DC; TRUE; DC I; 
Row (IsSupersonic (B)) [ DC; DC; DC; TRUE I 1  
[ 1000;1000;4000;4000;2000]; 
Figure 5: VerticalSeparationRequired Table in S I 
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Figure 6: Example Row 
A-FlightLevel <= 280 
(280 < AHightLevel ) AND (A.FlightLevel<=450) 
450 < A. FlightLevel 
Having related conditions in a row uses the structure 
of the table to show how the user views the possible 
values of the row label. For example, in the table 
found in Figure 1 for vertical separation, the flight 
level of each aircraft is only important in how it 
compares to flight levels 280 and 450 for the purposes 
of the function given by the table. Therefore the 
analysis can assume that the specifier would like the 
analysis results given in these terms as well. This is in 
keeping with our goal of returning results at the same 
level of abstraction as the specification. 
NOT(a1) AND NOT(a2) 
a1 AND NOT(a2) 
NOT(a1) AND a2 
The simplification engine uses the entries in a row to 
partition the state space for the aspect of the problem 
given by the label of that row. This partition can then 
be encoded in Boolean variables just as an enumerated 
type can be encoded for automatic verification (as seen 
in [ 1, lo]). For example, if a row contained the entries 
found in Figure 6, there are three conditions given by 
the cells in this row: 
A.FlightLeve1 <= 280 
(280 < A.FlightLeve1) AND (A.FlightLevele450) 
450 < A. FlightLevel 
The flight levels of A have been divided into three 
ranges. To represent these ranges, we need two 
Boolean variables, say a1 and a2. We can use the 
encoding given in Figure 7. The use of structure 
eliminates the need for the more heavyweight 
reasoning of a theorem prover in this instance. 
This encoding results in one leftover possible encoding 
for the Boolean variables of al=true and a2=true. 
Since this does not correspond to any possible real 
case, we add this to the final expression to check in 
the analysis to ensure that this artifact does produce an 
extraneous result. 
This technique does make the assumption that the 
partition the user provides is complete and consistent. 
This is not always the case. Some readers may have 
noticed that for , the table 
“VerticalSeparationRequired” in Figure 1, using only 
the elements in the first row leaves out the case for 
when the flight level is between 280 and 450. An 
earlier version of the tool stated these assumptions 
about the partition to the user. This approach isolated 
details of the specification to review separately. The 
conditions given by the partition could also be 
evaluated by an automated decision procedure in a 
theorem prover such as PVS [13]. 
After noting that these assumptions are incorrect (i.e., 
a range is missing), one possible remedy is to modify 
the table. However, in all cases for the tables in this 
specification, the predicates over numeric values 
consist of a comparison to a concrete value. To 
improve the accuracy of the analysis results, we added 
a simple interval checker which checks the partition of 
the range given by the elements of the row and adds 
any ranges not mentioned explicitly in the row. After 
this addition, one table remained with overlapping 
ranges in the elements of the row. The interval 
checker identified this case and we modified the table 
to separate the ranges into multiple rows and used 
environmental assumptions to relate the rows. 
There are many times when the possible values given 
by the element labeling the row are known. An 
example is a Boolean condition such as “IsSupersonic” 
found in the “VerticalSeparationRequired” table. This 
element can take on the values true and false even 
though the row for it in this particular table never has 
a false case. The checker automatically recognizes 
these situations and considers both true and false as 
possible values in the analysis. This is applicable for 
any values of finite types. Enumerated types can be 
declared using S declarations. 
Figure 7: Example Encoding 
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Including N ~ S . S  
>%comp VerticalSeparationRequired 
VerticalSepacationRequired is: 
(Table 
t 
((Row (FlightLevel A)) 
((Row (FlightLevel B)) 
;((Row (IsSupersonic A)) [DC;DC,TRUE;DC]); 
((Row (IsSupersonic B)) [Dc;DC;Dc;TRLE])]) 
[(lx.(x e= 280));DC;(lx.(x > 450));(lx.(x > 450))l); 
[DC;(lx.(x e= 280));Ox.(x > 450));@.(x > 450))l) 
t1000; 1000;4000;4000;20001) 
Invoking interval checker ... 
Interval checker partitions the range into: 
((FlightLevel A) > 450) 
((280 e (FlightLevel A)) AND ((FlightLevel A) e= 450)) 
((FlightLevel A) <= 280) 
Invoking interval checker ... 
Interval checker partitions the range into: 
((FlightLevel B) > 450) 
((280 e (FlightLevel B)) AND ((FlightLevel B) e= 450)) 
((FlightLevel B) e= 280) 
The following cases 
yield the default value of 2000 
Case 1 
Row 1 : ((280 e (FlightLevel A)) AND ((FlightLevel A) e= 450)) 
Row 2 : ((280 e (FlightLevel B)) AND ((FlightLeveI B) e= 450)) 
Row 3 : DC 
Row 4 : DC 
case 2 
Row 1 : ((FlightLevel A) > 450) 
Row 2 : ((280 e (FlightLevel B)) AND ((FlightLevel B) e= 450)) 
Row 3 : DC 
Row 4 : DC 
case 3 
Row 1 : ((280 e (FlightLevel A)) AND ((FlightLevel A) e= 450)) 
Row 2 : ((FlightLevel B) > 450) 
Row 3 : DC 
Row 4 : DC 
case4 
Row 1 : ((FlightLevel A) > 450) 
Row 2 : ((FlightLevel B) > 450) 
Row 3 : ((IsSupersonic A) = F) 
Row 4 : ((IsSupersonic B) = F) 
Stats for VerticalSeparationRequired completeness checking: 
Number of cases identified: 4 
Total time: 1 sec 
> 
Figure 8: Completeness Checker Output 
5.1 Completeness Checking 
Checking the completeness of a table means 
determining if all possible cases are covered by the 
specification. The meaning of a column is the 
conjunction of the predicates in the row cells. For the 
tables, completeness checking involves checking 
whether the expression denoting the disjunction of the 
columns is a tautology. By applying the semantic 
function for the meaning of a predicate table and using 
the Boolean encodings identified by the simplification 
engine described above, we can evaluate this check 
efficiently. 
Figure 8 shows a Fusion session in which the 
completeness analysis function “comp” is applied to 
the table “VerticalSeparationRequired”. Every line 
shown in Figure 2 is generated by Fusion except for 
the two user commands which appear on the lines that 
begin with the user prompt, 5”. The first command 
“%include  minima.^" causes the S representation of 
the separation minima to be parsed and typechecked. 
The second command “%camp 
VerticalSeparationRequired” causes the completeness 
analysis function to be applied to the table 
“VerticalSeparationRequired”. 
The completeness analysis function first invokes the 
interval checker for the first two rows. It correctly 
determines the missing range for the possible values of 
the “HightLevel” of the aircraft. 
The completeness analysis function then generates a 
list of the cases covered by the default column. The 
analysis reveals four of these cases. In order to 
minimize the amount of output generated by the 
checker, the results are given in an approximation of 
. minimal sum-of-prbducts form. This can be seen in 
the use of “don’t care” (“DC”) values for some of the 
rows. It was important that these results were given in 
terms of the unexpanded row label in cases where the 
row label was an application of a function defined 
elsewhere. This meant the reviewer could easily 
match the cases given in the results to the original 
table in HTML after substituting the row label into the 
blank. 
In reviewing this session output, the domain expert 
would decide whether the default value, 2000, is 
appropriate for the listed cases. The maximum 
number of default cases revealed by the completeness 
analysis for this specification was 50 - for a table of 
eight rows and six columns. A table is not necessarily 
flawed because it has default cases - but it is 
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important for the default cases to be enumerated and 
reviewed by a domain expert. This kind of analysis 
would be performed by some means in a disciplined 
system development process. However, the use of an 
automated completeness analysis function, as 
illustrated here, streamlines and systematizes the 
review process by enumerating the default cases 
explicitly. A possible method of evaluating these 
would be to iteratively examine a single case, 
determine whether it is an error or not, and then add 
it, likely in a generalized format (Le., with “don’t 
care” values in some of the cells) to the table. This 
approach would mean that the default cases would 
gradually be fully specified. Thus, the use of Fusion 
for this purpose can also be seen as a way to measure 
the quality of a specification. 
order to reduce these expressions to the terms used in 
the tables, we substituted any existing items of the 
correct type as the parameter in the “forall” 
expression. Most of the tables involve two flights, A 
and B. The above environmental assumption would 
evaluate to: 
mutually-exclusive(InCruiseC1imb A, IsLevel A) 
AND 
mutually-exclusive(InCruiseC1imb B, IsLevel B) 
Substitutions determined by the simplification engine 
for the table, along with some additional Boolean 
variables (since all environmental assumptions are not 
relevant to every table) are used to encode the 
environmental Bssumption. 
In Heimdahl and Leveson’s work [6], they are able to 
draw conclusions about the overall completeness of a 
specification by referring to a functional definition of 
the semantics. For this specification, we can ask 
whether the completeness of individual tables ensures 
the completeness of the overall specification. Given 
that the tables represent functions, if the other parts of 
the specification (including the uninterpreted 
functions) represent total functions then we can 
conclude that the specification is complete, assuming 
the scope of each table is complete. 
The addition of environmental constraints slightly 
changed the method of evaluating the completeness of 
a table. Instead of checking whether the meaning of 
the table was a tautology, we had to check whether the 
environment conjoined with the negation of the 
meaning of the table was a contradiction. 
In the output, the environmental assumptions are not 
listed. They are existentially quantified out of the 
results. 
5.3 Consistency Checking 
5.2 Environmental Assumptions 
In reviewing the output of the completeness checker, 
our domain expert pointed out that some of the cases 
produced were impossible. These were situations 
where the rows within a table were related to each 
other. For example, an aircraft cannot satisfy both of 
the constraints “InCruiseClimb” and “IsLevel” at the 
same moment. 
These constraints are information about the physical 
limitations of the items involved in the specification. 
They can be considered assumptions about the 
environment. We documented these in S using 
expressions such as: 
forall @:flight). 
mutually-exclusive(InCruiseC1imb F, IsLevel F) 
where “mutually~exclusive” is defined to mean only 
one of its arguments can be true. 
These expressions are evaluated using the symbolic 
functional evaluator as for the tables. However in 
Consistency checking involves comparing each 
column of a table to all other columns within the table 
that have a different return value to see if the cases 
denoted by the columns overlap. The same evaluation 
xons OtherSameDuLongSep env 
otherSameDih0ngSep is: 
( 
(Table 
[((Row (RepoxtedOverCommonPoint (A , B))) [TRuE;DC]); 
((Row (SameOrDivergingTracks (A , B))) [TRUE,DC]); 
((Row ((Allof [A;B]) (k((Is0nRoute Routes3) x)) 
[DC;TRUE])]) [ 15;20;301) 
Columns 1 and 2 conflict in the following: 
Case 1 
Row 1 : ((ReportedOverCommonPoint (A, B)) = T) 
Row 2 : ((Same0rDivergingTrack.s (A, B)) = T) 
Row 3 : (((Allof [A;B]) (lx.((IsOnRoute Routes3) x)) = T) 
Stats for OtherSameDirLongSep consistency checking: 
Number of cases identified: 1 
Total time: 0 sec 
Figure 9: Output of Consistency Checker r 
1 
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and simplification process used for completeness 
checking is used for this analysis. However, here we 
check whether the conjunction of the meaning of the 
two columns is a contradiction. If the result is a 
contradiction, the checker indicates the two columns 
involved and lists the case(s) where they overlap in the 
same form as the output for completeness checking. 
The results of analyzing the separation minima 
revealed that two tables are inconsistent. After 
consulting the official specification (i.e. not the pseudo 
code representation), our domain expert concluded 
that these are cases where the specification is 
ambiguous. 
Figure 9 shows the result of analyzing one of the 
tables that is inconsistent. The table 
“otherSameDirLongSep” specifies the number of 
minutes of time that must exist between two aircraft 
(that are not both turbojet or both supersonic) flying in 
the same direction for them to be considered 
longitudinally separated. The checker identified that, 
for the case where two aircraft have reported over a 
common navigation point, are on the same or 
diverging tracks, and are both on a particular set of 
routes that have special criteria, the table is ambiguous 
as to whether there should be 15 or 20 minutes of 
separation between them. 
The second -table with inconsistencies describes 
requirements for lateral separation5. This table has 
eight rows and four columns. This case again involves 
special provisions for particular routes that overlap 
with the more general criteria. The results clearly 
reveal cases in the official specification that are 
ambiguous as to the amount of lateral separation 
required between aircraft . 
5.4 Symmetry Checking 
Symmetry is a desirable property of this specification. 
It is important that the separation criteria are the same 
regardless of the order of the parameters (i.e., the two 
flights) given to the functions and predicates that the 
tables describe. 
There were actually two other tables with 
inconsistencies but these two tables 
“LateralSeparationRequiredInMiles” and 
“LateralSeparationRequiredInDegrees” represent the 
same sets of conditions, but have different return 
values for the functions. 
>%sym ssOppDirNoLongSepPenod 
ssOppDirNoLongSepPericd is: 
(Table [((Row (ReportedOverComonPoint (A , B)) 
[TRUE;FALSEI)I 
) 
Me@ (A , B)) , ((ept (A , B)) + 10)); 
(((ept (A,  BN - 151, ((ept (A , B)) + 15))l) 
The table is symme@ic ifthe following condition(s) hold 
(some conditions may overlap): 
( 
((ReportedOverCommonPoint ((FST (A, B)) , (SND (A, B)))) = T) 
((RepoxtedOverCommonPoint ((FST (B , A)) , (SND (B , A)))) = T) 
) 
- 
( 
((ReportedOverCommonPoint ((FST (A, B)) , (SND (A, B)))) = F) 
((ReptedOverCommonPoint ((FST (B ,A)), (SND (B , A)))) = F) 
) 
- 
Total time: 1 sec 
> 
Figure 1 0  Output of Symmetry Checker 
To carry out symmetry checking, two versions of the 
table are created - one with each ordering of the 
parameters. The meaning of the disjunction of all 
columns within each table that.return the same result 
is compared to the other table. 
If these expressions are not equivalent, the symmetry 
checker returns constraints, that if satisfied, would 
mean the table is symmetrical. Figure 10 shows an 
example of the output of the symmetry checker applied 
to a simple table. 
The initial results of this analysis (as seen in Figure 
10) pointed out that the symmetry of a table is often 
dependent on the symmetry of the primitive terms 
used in the table. Environmental assumptions of the 
form, 
forall A B. 
ReportedOverCommonPoint (A,B) = 
ReportedOverCornmonPoint(B,A) 
were added to make this analysis more accurate. 
While this analysis did not reveal any errors in the 
specification, it did point out information about the 
primitive terms which might not be known by an 
implementor of the separation minima in software. 
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6. Future Work 
This work is the first attempt to validate the thesis 
ideas of the first author. The operational semantics 
integrate the “style” of specification with the predicate 
logic environment, and are used directly in analysis to 
map the specification (possibly in multiple notations) 
into a form that can be automatically analyzed using 
state space exploration analysis techniques. The use 
of the explicit semantic definitions retains the 
structure of the specification for analysis so that 
structure can be used to help create a finite model for 
analysis. This was illustrated here in the use of 
predicate logic along with a tabular notation, and 
using the structure given in the rows to partition the 
state space. The continuation of this thesis work will 
look at how the techniques used in this example can be 
generalized for other notations and other state space 
exploration analysis techniques, such as model 
checking. 
purpose interface made it possible to integrate the 
functional and data aspects of the specification for 
analysis. Rather than taking the approach of only 
allowing specifications that definitely can be analyzed 
using finite means, we have started from general- 
purpose logic interface and applied particular 
techniques when the specification fit a particular form. 
This opens a door to the possibility of using formal 
specifications created primarily by domain experts as 
input to more specialized analysis techniques such as 
theorem proving performed by formal methods 
experts. It would be straightforward to convert the S 
representation of our tabular style of specification into 
input for other analysis tools such as PVS [I31 and 
HOL [4]. 
Recently, a 4th edition of the document “Application 
of Separation Minima for the NAT Region” has been 
produced. This document has some significant 
additions including reduced vertical separation 
minima. It would be interesting to see if this 
document corrects the ambiguities found in this work 
through consistency checking. A particular issue in this work is the use of constants 
with semantic definitions as the keywords that capture 
the structure of the table, such as “ROW” and “Table”. 
This means that the notation associated with the 
semantics no longer has to be “lifted” from the base S 
notation. If the more traditional path of defining 
keywords like “ROW” and “Table” as constructors had 
been chosen, any place one table references another 
table, the reference would need to be “wrapped“ with 
its semantic function to refer to the meaning of the 
table. However, the execution of the semantic 
functions expands the definitions used in the 
Specification. For the most efficient execution, 
evaluation must be done in place, which eliminates the 
original expression. This makes it difficult to return 
the appropriate level of abstraction in the results. In 
the case of the tables, the output had to be given in 
terms of the labels of the rows to be useful to the 
reviewer. We have already implemented a method of 
maintaining the original expression that works for the 
results given here. We are working on formally 
defining this method generally so that it is possible to 
retain the appropriate original expression while still 
taking advantage of evaluation in place. 
HTML and how it is possible to integrate this with 
Another important point in this work is the use of the a format that can be used as input to analysis tools. 
general purpose interface language, predicate logic. 
State space exploration analysis techniques are geared Although it rests upon a solid mathematical 
toward model-oriented specification methods. While foundation, we believe that the approach illustrated in 
the form of the specification used in this example is this paper could be fully integrated into an industrial 
functional, we have illustrated how data aspects of the system/software engineering process without causing 
problem can aid in the analysis. Having a general- the domain experts to be excluded or extensively re- 
7. Conclusion 
This paper is perhaps most notable for the example of 
applying formal methods to the ICAO standard for 
separation between aircraft over the North Atlantic. 
The ease with which a domain expert was able to 
review and edit the specification and analysis results is 
a favourable data point in the struggle to make formal 
methods acceptable to industry. Beyond documenting 
this collaborative effort as an instance of the industrial 
use of formal methods, this work illustrates: 
0 the integration of the tabular style into a general- 
purpose predicate logic environment which 
allowed the specification of uninterpreted 
functions, and environmental assumptions; 
e a framework for analysis which ‘uses the explicit 
operational semantics directly, allowing different 
notations to be combined, and making it possible to 
exploit the structure of a given notation in analysis 
and to return results at the correct level of 
abstraction; 
0 the advantages of using a presentation format in 
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trained in formal methods. The automated analysis 
provided by Fusion streamlines the manual review 
process by automating some of the processing that 
would otherwise need to be done manually. 
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Appendix A 
The S notation is very similar to the syntax for the 
term language used in the HOL theorem prover [4]. 
But unlike HOL, S does not involve a meta-language 
as part of the specification forma for declarations and 
definitions. Instead, the syntax for declarations and 
definitions is an extension of the syntax used for 
logical expressions. (In this respect, S more closely 
resembles Z and other similar f m a l  specification 
notations.) For example, the symbol “:=” is used in S 
for a definition, e.g., “TWO := 2”, in contrast to an 
assertion, e.g., “TWO = 2”. 
Another difference that will likely be noticed by 
readers familiar with HOL is the explicit type 
parameterization of constant declarations and 
definitions. Type parameters, if any, are given in a 
parenthesized list which prefixes the rest of the 
declaration or definition. This is illustrated in the 
definitions given below by the parameterization of 
“EveryAux” by a single type parameter, “ty”. 
Many of the definitions shown below are given 
recursively based on the recursive definition (not 
shown here) of the polymorphic type “list”. These 
recursive definitions are given in a pattern matching 
style (similar to how recursive functions may be 
defined in Standard ML) with one clause for the 
“NIL” constructor (Le., the non-recursive case) and 
another clause for the “CONS” constructor (i.e., the 
recursive case). Each clause in this style of S 
definition is separated by a “I”. The functions “HD” 
and “TL” are standard library functions for taking the 
head (Le., the first element) of a list and the tail (i.e., 
the rest) of a list respectively. 
Type expressions of the form, “:tyl->ty2”, are used in 
the declaration of parameters that are functions from 
elements of type “tyl” to elements of type “ty2”. 
Similarly, type expressions of the form, “:(ty) list”, 
indicate when a parameter is a list of elements of type 
,‘ty’’. 
Lambda expressions are expressed in S notation as, 
“\x.F’ (where E is an expression) . 
The semantic definitions for the tabular notation given 
in the S notation are shown below. 
(p e) AND EveryAux tl p; 
Every @:ty->bool) 1 := EveryAux 1 p; 
ExistsAux (NIL) (p:ty->bool) := F I 
ExistsAux (CONS e tl) p := (p e) OR ExistsAux tl p; 
(:ty) 
(:ty) UNKNOWN : ty; 
Exists (p:ty->bool) 1 := ExistsAux 1 p; 
(:ty)DC := \(x:ty).T; 
TRUE := \x.x=T; 
FALSE := \x.x=F; 
(:tYl) 
RowAux2 (CONS (p:tyl->bool) tl) label := 
RowAux2 (NIL) label := NIL; 
CONS (p label) (RowAux2 tl label) I 
(:ty)Row label (plist:(A->bool)list) := 
RowAux2 plist label; 
Columns t := 
if ((HD t)=NIL) then NIL 
else CONS 
(Every (HD) t) 
(Columns (Map t (TL))); 
(:ty) 
TableSemAux2 (NIL) (retVals:(ty)list) := 
if (retVals=NIL) then UNKNOWN 
else (HD retvals) I 
if col 
then (HD retvals) 
else TableSemAux2 colList (TL retvals); 
TableSemAux2 (CONS col collist) retvals := 
(:ty) 
Table t (retVals:(ty)list) := 
TableSemAux2 (Columns t) retvals; 
F’redicateTable t := 
Exists 0X.x) (Columns t); 
CtY) 
EveryAux (NIL) (p:ty->bool) := T I 
EveryAux (CONS e tl) p := 
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Abstract 
Formal methods can be applied with different levels 
of rigor. The more rigorously used, the more confi- 
dence is obtained in a formal model of a computer 
system. However, rigorous development using for- 
mal verification requires skilled personnel and is 
costly. Based on our experience of introducing for- 
mal specification to some European industrial com- 
panies, e.g. British Aerospace [7] and Aerospatiale 
131, we believe that a less rigorous approach using 
validation by testing is a complement to formal ver- 
ification, which engineers can use cost-effectively 
early in their formal methods careers. When they 
become more confident with constructing formal 
models, it would be natural to take the next step 
and introduce verification. In this paper we illus- 
trate how testing-based validation can be applied 
to the SAFER example used throughout [9]. 
1 Introduction 
Historically, NASA’s involvement in formal meth- 
ods has concentrated on formal verification using 
mechanical theorem provers [l, 2, 91. In technology 
transfer projects supported by NASA such formal 
verification has been in focus. This is clearly under- 
standable considering the criticality of the systems 
being developed in the avionics sector. However, we 
believe that the technology transfer process is more 
likely to have significant effect if the formal meth- 
ods technology is incorporated in smaller “deltas” 
into the existing practice [5]. We only consider the 
transfer fully successful when the engineers nor- 
mally developing the avionics systems, rather than 
the formal methods experts, feel that the technol- 
ogy is accessible to them and can be applied in a 
cost-effective manner. 
With formal methods, engineers construct ab- 
stract models of computer systems before they start 
coding them. Among others, many of NASA’s tech- 
nology transfer projects have shown that benefits 
can be obtained already by formally specifying a 
system, but validation by testing and verification 
can increase confidence in models. Software engi- 
neering practice is heavily based on testing, and 
so this technique is well-known to engineers. We 
therefore advocate the use of testing to validate 
formal models. If animation is supported by tools, 
this prototyping activity also supports the presen- 
tation of models to others. A further advantage is 
that the formal specification can also be used as a 
basis for verifying interesting properties. Verifica- 
tion requires more skilled personnel than specifica- 
tion, and thus we see the technology transfer as a 
two step process. When the engineers feel confident 
in using formal specification and testing, it seems 
feasible to introduce verification. 
In this paper we illustrate how a testing-based 
validation approach can be applied to the SAFER1 
example from [9] using VDM-SL [lo] and the IFAD 
VDM-SL Toolbox [8,4]. In [9], SAFER is specified 
in the PVS notation and properties are proved us- 
ing the PVS theorem prover [ll]. The VDM-SL 
notation is quite close to the PVS notation, but it 
is not the notational differences we find interest- 
ing. Instead, we focus on the kind of analysis that 
can be performed using a validation by testing ap- 
proach rather than formal verification. This analy- 
sis reveals some interesting “unclarities” in [9]. To 
support the testing approach, we exploit the Dy- 
namic Link facility of the Toolbox for rapid pro- 
totyping [6], linking graphical visualization models 
(compiled code) with our executable specification. 
We believe that this kind of animation support is 
very useful, in particular for presenting a specifi- 
cation to customers and non-trained staff members 
(e.g. management). 
The remaining part of this paper starts with an 
overview of the SAFER system and the VDM-SL 
lSAFER is an acronym for “Simplified Aid For EVA (Ex- 
travehicular Activity) Rescue”. 
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Figure 1: Front and back views of SAFER system 
worn by NASA crewmember. 
specification of SAFER. This is followed by a sec- 
tion in which we illustrate how a validation ap- 
proach can be used to investigate different prop- 
erties. Finally, a few concluding remarks are pro- 
vided. The reader is assumed to  have a basic knowl- 
edge of VDM-SL or a similar notation such as PVS. 
2 Overview of the SAFER 
System 
This overview of the SAFER system is based on, 
and partly copied from, the NASA report [9], which 
describes a cut-down version of a real SAFER sys- 
tem. 
SAFER is a small, lightweight propulsive back- 
pack system designed to provide self-rescue capabil- 
ities to a NASA space crewmember separated dur- 
ing an EVA (Extravehicular Activity). This type 
of contingency can arise if a safety tether breaks, 
or if i t  is not correctly fastened, during an EVA 
on a space station or on a Space Shuttle Orbiter 
docked to a space station. SAFER attaches to 
the underside of the Extravehicular Mobiiity Unit 
(EMU) primary life support subsystem backpack 
and is controlled by a single hand controller that 
is attached to the EMU display and control mod- 
ule (see Figure 1). SAFER provides an attitude 
hold capability and sufficient propellant power to 
automatically detumble and manually return a s e p  
arated crewmember. 
The SAFER system works by firing 24 gaseous- 
nitrogen (GN2) thrusters, four in each of the posi- 
tive and negative X, Y and Z directions. These 
are placed on the upper and lower edges of the 
grey part of the backpack in Figure 1 (see also 
Figure 2: SAFER hand controller. 
Figure 13). The main focus of our specification 
is on the thruster selection logic, for example tak- 
ing into account that translational hand controller 
commands are prioritized, with the priority order 
being X, Y and 2. Other aspects of the SAFER 
are ignored, e.g. the calculation of control output in 
the Automatic Attitude Hold (AAH), and various 
display units and switches on the hand controller 
which are not directly related to the selection of 
thrusters. 
The hand controller is a four-axis mechanism 
with three rotary axes and one transverse axis us- 
ing a certain hand controller grip (see Figure 2). A 
command is generated by moving the grip from the 
center null position to mechanical hardstops on the 
hand controller axes. Commands are terminated 
by returning the grip to the center position. The 
hand controller can operate in two modes, selected 
via a switch, either in translation mode, where X, 
Y, 2 and pitch commands are available, or in rota- 
tion mode, where roZZ, pitch, yaw and X commands 
are available (see Figure 3). Note that X and pitch 
commands are available in both modes. Pitch com- 
mands are issued by twisting the hand grip around 
Figure 3: Six degree-of-freedom commands. Arrow 
direction is positive. 
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its transverse axis, while the other commands are 
obtained around the rotary axes. 
A push-button switch on top of the grip initiates 
and terminates AAH according to a certain proto- 
col. If the button is pushed down once the AAH 
is initiated, while the AAH is deactivated if the 
button is pushed down twice within 0.5 seconds. 
As indicated above there are various priorities 
among commands. These make the thruster selec- 
tion logic slightly complicated. Translational com- 
mands issued from the hand controller are priori- 
tized to provide acceleration along a single trans- 
lational axis, with the priority being X first, Y 
second, and Z third. When rotation and transla- 
tion commands are present simultaneously from the 
hand controller, rotations take priority and trans- 
lations are suppressed. Moreover, rotational com- 
mands from the hand grip takes priority over con- 
trol output from the AAH, and the corresponding 
rotation axes of the AAH remain off until the AAH 
is reinitialized. However, if hand grip rotations 
are present at the time when the AAH is initiated, 
the corresponding hand controller axes are subse- 
quently ignored, until the AAH is deactivated. 
In Appendix C.2 of the NASA report, a num- 
ber of requirement properties for SAFER are listed. 
Below we list a few relevant ones for our specifica- 
tion of the SAFER, and in Section 4.3 we discuss 
some scenarios which, among others, could be used 
to test that the specification satisfies the require- 
ments. 
(18) The pushbutton switch shall activate AAH 
when depressed a single time. 
(19) The pushbutton switch shall deactivate AAH 
when pushed twice within 0.5 seconds. 
(37) The avionics software shall disable AAH on 
an axis if a crewmember rotation command is 
issued for that axis while AAH is active. 
(38) Any hand controller rotation command 
present at the time AAH is initiated shall sub- 
sequently be ignored until a return to the off 
condition is detected for that axis or until 
AAH is disabled. 
(39) Hand controller rotation commands shall 
suppress any translation commands that are 
present, but AAH-generated rotation com- 
mands may coexist with translations. 
(40) At most one translation command shall be 
acted upon, with the axis chosen in priority 
order X, Y, Z. 
(41) The avionics software shall provide acceler- 
ations with a maximum of four simultaneous 
thruster firing commands. 
These may seem straightforward and clear, but the 
discussion in Section 4.3 below will show that in 
fact they are not. 
3 VDM-SL Specification of 
SAFER 
In [9], a PVS specification is provided of a cut-down 
version of SAFER. We have translated this speci- 
fication to VDM-SL, a relatively straightforward 
task since the two notations share many constructs. 
We have further simplified the model by cutting out 
parts which are irrelevant to the thruster selection 
logic, such as display units and interface functions 
to external sensors. These parts were only mod- 
eled in a very implicit way in PVS anyway, using 
e.g. uninterpreted functions. 
We present some excerpts from the VDM-SL 
specification. We will make this presentation in- 
dependent of the module structure of the specifica- 
tion, which contains five modules: A UX (auxiliary 
definitions), HCM (hand controller module), A AH 
(automatic attitude hold), TS (thruster selection) 
and SAFER (main control cycle). Modules may use 
definitions from other modules by prefixing with 
the module name, e.g. HCM'HandGripPosition 
and A UX'RotCommand. 
3.1 Main Control Cycle 
The SAFER system works by calculating thruster 
settings very frequently. As in the PVS model we 
assume that this happens by iteratively calling the 
main control operation, called ControlCycle. The 
main purpose of this operation is to calculate the 
thruster settings according to the hand controller 
commands and AAH control output, and to main- 
tain the state of the AAH protocol. The operation 
is defined as shown in Figure 42. 
VDM-SL supports both a functional subset, 
where a state can only be modeled indirectly in 
the signature of functions, and an imperative sub- 
set which supports states, operations and program- 
ming language statements directly. Here, Control- 
Cycle is defined as an operation and not a function, 
since it depends on the AAH state (see Section 3.3) 
2The notation mk-R(. . .) is used to construct an element 
of a record type R. 
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ControlCycle : HCM'SwitchPositions x HCM'HandGripPosition x A UX'RotCommand 4 
ControlCycle (mk-HCM'SwitchPositions (mode, aah), raw-grip, aah-cmd) A 
TS' ThrwterSet 
let grip-cmd = HCM'GripCommand (raw-grip, mode), 
(AAH'%nsition(aah, grip-cmd, clock) ; 
thrusters = TS'SelectedThrusters (grip-cmd, aah-cmd, AAH'ActiveAxes (), AAH'IgnoreHcm ()) in 
clock := clock + 1; 
return thrusters ) 
Figure 4: The ControlCycle operation. 
I 
SelectedThrusters : AUX'SizDofCommand x AUX'RotCommand x AUX'RotAzis-set x 
SelectedThrusters (hcrn, aah, active-axes, ignore-hcm) 
A UX'RotAxis-set 3 ThrusterSet 
let mk-A UX'SixDofCommand (tran, rot) = IntegmtedCommands (hcrn, aah, active-axes, ignore-hcm), 
mk- (bf-mandatoy, bf-optional) = BFThrusters (tran (X), rot (PITCH), rot (YAW)), 
mk- (lrud-mandatory, lrud-optional) = LRUDThrwters (tran (Y), tran (Z) ,  rot (ROLL)), 
bf -thr = if rot (ROLL) = ZERO 
then bf -optional U bf -mandatory 
else bf -mandatory, 
Irud-thr = if rot (PITCH) = ZERO A rot (YAW) = ZERO 
then lrud-optional U lrud-mandatory 
else lrud-mandatory in 
bf-thr U lrud-thr 
Figure 5: The SelectedThmsters function. 
and the SAFER state, which is simply a natural 
number valued clock (as in [9] we do not use a real- 
time clock): 
clock : N 
init s A s = mk-SAFER(0) 
state SAFER of 
end 
The result of a call to ControlCycle is a set of 
thruster settings, i.e. a set of thruster names to 
be turned on. The arguments of ControlCycle are: 
(1) switch positions on the hand controller, telling 
whether the mode is translation or rotation and 
whether the AAH button on the grip is up or down, 
(2) hand grip positions, a record containing four 
fields corresponding to the transverse axis and the 
three rotation axes, and (3) external input from 
the AAH control laws whose calculation is based 
on data measured by sensors. This AAH control 
function in (3) is not modeled either in the PVS 
specification of [9], though it is mentioned in a very 
implicit way. 
The control cycle first transforms the "raw" grip 
commands to  translation and rotation commands. 
Next it calculates the thruster settings and then 
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the AAH state is updated in the body of the let- 
statement. We treat each of these steps in separate 
subsections below. Note that values of AAH state 
variables are fetched by calling the operations Ac- 
tiveAxes and IgnoreHcm, which both return sets of 
rotation axes. 
3.2 Thruster Selection 
The six degree-of-freedom of the translation and 
rotation commands is modeled using a record type: 
SizDofCommand :: tran : TkunCommand 
rot : RotCommand; 
whose two fields are finite maps, i.e. a kind of ta- 
bles, from translation and rotation axes respec- 
tively to axis commands. For example, the type 
of translation commands is defined as follows: 
I 
BFThrusters : AUX'AxisCommand x AUX'AxisCommand x AUX'AxisCommand 4 
BFThrusters ( A ,  B ,  C )  2 
cases rnk- (A,  B,  C) : 
Thrusterset x Thrusterset 
~~- (NEG,ZERO,ZER~)  + mk-((Bl,B4},{B2,B3}), 
mk- (ZERO, ZERO, ZERO) + rnk- ({}, {}), 
mk- (Pos,NEG, ZERO) 4 mk- ({Fl, F2}, {}), 
... 4 ..* 
end; 
LRUDThrusters : AUX'AxisCommand x AUX'AxisCommand x AUX'AxisCommand + 
LRUDThrusters ( A ,  B ,  C )  
cases mk- (A,  B ,  C) : 
Thrusterset x Thrusterset 
mk- (NEG, NEG, ZERO) 4 rnk- ({I, {}), 
rnk- (NEG, ZERO, ZERO) + mk- ((LlR,L3R}, {LlF,LJF}), 
rnk- (Pos, ZERO, POS) + mk- ({R2R}, {R2F, R4F}), 
... 4 ... 
end: 
Figure 6 Extracts from BFThruster and LRUDThrusters. 
l?ranCommand = ThnAxis 2 AxisCommand 
inv cmd dorn cmd = {X,Y,Z}; 
where the invariant ensures that command maps 
are total. The type of rotation commands is d e  
fined similarly. Enumerated types are used for axis 
commands and translation and rotation axes: 
AxisCommand = NEG I ZERO I POS; 
ThnAxis = X I Y I Z; 
RotAzis = ROLL I PITCH IYAW; 
In the SelectedThrusters function in Figure 5 
grip commands from the hand controller (with six- 
degree-of freedom) are integrated with the AAH 
control output. Then thrusters for back and for- 
ward accelerations and left, right, up and down 
accelerations are calculated by two separate func- 
tions. These represent a kind of look-up tables, 
modeled using cases expressions. Note that they 
return two sets of thruster names, representing 
mandatory and optional settings respectively. Cut- 
down versions of the functions are presented to save 
space, see Figure 6. Note that thrusters are named 
according to  which direction they provide acceler- 
ation for, and the number indicates which of four 
quadrants they are positioned in. The third letter 
indicates whether the thruster is positioned to the 
rear or front in a quadrant (see Figure 13 below). 
The first case in LRUDThrusters yields two empty 
sets since it is a "Not Applicable" case. 
The more interesting parts of the specification 
can be found in the IntegmtedCommands function 
and the auxiliary functions it uses. Together these 
define the selection logic, modeling for instance the 
various priorities among translation and rotation 
axes. Below, null translation and rotation com- 
mands map all axes to ZERO. 
The IntegratedCommands function is presented 
in Figure 7. The function treats two cases, de- 
pending on whether or not the set of active axes in 
the AAH is empty (tested in AllAxesOfn. If there 
are rotation commands from the hand controller 
then these take priority over translation commands 
using the PrioritizedTmnCmd function (see Fig- 
ure 7). Otherwise translation commands are pri- 
oritized in the order X, Y, 2. 
If there are rotation commands from both the 
AAH and the hand controller then these must be 
combined such that the hand controller commands 
take priority, unless they were also issued when the 
AAH was initiated (recorded in ignore-hem). This 
is done by the CombinedRotCmds function (see 
Figure 7). Note that the operator used in the 
CombinedRotCmds function is simply a union be- 
tween maps. AUX'rot-axis-set is defined as the set 
of all rotation axes. This completes the description 
of the thruster selection logic. 
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IntegmtedCommands : A UX'SixDofCommand x AUX'RotCommand x AUX'RotAxis-set x 
AUX'RotAxis-set + AUX'SixDofCommand 
IntegmtedCommands (mk-A UX'SixDofCommand (tmn, rot), aah, active-axes, ignore-hcm) 2 
if AAH'AllAxesOff (active-axes) 
then if RotCmdsPresent (rot) 
then m k-A UX' SixDofCommand ( A  UX 'null-tmn- command, rot 1 
else rnk-AUX'SixDofCommand (PrioritizedThnCmd (tmn), AUX'null-rot-command) 
then m k-A UX' SixDofCommand ( A  UX'null-tmn- command, 
eise mk-AUX'SixDofCommand (PrioritizedlknCmd (tmn), aah); 
else if RotCmdsPresent (rot) 
CombinedRotCmds (rot, aah, ignore-hcm)) 
CombinedRotCmds : AUX'RotCommand x AUX'RotCommand x AUX'RotAxk-set + AUX'RotCommand 
CombinedRotCmds (hcm-rot, aah, ignore-hcm) 2 
let aah-axes = ignore-hcm U { a  I a E AUX'rot-m&set hcm-rot (a)  = ZERO) in 
{ a  C )  aah ( a )  I a E aah-axes} a { a  C )  hcm-rot ( a )  I a E AUX'rot-axis-set \ aah-axes}; 1 
PrioritizedlPrcnCmd : AUX' ThnCommand + AUX'!lhnCommand 
Prion'tizedlknCmd (tran) a 
if tmn ( X )  # ZERO 
then AUX'null-tmn-command t { X  C )  tmn ( X ) }  
elseif tran (Y )  # ZERO 
then AUX'null-tmn-command t {Y H tmn (Y)} 
elseif tmn (Z)  # ZERO 
then AUX'null-tmn-command t {Z C )  tmn (Z)} 
else A UX'null-tmn-command; 
Figure 7: The IntegratedCommands function and its auxiliary functions. 
down 
UP 
down 
Figure 8: The AAH protocol state machine. 
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I Transition : HCM'ControlButton x AUX'SzjDofCommand x M 4 () 
Transition (button-pos, hcm-cmd, clock) a 
let engage = Buttonlhznsition (toggle, button-pos, active-azes, clock, timeout), 
(active-axes := ( a  I a E AUX'rot-axis-set starting V 
starting = (toggle = AAH-OFF) A (engage = AAHSTARTED) in 
(engage # AAH-OFF A a E active-axes A 
(hcm-cmd.rot ( a )  = ZERO V a E ignore-hcm))}; 
(7 starting A a E ignore-hcm)); 
ignore-hcm := { a  I a E AUX'rot-azis-set - (starting A hcm-cmd.rot ( a )  # ZERO) V 
timeout : = if toggle = AAH-ON A engage = PRESSED-ONCE 
then clock + click-timwut 
else timeout; 
toggle := engage); 
Figure 9 The Tkansition operation. 
3.3 AAH Transitions 
Finally, we present excerpts from the AAH module. 
The AAH push-button protocol can be viewed as a 
state machine, presented in Figure 8. In VDM-SL, 
the state of the AAH is represented by: 
state AAH of 
active-azes : AUX'RotAzis-set 
ignore-hcm : A UX'RotAzis-set 
toggle : Engagestate 
timeout : M 
init  s 2 s = mk-AAH (0, {},AAH-oFF,O) 
end 
where the actual state machine states are presented 
as an enumerated type: 
Engagestate = AAH-OFF I AAHSTARTED I 
AAH-ON I PRESSED-ONCE I 
AAH-CLOSING I PRESSED-TWICE 
The main operation in the AAH module is !?rami- 
tion which is defined in Figure 9. It uses the func- 
tion Button Transition, a direct encoding of Fig- 
ure 8, to calculate the next state. Note that Tmn- 
sition uses a starting predicate for the situation 
when the AAH is initiating. The starting predi- 
cate is used to calculate the active axes and axes 
for which the hand controller must be ignored. 
4 Validation Using Testing 
The NASA guidebook [9] focuses mainly on for- 
mal verification as a method for analysis of re- 
quirements and high-level design. However, we find 
that alternative approaches to validating specifica- 
tions based on testing techniques are also beneficial, 
though they should not replace verification. From a 
technology transfer viewpoint, testing is cheaper to 
introduce, but in most situations it is also cheaper 
to apply than verification and would therefore, in 
particular, be suitable for the early stages of anal- 
ysis like model construction. 
In this section we illustrate the use of test- 
ing techniques to validate the VDM-SL model of 
SAFER presented above. Our specification is writ- 
ten in the executable subset of VDM-SL, which is 
supported by the interpreter of the IFAD VDM-SL 
Toolbox. We shall illustrate the use of a test cover- 
age facility of the Toolbox, and we shall try to use 
testing techniques and the Dynamic Link facility to 
investigate the properties listed in Section 2. 
4.1 Test Coverage of Specifications 
In addition to basic facilities for checking speci- 
fications, such as syntax and type checking, the 
IFAD Toolbox supports a large executable subset 
of VDM-SL. This means that the Toolbox supports 
validation techniques such as testing which are usu- 
ally not encouraged by theorem provers. We shall 
not turn this into an exercise in test case selection, 
but limit our attention to just a few test cases for 
illustration. 
In testing, the focus is often on more concrete 
properties than in verification; given some input we 
test whether some function computes the desired 
result. This kind of testing, which to a large extent 
also could be performed by theorem provers, e.g. 
if rewriting is available, is not considered nor men- 
tioned in [9]. However, it does make sense to test, 
for instance, that thrusters are fired correctly ac- 
cording to hand grip commands. The actual selec- 
tion is based on some fairly large tables which have 
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SAFER' ControlCycle (mk-HCM'SwitchPositions (TRAN, UP), 
mk-HCM'HandGripPosition (ZERO, POS, ZERO, ZERO), AUX'null-rot-command) 
I 
{mk- (mode, a,  b, c, d )  C) SAFER'ControlCycle (mk-HCM'SwitchPositions (mode, UP), 
1 mode E {TRAN, ROT}, a, b, c, d E { N E G ,  POS, ZERO}} 
m k- HCM 'HundGripPosition (a,  b , c , d )  , A UX ' null-rot- command) 
Figure 10: Compact test expressions. 
LRUDThrusters : AUX'AxisCommand x AUX'AxisCommand x AUX'AxisCommand + 
LRUDThrusters (A ,  B ,  C )  
cases mk- (A,  B ,  C )  : 
Thrusterset x Thrusterset 
~ ~ - ( N E G , Z E R O , Z E R O )  + mk-({LlR,L3R),{LlF,L3F}), 
mk- (Pos, ZERO, POS) + mk- ({R2R}, {R2F, R4F}), 
... + ... 
end; 
Figure 11: Extracts from LRUDThrusters with test coverage information. 
been translated by hand to the specification, and 
of course such translation could have introduced 
errors. 
Test expressions can be typed in manually for the 
interpreter. For example, in the first expression in 
Figure 10 a call of ControZCycZe with a forward 
acceleration command is issued. The interpreter 
will immediately evaluate this to the correct result, 
which is the set {Fl,F2,F3,F4}. 
If one wishes to test all hand grip commands 
without typing all combinations in by hand, then a 
compact test expression could be written in VDM- 
SL using a map comprehension expression as shown 
as the second expression in Figure 10. Assuming 
that the AAH is switched off, this will cover all 
hand grip translational and rotational commands, 
in total 2 * 34 = 162 cases. This is executed in 
seconds. The result is a large map from vari- 
able values to results (thruster settings). Inter- 
estingly, this test only yields 17 different settings 
and does not cover the functions BFThrusters and 
LRUDThrusters very well; recall these convert six 
degree-of-free commands to thruster names. A 
test coverage facility is provided with the Tool- 
box, which computes basic statistical information 
and colors uncovered parts of specifications as il- 
lustrated in Figure 11. The two thruster functions 
are both called 162 times, but they are only covered 
41% and 46% respectively. 
The reason for this bad coverage is due to prior- 
ities for hand controller translational axes and for 
rotation and translation commands from the hand 
controller. A larger test where the AAH pushbut- 
ton and rotation command output are also variable 
(8748 cases, executed in 7 minutes) yields 189 dif- 
ferent thruster settings and covers the BFThrusters 
function 100%. However, the LRUDThrusters 
function is still only 72% covered. But the uncov- 
ered parts are precisely those that have the "Not 
Applicable" label in the requirement specification 
from [9], so this is good. The test coverage coloring 
shows this very clearly in the boxes in Figure 11 (we 
have cut the specification down to the same cases 
as in Section 3.2). The sub-expressions written in 
grey have never been reached in the interpretation 
of the test argument(s). Note that in principle it 
would be possible to manually inspect the 8748 test 
results to check that the thruster settings are cor- 
rect, but this may not be feasible in all situations. 
Also note that the tests mentioned above only test 
the AAH state machine protocol in an arbitrary 
way, and therefore the AAH transition function is 
not fully covered by this kind of testing. 
4.2 Using Dynamic Link Modules 
Such tests as described above could be difficult to 
understand for staff members who have not been 
trained in the notation used for the formal specifi- 
cation. The value of the model would also increase 
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Figure 12: The interface model of the hand controller. 
in the discussion with someone outside the devel- 
opment team, such as a customer, if some kind of 
prototype could be produced where the interface to 
the formal model is easier to understand. 
In order to ease this kind of testing we can exploit 
the Dynamic Link facility of the IFAD Toolbox for 
combining compiled code and VDM-SL specifica- 
tions [6]. We have made a simple interface model 
of the hand controller using Tcl/Tk and linked this 
with the SAFER specification. Figure 12 shows 
a screen dump of the interface, where the mode 
(translational or rotational) and the AAH switch 
together form the first parameter to ControlCycIe. 
The hand grip positions form the second parame- 
ter, and the AAH control outputs form the third 
parameter simulating the external input from the 
AAH control laws whose calculation would be per- 
formed from sensor data of movements of the as- 
tronaut. 
Moreover, a simplified model of the SAFER 
backpack in a 3D Graphics tool called Geomview3 
is also linked to the specification and used to vi- 
sualize thruster settings (see Figure 13). This sim- 
ple figure could naturally be enhanced significantly, 
but our purpose here is simply to illustrate the fea- 
sibility of this approach. For example, if we move 
the hand grip forward, we expect to see the for- 
ward thrusters fire in the backpack model. Hence, 
we can very easily make basic tests of the SAFER 
thruster selection logic. This animation approach 
is useful for testing many requirement properties of 
SAFER (see Section 4.3). 
If effort would be put into calculating how the 
astronaut would be moving depending upon the 
thrusters fired then naturally a more advanced Dy- 
3Geomview is available at http: //www. ge0m.m. e d d  
docs/software/viz/geomview/geomview.html. 
namic Link module could be made to show the 
movement in 3D. We have a naive solution to this 
based on a simple model of astronaut movements 
in space. 
4.3 Validating Properties 
We shall now discuss a testing approach to validat- 
ing, i.e. checking but not verifying, that some of the 
requirement properties listed in Section 2 hold in 
our VDM-SL model; we do not have room in this 
paper to  consider all of them. The testing raised in- 
teresting questions regarding the requirements and 
found various omissions/problems in our specifica- 
tion as well as in the PVS specification. 
4.3.1 
Recall property (41): 
Automatic Checking of Property (41) 
The avionics software shall provide accel- 
erations with a maximum of four simulta- 
neous thruster firing commands. 
Consider also: 
El Thruster firing consistency: No two selected 
thrusters should oppose each other, i.e., have 
canceling thrust with respect to the center 
of mass. (Mentioned in Section (3.4.1 of the 
NASA report.) 
These are properties that should hold for all 
thruster settings output from the SAFER Control- 
Cycle and therefore they can conveniently be stated 
as a post-condition on ControlCycle, see Figure 14. 
The Toolbox interpreter can be requested to au- 
tomatically check that the post-condition holds for 
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Figure 13: The interface model of the SAFER backpack. 
ControlCycle : HCM'SwitchPositions x HCM' HandGripPosition x A UX Rot Command A TS' Thrusterset 
ControlCycle (mk-HCM'SwitchPositions (mode, aah), mu-grip, aah-cmd) a 
let grip-cmd = HCM'GripCommand (mw-grip, mode), 
(AAH'%nsition( aah, grip-cmd, clock) ; 
clock := clock + 1; 
return thrusters ) 
post card RESULT 5 4A 
thrusters = TS'SeIectedThrusters (grip-cmd, aah-cmd, AAH'ActiveAxes (), AAH'IgnoreHcm ()) in 
ThrusterConsistency (RESULT) j 
ThrusterConsistency : TS' ThrusterName-set + B 
ThrusterConsistency (thrusters) 4 
-, ({Bl, F l}  E thrusters) A 
1 ((B2, F2) E thrusters) A 
1 ((B3, F3) thrusters) A 
1 ((B4, F4) 5 thrusters) A 
1 (thrusters n {LlR,LlF} # {} A thrusters n {R2R, R2F} # {}) A 
-, (thrusters n {L3R, L3F) # {} A thrusters n {R4R, R4F) # {}) A 
-(thrusters n {DlR, DlF} # {} A thrusters t l  {U3R1U3F} # {}) A 
1 (thrusters n {D2R, D2F) # {} A thrusters n {U4R, U4F) # {}) 
Figure 14: The ControlCycle operation and the ThrusterConsistency function. 
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all results from ControlCycle (this feature is op- 
tional). Hence, if a result failed the check, the in- 
terpreter would give a run-time error with position 
information (line and column) in the specification 
document. This never happened in any of our tests 
(including the big test mentioned above). 
In [9] a proof of the maximum thruster property 
(41) is given. The validation made here is not as 
strong as that, because we would have to test it 
with all values in a model-checking fashion. How- 
ever, the validation carried out here has definitely 
increased our confidence in the maximum thruster 
property being satisfied with our model. 
Point: In cases where a property does not hold, 
the validation technique can be an efficient way of 
discovering counter-examples. It can also increase 
confidence in a model. 
4.3.2 Property (18) 
The pushbutton switch shall activate 
AAH when depressed a single time. 
This property is related to the protocol of the 
AAH given in Figure 8, and thus it may be a good 
idea to revisit this figure to be able to follow the 
possible test scenarios. Assume the hand grip is 
in center position throughout this test; this means 
that no trzmslation or rotation commands are 
issued from the hand grip. Initially, the AAH is in 
the “off state”. Thus, initially any AAH control 
rotation output must be ignored. Using various 
arbitrary examples we can test that the thruster 
settings are empty. The AAH is activated by 
pushing the AAH button down. The AAH goes 
to the “started state”, but it does not go to the 
“on state” until the button is released. We can 
run the same and other AAH rotation commands 
to see that they are now taken into account (and 
are performed correctly). Note that property (38) 
would affect this test if a rotation command from 
the hand grip was issued at the same time as the 
AAH was initiated. 
Point: In this case the test has increased our con- 
fidence that property (18) is satisfied, such that it 
is sufficient to push the AAH button without re- 
leasing it again. 
4.3.3 Property (19) 
The pushbutton switch shall deactivate 
AAH when pushed twice within 0.5 sec- 
onds. 
This property is also related to the AAH protocol 
so Figure 8 must be used again. The timeout of 
0.5 seconds is for test purposes represented as 10 
control cycles in our specification. As in [9] we 
do not represent a real-time clock. We first turn 
the AAH on by pressing and then releasing the 
AAH button. We then press and release the AAH 
button twice within 10 cycles and check that the 
AAH is turned off by running a number of tests 
with rotation commands from the AAH. Turn 
AAH on again, press and release the AAH button 
once, wait at least 11 cycles, press and release 
again and check that the AAH still works. Finally, 
press, release and press the AAH button within 
10 cycles. The report [9] is unclear here: Strictly 
speaking, property (19) says that this should 
deactivate the AAH while the PVS specification 
and the AAH state diagram does not deactivate 
the AAH until the button is released. 
Point: Since the word “pushed” (rather than 
“pushed and released”) is used in property (19) our 
validation have discovered a discrepancy between 
requirement (19) and both the PVS model and the 
state transition diagram from Figure 8. 
4.3.4 Property (37) 
The avionics software shall disable AAH 
on an axis if a crewmember rotation com- 
mand is issued for that axis while AAH is 
active. 
This property is related to the combination of the 
AAH protocol and the thruster selection logic for 
rotation commands. We can test this by first in- 
specting how SAFER behaves when the AAH is 
switched on and the AAH control output wishes 
to rotate over an axis. Afterwards we can inspect 
what happens if the hand grip controller issues a 
rotation command on the same axis. In this case 
property (37) requires SAFER to disable the AAH 
for that axis. 
One possible first test scenario for this property 
could be: Assume the hand grip is in center posi- 
tion (all directions are ZERO). Turn the AAH on 
(button down and then up) and issue an AAH rota- 
tion (control output) on an axis, e.g. roll left. Keep 
this rotation while making a rotation command on 
the hand grip, e.g. roll right (in rotation mode). 
Check the output to see that this takes precedence 
over AAH. Keep the AAH rotation but center the 
hand grip. The AAH axis should remain off, as 
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stated explicitly in Section C.4.1 of the NASA re- 
port. 
However, when executing the test scenario on 
our specification, this appears not to be the case. 
The test shows that the AAH axis still has influ- 
ence on the selected thrusters, in fact, the result 
is exactly the same as before the axis was deac- 
tivated. The problem is that our model (like the 
PVS model) implicitly assumes that the AAH con- 
trol output does not provide a rotation command 
for an axis which is not active. In our manu- 
ally generated AAH output, this may however be 
the case. We could capture this problem using a 
pre-condition on the SAFER ControlCycle opera- 
tion. In the PVS specification, an obvious place to  
take this into account would be in a post-condition 
of the AAH-control-out function, which could be 
done using the subtype facility in PVS, but in [9] 
this function is implicitly defined and does not give 
any information whatsoever about implementation 
requirements. When translating the PVS specifi- 
cation to VDM-SL, we cut out the very implicit 
AAH-control-out and modeled this as the third ar- 
gument of ControlCycle instead. A post-condition 
on the PVS AM-control-out would therefore have 
been translated to a pre-condition on ControlCycle 
in our model. 
As a consequence of the implicitness concern- 
ing the AA€I control output, it is not possible 
to verify property (37) in a black-box fashion in 
PVS, as discussed above. However, a white-box 
approach of showing that the L‘active” flag is p rop  
erly reset and stays off is possible. But in the 
NASA report it is not documented anywhere that 
the AAH-control-out should take this flag into ac- 
count, which then seems to be an omission, at least. 
As mentioned above, this requirement would be 
easy to specify in a post-condition, which would 
enable black-box verification. The verification of 
other properties is also weakened by this omission. 
For example: 
Once AAH is turned off for a rotational 
axis it remains off until a new AAH cycle 
is initiated. 
which appears in Section C.4.1 of the NASA report. 
Point: In validating this property we discovered 
that neither our model nor the PVS model in [9] is 
sufficiently strong to prove certain desirable prop  
erties . 
4.3.5 Property (38) 
Any hand controller rotation command 
present at the time AAH is initiated shall 
subsequently be ignored until a return to 
the off condition is detected for that axis 
or until AAH is disabled. 
A question raised immediately here when trying 
to design a test scenario was: what do they mean 
by “a return to the off condition”? If one carefully 
reads the PVS specification, and in particular 
looks at the way that ignore-hcm is updated in 
Bansition, it seems clear that the only way for 
a hand controller rotation command to become 
reconsidered is by manually disabling the AAH. 
Point: This is an example where seeking to come 
up with a test case for a certain situation discovered 
an ambiguity in the meaning of this requirement. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have illustrated the analysis of a 
formal specification using a testing-based approach 
to validation. We believe that the ratio between the 
insight gained by this kind of analysis and the effort 
spent on the analysis is promising, in particular in 
a technology transfer context, because less skilled 
engineers are required for this kind of validation 
than if formal verification was applied. Moreover, 
many errors can be found (relatively) cheaply using 
testing which otherwise might require a great deal 
of effort to single out using formal verification. 
The kind of tool support demonstrated in this 
paper, including the combined use of a specification 
executor and Dynamic Link modules, can in our 
opinion help in making the formal methods technol- 
ogy accessible to more engineers. Specifically with 
respect to the SAFER example, we believe that  
the prototyping and animation facilities provide an 
easy way for a specifier to demonstrate the con- 
sequences of the thruster selection logic to some- 
one unfamiliar with formal notations. Moreover, 
in the SAFER example there is very little trade- 
off in going from the PVS model to an executable 
VDM-SL model, because the PVS model is already 
relatively concrete and essentially executable. Gen- 
erally speaking, models for verification might be 
more abstract than executable models to ease ver- 
ification, and so there could be a trade-off. 
We see validation using simulation and formal 
verification as complementary techniques which 
can be fruitfully applied in the same project. Given 
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that the system is sufficiently critical to justify the 
costs, we imagine that the most productive ap- 
proach would be to use the validation technology 
first, and to continue with a formal verification of 
the properties which cannot simply be tested, after 
the worst bugs in the model have been removed. 
These different kinds of analyzes tend to discover 
different kinds of problems. Hence, though some 
verification of the PVS specification of SAFER had 
already been carried out in [9], we were still able to 
detect a few points that need further clarification 
using the validation approach (see Section 4.3). 
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that 
verification is costly. However, for certain 
restricted domains automatic verification using 
model checking has proved to be feasible, and hence 
potentially very cheap to apply. One might view 
the use of such automatic verification tools as a 
compromise towards fully verified models. Typi- 
cally, the price for this compromise is a more re- 
strictive notation increasing the effort required to 
produce models. 
In fact, we have continued the experiment above 
together with Arne Boralv from Logikkonsult, in 
order to investigate the potential power of auto- 
matic verification. Arne Boriilv has taken our VDM 
description and manually translated it to a model 
in NP-Tools [12], using only propositional logic 
extended with integer arithmetic and enumerated 
types. Usingthis model it was possible to automat- 
ically prove the maximum thruster and the thruster 
consistency requirements, as well as some other 
properties. Proof execution times were within the 
order of seconds (45 seconds for the hardest require- 
ment, maximum thruster). For rather finite sys- 
tems like the SAFER example we envisage that it 
would be possible to automatically translate VDM 
models to models in NP-Tools and in this way be 
able to automatically verify properties fast. This 
approach seems appealing and will be further in- 
vestigated. 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank Erik Toubro Nielsen, Ole 
Storm Pedersen and Anders Sprndergaard for de- 
veloping the different parts of the Dynamic Link 
modules. We are also grateful for the constructive 
comments we got on earlier versions of this paper 
from Hanne Carlsen, Benny Graff Mortensen, Paul 
Mukherjee and Anne Berit Nielsen. Finally PGL 
would like to thank John Kelly for asking for review 
comments on [9]. 
References 
Ricky W. Butler, James L. Caldwell, Vic- 
tor A. Carreno, C. Michael Holloway, Paul S. 
Miner, and Ben L. Di Vito. Nasa lang- 
ley’s research and technology transfer pro- 
gram in formal methods. In Tenth Annual 
Conference on Computer Assurance (COM- 
PASS 95). Gaithersburg, MD, June 1995. 
(expanded version available from http://atb- 
www.larc.nasa.gov/fm.html). 
James L. Caldwell. Formal methods 
technology-transfer: a view from nasa. In 
S. Gnesi and D. Latella, editors, Proceedings 
of the ERCIM Workshop on Formal Methods 
for Industrial Critical Systems, Oxford Eng- 
land, March 1996. 
Lionel Devauchelle, Peter Gorm Larsen, and 
Henrik Voss. PICGAL: Lessons Learnt from a 
Practical Use of Formal Specification to De- 
velop a High Reliability Software. In DA- 
SIA’97. ESA, May 1997. 
RenC Elmstrprm, Peter Gorm Larsen, and 
Poul Bprgh Lassen. The IFAD VDM-SL Tool- 
box: A Practical Approach to Formal Speci- 
fications. A CM Sigplan Notices, 29( 9) : 77-80, 
September 1994. 
J.S. Fitzgerald and P.G. Larsen. Formal spec- 
ification techniques in the commercial devel- 
opment process. In M. Wirsing, editor, Po- 
sition Papers from the Workshop on Formal 
Methods Application in Software Engineering 
Practice, International Conference on Soft- 
ware Engineering (ICSE-1 y), Seattle, April 
1995. ftp://ftp.ifad.dk/pub/papers/icse.ps.gz. 
Brigitte Frohlich and Peter Gorm Larsen. 
Combining VDM-SL Specifications with C++ 
Code. In Marie-Claude Gaudel and Jim Wood- 
cock, editors, FME’96: Industrial Benefit and 
Advances in Formal Methods, pages 179-194. 
Springer-Verlag, March 1996. 
Peter Gorm Larsen, John Fitzgerald, and Tom 
Brookes. Applying Formal Specification in 
Industry. IEEE Software, 13(3):48-56, May 
1996. 
Paul Mukherjee. Computer-aided Validation 
of Formal Specifications. Software Engineering 
Journal, pages 133-140, July 1995. 
63 
[9] NASA. Formal methods, specification and ver- 
ification guidebook for software and computer 
systems - a practitioner’s companion. Techni- 
cal Report Draft 2.0, Washington, DC 20546, 
USA, November 1996. 
[lo] P. G. Larsen and B. S. Hansen and H. 
Brunn N. Plat and H. Toetenel and D. J. 
Andrews and J. Dawes and G. Parkin and 
others. Information technology - Program- 
ming languages, their environments and sys- 
tem software interfaces - Vienna, Develop- 
ment Method - Specification Language - 
Part 1: Base language, December 1996. 
[ll] PVS World Wide Web page. 
[12] Gunnar StAlmarck. A System for Determin- 
ing Propositional Logic Theorems by Applying 
Values and Rules to  Triplets that are Gener- 
ated from a Formula, 1989. Swedish Patent 
No. 467 076 (approved 1992), U.S. Patent No. 
5 276 897 (19941, European Patent No. 0403 
454 (1995). 
http://wuu.csl.sri.com/pvs/overview.html. 
64 
2q 
Requirements Analysis of Real-Time Control Systems using PV 
Bruno Dutertre Victoria Stavridou 
bruno@dcs.qmw.ac.uk, victoria@dcs.qmw.ac.uk 
Department of Computer Science, 
Queen Mary and Westfield College, 
University of London 
Abstract 
This paper presents a practical application of the 
PVS theorem prover involving requirements analy- 
sis of real-time control systems. This work was con- 
ducted within the SafeFM project and relied on a 
real world avionics case study. We show how PVS 
was used to formalize the software requirements for 
the system and to verify safety-related properties. 
We also present the main result of the experiment. 
We give an overview of PVS libraries which were de- 
veloped after the case study experiment and are in- 
tended to facilitate the specification and verification 
of similar systems. 
1 Introduction 
The SafeFM project' investigated the practical ap- 
plication of formal methods to the development and 
assessment of high integrity systems [17]. Within the 
project, we investigated the use of formal methods 
and theorem proving in requirement analysis of real- 
time control systems. A major part of this work 
involved an experiment applying the PVS theorem 
prover to the analysis of an avionics control system. 
The case study was a substantially complex exam- 
ple based on an existing system developed by GEC- 
Marconi, one of our SafeFM partners. 
This paper presents the main results of SafeFM in 
the domain of formal requirement specification and 
analysis. Section 2 gives an overview of the verifica- 
tion method. Section 3 presents the formal notations 
we used and shows how PVS can provide mechanical 
support to formal requirements analysis. Section 4 is 
an overview of the case study experiment; it describes 
the successive phases of the formalization and verifi- 
'This work was partially funded under the UK Department 
of Trade and Industry SafeIT programme by EPSRC Grant 
No GRIH114il  under DTI Project No IED/1/9013. 
cation using PVS, and presents the main experimen- 
tal results. Section 5 describes further work dealing 
with one of the limitations of PVS identified during 
the case study: the lack of general purpose libraries. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Applications Considered 
SafeFM focused on a specific class of high-integrity 
systems, namely digital controllers. In particular, we 
were interested in medium size applications encoun- 
tered in avionics such as air-data computers or store 
managers. These applications have several important 
characteristics: 
0 They are usually fault tolerant systems with a 
redundant architecture. Because of the need for 
bigh reliability, avionics controllers incorporate 
multiple processors so that hardware failures can 
be tolerated. 
a They are real-time applications. Digital con- 
trollers interact with an active environment 
which imposes timing constraints. For example, 
input signals have to be sampled and processed 
at a sufficient rate for the system to maintain an 
accurate image of its environment. Commands 
have to be produced at the right time and may 
have to accommodate various externally defined 
mechanical constraints. 
0 They are hybrid systems. They may receive in- 
put both from discrete or from analogous sources 
and have to implement complex control laws 
which mix logical and numerical computations. 
All these characteristics are related to a major ele- 
ment of all control applications: the system under 
control. Real time digital controllers cannot be un- 
derstood and analyzed without taking into consid- 
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eration the controlled system, its behavior, and its 
properties. 
2.2 Method of Analysis 
Our primary objective within SafeFM was to design 
a methodology for the formal analysis of software re- 
quirements for real-time digital controllers. Our in- 
vestigation was guided by the SafeFM case study and 
we started from the following point of view: 
The control system consists of various processing 
units and the  general architecture of the system 
(processors, communication links, interface, etc.) 
is given. 
The requirements describe functional modules to 
be implemented by each of the processors. T y p  
ically, each module defines a control function or 
some other task such as failure detection or mon- 
itoring. The requirements may include real-time 
and temporal constraints as well as purely func- 
tional aspects. 
In order to get confidence in the validity of require- 
ments, we want first to check that the description of 
each module is internally consistent. This assumes 
that the requirements can be specified formally and 
that various consistency checks can be performed on 
the formal specification. Verification might include 
type checking, the  detection of out-of-range values, or 
the proof of general semantic properties. The preser- 
vation of invariants in state-based formalisms such as 
B[1] or VDM[10] is a typical example of such semantic 
verification. Although it is not exactly a consistency 
property, checking total coverage of the input domain 
is another important example of semantic validation 
[9, 151. 
The class of applications we consider are often 
safety critical or safety related. In this context, check- 
ing only the internal consistency of functional require- 
ments is not sufficient. We also need to be able to ver- 
ify that critical properties are satisfied. Such prop- 
erties are global constraints on the behavior of the 
system under control. Verifying that a system sat- 
isfies these high-level properties requires more than 
knowing the functional requirements of each module. 
Additional information, such as the architecture of 
the controller and a model of the system under con- 
trol. is necessary. 
In summary, we assume that specifications for real- 
time control applications can be structured into three 
broad classes: the functional requirements, a l i t  of 
assumptions about the controlled system, and the 
critical properties to be verified. Coherence can be 
demonstrated by applying various consistency checks 
to individual functional modules and by proving that 
the critical properties are satisfied by the functional 
requirements. 
3 Requirements Analysis with 
PVS 
In order to perform the different kinds of verification 
mentioned above, some form of mechanical support is 
necessary. The tool must provide a rich formal nota- 
tion able to cover the various classes of requirements 
of real-time control systems. It must also support 
reasoning about numerical as well as logical proper- 
ties . 
PVS was the tool chosen for SafeFM. PVS offers 
both a very expressive specification language based 
on higher order logic and a powerful theorem prover. 
A description of the system and examples of appli- 
cations of PVS can be found at the PVS world-wide 
web site’ and elsewhere [4, 13, 14, 161. 
PVS is a general system and we had to define a 
specification approach for real-time systems require- 
ments. We used a straightforward and easy to im- 
plement approach with explicit time. Time is mod- 
eled by the non-negative real numbers, time varying 
quantities are manipulated explicitly as functions of 
time, and temporal properties are written using ex- 
plicit time indices. 
There are two kinds of time dependent variables. 
The first kind is used to specify the requirements of 
discrete components; functions are defined on a sub- 
set of the time domain which represents a clock. The 
second is total function of time and models the con- 
tinuous variables of an application. 
3.1 Functional Requirements 
In order to specify functional requirements, we used 
a data Aow approach inspired from the synchronous 
languages LUSTRE and SIGNAL [S, 111. Every module 
is assumed to be acti-c-ated at regular intervals by a 
clock of known frequency. In PVS, such clocks are 
defined as follows: 
clocks [K : posreal] : THEORY 
BEGIN 
IMPORTING time 
http://www.csl.sri.com/pvs.htrnl 
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t : VAR t i m e  
n: VAR nat 
clock: TYPE = 
C t  I E X I S T S  n : t = n * K 3 .  
.4 clock is a parameterized subtype of t i m e ,  charac- 
terized by a positive real K - the period of the clock. 
An element x is of type clockCK1 if it is a multiple 
of the period. 
The specification for each functional module in- 
cludes a clock and a list of input, output and inter- 
nal variables. All these are time dependent and are 
represented as functions of the module’s clock. For 
example, an output WSCMD of a module of clock H is 
of type 
WSCMD : CH -> us-range]. 
The elements of H represent the instant when the 
module is activated, the input signals processed, and 
the output produced. The clock forms an increasing 
sequence of instant 
to < tl C t z  C ... C ti C ..- 
and W S C M D ( ~ ~ )  is the command computed at the i-th 
activation. 
With this approach, requirements can be specified 
as a list of function definitions. For example, we could 
have the followjng definition for WSCMD: 
t: VAR H 
WSCMD(t): us-range = m a x ( X ( t 1 ,  Y ( t ) ) ,  
where X and Y are other variables of the same mod- 
ule. Since we want the specifications to be imple- 
mentable in software, certain restrictions are imposed 
on the form of the definitions. Roughly, we require 
that the value of an internal or output variable X at 
time ti only depends on values of other variables at 
ti or at ti-l and possibly on X ( t i - 1 ) .  Intuitively, in 
case where X ( t i )  depends on X ( t i - 1 ) ,  the variable 
X is kept in memory for use in the subsequent step; 
the corresponding PVS definition uses recursion. For 
example a definition such as 
F ( t )  : RECURSIVE real = 
IF in i t ( t )  THEN A ( t )  
ELSE F(pre( t ) )  + A ( t )  
ENDIF 
MEASURE rank 
means that F accumulates the successive values of A. 
The predicate i n i t  and the functions pre and rank 
are generic and defined for every clock. i n i t ( t )  is true 
if t is the first element of the clock, pre(ti) is equal to 
t i-1 and rank(tj) is equal to i. The measure clause in 
the definition is required by PVS for every recursive 
function and is used to ensure that the function is 
well defined so that the recursion always terminates. 
In most points, this model is similar to an abstract 
state machine, as used in [3, 51 for example. The 
state at  time ti is a vector X I  (ti), .. . , X,(t i )  where 
XI,. . .,.Yn are variables of the module. The transi- 
tion function and the initial state are implicitly con- 
tained in the definition of all these variables. The 
restricted form of recursive definition shown above 
ensures that the state at  time ti depends on the value 
of input variables at ti and on the state at t i - 1 .  
Using this form of data flow specifications, the 
functional requirements are all expressed in a purely 
definitional style. This is strong evidence concerning 
the consistency of requirements. When type checking 
the specifications, PVS may generate various proof 
obligations known as TCCs. For example, a PVS 
specification such as 
cmd-range : TYPE = 
{x: reall 0 <= x AND x < M 3 
CMD(t) :  cmd-range = A ( t )  * A c t ) ,  
defines a data flow CMD of range cmdiange. When an- 
alyzing this specification, PVS will generate a TCC to 
ensure that the expression A ( t )  * A ( t )  is effectively 
within the allowed range: 
CMD-TCCl: OBLIGATION 
FORALL t : 
0 <= A ( t )  * A ( t )  AND A c t )  * A ( t )  < M .  
Provided all such TCCs are discharged, we know that 
all the data flows are well defined functions; there 
is no risk of inconsistency. Since PVS requires that 
all functions are total, this style of specification also 
ensures the total coverage of input domains. 
3.2 Assumptions and Critical Proper- 
Assumptions about the system under control and 
the critical properties to be verified are written as 
PVS axioms and conjectures, respectively. Unlike 
the functional requirements, assumptions and prop- 
erties may be related to  non-discrete quantities such 
as external physical parameters or the position of me- 
chanical components. For example, assuming a sps- 
tem receives input signals P t  and Ps from a probe 
measuring atmospheric pressure then the two inputs 
might be declared as 
ties 
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Pt , Ps: [time -> pressure-range] 
and we can write assumptions such as 
pressure-constraint: AXIOM 
FORALL (t:time): Ps(t) <= Pt(t). 
In the same way, a critical property is written as a 
conjecture using explicit time indices and quantifiers. 
For example, a typical response property could look 
like: 
response: CONJECTURE 
EXISTS u : 
FORALL t : Pl(t) IMPLIES 
t <= u AND u <= t + D AND P2(t); 
P2 is expected to hold within a delay D after P1 is 
true. 
3.3 Verification 
Once formalized, the requirements for a real-time 
controller consist of one or several functional modules 
specified as a set of data-flow definitions, a collection 
of ayioms which describe assumptions about the con- 
troller’s environment, and a list of conjectures which 
specify critical properties. There are also other ele- 
ments such as the communication between the mod- 
ules or between functional modules and the controlled 
system. 
The verification of requirements is then a theorem 
proving exercise; we have to prove the conjectures us- 
ing the axioms and the data flow definitions. In prac- 
tice, the proofs of critical properties can be complex 
and require the introduction of many intermediate 
theorems and lemmas. 
It is also useful to prove simple properties of the 
specifications (so-called putative theorems) - Such 
properties axe intended to check that the formaliza- 
tion of assumptions or functional requirements is rea- 
sonable. They are typically simple properties one ex- 
pects to be true of the system which may or may not 
help prove the main results. 
4 The Case Study 
This methodology and formalization approach have 
been applied within SafeFM to a realistic case study. 
The system is based on an air-data computer which 
controls the flaps and variable geometry wings of an 
aircraft. The example is typical of the target appli- 
cations. It is a real-time system with a redundant 
architecture and it performs complex control func- 
tions as well as failure detection tasks. Originally, 
Figure 1: ADC architecture 
the requirements were expressed in a mixture of En- 
glish description, mathematical formulas and various 
graphs. The requirements were produced by software 
engineers with previous experience with systems sim- 
ilar to the case study and were inspired from a large 
subset of an existing air-data computer. 
The remainder of this section gives an overview of 
the air-data computer and of its formalization and 
verification. X more detailed description of the case 
study appears in [i’]. 
4.1 Architecture 
The architecture of the controller is shown in Fig. 1. 
The system includes two channels with different 
clocks, each channel being composed of up to four 
functional modules. A primary channel performs all 
the controller’s function during normal operatic.? and 
a backup channel with restricted functionality ,< kes 
over when the primary fails. The two chann 
not synchronize; they have two independent clocks of 
different frequencies. The only cross channel comrnu- 
nication is a discrete signal which indicates failures 
of the primary channel to  the backup channel. 
The commands from the two channels are transmit- 
ted to servos which control the wing sweep actuators. 
Feedback signals from the servos and actuators are 
continuously monitored by the two channels in order 
to detect mechanical failures. The controller receives 
other input signals from the pilot, from various sen- 
sors and probes. and from other avionics systems in 
the plane. 
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wing-sweep-primary [ 
(IMPORTING time, types) 
ALTITUDE : [time-> altitude-range] , 
MACH : [t ime-> mach-range] , 
. . .] : THEORY 
BEGIN 
... 
t : VAR clock[PRIMARY,PERIOD] 
... 
AUTO,MODE(t) : RECURSIVE boo1 = 
if DESELECT-AUTO (t ) 
then FALSE 
elsif SELECT-AUTO(t) or init(t) 
then TRUE 
else AUTO-MODE(pre(t) 
endif 
MEASURE rank 
... 
WSCMDl(t) : RECURSIVE us-range = . . . 
END wing-sweep-primary. 
Figure 2: Example of functional module 
4.2 Funet'ional Requirements 
The PVS formalization of the functional requirements 
consists of six modules describing the six main func- 
tions of the controller. Each of these functional mod- 
ule is specified as a separate PVS theory. Fig. 2 
gives an overview of such a functional module. The 
theory specifies the wing sweep control function per- 
formed by the primary channel. The theory param- 
eters ALTITUDE, MACH, etc. specify the input signals 
received by the module. The theory contains a list 
of data-flow definitions which are all functions of the 
same clock, the clock of the primary channel. The fig- 
ure shows two examples of data-flows; AUTOYODE cor- 
responds to an internal boolean variable and WSCMDl 
specifies the wing sweep commands produced by the 
primary channel. 
ample, the axiom cmdsings below relates the wing 
sweep angle (WSPOS) and the wing sweep commands 
(CMD) when certain mechanical interlocks are not ac- 
tive. The value CMD(t) depends on the wing sweep 
command produced by the active channel. 
cmd-wings : AXIOM 
constant-in,interval(CMD,t ,t+eps) 
not wings-locked-in-interval(t , t+eps) 
CMD(t) = WSPOS(t+eps) 
CMD(t) < WSPOS(t+eps) and 
WSPOS(t+eps) <= wSPOS(t) - eps*min-rate 
CMD(t) > WSPOS(t+eps) and 
WSPOS(t+eps) >= WSPOS(t) + eps*min-rate 
and 
implies 
or 
or 
Other axioms describe the evolution of the wing 
sweep angle when the locks are active, the initial posi- 
tion of the wings, and various contraints about other 
components of the system. 
The air-data computer has to satisfy two main 
safety properties related to constraints on the posi- 
tion of the wings when various sets of flaps are ex- 
tended. Our first attempt to verify these properties 
failed because of a lack of information about the sys- 
tem under control. In particular, our first model did 
not include mechanical interlocks which ensure that 
the flaps do not extend at  the wrong time. Other me- 
chanical locks limit the extension of the wings when 
the flaps are not retracted. 
After several iterations and consultation with 
GEC-Marconi engineers, we reformulated the initial 
safety requirements in order to take the mechanical 
locks into account. We defined the safe states of the 
two channels as those where the wing sweep com- 
mands issued cannot force the wings against the me- 
chanical interlocks. We then specified three safety 
properties: 
m While the primary channel is in control, the sys- 
tem stays in a safe state. 
4.3 Assumptions a d  Safety Proper- 0 After the backup channel assumes control, it 
converges to a safe state within a specified pe- 
riod of time. 
ties 
The assumptions give a (crude) model of mechanical 
and eleetro-mechanical components of the controlled 
system (sensors, actuators, and interlocks). For ex- 
m If the backup channel is in control and in a safe 
state, it will stay in a safe state. 
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These three constraints are expressed easily in PVS. 
The first property ensures that the system is in a safe 
state until a possible failure of the primary channel. 
The second corresponds to  a transitory period from 
the instant the primary channel fails to the instant 
the backup channel reaches a safe state. The third 
property ensures that once the backup channel has 
reached a safe state, the system remains in a safe 
state. 
The second property indicates that  the backup 
channel may not be immediately in a safe state when 
the primary channel fails. This is due to the absence' 
of synchronization between the two channels. Be- 
cause the two subsystems have different clocks and 
receive input from separate sources, there can be a 
substantial difference between their internal states 
and between the wing sweep commands they com- 
pute. If the backup channel takes control while the 
difference is large, it may momentarily produce com- 
mands which force the interlocks but the latter ensure 
that the wings remain in a safe position. 
4.4 Results 
The formalization of the system consisted of approx- 
imately 4500 lines of PVS specifications. This in- 
cluded basic theories and definitions for time and 
clocks, a collection of general purpose functions and 
theorems (background knowledge), and the specifica- 
tion of the case study proper. The amount of effort 
involved in formalization and verification is estimated 
at around 18 person months. Approximately half of 
this time was spent on the verification of the three 
main properties. As a whole, a total of 385 proofs 
were performed. These include 106 TCCs most of 
ahich were discharged automatically by the prover; 
the rest was proved by hand. The verification of the 
three top-level critical properties required the proof 
of a total of 124 propositions. The other properties 
we verified were putative theorems whose proofs did 
not pose any major difFiculty. 
During the proof of a putative theorem, an error 
was found in our formalization of the functional re- 
quirements. This corresponded to an unespected sit- 
uation where a "lower limit" gets larger than an " u p  
per limit" and the resulting commands are wrong. 
This error is triggered by an exceptional combina- 
tion of input parameters. It can be traced back to 
the original informal requirements where the possible 
inversion of the two limits is completely overlooked. 
This was the only error discovered in the functional 
requirements. After a simple correction, all the pu- 
tative theorems were proved. 
The main difficulty we encountered was a lack of in- 
formation about the system under control and the im- 
precision of the informal safety requirements. There 
was only limited information about these aspects in 
the original requirements which were destined pri- 
marily for software engineers and focused on func- 
tionality. As a result, our first attempts to prove the 
safety properties were unsuccessful. The solution was 
to consult with systems engineers who have a wider 
view of the system including hardware and software 
as well as safety mechanisms. We also got more infor- 
mation about the expected behavior of the controller 
from various documents including the pilot's manual. 
The interaction with systems engineers and the new 
sources of information helped us clarify the safety re- 
quirements and formulate the correct assumptions. 
Once the precise requirements were established, we 
were able to prove the safety properties. 
The experiment clearly demonstrated the advan- 
tage of the PVS specifications over the original in- 
formal document; the formal requirements are con- 
cise, precise, and unambiguous. In this respect, the 
SafeFM case study has confirmed other authors' con- 
clusions about the value of formal requirements spec- 
ifications 13, 51. 
However, the main benefits of the formal approach 
were realised during the validation stages. Proofs 
are an essential means of detecting errors in require- 
ments. The proof process requires a thorough analy- 
sis and gives a profound understanding of the system 
behavior. In particular, proofs can help understand 
the subtle interactions between the components of a 
complex control system. 
An important conclusion of the case study is that 
formal methods can be applied in practice to the re- 
quirement analysis of real industrial systems. By the 
size of its specification and the number of proofs per- 
formed, our experiment represents a major effort in 
formal verification. Such large scale verification is 
feasible and beneficial provided adequate tool sup- 
port is available. In this respect, SafeFM has corrob- 
orated other reports on industrial uses on PVS, such 
However, another lesson of the experiment was that 
the proof process can be expensive and difficult to 
estimate. It took us eighteen months to complete the 
work instead of the six we had originally planned. 
Some of these delays can be attributed to our lack of 
familiarity with PVS. Other factors can also explain 
this time overrun: 
0 There was little guidance on how to apply PVS 
effectively to real-time control applications. A 
as [12]. 
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non-negligible part of the work was taken up in 
writing PVS theories defining the basic notions 
of clocks and time. 
We had to  spent time in developing and proving 
various general purpose results. For example, we 
had to prove properties of sets of real numbers 
or of finite sets. 
The initial requirements document was written 
from a software engineering point of view and 
contained little information about the system 
under control. Several iterations were required 
before formulating the correct assumptions and 
getting the precise safety requirements. 
Building PVS Libraries 
Some of the difficulties encountered were due to a 
lack of maturity of the PVS prover. In order to re- 
duce the effort involved in formal specification and 
in verification, it is necessary to provide general pur- 
pose PVS libraries. Fortunately, this need has been 
identified and the current version of PVS comes with 
more predefined notions and with better support for 
libraries3. An important issue for the PVS commu- 
nity is to develop and make available further libraries. 
In order to contribute to  this effort, we have de- 
veloped various PVS libraries during the last months 
of the SafeFM project. The main one includes basic 
results of real analysis [SI. Some aspects of the case 
study specification could have been simpler to model 
if such a library had been available. Other PVS de- 
velopments were related to finite sets and have been 
incorporated in a more general library [2]. In more 
recent work, we defined a smaller set of PVS theo- 
ries for manipulating roots and square roots of real 
numbers4. 
The main objectives when building such libraries 
are generality and usability. We need to define no- 
tions as generally as possible to make them applicable 
to  many classes of problems. We also need to present 
the results in a convenient form to ease their use in 
PVS proofs. 
In developing the SafeFM libraries, we used the 
following principles: 
0 For the notion of continuity to be useful in prac- 
tice, we cannot restrict ourselves to  the case of 
31vfost of the SafeFM work was done with an older version 
4These PVS libraries are accessible at 
which did not include these facilities. 
http://www.cs.rhbnc.ac.uk/research/formal/safefm-p%. html 
or ftp://ftp.cs.rhbnc.ac.uk/pub/safefm/pvs/roots.dmp.gz 
total functions from P to Iw; we must be able 
to consider continuous functions defined on sub- 
types of the reals. 
0 The most convenient and powerful way of using 
lemmas in proofs is using the rewriting capabili- 
ties of PVS. The mechanism takes lemmas which 
have the syntactic form of a "rewrite rule" or of 
a "conditional rewrite rule". The user can either 
apply these rules selectively or install them as 
automatic rules which will be used internally by 
the theorem prover. 
Another important capability is the general 
proof commands PVS provides for reasoning by 
induction. These commands use (explicitly or 
implicitly) lemmas which must have a particular 
form. We need to provide such induction rules 
when necessary. 
0 PVS relies on a powerful type system and type 
checking mechanism. The latter can generate 
proof obligations to ensure that specifications 
are consistent. As far as possible we need to re- 
duce the number of proof obligations that might 
be generated when using lemmas and functions 
from the library. A new feature of PVS - the 
judgements - can be of great help in this respect. 
0 Taking advantage of the decision procedures is 
another way of making lemmas and theorems 
simpler to use; we need to provide results in a 
form such that the decision procedures can be 
applied. 
This can sometimes work against the principle of 
generality. For example, the following important 
property is proved in the continuity library: from 
any sequence of reds, one can extract a mono- 
tonic subsequence. This property is also true for 
sequences of any type T, provided T is totally 
ordered. Unfortunately, manipulations of order 
relations on general, non-numerical types are ex- 
tremely tedious because no decision procedures 
apply. 
There are simple pragmatic rules one can adopt 
which can make libraries both easier to use and 
widely applicable: 
0 Generality can be achieved by using parameter- 
ized theories and the subtyping structure. For 
example, parameters allowed us to define conti- 
nuity of functions of type CT -> rea11 where T 
is any subtype of the reds. 
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Usability can be improved by writing lemmas All the above rules provide only partial answers to 
and properties in certain syntactic forms.in or- the difficult problem of building usable libraries. It 
der to make them usable as rewrite or induction is hard to anticipate what results and lemmas can be 
rules. The possible forms of rewrite rules are pre- useful in practice and to know how to present them in 
sented in [l6]; a few examples are given below a convenient form. Such issues can only be resolved 
by acquiring more experience in library development 
and by learning from users of libraries. sqrt-def : LEMMA 
sqrt(x1 = y IFF y * y = x 
square-sqrt : LEMMA 6 Conclusion 
sqrt(x> * sqrt(x) = x 
sqrt-square : LEMMA 
sqrt(x * XI = x. 
One main objective of SafeFM was to investigate 
practical methods of producing coherent software re- 
quirements for digital controllers, using a formal ap- 
proach and theorem proving. The case study exper- 
are non-negative reals. iment has confirmed the potential benefits of formal The two and 
It is convenient to offer several variants of the 
same theorem, even if they look redundant. For 
esample, it does no harm to have the following 
lemmas about square roots even though my- 
thing provable with the last three lemmas is 
provable from the first one alone. 
both-sides-sqrt-lt : LEMMA 
sqrt(x1 < sqrt(y) IFF x < y 
both-sides-sqrt-le : LEMMA 
sqrt(x) <= sqrt(y) IFF x <= y 
both-sides-sqrt-gt : LEMMA 
sqrt(x> > sqrt(g) IFF x > y 
both-sides-sqrt-ge : LEMMA 
sqrt (x) >= sqrt (y) IFF x >= y. 
With these four variants, many properties can be 
proved by automatic rewriting. A single lemma 
would require much more tedious manual inter- 
vention to instantiate the variables. 
requirements analysis. A formal specification pro- 
vides clear advantages such as clarity and precision, 
but the main benefit in our experiment was the fea- 
sibility of thorough analysis via proofs. 
The project showed that PVS provides adequate 
tool support for such an analysis. A relatively large 
and complex system was completely formalized and 
verified with PVS. We believe that the theorem prov- 
ing technology is mature enough to be applied to real- 
life, industrial applications. The main practical issue 
is to provide guidance on the use of theorem provers 
to specific classes of problems and in developing li- 
braries to facilitate specification and verification. 
0 The judgement clauses are extremely useful for 
simplifying type checking and reducing the num- 
ber of proof obligations. This mechanism is de- 
scribed in [13, 41; it allows US to specify for ex- 
ample that the square root of a positive number 
is positive: 
JUDGEMENT sqrt 
HAS-TYPE Cposreal -> posreall . 
e It may be sometimes necessary to reduce gen- 
erality in order to improve usability. This is in 
particular the case when notions are defined on 
types too general for the decision procedures to 
aPPlv- 
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Abstract 
Abstract 
This paper reports experience from how a project 
engaged in the process of requirements analysis for 
evolutionary builds can reuse the formally specified 
design model produced for a similar, earlier project in 
the same domain. Two levels of reuse are described 
here. First, a formally specified generic design model 
was generated on one project to systematically cap- 
ture the design commonality in a set of software mon- 
itors onboard a spacecraft. These monitors period- 
ically check for faults and invoke recovery software 
when needed. The paper summarizes the use of the 
design model to-validate the software design of the 
various monitors on that first project. Secondly, the 
paper describes how the formal design model created 
for the first project was reused on a second, subsequent 
project. The model was reused to validate the evolu- 
tionary requirements for the second project’s software 
monitors, which were being developed in a series of 
builds. Some mismatches due to the very different ar- 
chitectures on the two projects suggested changes to 
make the model more generic. In addition, several 
advantages to the reuse of the first project’s formal 
model on the second project are reported. 
1 Introduction 
In some application domains, successive software 
projects tackle many of the same problems. In such 
applications, software design from prior projects in the 
same domain or product family is sometimes used to 
‘Mailing address is Dept. of Computer Science, Iowa State 
University, Ames, IA 50011. The research described in this pa- 
per was carried out by the Jet PropukionLaboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, under a contract with NASA. 
guide the requirements for a current project. At the 
informal level this occurs when “Lessons Learned” on 
earlier projects are collected and considered during the 
requirements phase of a subsequent project. In other 
cases, reuse of existing software components or design 
patterns from a previous project may be mandated on 
a new project, with the reuse sometimes driving the 
requirements [20]. 
This paper investigates how a project engaged in 
the process of requirements analysis can exploit the 
formal design modeling and analysis done on a simi- 
lar past project in the same application domain. The 
approach is outlined in Figure 1. 
The paper describes two applications of reuse: 
1. A formally specified design model was generated 
on Project 1 to systematically capture the de- 
sign commonality in eighteen software monitors. 
This generic model was then reused to validate 
the software design of each of the eighteen moni- 
tors. 
2. The formal model created for Project 1 (the 
Cassini spacecraft) was subsequently reused to 
analyze the requirements for similar software (Le., 
fault monitors) on a second project in the same 
application domain. 
Each element (data item or function) of the 
generic formal model produced for Project 1 was 
either traced to the requirements for the monitors 
in Project 2 (the Deep Space-1 spacecraft) or the 
discrepant element was noted and investigated. 
In addition to the anticipated benefit of validating re- 
quirements in the current build of Project 2, the work 
also clarified the allocation of requirements among the 
software elements, provided a structured way to cap- 
ture design constraints and design assumptions during 
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Project 1: 
Modeling of OMT & PVS Design Design 
Design generic design Specifications analysis 
features 
Initial 
issues 
to current build‘s 
requirements 
Figure 1: Reuse of Project 1’s Formally Specified Design Model for Requirements Validation on Project 2 
requirements analysis, and guided the identification of 
requirements to be added in later builds during the 
evolutionary software development process. 
The need for -rapid, low-cost requirements analy- 
sis and the planned, steady evolution of requirements 
on the new project motivated the reuse of the ear- 
lier design model. The goal was to import some of 
the lessons learned about system-level fault protection 
monitor design on the earlier project into the subse- 
quent project in a structured but informal way. The 
results show that, although the software architectures 
and the development processes for the two systems 
are very different (see Section 4), the design model 
from the earlier project provided some guidance for 
validating a specific build’s requirements and identify- 
ing future builds’ requirements in the second project. 
By tracing each element of the earlier formal design 
model to the preliminary requirements for the later 
system, additional insights into the assumptions un- 
derlying the requirements, the design constraints of 
the new system, and the criteria for design choices 
were gained. 
The assumption underlying the experimental reuse 
of the first project’s formal model on the second 
project’s requirements is that similar behavior and 
similar data must occur in each monitor in this do- 
main. This assumption turned out to be largely true. 
The data items and functions in the formal specifi- 
cation can often be mapped directly to a data or be- 
havioral requirement in the second project’s monitors, 
adding some assurance that the requirements are com- 
plete and correct. This mirrored the experience apply- 
ing the generic formal model to the eighteen monitors 
in the first project. In that case, flagging deviations 
of particular monitors from the norm (Le., the generic 
model) was a quick way to identify areas of concern for 
additional analysis or testing. Similarly, identification 
of instances in which the second project’s monitors 
deviated from the first project’s generic formal model 
provided insights into currently missing requirements 
(to be required in later builds) and into implied design 
constraints. 
Both projects involved fault-monitoring software in 
the same domain. Project 1 is the Cassini space- 
craft, set for an October, 1997 launch to Saturn and 
its moon, Titan. Project 2 is the Deep Space-1 (DS 
1) spacecraft, which will be launched in 1998 to ren- 
dezvous with an asteroid and a comet [7]. The soft- 
ware described here was, on both projects, the system- 
level fault-protection monitoring software. In the 
spacecraft domain, a monitor is software that period- 
ically checks for malfunctions and initiates a process 
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leading to recovery when appropriate. The monitors 
are the “eyes and ears” of the spacecraft [15]. 
In both projects the software monitors are required 
to display similar behavior (e.g. ignoring transient 
faults) and to use similar data (e.g., fault thresholds 
against which the input data is measured to deter- 
mine if a fault exists). A fault is defined to be ei- 
ther “a defect in a hardware device or component” 
or “an incorrect step, process, or data definition in a 
computer program” [9]. Monitors are safety-critical 
software in that they must autonomously detect on- 
board threats to the spacecraft’s health and mission. 
Since fault monitoring software in other applications’ 
control systems frequently displays many of the same 
behavior and data dependencies represented in the for- 
mal model here, the approach described in this paper 
may have application beyond the spacecraft domain. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec- 
tion 2 describes the formal specification and analy- 
sis of the generic model. Section 3 summarizes the 
results from its use on the first project. Section 4 
surveys some relevant commonalities and differences 
between the two projects in terms of their software 
development processes (waterfall vs. spiral) and their 
architecture (centralized vs. remote agents). Section 
5 describes the results from the application of the de- 
sign model to the requirements analysis of the soft- 
ware builds on the second project. Section 6 briefly 
discusses related work and future directions. Section 
7 summarizes the lessons learned from the experience 
reported here. 
2 The Formal Model 
In previous work we used two technologies, formal 
methods and object-oriented modeling, to analyze the 
software design for portions of the Cassini spacecraft’s 
software [l, 14. The two tools that were used were 
OMT, the Object Modeling Technique [17], and PVS, 
the Prototype Verification System tool (SRI). PVS is 
an integrated environment for developing and analyz- 
ing formal specifications using support tools and a the- 
orem prover [18]. These tools allowed the modeling, 
formal specification, and analysis of the monitors’ de- 
sign in the Cassini system-level fault protection soft- 
ware [ll] . 
There are eighteen monitors in the system-level 
fault protection onboard the Cassini spacecraft. Eight 
of these are overtemperature monitors that are nearly 
identical in their logic. The other ten fault monitors 
detect loss of commandability (uplink), loss of teleme- 
try (downlink), heartbeat loss (i.e, communication be- 
tween computers), overpressure, overtemperature, un- 
dervoltage, and selected other failures. 
These monitors share many of the same functions 
and attributes. One of the roles of the OMT mod- 
els in the design analysis was to explicitly represent 
these common features in a way that could be read- 
ily reviewed by the Cassini engineers. This approach 
worked well. The OMT approach provides three view- 
points from which to represent the software design. 
The design of the fault protection monitor was thus 
represented in three OMT design diagrams [ll]: 
a The object-oriented design approach was repre- 
sented in a object diagram. At the design phase, 
the object model of the monitor provided insight 
into the common behavior, properties, and rela- 
tionships that the various monitors share. The 
OMT diagrams allowed the similarities in the 
monitors to be compactly represented. 
e The functional viewpoint was represented in a 
data flow diagram. The data flow diagram char- 
acterized the data and data transformations com- 
mon to all Cassini system-level fault protection 
monitors. 
a The dynamic viewpoint was represented in a state 
diagram (Fig. 2). The state diagram for the de- 
sign contained a sequence of six states that an 
active monitor can reach. Monitors commonly 
(1) test the validity of the input measurements 
that they receive from the sensors, (2) detect the 
existence of a fault condition in the various in- 
put data, (3) decide whether a fault condition in 
fact exists (perhaps by voting), (4) disregard tran- 
sient anomalies, (5)  determine whether a recov- 
ery response is appropriate, and (6) update state 
data, including possibly a request for a recovery 
response. 
The formal specification in PVS of the design for 
the monitor software drew on the OMT diagrams to 
guide the formal specification of the design model. 
This was consistent with our earlier experience that 
creating OMT diagrams prior to formally specifying 
the requirements enhanced the accuracy of the initial 
formal specifications and reduced the effort required 
to produce them [12]; see also [4. The formal speci- 
fication in PVS of the design for the monitor consists 
of two theories (five pages of typechecked PVS spec- 
ifications). The first theory, called mon, specifies the 
design of a system-level fault protection monitor (Fig. 
3). Voting behavior (among inputs on whether a fault 
exists) was not represented in the formal model, al- 
though it would be a desirable addition. 
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a L y  
fault indicated 
<-I Test for fault "-c> Check if output ":()"_ Update state response 
persistence enabled values 
Figure 2: Dynamic Model 
% Generic Cassini System-Level Fault Protection Monitor 
X Monitor requests recovery response. 
request-response (i, x, threshold, low-filter, high-filter, enabled, 
prev-persist-ctr, persist-limit, sensor-input): boo1 = 
valid-data-exists (i, low-filter, high-filter) 
AND cond-exists (i, I, threshold, low-filter, 
AW cond-persists (i, x, threshold, low-filter, 
high-f ilter, sensor-input) 
high-f ilter , prev-persist-ctr , persist-limit , 
sensor- input 1 
AND enabled 
Figure 3: Excerpt from the Formal Model 
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The second theory, called monlem, states seven lem- 
mas that specify the monitor’s behavior. Two of these 
lemmas describe basic safety properties that the mon- 
itor is expected to obey, as documented in .the project 
requirements ( “A response is requested by a monitor 
only if the detected fault is not a transient fault” and 
“If a fault is not detected by a monitor, then the mon- 
itor doesn’t request a response”). The other five lem- 
mas concern the monitor’s interfaces, i.e., the validity 
of the input data it uses to make a control decision as 
to whether to request a recovery attempt. The seven 
lemmas were proven, several by Martin Feather. 
The conformity of the OMT representation and 
the formal specifications to the actual, final soft- 
ware design was checked against the eighteen system- 
level fault protection monitors in the post-Critical 
Design Review document [3, 41. One step in evalu- 
ating that the model accurately represented the de- 
sign was to classify the Data Lists provided in [3] 
for each of the monitors, and then to map those 
data classifications to the model. Toward this goal, 
the 162 data items in the Data Lists were classi- 
fied into eight categories. In descending order of fre- 
quency, the eight categories were: Measurements (in- 
put data from sensors), Enabled/Disabled flags (moni- 
tors can be disabled), Thresholds (limits beyond which 
a fault condition exists), Filters (persistence require- 
ments so that transient faults are ignored), State 
Updates (e.g., “high-water”-the highest measurement 
seen to date), Validity ranges ( measurements out- 
side these ranges are assumed to be from failed sen- 
sors), Heartbeat/Messages (from other software), and 
State Currently Commanded (information about the 
current configuration). The eight categories of data 
found in the document were reflected in the OMT de- 
sign model and the formal specifications. 
3 Reuse of the Formal Model on 
Project 1 
The design analysis involved in constructing the 
model, in formally specifying the design of the moni- 
tor, in stating and proving the lemmas, and in confirm- 
ing the accuracy of the model and specifications, iden- 
tified eight deviations of Project 1’s individual fault 
monitors from the formal specification of the generic 
design. Four of the eight discrepancies were found 
through the design analysis needed to develop the for- 
mally specified generic model. The other four of the 
eight discrepancies were found by comparing the Data 
Lists for each of the eighteen fault monitors with the 
data in the formal specification. The issues found were 
reported back to the Cassini project. In each case, ei- 
ther a decision was made to retain the current design 
for the reason listed below or the issue was still being 
worked when this phase of the analysis ended. 
None of these discrepancies involved errors in the 
design logic, but several yielded discussions about the 
most robust way to design the software or how best to 
flag these items for attention during testing. Among 
the more interesting issues found by the analysis were: 
Unnecessary coupling. In a single case, a monitor 
cancels a response. This appears to be unnec- 
essary coupling of the monitor and the response, 
since in all other cases, the Fault Protection Man- 
ager performs this supervisory function. Conver- 
sations with the software designers indicated that, 
since there is no known problem with the current 
unique design for this monitor, that it will be re- 
tained. 
Unique design. In a single case, a monitor dis- 
ables itself (permanently or until ground opera- 
tors interfere) if it even once receives bad data. 
In all other cases, the response disables its related 
monitor. The design ratonale is that past flight 
data indicates that once a transducer (the hard- 
ware component providing the data) provides un- 
healthy data, that it is likely to be unrelative from 
then on. However, other monitors do not cease to 
accept data from transducers that have once pro- 
vided unhealthy data. 
Missing data validity checks? Inputs from the 
transducers on the propellant tanks and temper- 
ature transducers are checked for validity (i.e., 
whether the values are outside a range of cred- 
ible values, which would indicate a failed trans- 
ducer); however, inputs from other sensors do not 
undergo similar validity checks. At the time the 
study ended, this design issue was being worked 
as an action item by the design team. 
Misleading data name. In one monitor, the mon- 
itor can update the value of two global variables 
even when the monitor’s “Enabled flags” indicate 
that its output is disabled. Thus, in this one case, 
a disabled monitor can produce output, contrary 
to what the flags’ names suggest. 
Several other discrepancies involved inconsistent doc- 
umentation practices (e.g., a passed variable was in 
one case inaccurately listed as a global variable). By 
raising these issues while the design was still being de- 
fined, the Cassini design team was able to resolve them 
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(by change or by documenting a rationale for the in- 
consistency) prior to implementation and testing. 
The key benefit of abstracting from the documen- 
tation of individual monitors to model and formally 
specify the design of a general-purpose monitor in 
this study was to support design analysis. Flagging 
the design deviations of specific monitors from the 
general pattern was useful to the design verification 
process. These deviations are more likely to be de- 
sign errors, more likely to be implemented incorrectly 
(because they are exceptions to the norm), and more 
likely to be overlooked in the selection of test cases 
than other software. For example, Software FMEA’s 
(Failure Modes and Effects Analyses) that were being 
performed at the same time on the Cassini system- 
level fault protection software incorporated the design 
deviations found via the formal methods analysis into 
the SFMEA process [13]. 
4 Similarities and Differences in the 
Two Projects 
The fault monitors on the two spacecraft have much 
in common. In both systems the fault protection soft- 
ware is divided into software monitors, that detect 
when a fault condition exists, and software responses, 
that take autonomous action to command the space- 
craft to a known-safe state. 
Despite the similarities in the responsibilities of the 
fault monitors in the two systems, there are major dif- 
ferences in both the software architectures and in the 
development processes. System-level fault protection 
on Cassini is managed by a Fault Protection Executive 
that runs in a separate virtual machine. This is con- 
sistent with the basic fault protection design of prior 
spacecraft from which Cassini inherited portions of its 
fault-protection architecture. DS-1, currently under 
development, instead uses an innovative architecture 
based on recent advances in remote agent software, 
artificial intelligence, and robotics to monitor and re- 
cover from faults. 
The software development process on Cassini is es- 
sentially a waterfall software development process tai- 
lored to the needs and constraints of the overall sys- 
tem development. The software development process 
on DS-1 uses an evolutionary model, similar to the 
spiral process model, with rapid development of an 
initial system and three subsequent builds to add in- 
cremental functionality. The requirements for a next 
build are derived in large part from the testing of the 
previous build. Consequently, the distinction between 
requirements and design is blurred. Risk identification 
during testing, and risk resolution during the defini- 
tion of the next build’s goals and constraints, drive 
the evolution of the requirements. 
This evolutionary development of requirements, to- 
gether with the shift from a familiar to a relatively 
new spacecraft architecture, motivated the decision 
to reuse the Cassini design model. Concerns with 
requirements completeness and consistency for each 
build’s baseline could be addressed in part by reference 
to the previous project’s formally specified generic 
model. 
On DS1, two monitors have been established as 
C++ classes which can be reused by various subsys- 
tems [5, 14, 15, IS]. The two monitors are a Thresh- 
old Monitor, which closely parallels the functionality 
of the generic Cassini monitor in detecting when a 
persistent fault occurred, and a Transaction Monitor, 
which reports on the status of a transaction (e.g, the 
successful or failed attempt to take a picture). On 
Cassini the generic monitor model was created strictly 
for independent design validation; on DS-1 the moni- 
tor class is incorporated directly into the implementa- 
tion. The two DS-1 monitors are specified by means 
of state transition diagrams, supplemented by descrip- 
tions of the data. It is these specifications of mon- 
itors to which the Cassini generic design model was 
mapped. 
One difficulty in mapping the generic formal model 
to DS-1’s requirements was that the states in DS- 
1’s monitors represent the software’s knowledge of the 
hardware device it is monitoring, whereas the states in 
Cassini’s monitors represent the monitor’s own state 
of execution. This difference complicated the mapping 
since the same condition may lead to different states 
in the two systems. For example, on Cassini when the 
predicate “sensor surpasses threshold” becomes true, 
the software changes state from “Determine if fault 
indicated” to “Test for fault persistence.” In DS-1 the 
same predicate causes the state to change from, e.g., 
the nominal state (“Looks-OK”) to the state indicat- 
ing that a fault may exist. 
5 Reuse of the Formal Model on 
Project 2 
Nine threshold monitors and seven transaction 
monitors are included in a recent, intermediate build 
of DS-1 [15, 161. An early estimate was that there 
will be at least thirty monitor instances in the final 
launch code [SI. In addition, aggregate monitors will 
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be composed from several Threshold Monitors. 
The formal specification in PVS of the generic de- 
sign model of the Cassini system-level fault protection 
monitors was used to build two tables, one for the 
data items in the formal model and one for the func- 
tions in the formal model. In these tables each element 
of the formal generic model (data and functions) was 
traced to the current DS-1 build’s requirements for the 
Threshold and Transaction monitors. 
The tables list nineteen elements of the design 
model (the external inputs to the monitor, the prior 
state inputs and next state outputs, the external out- 
puts, and the functions). Some simple data items and 
functions needed only for correct PVS specification or 
to simplify proofs (e.g., a variable that specifies the or- 
dinal number of an input within a set), but that were 
not present in the OMT models, are excluded from 
the tables. Figure 4 shows an example from the Data 
Table of the input data item, “persistence-limit” . Fig- 
ure 5 shows a sample function, “condition-persists” . 
In the tables, “S” is a structure holding the internal 
monitor state, with S-Persistence being the limit on 
the number of unacceptable values, beyond which an 
error is declared; and S.Count being the number of un- 
acceptable values [15]. (The actual tables are turned 
sideways with each row of the table describing a data 
item or function, and the Transaction and Thresh- 
old monitors described separately, but are reformatted 
here for readability of the excerpts.) in a paper.) 
Those elements that are present in the Cassini de- 
sign model but are neither in a current DS-1 build nor 
have a clear rationale for being excluded are candi- 
dates for software requirements for future DS-1 builds. 
On the other hand, because the monitors in DS-1 
have less spacecraft redundancy to manage, some data 
and behavior present in Cassini monitors are not re- 
quired on DS1.  For example, the D S 1  monitors do 
not receive redundant sensor data, so do not need the 
“numsensors” data item present in the Cassini design 
model. 
The following types of issues arose during the de- 
velopment and inspection of the tables: 
1. Evolutionary requirements. The tables were 
most useful in identifying some requirements that 
needed to be added in later builds. The tables al- 
lowed the current status of the requirements to 
be tracked against the generic design model for 
similar software. The tables thus serve as a par- 
tial checklist against which the evolving require- 
ments can be measured. The tables also allow 
some possible requirements for future builds to be 
inferred. For example, the collection of data re- 
quired for ground diagnosis of the monitor’s state 
was explicitly deferred to a later build (e.g., the 
collection by the Threshold Monitors of the high- 
est and lowest values that each monitor ever sees 
for downlinked telemetry). The tables capture 
this intent for later builds’ requirements. 
2. Validation of requirements in the current build. 
Instances in which the D S 1  monitors were not 
required to exhibit behaviors that were present in 
the generic model were fed back to  the project for 
confirmation. In most cases investigation yielded 
a rationale for the exclusion (e.g., there is not the 
same redundancy in sensor input on DS-1 as on 
Cassini, so DS-1 monitors do not need the “num- 
ber of sensors” data item that the Cassini monitor 
used) or a better understanding of the spacecraft 
interfaces (e.g., that on DS-1 some lower-level fl- 
tering of the data occurs before the data are made 
available to the monitors). In a few cases devia- 
tions of a DS1 monitor from the generic model 
led to continued discussions of some requirements 
decisions. For example, the use of dual thresh- 
olds (“too-high” and “too-low”) in the Thresh- 
old Monitor raised questions about whether a 
single persistence counter suffices, since it masks 
whether the upper threshold, lower threshold, or 
some combination of both thesholds has been re- 
peatedly surpassed. 
3.  Clarifications of requirements allocation. Given 
DS-1’s innovative architecture and increased au- 
tonomy, there is an ongoing focus by the project 
on providing clean interfaces among software 
components and on avoiding the possibility that 
requirements drop through the cracks. The pro- 
cess of systematically either mapping each ele- 
ment of Cassini’s design model elements to DS-1’s 
monitors or of documenting why that element was 
not needed in DS-1 assists in this effort. The pro- 
duction of the tables prompted several questions 
about requirements allocation that crossed sub- 
system boundaries, leading to useful clarification 
by project personnel. Examples are where valid- 
ity checks and noise filtering on input data are 
performed (externally or internally to the moni- 
tor); how outdated sensor inputs are handled; and 
where and under what conditions various data 
items should be reinitialized (e.g. should one 
good reading reset the fault counter to zero?). 
4. Design constraints/rationales. The tables which 
trace Cassini’s generic formal model of the fault 
monitor to DS-1’s requirements for the monitors 
81 
Figure 4: Reuse of Formal Model for Requirements Validation of Data 
Figure 5: Reuse of Formal Model for Requirements Validation of Functions 
document both the rationale and assumptions 
made by Cassini in adopting their design, and 
the reason for deviations of DS-1’s requirements 
from that baseline. For example, on Cassini there 
was a design decision to allow monitors to  remain 
enabled but-to disable their output under some 
circumstances. The table notes that this distinc- 
tion has no meaning for DS1,  where the design 
is constrained to handle monitors as subsystem 
function calls. 
Initially an effort was made to  trace each element 
in the OMT diagrams to the D S 1  monitors. This was 
useful for better understanding the DS-1 monitors, es- 
pecially with regard to requirements allocation. How- 
ever, the subsequent tracing of the PVS elements to 
the DS-1 monitors subsumed this earlier work. More- 
over, the imprecision and repetition in the OMT dia- 
grams was removed by focusing on the PVS specifica- 
tions. The tracing of the OMT diagrams to the DS-1 
monitors is thus omitted here. 
6 Discussion 
The discussion up to this point has primarily de- 
scribed the reuse of the formally specified generic 
model from the first project on the requirements val- 
idation of the second project’s fault monitors. This 
effort at reuse was also instructive for validating the 
formal model itself and for pointing toward possible 
areas of future work. 
6.1 Evaluating the formal model 
There were data items in D S l ’ s  monitors that did 
not appear in the generic design model, namely dual 
upper and lower thresholds for detecting fault condi- 
tions. On Cassini only one threshold was tested in 
any single monitor-e.g., overpressure and underpres- 
sure would be tested in separate monitors since differ- 
ent responses would be triggered. However, the devia- 
tion of the DS-1 Threshold Monitor from this pattern 
was a reminder that any extension of this generic de- 
sign monitor to other applications should also handle 
a design decision to test dual thresholds in a single 
monitor. 
Similarly, although the value of the fault persis- 
tence counter in Cassini never exceeds the value of 
the persistence limit, in DS-1’s Transaction Monitor 
the counter can increase beyond this limit. Again, 
any further generalization of the generic design mon- 
itor should take this possibility into account. Most 
interesting is the inclusion in the DS-1 monitors of a 
confidence level, a number against which the number 
of successful or non-failed iterations of the monitor is 
compared. Too few successful iterations lead the mon- 
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itor to report that it knows too little to accurately re- 
port the situation, i.e., the status is “unknown” [16]. 
Several of these mismatches between the second 
project’s requirements and the model could be re- 
solved by revisions or extensions to the formal model. 
Such work is currently underway by others in antici- 
pation of reuse on subsequent projects. 
Other mismatches are not readily resolvable due to 
the very different architectures on the two projects. 
For example, the second project’s transaction mon- 
itors must report all changes, good or bad, rather 
than just faults, due to the increased on-board state 
modeling required by the remote agents. The formal 
model did a better job of validating the requirements 
for the Threshold Monitor on D S 1  than the Transac- 
tion Monitor on DS-1, since the Threshold Monitor’s 
requirements were closer to the behavior of the Cassini 
monitors. This suggests that a set of generic models 
of fault monitors, rather than the single monolithic 
model developed for Cassini, may be needed if the 
generic model is to be reused for design (rather than 
requirements) validation. 
Despite these limitations, the reuse of the for- 
mal model performed well in providing an early rea- 
sonableness check on the completeness and the cor- 
rectness of the requirements for the second project’s 
monitors. At the fairly high level of abstraction in 
the model, a high degree of correspondence between 
the required behaviors or responsibilities of the two 
project’s monitors, and between the data they need 
to do their jobs, was evident. Required functionality 
currently deferred to later builds in the second project 
became evident and could be made explicit in the ta- 
bles. 
Architectural differences, which will lead to very 
different implementations of the fault monitors on the 
two spacecraft are, for the most part, masked at the 
model’s high level of abstraction. A more detailed 
formal model might be less appropriate for reuse in 
requirements validation of the second project since it 
might be more likely to contain architectural depen- 
dencies. 
Of the seven lemmas that were formally specified 
and proved in PVS for the Cassini generic design 
model, five involved the validity of the input data used 
for the control decision of whether to request a re- 
covery response. All five of the properties specified 
in these lemmas (e.g., “The valid data from a sensor 
is within the range low-filter to high-filter”) are re- 
quired behavior of the lower-level “reflex” or fault de- 
tection behavior incorporated into each component in 
DS1. One of the remaining two lemmas (“A response 
is requested by a monitor only if the detected fault is 
not a transient fault”) describes required behavior of 
the Threshold and Transaction Monitors. The other 
lemma (“If a fault is not detected by a monitor, then 
the monitor doesn’t request a response”) describes re- 
quired behavior of the Threshold Monitor but not of 
the Transaction Monitor. This is because the Trans- 
action Monitor reports any change in status, including 
the first successful transaction after a string of failed 
transactions. 
6.2 Related Work 
Recent work in design patterns contains much in 
common with the process of defining and reusing the 
generic model described in this paper. Both ap- 
proaches emphasize the specification of Kthe core of 
a solution to a recurring problem” [lo]. However, the 
use of the generic model differs in two significant ways 
from the use of design patterns. 
First, the reuse of the generic model provided a 
mechanism for requirements validation rather than a 
design mechanism. The formally specified and vali- 
dated components of the generic model were traced 
to the components of the second project to check for 
gaps in functionality, robustness, and environmental 
assumptions. The generic model thus provided a rea- 
sonableness check on requirements rather than a de- 
sign pattern for the new project’s software. 
Secondly, design patterns are often tightly linked 
to an architectural model. In contrast, one of the in- 
teresting features of the reuse of the generic model 
is that the second project had a significantly differ- 
ent architecture (remote agents) from the first project 
(centralized control). This is discussed in more detail 
in Section 4. 
6.3 Future Work 
Future work on generic monitors may involve iden- 
tifying and specifying one or more multimission fault 
protection monitor for use in future spacecraft devel- 
opment. Since monitoring software similar to that on 
the spacecraft is part of many other safety-critical con- 
trol systems, the monitor is also being investigated as 
a possible design pattern [19]. Possible benefits of such 
an effort include: 
a Reducing design complexity. The specification of 
a generic design supports functional abstraction 
by identifying shared properties. It supports data 
abstraction by identifying the common objects 
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and classes, and operations on them. By organiz- 
ing similiar objects into classes and similar classes 
into superclasses, a generic design can help un- 
cover underlying similarities and promote gener- 
alization and inheritance of shared attributes. In 
general, a common design specification keeps the 
internal logic of the individual modules as simple 
and general-purpose as possible. 
0 Encouraging gradual design refinement. Use of a 
generic design may encourage hierarchical design 
development (successive refinement). For exam- 
ple, some monitors vote on whether a fault exists, 
but the voting strategy (2 of 3, etc.) varies among 
the monitors. Design updates often change the 
voting strategy in a particular monitor. With a 
generic design the details of the different voting 
strategies can be cleanly deferred to the detailed 
design stage of each monitor. 
0 Tracking and evaluating design changes. The ex- 
istence of a model and formal specification may 
allow more rapid response to proposed design 
changes by keeping the program structure evi- 
dent. This might help avoid “design recovery” 
problems in the maintenance of existing software. 
0 Reducing test time by reducing coupling and in- 
creasing cohesion. General-purpose designs keeps 
the interfaces simple and the interdependence 
among modules minimal. The attention paid to 
abstraction creates more tightly bound modules 
with a clear sequence of tasks. 
Work is underway to investigate whether a similar 
strategy for requirements reuse in a software product 
family offers these same advantages. 
7 Conclusion 
Formally modeling and analyzing the design of a 
generic fault protection monitor articulated the many 
commonalities among the data and functions of the 
eighteen Cassini software monitors. Having a formally 
specified design of a general-purpose fault protection 
monitor then allowed the occasional design deviations 
of individual monitors from the general pattern to be 
readily flagged for further analysis. This was useful be- 
cause the discrepancies (1) may be design errors, (2) 
may need additional documentation of their design ra- 
tionale (to preserve project awareness of their unique- 
ness), and (3) may require special attention during 
testing (since erroneous implementation of these ex- 
ceptions from the pattern is easy). 
The formally specified design model provided a 
baseline against which to measure the completeness 
of the requirements for similar fault-monitoring soft- 
ware on DS-1. Tracing data items and functions in the 
PVS design model to the requirements for the moni- 
tors in the second project helped (1) validate require 
ments in the current build, (2) identify requirements 
for future builds, (3) clarify the allocation of require- 
ments among software components, and (4) document 
possible design rationales and constraints. 
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Abstract 
Although formal methods for developing com- 
puter systems have been available for more than a 
decade, few have had significant impact in practice. 
A major bam’er to their use is that developers find 
formal methods difficult to understand and apply. 
One ezception is a formal method called SCR for 
specifying computer system requirements which, due 
t o  its easy-to-use tabular notation and demonstrated 
scalability, has achieved some success in indust y. 
To demonstrate and evaluate the SCR method 
and tools, we recently used SCR to specify the re- 
quirements of a simplified mode control panel for the 
Boeing 737 autopilot. This paper presents the SCR 
requirements specification of the autopilot, outlines 
the process we-used to create the SCR specification 
from a prose description, and discusses the problems 
and questions that arose in developing the specifica- 
tion. Formalizing and analyzing the requirements 
specification in SCR uncovered a number of prob- 
lems with the original prose description, such as 
incorrect assumptions about the environment, in- 
completeness, and inconsistency. The paper also 
introduces a new tabular format we found useful in 
understanding and analyzing the required behavior 
of the autopilot. Finally, the paper compares fhe 
SCR approach to requirements with that of Butler 
[5], who uses the PVS language and prover 1141 to 
represent and analyze the autopilot requirements. 
1 Introduction 
Although formal methods for developing com- 
puter systems have been available for more than 
a decade, few of these methods have had significant 
impact in the development of practical systems. A 
major impediment to the use of formal methods in 
industrial software development is the widespread 
view that the methods are impractical. Not only 
‘This work was supported by the Office of Naval Research. 
do developers regard most formal methods as dif- 
ficult to understand and apply; in addition, they 
have serious doubts about the scalability and cost- 
effectiveness of the methods. 
A promising approach to overcoming these prob- 
lems is to hide the logic-based notation associated 
with most formal methods and to adopt a notation, 
such as a graphical or tabular notation, that devel- 
opers find easy to use. Specifications in the more 
“user-friendly” notation can be translated automat- 
ically to a form more amenable to formal analysis. 
In addition, the formal method should be supported 
by powerful, easy-to-use tools. To the extent fea- 
sible, the tools should detect software errors auto- 
matically and provide easy-to-understand feedback 
useful in tracing the cause of an error. 
By providing a “user-friendly” tabular notation 
with demonstrated scalability, a formal method 
called SCR for specifying the requirements of com- 
puter systems has already achieved some success in 
practice. Since the publication more than 15 years 
ago of the requirements specification for the A-7 air- 
craft’s Operational Flight Program (OFP) 112, 11 , 
many industrial organizations, including Rockwell- 
Collins, Lockheed, Grumman, and Ontario Hydro, 
have used SCR to specify requirements. To support 
the SCR method, we have recently developed a for- 
mal state machine model to define the SCR seman- 
tics [9, 111 and a set of integrated software tools to 
support validation and verification of SCR require- 
ments specifications [8, 10, 41. The tools include 
an editor for creating and modifying a requirements 
specification, a simulator for symbolically execut- 
ing the specification, a consistency checker which 
checks the specification for well-formedness (e.g. , 
syntax and type correctness, no missing cases or 
unwanted nondeterminism), and a verifier based on 
model checking for analyzing the specification for 
application properties. 
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To demonstrate and evaluate the SCR method 
and tools, we recently used SCR to specify the re- 
quirements of a simplified mode control panel for 
the being 737 autopilot based on a description 
in a report by Butler [5]. Butler initially presents 
an incomplete prose description of the autopilot, 
and then adds prose to clarify the description. He 
also represents the required behavior in the PVS 
language [14] and verifies certain properties of the 
model using the PVS prover. This paper outlines 
the process we used to create the SCR requirements 
specification of the mode control panel, presents the 
SCR specification, and discusses the problems and 
questions that arose in developing the specification. 
Formulating the requirements specification in SCR 
exposed a number of problems with the prose de- 
scription of the requirements, such as missing ini- 
tial values, missing type definitions, missing units 
of measurement, lack of specificity, incorrect re- 
quirement, and several instances of inconsistency. 
The paper also introduces a new tabular format we 
found useful in understanding and analyzing the be- 
havior of the autopilot. Finally, the paper compares 
the SCR approach to requirements with Butler’s 
PVS approach. 
2 The SCR Method: Background 
2.1 SCR and Other Approaches 
A recent article by Shaw [IS] presents and dis- 
cusses a numbkr of different “specifications” of an 
automobile cruise control system. Each is con- 
structed to satisfy different objectives. For example, 
Atlee and Gannon use a language based on logic to 
model the required behavior of a cruise control sys- 
tem [3] and a model checker to detect violations of 
selected properties. Below, we refer to their logic- 
based description as an abstract model. 
The abstract model in [3] differs from an SCR 
specification in an important respect-namely, in 
the specific information it contains about the re- 
quired behavior. Because its purpose is verifica- 
tion, the abstract model omits many details. For 
example, it does not describe the system outputs. 
Omitting this information in an abstract model is 
appropriate because the properties analyzed in [3] 
are independent of the system outputs and because 
a model useful in verification should only include in- 
formation needed to reason about selected proper- 
ties. Eliminating irrelevant information is especially 
important in verification. Without dramatic reduc- 
tions in the size of the state space to be analyzed, 
model checking is usually infeasible. Moreover, the 
elimination of irrelevant facts is also beneficial in 
mechanical theorem proving where the model to be 
analyzed should only include those facts needed to 
establish the properties of interest. 
In contrast to the abstract model of the system 
described in [3] , the SCR requirements specification 
is a repository for all information that developers 
will need to construct the system software. Hence, 
it is necessarily more detailed and less abstract than 
a model useful in verification. An advantage of the 
SCR approach to requirements is that it not only 
provides detailed guidance on exactly what infor- 
mation belongs in a requirements document, but in 
addition provides a conceptual model of the system 
to be developed as well as special language con- 
structs for representing the system requirements. 
This detailed guidance, system model, and language 
constructs specialized for requirements specification 
are lacking in more generic languages such as State- 
charts [7] and PVS which, unlike SCR, are not c u s  
tomized for requirements specification. 
2.2 The SCR Model 
In the SCR approach, the system requirements 
are specified as a set of relations that the system 
must maintain between quantities of interest in its 
environment. In SCR, a requirements specifica- 
tion provides a “black box” description of the re- 
quired behavior as two relations, REQ and NAT, 
from monitored variables, representing environmen- 
tal quantities that the system monitors, to con- 
trolled variables, representing environmental quan- 
tities that the system controls [15]. NAT describes 
the natural constraints on the system behavior, such 
as constraints imposed by physical laws and the sys- 
tem environment. REQ describes the relation the 
system must maintain between the environmental 
quantities represented by the monitored and con- 
trolled variables. In SCR, these relations are speci- 
fied concisely using a tabular notation. 
To provide a precise and detailed semantics for 
the SCR method, the SCR model represents a sys- 
tem as a finite state automaton and describes the 
monitored and controlled variables and other con- 
structs that make ;p an SCR specification in terms 
of that automaton [ll, 91. To concisely describe the 
required relation between the monitored and con- 
trolled variables, the model uses four constructs- 
modes, terms, conditions, and events. A mode class 
is a partitioning of the system states. Each equiva- 
lence class in the partition is called a sglstem mode 
(or simply mode). A term is any function of mon- 
itored variables, modes, or other terms. A conda- 
Zion is a predicate defined on a system state. An 
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event occurs when the value of any system variable 
changes (a system variable is a monitored or con- 
trolled variable, a mode class, or a term). The nota- 
tion “QT(c) WHEN d” denotes a conditioned event, 
defined as 
OT(c) WEEN d%f - c A c ’ A d ,  
where the unprimed conditions c and d are evalu- 
ated in the “old” state, and the primed condition 
c‘ is evaluated in the “new” state. Informally, this 
denotes the event “predicaie c becomes true in the 
new state when predicate d holds in the old state”. 
The notation ‘‘@F(c)” denotes the event QT(IOT 
c). During the operation of the system, the envi- 
ronment changes a monitored variable, causing an 
input event. In response, the system updates terms 
and mode classes ‘and changes controlled variables. 
3 Developing the SCR Requirements 
Figure 1 illustrates the simplified mode control 
panel for the Boeing 737 as described in [5]. The au- 
topilot monitors the aircraft’s altitude (ALT), flight 
path angle (FPA) and calibrated air speed (CAS) 
and controls three displays which, depending on the 
mode, show either the current or desired value of 
the aircraft’s altitude, its flight path angle, and its’ 
airspeed. The pilot enters (i.e., preselects) a new 
value into a display by using one of three knobs 
next to the displays and engages or disengages the 
autopilot by pressing one of four buttons at the top 
of the panel. Appendix A contains a prose descrip 
tion of the system adapted from [5]. The reader 
should note that the prose presented by Butler in 
[5] was intknded as an example and is therefore (in- 
tentionally) incomplete. In the prose presented in 
this paper, we have (to the best of our knowledge) 
eliminated all intended incompleteness. Also, the 
variable names have been changed slightly to con- 
form to the naming conventions of SCR specifica- 
tions. 
3.1 Environmental Variables 
In the autopilot specification, we use the pre- 
fix ‘%I” to indicate the names of monitored vari- 
ables. The type of a monitored variable indicates the 
range of values that may be assigned to the variable. 
The autopilot system monitors the current altitude 
(represented by monitored variable mALTcurrent), 
the current flight path angle (mFPAcurrent), and 
the current calibrated air speed (mCAScurrent). 
Each of these monitored variables is of type inte- 
ger. We assume that the autopilot measures the 
Figure 1: Mode Control Panel 
altitude mALTcurrent in feet, the flight path an- 
gle mFPAcurrent in degrees, and the calibrated 
air speed mCAScurrent in feet per second. The 
monitored variables mALTsu, mATTsu, mCASsu, and 
mFPAsa represent the positions of the four buttons, 
and each is either on or off. Finally, the mon- 
itored variables mALTdesired, mCASdesired, and 
mFPAdesired represent the values indicated by the 
three knobs and range over the integers. 
The controlled variables are assigned names with 
the prefix “c”. Just as for monitored variables, 
each controlled variable has an assigned type. As 
in [5], we only model the mode control panel, omit- 
ting commands sent to the flight control computer. 
We represent the three controlled quantities of the 
mode control panel as cALTdisplay, cFPAdisplay, 
and cCASdisplay and assume each is of type in t e  
ger. We further assume that cALTdisplay displays 
the altitude in feet, cFPAdisplay displays the 
flight path angle in degrees and cCASdisplay dis- 
plays the calibrated air speed in feet per second. 
3.2 System Modes 
The SCR specification includes a single mode 
class mcStatus containing modes in the set 
{ ALTmode, ATTmode, FPAarmed, FPAunarmed) . When 
the system is in FPA mode and the altitude engage 
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mode is “armed”, we say the system is in mode 
FPAarmed. When the system is in the “normal” 
flight path angle selected mode, we say the sys- 
tem is in mode FPAunamed. Thus, the system is 
in FPAmode when mcStatus is either FPAanned or 
FPAunarmed. Because the system can be in the cal- 
ibrated air speed mode independently of whether it 
is in ALTmode, ATTmode, or FPAmode, we exclude the 
calibrated air speed mode from mcStatus and use a 
term to describe whether the system is in this mode 
(see below). 
3.3 Terms 
, 
rows R3 and R5 are both derived from paragraph 1.  
R1 The pilot engages a mode by pressing the cor- 
responding button on the panel (paragraph l),  
i.e., pressing ALTsw engages ALTmode. How- 
ever, the altitude must be preselected before 
ALTsu is pressed (paragraph 4). If the pi- 
lot dials an altitude that is more than 1200 
feet above ALTcnrrent and then presses ALTsw, 
then ALTmode will not directly engage (para- 
graph 3) .  
R2 If the pilot dials into ALTdesired an altitude 
that is  more than 1200 feet above ALTcurrent 
and then presses ALTsw, then ALTmode will not 
directly engage. Instead, the altitude engage 
mode will change to  “armed” and FPAmode is 
engaged (paragraph 3). 
Terms are assigned names with the prefix “t”. 
The autopilot specification contains five terms, 
each of type boolean. The terms tALTprese1, 
tCASprese1, and tFPAprese1 indicate whether the 
pilot has preselected the altitude, the calibrated air 
speed, or the flight path angle using one of the 
three knobs. The term tlear denotes when the 
difference between the desired altitude and the cur- 
rent altitude is less‘than or equal to 1200 feet, i.e., 
mALTdesired - mALTcurrent 5 1200. Finally, the 
term tCASmode indicates whether the system is in 
the calibrated air speed mode. 
3.4 Relation REQ 
i 
R4 The pilot engages a mode by  pressing the cor- 
responding button on the panel (paragraph l ) ,  
Le., pressing ATTsw should engage ATTmode, 
OR if the pilot dials in a new altitude while 
R3 The pilot engages a mode by pressing the cor- 
responding button on the panel (paragraph 
l ) ,  Le., by pressing FPAsw the pilot engages 
FPAunarmed. 
ALTmode is engaged, then ALTmode is disen- 
gaged and ATTmode is engaged (paragraph 7). The relation RE& is specified by a set of tables, one for each controlled variable, term, and mode 
class. R5 Same as row R3. 
Mode Transition Table. The mode transition 
table in Figure 2 specifies the behavior of the 
mode class mcStatus. In the table, the expres- 
sion CHABGEl)(x) denotes the event “variable I. has 
changed value”. The table defines all events that 
change the’value of the mode class mcstatus. For 
R6 Combination of scenarios for rows (4) and (3) 
above. 
R7 FPAmode will remain engaged until the air- 
craft is within 1200 feet of ALTcurrent, then 
ALTmode is automatically engaged (paragraph 
example, the fourth row of the table states: “If 3). 
mcStatus is ALTmode, and mATTsa is switched on, or 
the setting of knob mALTdesired is changed, then 
mcStatus changes to ATTmode.” An assumption is 
that events omitted from the table do not change 
the value of the mode class. For example, when 
the system is in ALTmode, pressing the button la- 
beled “ALTsw” (that is, the occurrence of the input 
event QT(mALTsu=on)) does not change the value of 
mcStatus. 
Each row in the mode transition table in Figure 2 
corresponds to certain parts of the prose description 
in Appendix A. We describe this correspondence 
below by associating each row of the table with the 
number of a paragraph in the prose description in 
Appendix A. In some casesj two rows of the table 
are derived from the same paragraph; for example, 
R8 The pilot engages a mode by pressing the cor- 
responding button on the panel (paragraph l), 
Le., by pressing mATTsu the system enters 
ATTmode, OR FPAsw toggles on and 08 every 
time it is pressed (paragraph 5 ) .  
R9 Same as row R1. 
R10 Same as row R2. 
Term and Controlled Variable Tables. Each 
of the three terms, tALTprese1, tCASprese1, and 
tFPApresel, is true when the corresponding dis- 
play, cALTdisplay, cCASdisplay, or cFPAdisplay, 
shows the “preselected” value and is false when the 
corresponding display shows the “current” value. 
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Figure 2: Mode Transition Table for mcstatus 
Figure 3: Condition Table for cCASdisplay 
Figure 3 is a condition table which specifies the 
behavior of the display cCASdisplay. This table 
states: “If tCASprese1 is true, then cCASdisplay 
has the value mCASdesired; otherwise, it has the 
value mCAScurrent” . The behavior of displays 
cALTdisplay and cFPAdisplay are specified sim- 
ilarly (see Appendix B). 
The event table in Figure 4 specifies the behav- 
ior of tALTpresel. Like mode transition tables, 
event tables make explicit only those events that 
cause the variable defined by the table to change. 
For example, the first entry in the first row states: 
“If mcStatus is ATTmode and mALTdesired changes 
value, then ZALTpresel becomes true.” The entry 
“HEVER” in an event table means that no event can 
cause the variable defined by the table to assume 
Figure 4: Event Table for tALTpresel 
the value in the same column as the entry; thus, the 
entry “NEVER” in row 2 of the table means, “When 
mcStatus is ALTmode or FPAarmed, then no event 
can cause tALTpiese1 to become true.” Figure 5 
shows the event table for tFPAprese1. 
4 Questions and Issues 
Developing the SCR specification raised a num- 
ber of questions about the required behavior of the 
mode control panel described by the prose in [5]. 
In a few cases (noted below), the problems were 
corrected in Butler’s PVS formulation. These ques- 
tions arose because applying the SCR method ex- 
poses instances of incompleteness and inconsistency 
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Figure 5:  Event Table for tFPApresel 
in the specification. This section presents these 
problems and describes how we resolved them. In 
resolving each problem, we made an educated guess 
about the actual requirement. Appendix B contains 
our revised SCR specification. For this specifica- 
tion to be acceptable, however, our decisions would 
need to be reviewed by system engineers with ex- 
pert knowledge of the Boeing 737 autopilot. 
4.1 Incompleteness 
Developing -the SCR specification exposed nu- 
merous instances of incompleteness in the prose de- 
scription. First, the prose provides no informa- 
tion about the types, ranges, and units of mea- 
surement of the monitored variables that repre- 
sent the current and desired altitude, (mALTcurrent 
and mALTdesired), the current and desired flight 
path angle (mFPAcurrent and mFPAdesired), and 
the current and desired calibrated air speed 
(mCAScarrent and mCASdesired). In addition, the 
ranges and units of measurement of the three con- 
trolled variables cALTdisplay, CFPAdisplay, and 
cCASdisplay are also omitted. This information is 
also missing in Butler’s PVS model due to its ab- 
stract level. As noted above, the SCR specification 
represents these quantities as integers. In the final 
specification , even more precise information about 
the types would be required. For example, what are 
the minimum and maximum values of each moni- 
tored quantity? Are negative integers acceptable? 
In addition, the prose description does not indi- 
cate the initial state of the autopilot. Butler’s PVS 
description, however, does provide this information. 
Our SCR specification states that in the initial state 
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mcStatas is ATTmode, tCASmode = false, the de- 
sired and current altitude are 0, etc. Appendix B 
shows the initial values and types of the monitored 
and controlled variables, terms, and mode class in 
the SCR specification. (In a specification produced 
by our toolset, the variable and mode class dictio- 
naries, omitted here due to space limitations, would 
contain this information.) 
4.2 Lack of Specificity 
Paragraph 5 of the prose description states: 
‘%PASW toggles on and 08 every time it is  pressed.” 
Paragraph 1 states: “One of the three modes 
ATTmode, FPAmode, or ALTmode should be engaged at 
all times.” From these two sentences one can infer 
that if FPAmode is toggled of€ by FPAsw, then one of 
ATTmode or ALTmode is engaged; but not which one. 
In our specification as well as Butler’s, the decision 
is to engage ATTmode. 
4.3 Wrong Interpretation 
Paragraph 3 of the prose description states: “If 
the pilot dials an altitude that is more than 1200 
feet above ALTcurrent and then presses ALTsw, 
then ALTmode will not directly engage. Instead, 
the altitude engage mode will change to  armed and 
FPAmode is engaged.” This sentence is either incor- 
rect, or is misinterpreted by Butler-the PVS model 
in [5] sets the altitude engage mode to armed also in 
the case where the pilot dials a value for desired alti- 
tude that is more than 1200 feet below ALTcurrent 
and then presses ALTsw. 
4.4 Incorrect Requirement 
Paragraph 6 of the prose description states: 
‘‘Whenever a mode other than CASmode is en- 
gaged, all other preselected displays should return 
t o  current.” However, consider the scenario where 
CASmode is engaged, CASdisplay shows the pre- 
selected value, and the pilot engages ATTmode. 
Clearly, returning CASdisplay to show the cur- 
rent value would be wrong in this situation since 
CASmode remains engaged. Therefore, the above 
sentence should read instead, “Whenever a mode 
other than CASmode is engaged, ALTdisplay and 
FPAdisplay, i f  preselected, should return to cur- 
rent.” The PVS model does the right thing for this 
scenario; however, Butler does not point out the 
error in the prose. 
4.5 Inconsistent Requirement 
Paragraph 6 of the prose description states: 
“Whenever a mode other than CASmode is engaged, 
ALTdisplay [. . .I, if preselected, should return to  
current.” For the scenario of paragraph 7 “If the 
pilot dials in a new altitude while ALTmode is en- 
gaged or the altitude engage mode is “armed”, then 
ALTmode is  disengaged and ATTmode is  engaged.” 
This suggests that tALTprese1 is set to false (be- 
cause ATTmode is engaged). On the other hand, the 
sentence “However, the pilot can enter a new value 
into a display by dialing in the value using the knob 
next to the display“ of paragraph 2 suggests that 
tALTprese1 is set to true for this scenario (because 
the pilot has dialed-in a new altitude). We resolved 
this inconsistency by setting tALTprese1 to false. 
Butler does not point out this inconsistency in the 
prose. Unlike the SCR specification, his PVS model 
resolves the inconsistency by preselecting the dis- 
play. 
5 Consistency Checking, Simulation 
After creating the requirements specification, we 
used our automated consistency checker [a, 91 to 
check for proper syntax, type correctness, miss- 
ing eases, nondeterminism, and other application- 
independent properties. Then, we used our simula- 
tor to symbolically execute the requirements specifi- 
cation [lo] to ensure that the specification captures 
(what we assume is) the “customers’ intent”. For 
the autopilot specification, our consistency checker 
detected three instances of inconsistent require- 
ments. Whereas we detected the inconsistency de- 
scribed in Section 4.5 by inspection, we overlooked 
the following three cases of inconsistency. Butler’s 
PVS model, being too abstract, failed to detect any 
of these problems. 
1. Consider the two sentences in paragraph 2 of 
the prose description: (1) However, the pi-  
lot can enter a new value into CFPAdisplayl 
by  dialing in the value using the knob 
CFPAdesiredl and (2) Once the target value 
is achieued [, . .], the display reverts to  showing 
the “current ” value. These sentences are incon- 
sistent in the situation where the pilot enters 
a new value into FPAdisplay that is the same 
as FPAcurrent. In this situation, should the 
display show the dialed-in value or the current 
value? 
Butler’ answers this question as follows: The 
phrase . . . “will this affect the preselected value 
(i.e., change it to current)” is diflcult to  inter- 
pret. I assume you meant “will this affect the 
status of the corresponding display (i.e., change 
’Private communication. 
2. 
3. 
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if to  current)”. Interestingly in this case the 
status distinction i s  an artifact of the formal- 
ism because the target and current are the same 
value. So the ’status” is merely a matter of 
choice/taste. 
While we agree with Butler that the status dis- 
tinction does not affect the current value of 
the display, we note that it does affect the 
future values displayed. For instance, s u p  
pose FPAcurrent proceeds to diverge from 
FPAdesired immediately following the above 
scenario. The sentence marked (1) specifies 
FPAdisplay to continue to show FPAdesired, 
whereas the sentence marked (2) specifies that 
FPAdisplay should track the “current” value. 
We resolved this issue by assuming that sen- 
tence (2) takes precedence over sentence (1). 
The table defining tFPAprese1 in Appendix B 
reflects this decision. 
A similar scenario may be constructed for the 
calibrated air speed display. We resolved the is- 
sue in the same way as above. The table defin- 
ing tCASprese1 in Appendix B reflects this de- 
cision. 
The first sentence of paragraph 7 states: If the 
pilot dials in a new altitude while [. . .] the alti- 
tude engage mode t s  “armed”, then ALTmode is 
disengaged and ATTmode is engaged. However, 
dialing in a new altitude in mode FPAarmed can 
cause txear to simultaneously become true, 
which leads to inconsistency. We ignore the 
event OT(tlOear) in this situation. The revised 
specification for mcStatus in Appendix B re- 
flects this decision. 
Application Properties 
After applying the consistency checker and the 
simulator, we wanted to check the requirements 
specification for critical application properties, such 
as safety properties. Verification may be carried out 
using an interactive theorem prover such as PVS 
[14, 51, or by using “lightweight” analysis tools such 
as model checkers. The SCR toolset supports proof 
of safety properties of requirements specifications 
using model checking based on state exploration 241. 
The following sentences in paragraph 1 of the prose 
description are examples of properties of the autopi- 
lot mode control panel: 
. 
1. Only one of the three modes ALTmode, 
ATTmode, or FPAmode can be engaged at any 
time. 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
One of the three modes, ALTmode, ATTmode, or 
FPAmode should be engaged at all times. 
model check a smaller, more abstract model. To 
obtain the abstraction, we exdoit the structure of 
the formula and the siructur; inherent in all SCR 
Engaging any Of the three modes 
callY 
specifications. We use the two correctness preserv- 
ing reductions of [4] to derive the abstract specific-- the Other two to be disengaged since 
Only One Of these three modes can be engaged 
at a time. 
tion. Finally, we translate the abstract specification 
to PROMELA, the language of Spin [13], and run 
The mode CASmode can be engaged at the same 
time as any of the other modes. 
Spin On the PROMELA 
When we initially attempted to check property 
P1, Spin detected a violation. The counterexample 
The type definition of mode class mcstatus 
is {ALTmode, ATTmode, FPAarmed, FPAunarmed}, and 
by definition, the system is in FPAmode if mcStatus 
is FPAarmed or FPAunarmed. We denote the system 
being in CASmode by the boolean term tCASmode 
whose value is independent of mcstatus. By this 
choice of the domain for mode class mcstatus, and 
the definition of tCASmode, the above properties are 
.trivially satisfied (and verified automatically by a 
type checker). 
5. Whenever the altitude engage mode is 
“armed” , FPAmode is engaged. 
For the SCR autopilot specification, this follows 
directly from the definition of FPAmode, i.e., the 
system is in FPAmode if mcStatus is FPAarmed or 
FPAunarmed. Therefore, if mcStatus is FPAarmed, 
the system is in FPAmode. 
We used the Spin model checker to verify the 
requirements specification for two additional prop- 
erties stated in [5] which are listed below. These 
properties could not be checked using simple type 
checking. 
P1 When FPAmode is disengaged, the FPA display 
reverts $0 showing the “current” value. 
P2 When ALTmode is disengaged, the ALT display 
reverts to showing the “current” value. 
We currently check two classes of properties: 
state invariants, which assert the truth of a pred- 
icate formula for all reachable states of a system, 
and transition invariants, which assert the truth of 
a predicate formula (on two states) for all pairs of 
consecutive states of a system. Both P1 and P2 are 
transition invariants. Model checking can be inef- 
fective in practice due to state ezplosion. By their 
very nature, the number of reachable states of prac- 
tical systems is usually very large in relation to their 
logical representation. Several techniques have been 
proposed in the literature for limiting state explo- 
sion. The technique we use is abstraction-instead 
of model checking the whole SCR specification, we 
generated by Spin had 4867 states (which trans- 
lates to 811 SCR “steps”). The shortest counterex- 
ample had only 73 states (12 SCR “steps”). By 
running the counterexample through the simulator 
of our toolset, we were able to pinpoint the cause 
of the property violation-a typographical error in 
the mode transition table for mclitatus. 
7 A New Tabular Format 
In [5], Butler presents two different PVS mod- 
els of the panel requirements. In his initial model, 
he identifies the different input events (e-g., chang- 
ing the ALT button to on, setting the knob labeled 
ALT to a new value, etc.) and then specifies the 
required behavior by describing the state changes 
and the changes in the displays that each input 
event causes. Thus, his initial model is organized 
by the input events. His second model defines a 
set of modes and describes the required behavior in 
terms of those modes. Butler claims that the lat- 
ter organization, which is the organization used in 
SCR specifications, results in “a more complex for- 
mulation for this example problem.” Moreover, he 
notes that his initial model is smaller, containing 
373 words in contrast to 761 words. 
We agree that understanding the overall system 
behavior can be difficult when that behavior is spec- 
ified in numerous tables. This problem is overcome 
to some extent by the dependency graph produced 
by our toolset (see Appendix B), which shows all 
the variables in the specification and their depen- 
dencies. In initially creating the SCR specifica- 
tion, we developed individual tables for the mode 
class, the terms, and the three control variables. To 
enhance our understanding, we introduced a new 
tabular format that combines several smaller tables 
into a larger table. This larger table, which speci- 
fies the values of several variables each defined by 
either a mode transition table or an event table, is 
similar to the “selector table” used in the original 
A-7 requirements specification2. 
SCR specification of the OFP for the C-1305 aircraft. 
2A similar tabular format was also used in Lockheed’s 
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The specification in Appendix B contains two ex- 
amples of the new tabular format. The first exam- 
ple defines the values of the terms tCASmode and 
tCASprese1. The other defines the values of the 
mode class mcStatus and the terms tALTpresel 
and tFPAprese1. The new tabular format is useful 
because it collects in a single place all events that 
change a set of related variables. For example, the 
table defining mode class mcStatus and the terms 
tALTprese1 and tFPAprese1 shows that when the 
system is in mode FPAarmed, pressing either mATTsv 
or mFPAsu causes the system to enter ATTmode and 
sets both tALTpresel and tFPAprese1 to false. Al- 
though the new table format is useful, the three s e p  
arate tables defining mcStatus, tALTpresel, and 
tFPApresel are also useful, but for answering a dif- 
ferent set of questions: for example, the table defin- 
ing the mode class mcstatus identifies all events 
that can change the current mode but does so with- 
out the clutter of the extra information in the new 
table. Further, in a large application, merging ta- 
bles together into a single table could produce very 
large tables that would be difficult to understand. 
As a result, we plan to support both our original 
tables, which define individual variables, and the 
new table, which defines two or more variables- 
and to automatically generate the larger table from 
selected tables that define individual variables. 
In our view, the SCR specification in Appendix B 
is both easy t o  understand and concise. The 
complete specification is contained in two pages. 
Moreover, the SCR specification has an advantage 
over Butler’s PVS model: it is easier to change. 
For example, our initial version of the specifica- 
tion defined a term called tArmed and only three 
modes, FPAmode, ALTmode, and ATTmode, in the 
mode class mcstatus. Our revised version removed 
the term tArmed and replaced mode FPAmode with 
two modes FPAarmed and FPAunaxmed, thus pro- 
ducing a specification that was more concise and 
easier to understand. Making the change was quite 
straightforward-we simply eliminated the table for 
tArmed, revised the table €or mcbtatus, and modi- 
fied the tables for tALTpresel and tFPApresel to 
describe the required behavior in modes FPAarmed 
and FPAunarmed. The tables defining the displays 
as well as all rows of tables that did not involve 
FPAmode were unchanged. 
8 SCR versus PVS 
Although PVS was not specifically designed to 
specify requirements, Butler advocates the use of 
the PVS language and prover for requirements spec- 
ification [5]. In his report [5], Butler presents two 
PVS models of the mode control panel and ver- 
s e s  properties of the model organized by inputs 
using the PVS prover. As noted in the introduc- 
tion, different formal models serve different pur- 
poses. While the PVS model of the panel allowed 
Butler to verify certain properties of interest, in our 
view, PVS is not a good notation for expressing 
requirements specifications to be used by software 
developers. This is because PVS, a language based 
on higher-order logic, produces specifications that 
are less readable by practitioners than specifications 
in alternative, more user-friendly languages. More- 
over, because PVS is not part of a requirements 
method but is a general-purpose language designed 
to specify mathematical models, most PVS models 
omit (abstract away) information needed in a re- 
quirements specification-that is, PVS models are 
usually incomplete. Many of the questions that 
arose in our development of the SCR specification 
emerged because an SCR specification requires in- 
formation that is lacking in Butler’s PVS model. 
Below, we compare the SCR approach to require- 
ments specification and verification with the ap- 
proach used by Butler. Although some of the prob- 
lems we discuss are intrinsic to PVS, others are the 
result of decisions Butler made in developing the 
PVS model. 
8.1 What are the requirements? 
In the SCR approach, a requirements specifica- 
tion is complete when the specification contains all 
the information software developers will need to de- 
sign and implement the software. To accomplish 
this, the specification must identify the quantities of 
interest in the system’s environment, in particular, 
the monitored and controlled quantities, and specify 
the required relation between them. Butler’s PVS 
model does not clearly identify the environmental 
quantities of interest. Nor does the PVS model 
clearly delineate monitored and controlled quanti- 
ties. The result is that one cannot infer from the 
PVS model the required relationships among these 
quantities. 
The PVS model makes use of actions or ewenis 
as undefined (primitive) elements. In SCR, in con- 
trast, the system inputs and outputs are modeled 
as variables, thus capturing more semantic infor- 
mation about the system behavior. This seman- 
tic information can be exploited in analyzing the 
specification for errors. For example, the PVS 
model assumes that certain input events are mu- 
tually disjoint, which results in the omission of an 
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input event from the model (see Section 8.2). Since 
the SCR specification explicitly defines the environ- 
mental quantities of interest, this incompleteness in 
the specification was automatically detected during 
consistency checking. 
The requirements specification presented in Ap- 
pendix B is closer than the PVS model to a “real” 
requirements specification useful to developers. We 
note, however, that it is still incomplete in at least 
three respects. First, the 1/0 devices (or subsys- 
tems) that the autopilot uses to measure and com- 
pute the monitored and controlled quantities must 
be specified. Second, the required timing and ac- 
curacy of the system is yet unspecified. Third, the 
constraints imposed by NAT need to be specified. 
Once these aspects of the required software behav- 
ior are provided, developers would have all the in- 
formation necessary to design, implement, and test 
the system. . 
8.2 What are the constraints? 
To be complete, a requirements specification (in- 
cluding ours) should model the constraints that 
physical laws and the system’s environment im- 
pose on the environmental quantities. For exam- 
ple, changes in altitude are limited by physical laws 
(e.g., the laws of gravity) and by the maximum rate 
at which the Boeing 737 can gain or lose altitude. 
Inclusion of such constraints in the specification can 
be used later in software development to do sanity 
checks on the specification-and the code-and to 
indicate when some fault has occurred (e.g., a sen- 
sor measuring altitude has failed). 
Relations NAT and REQ are specified separately 
in the SCR method (see Section 2.2). The PVS 
model, on,the other hand, does not distinguish re- 
lationships that arise from existing physical or other 
constraints (relation NAT of SCR) and relation- 
ships that are to be enforced by the system (relation 
REQ of SCR). This gap leads to two related prob- 
lems: overspecification and incompleteness. 
Overspecification. It is useful (and simpler) to ig- 
nore impossible situations (i.e., situations ruled out 
by NAT) in the definition of relation REQ. For ex- 
ample, the PVS model defines the following events: 
the altitude reaches the pres- 
elected value 
the altitude is now near, but 
not equal to the preselected 
value 
On page 12 of [5], Butler addresses the scenario 
where the system is in mode FPAarmed (Le., predi- 
cate tlear is false) and the event altseached oc- 
al t ieached 
alt_getsaear 
curs without altgetsmeax occurring first. This 
situation is clearly ruled out by relation NAT (if 
tliear is false, the current altitude cannot reach 
the preselected value without tHear becoming true 
first). Therefore, when specifying relation REQ, 
one need not deal with the above scenario. 
. Incompleteness. The PVS model considers the 
following events to be mutually disjoint: 
input alt the action of dialing a value 
using mALTdesired 
altseached the altitude reaches the pres- 
elected value 
alt-getanear the altitude is now near, but 
not equal to the preselected 
value 
But, these events are nut disjoint. For exam- 
ple, the action of dialing a value (denoted by event 
inpatal t )  can simultaneously cause either of the 
other two events to occur. The PVS model fails to 
consider these cases. 
8.3 What is the level of abstraction? 
The PVS description of the autopilot may be 
viewed as an abstract model of the mode con- 
trol panel. For example, the monitored quan- 
tity ALTcuncent is denoted abstractly by two 
boolean variables al t ieached and a l t g e t s n e a r ;  
boolean variable i n p u t d t  abstractly denotes the 
pilot dialing in the desired altitude using knob 
ALTdesired; etc. Once the model is constructed, 
one can use deductive reasoning to check that the 
model satisfies specified properties of interest, such 
as the application properties described above. Al- 
though such an approach is a good way to detect 
errors in the system requirements, our claim is that 
such abstract models must be transformed into a 
more concrete requirements specification, such as 
the one we present in Appendix B. Without a re- 
quirements specification, one cannot determine the 
monitored and controlled quantities of interest, and 
the required relationship between them. If the cor- 
respondence between the abstract model and the 
requirements specification is informal (and the re- 
quired relation REQ is never specified explicitly), 
developers may misinterpret the requirements. 
8.4 Role of tool support 
The major strength of PVS is verification: using 
PVS, a user can analyze a specification for complex 
properties. In another task, we have used PVS to 
detect serious errors in the specification of a hybrid, 
real-time system [2]. However, because PVS was 
not designed for specifying and analyzing require- 
I 
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Problem Description 
Missing initial values 
Missing ranges, types, and 
Lack of specificity 
units of measurement 
Incorrect requirement 
Inconsistent requirements 
Wrong interpret ation 
Overspecification 
Incompleteness 
Transcription error 
Table 1: Detected Problems 
Location Phase Reference 
Formulating Consistency Model Checking 
SCR Spec Checking 
prose 4.1 
prose, PVS many 4.1 
PI= 1 4.2 
Pr= 1 4.4 
prose, PVS 1 3 4.5, 5 
SCR 1 6 
PVS 1 4.3 
PVS 1 0.2 
PVS 1 0.2 
ments, it lacks a requirements method. Without 
such a method, users have little guidance in devel- 
oping a requirements specification. In contrast, the 
SCR method has been specifically designed to pro- 
duce precise and complete requirements specifica- 
tions. In our experience, tools that support a spe- 
cific conceptual model and method are more effec- 
tive than general-purpose tools. If a formal model 
lacks a strong underlying method, the benefits of 
automation are likely to be minimal ([SI provides 
more details). Since the SCR method focuses on a 
limited class of systems and standardizes the con- 
ceptual model, the notation, and the process, sig- 
nificant automated tool support is possible. 
9 Analysis 
Table 1 summarizes the problems we detected in 
applying the SCR method to the autopilot specifi- 
cation and identifies the specification in which the 
problem occurs. Some of the problems listed (miss- 
ing initial values, lack of specificity, and incorrect 
prose) were corrected by Butler. All the other prob- 
lems, except the typographical error, were addi- 
tional problems detected when we applied the SCR 
method to Butler’s (presumably correct) prose spec- 
ification. All but four of them were detected in for- 
mulating the SCR specification. Of the remaining 
four problems, the typographical error was  detected 
by model checking and the remaining three cases 
of inconsistency were detected by our consistency 
checker. 
It is clear from Table 1 that merely specifying 
a system using the SCR method without any auto- 
mated analysis can expose many problems. It may 
be argued that some of these problems might even- 
tually be detected by the PVS prover. To do this, 
however, users must formulate properties that will 
expose the problems. It has been our experience 
that formulating correct properties for a large re- 
quirements specification can be non-trivial. More- 
over, in our opinion, the effort needed to analyze 
the specification with PVS would be significantly 
greater than the effort involved in formulating the 
specification in SCR and analyzing it with the SCR 
tools. 
Our experience can be compared to that of 
Miller3, who reports that the SCR method helped 
uncover 18 errors in a specification of an autopi- 
lot at Rockwell-Collins. Of the errors, one-third of 
them were detected during formulation of the SCR 
specification, one-third by the consistency checker, 
and one-third during simulation. (Since we used 
the simulator to a much smaller degree than Miller, 
we found no significant errors using the simula- 
tor.) Our two efforts clearly demonstrate that light- 
weight methods are highly effective in uncovering 
errors in requirements specifications. It is also im- 
portant to note that most of these errors, including 
those that were detected by formulating the spec- 
ification in SCR, would have probably gone unde- 
tected without appropriate tool support. 
10 Conclusions 
In this paper, we outlined a process for creat- 
ing an SCR requirements specification of a simpli- 
fied mode control panel for the Boeing 737 autopi- 
lot, based on the prose description of the system 
presented in 151. Developing an SCR specification 
of the autopilot uncovered a number of problems 
that were undetected in Butler’s formalization of 
the problem using PVS. While PVS is useful for ver- 
ifying deep properties of specifications, this study 
3Private communication. 
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provides evidence that PVS is not well suited for 
formulating and analyzing requirements specifica- 
tions, especially during the initial stages. This is 
due to a number of factors: the logic-based PVS 
language which software developers find difficult to 
apply, the mathematical sophistication and theo- 
rem proving skills that developers need to verify 
properties using the PVS prover, and the lack of a 
requirements method for PVS. 
We envision a process for developing high-quality 
requirements specifications that combines the SCR 
technology and a mechamcal prover, such as PVS. 
This process would rely on the light-weight SCR 
tools during the initial part of the requirements 
process-specification using a formal yet “user- 
friendly” notation to capture the requirements, au- 
tomated consistency checking and model checking 
to  detect violations of simple properties, and simu- 
lation to ensure that the specification captures the 
customers’ intent. Once sufficient confidence in the 
specification is developed, a mechanical proof sys- 
tem, such as PVS, may be used to verify deep prop- 
erties of the complete requirements specification 
or, more likely, safety-critical components. While 
software developers themselves will have the skills 
needed to apply the light-weight SCR tools, apply- 
ing heavy-duty theorem proving is likely to require 
formal methods experts with the requisite mathe- 
matical sophistication and theorem proving skills. 
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A Description of the autopilot 
1. The mode-control panel contains four buttons for selecting modes and three displays for dialing in or 
displaying values, as shown in Figure 1. The system supports the following four modes: attitude control 
wheel steering (ATTmode), flight path angle selected PPAmode), altitude engage (ALTmode), and calibrated 
air speed (CASmode). 
Only one of the first three modes can be engaged at any time. The mode CASmode can be engaged at the 
same time as any of the other modes. The pilot engages a mode by pressing the Corresponding button 
on the panel. One of the three modes, ATTmode, FPAmode, or ALTmode should be engaged at all times. 
Engaging any of the first three modes will automatically cause the other two to be disengaged since only 
one of these three modes can be engaged at a time. 
2. There are three displays on the panel: altitude (ALTdisplay), flight path angle (FPAdisplay), and Cali-  
brated air speed (CASdisplay). The displays usually show the current values of alfitude (ALTcurrent), 
flight path angle (FPAcurrent), and air speed (CAScurrent) of the aircraft. However, the pilot can 
enter a new value into a display by dialing in the value using the knob nezt to the display (ALTdesired, 
FPAdesired, or CASdesired). This is the target or “pre-selected” value that the pilot wishes the air- 
craft to attain. For example, i f  the pilot wishes to climb to 25,000 feet, he will dial 25,000 (using the 
knob ALTdesired) into ALTdisplay and then press ALTsu to engage ALTmode. Once the target value is 
achieved or the mode is disengaged, the display reverts to showing the ‘%urrent” value. 
9. If the pilot dials into ALTdesired an altitude that is more than 1,200 feet above the current altitude 
(ALTcurrent) and then presses ALTsu, then ALTmode will not directly engage. Instead, the altitude 
engage mode will change to “armed” and FPAmode is engaged. The pilot must then dial in, using the 
knob FPAdesired, the desired flight-path angle into FPAdisplay, which will be followed by  the flight- 
control system until the aircraft attains the desired altitude. FPAmode will remain engaged until the 
aircraft is within 1,200 feet of ALTcurrent, then ALTmode is automatically engaged. 
4. CASdesired and FPAdesired need not be pre-selected before the corresponding modes are engaged-the 
current values displayed will be used. The pilot can dial-in a different target value after the mode is 
engaged. However, the altitude must be pre-selected before ALTsu is pressed. Otherwise, the command 
is ignored. 
5. CASsu and FPAsw toggle on and 08 every time they are pressed. For example, if CASsu is pressed while 
the system is already in CASmode, that mode will be disengaged. However, i f  ATTsu is pressed while 
ATTmode is already engaged, the command is ignored. Likewise, pressing ALTsu while the system is 
already in ALTmode has no efect. 
6. Whenever a mode other than CASmode is engaged, all other pre-selected displays should return to  current. 
7. If the pilot dials in a new altitude while ALTmode is engaged or the altitude engage mode is “armed”, then 
ALTmode is disengaged and ATTmode is engaged. If the altitude engage mode is “armedn then FPAmode 
should be disengaged as well. 
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B 
Monitored Variables: 
SCR Specification of the autopilot 
mALTcarrent , mCAScurrent , mFPAcurrent : Integer initially all 0; 
mALTsu, ndTTsv, mCASsu, mFPAsu : {on, off} initially all off; 
mALTdesired, mCASdesired, mFPAdesired : Integer initially all 0; 
Controlled Variables: 
cALTdisplay, cCASdisplay, cFPAdisplay : Integer initially all 0; 
Terms: 
tALTprese1, tCASprese1, tFPAprese1 : Boolean initially all false; 
tCASmode : Boolean initially false; 
tlDear gf mALTdesired - mALTcurrent 5 1200; 
Mode Class: 
mcStatas : { ALTmode, ATTmode, FPAarmed, FPAunarmed} initially ATTmode; 
Figure 6: Variable Dependency Graph 
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QT (mCASdesired=mCAScuent 
Old Mode 
ATTmode 
ALTmode 
I Mode Class = mcStatus 
Events New Mode 
ALTmode 
FPAarmed 
QT(mALTsv=on) UHEN (tALTprese1 AND tNear) 
QT(mALTsw=on) WHEN (tALTprese1 AND NOT tNear) 
QT (mFPAswon) FP Aunarmed 
CHANGED(mALTdesired) 
CHANGED(mFPAdesired) 
QT(mATTsw=on) ATTmode 
QT(mFPAsv=on) FPAunarmed 
CHANGED (mALTdesired) ATTmode 
CHANGED (mFPAdesired) 
- 
false 
true 
f alae 
false 
false 
false 
false 
false 
I QT(mALTdesired = mALTcurrent) I 
FPAarmed I QT(mATTsw=on) OR QT(mFPAsu=on) I ATTmode 
false 
true 
false 
f alsq 
true 
false 
false 
true 
false 
FPAunarmed 
Conditions 
CHANGED (mALTdesired) ATTmode 
CHANGED(mFPAdesired) AND mFPAdeiired' # mFPAcarrent' 
QT(tHear) AND mALTdesired = mALTdesired' ALTmode 
QT(mFPAdesired = mFPAcurrent) 
QT(mALTsu=on) WHEN (tALTprese1 AND tNear) ALTmode 
QT(mALTsm=on) WHEN (tALTprese1 AND NOT tNear) FPAanaed 
QT(mATTsw=on) OR QT(mFPAsv=on) ATTmode 
CHANGED (mALTdesired) 
CHANGED(aFPAdesired) AND mFPAdcsired' # mFPAcorrcnt' 
QT(mFPAdesired = mFPAcurrent) 
I Conditions I 
false 
true 
false 
true 
false 
I Conditions I 
cCASdisDlav = 
tCASpresel I HOT tCASpresel 
mCASdesired I mCAScurrent 
cFPAdisplay = 
tFPApresel I NOT tFPApresel 
mFPAdesired I mFPAcurrent 
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Abstract 
A tabular language for describing synchronous be- 
haviors is developed as a visual representation for 
formalized design derivation. A sketch of behavior 
table syntax and semantics is given. An example 
illustrates the kinds of formal manipulations inves- 
tigated by the research. Evidence is accumulating 
that tables are perspicuous for specification, design, 
and verification, but graphical support is essential to 
their effective use. 
1 Introduction and background 
The tabular specification language described in this 
article emerged as a visual representation for inter- 
active system design. We started using tables in a 
casual way, generating them from the underlying ex- 
pressions of a formal system for design derivation 
[13]. Behavior tables emerged as a bridging nota- 
tion between control oriented and architecture ori- 
ented modes of description. 
With better graphical support, we think tables 
such as these can assume a prominent role in system 
specification, verification, and synthesis. In our case 
studies of design derivation, we began using tables 
to visualize formal transformations on design expres- 
sions. Over time, notational features evolved that 
we have not found in other hardware description lan- 
*This research is supported, in part, by the National Science 
Foundation under Grants MIP-9208745 and MIP96-10358. 
guages. Even though we intimately understand the 
underlying formalism, we believe that the tables are 
more expressive than the underlying modeling ex- 
pressions they represent because they offer additional 
visual structure. 
This realization prompted us to consider our ta- 
bles more seriously as a formal design notation, and 
we began exploring features that are useful in system 
design applications [28,25]. We comtemplated direct 
realizations in VLSI [20]. Other encouraging influ- 
ences have been the emerging tools and techniques 
for using tables in requirements specification, verifi- 
cation, and synthesis. These are reviewed in the next 
section. 
In Sections 3 through 5 we present a syntax and 
representative semantics for the tables we use. We 
think of behavior tables as denoting persistent, com- 
municating processes rather than procedures or func- 
tions. The substance of the difference is that behavior 
tables cannot themselves be entries in other behav- 
ior tables. Instead, they are composed by connect- 
ing their 1/0 ports. Thus, behavior tables represent 
typed, synchronous transition systems, which we be- 
lieve are closer to the intended high-level synthesis 
models than the “synthesizable subsets” of VHDL 
and Verilog now in use. 
Section 6 illustrates the kind of manipulations we 
perform in design derivation. The example was con- 
structed manually, but a corresponding derivation 
was performed using an existing transformation tool. 
Section 7 reviews additional syntactic features con- 
templated and topics of further research, including 
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manipulations that we have mathematically formal- 
ized but not automated. We believe that the most 
urgent task of this line research is to develop graph- 
ics interface facilities. 
An apology about terminology. The term “behav- 
ior table” arose spontaneously in our laboratory. In 
Section 3 we adopt “decision table” from [9] and “ac- 
tion table” from [18] for fragments of our forms. But 
these fragments are not identical to the previously 
published objects. Fbrthermore, there are other ob- 
jects in the literature with similar names, including 
“behavior table,” that have different, possibly incom- 
patible forms and interpretations. We hope this ter- 
minology will stabilize in the future. 
2 Related work 
The work on decision tables by Hoover, Chen, and 
others [9,8] inspired us to think more seriously about 
the behavior tables developed in our case studies of 
design derivation. Their Tablewise specification tool 
was developed for avionics software development, but 
clearly applies to reactive systems in general. In ad- 
dition to a graphical front end, there are functions for 
verifying exclusivity and completeness of decision ta- 
bles and for performing structural analyses to aid in 
obtaining these properties. Future topics mentioned 
in [9] include connections to state-machine and stat- 
echart based specification. This connection is the fo- 
cus of our interest. 
The Software Cost Reduction system of Naval Re- 
search Laboratories is also a requirements specifica- 
tion tool set with graphics support and aids for anal- 
ysis and verification [7]. A formalization in PVS by 
a group at SRI is based on SCR* constructs and 
also contains an extensive review of tabular speci- 
fication notations [19]. Their treatment is a shallow 
embedding, supported by tabular syntax contained 
in the PVS surface language. One immediate bene- 
fit of this approach is exploitation of the PVS type 
system, in particular, its management of type correct- 
ness conditions. Our experience integrating design 
derivation with PVS verification suggests a somewhat 
deeper embedding will needed to support reasoning 
about transformations. One reason for this is that 
the underlying semantic domain of streams is not well 
founded [14]. 
Leveson’s Requirements State Machine Language 
[16] is based on Harel’s state charts [6], but uses and- 
or tables to specify hyper-edges. She echos Hoover’s 
observation that decision tables are readily accepted 
and used by practicing engineers. 
Li and Gupta introduce timed decision tables as an 
HDL [18, 171. Their results on optimizations exploit- 
ing don’t care entries are directly applicable to the 
forms we use in our work. Their work is also evidence 
of the utility of a tabular specification language for 
CAD tool development. Behavior tables have been 
proposed as an interchange format by Gajski, Dutt, 
et. al. [5, 41. The intermediate synthesis language 
BLIV-MY contains a very rich syntax for the tab- 
ular specification of multi-valued boolean functions 
[15]. We find it very encouraging that research in 
high-level synthesis and formal methods finds com- 
mon ground in these tabular representations; it re- 
flects new opportunities for synergy between commu- 
nities that frequently encounter problems with each 
others’ not at ions. 
3 Syntax of behavior tables 
Behavior tables are arrays of terms over an amalga- 
mated abstract type giving ground syntax for con- 
stants and operations and equational laws for rea- 
soning about them. Our examples will involve com- 
monly understood types, but a type system is in- 
tended to support conceptual hierarchies, parameter- 
ization, and other structuring capabilities. A useful 
tool must have built-in reasoning for concrete types, 
but must also have facilities for reasoning about and 
between user specified type complexes. 
The notion of term evaluation used here is stan- 
dard. The value of a term, t ,  is written ant], where D 
is an assignment or association of values to variables. 
A generic don’t-care constant is written as ‘h’. 
A finite extension of propositional logic is 
assumed-Hoover calls it finite logic [SI. Arbitrary 
collections of enumerated values, or tokens, can be 
formed. These finite sets come with a polymorphic 
selection operation. A behavior table can be thought 
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of as a parallel composition of selection expressions. 
Behavior tables are closed expressions whose terms 
contain variables from three disjoint sets: I (inputs), 
S (data state), and C (combinational signals). Fix 
these sets for the remainder of this section. We will 
write ISC for I U S U C and SC for S U C. We 
use the term ‘register’ for an element of S, but this 
is a euphemism that should be interpreted very ab- 
stractly. There is no assumption that these variables 
denote finite values, nor are tables intended only for 
register-transfer specification. The form of a behav- 
ior table is 
I Name: Inputs -, Outputs 1 
I Conditions 11 Reoisters and Sionals 1 
Guard Computation Step 
Inputs is a list of input variables and Outputs is a set 
of terms over ISC; for simplicity, assume 0 g ISC.  
Conditions is a set P of predicates over ISC ,  that is, 
terms ranging over finite types, such as truth values, 
token sets, etc. A guard is a set of constants indexed 
by the condition set P: g = { ~ p } ~ ~ p .  We say g holds 
for an assignment u to ISC when, for each p E P,  
either ~p = b or ujl’p] = cp. 
A decision table D = [P, GI, consists of a condition 
set and a list of guards. Following [9], we say a de- 
cision table is functional when G describes a proper 
partitioning of the possible assignments to ISC. In 
other words, the guards are “exclusive and exhaus- 
tive.” A computation step or action is a set of terms, 
one for each register and signal: a = {tw)wESC. An 
action table is an indexed set of actions. 
A behavior table for I -, 0 consists of a decision 
table, D, with guards G = (91, . . . g n } ,  and an action 
table indexed by G, A = {tw,k  1 v E SC and g k  E 
GI- 
4 Synchronous semantics 
A behavior table [D, A] for 0 ISC denotes a rela- 
call these sequences streams because in prior work 
we obtain a semantics by interpreting a table as 
a (co)recursive system of stream-defining equations 
[13]. More directly, suppose we are given a set of 
initial values for the registers, { z ~ } ~ E s  and a stream 
for each input variable in I .  Construct a sequence of 
assignments, (uo, 01 . . .) for ISC as follows: 
(a) un(i)  is given for all i E I and all n. 
(b) For each s E S, ~ ( s )  = zS. 
(c) un+l(S) = un[ts,k] if guard gn: holds for a,. 
(d) For each c E C ,  an(.) = an[tc,k] if guard gk 
holds for a,. 
The stream associated with each o E 0 is 
(uo(o),u1(0),. . .). This semantic relation is well de- 
fined if there are no circular dependencies among the 
combinational actions {te,n: I c E C, gn: E G}. The 
relation is a function (i.e. deterministic) if decision 
table D is functional. 
This semantics is at odds with both TDTs and 
Tablewise (Section 2), but the differences are rec- 
oncilable, and are by no means special to tabular 
notations. We think of behavior tables as denoting 
persistent, communicating processes rather than pro- 
cedures to be invoked. 
In other words, behavior tables cannot themselves 
be entries in other behavior tables, but instead are 
composed by interconnecting their 1/0 ports. Com- 
positions give rise to hierarchical network descrip- 
tions in which the Yeaves” are tables. This is closer 
to the intended high-level synthesis models than the 
“synthesizable HDL subsets” now in use. For exam- 
ple, Borrione, et.al., have recently proposed hierar- 
chical finite state machines (HFSMs) as a common 
basis for €IDL interoperability [l]. The semantic rela- 
tionship between HFSMs and behavior tables is very 
close. 
Composition is specified by giving a connection 
map that is faithful to each component’s arity. Valid 
maps must preserve 1/0 directionality, excluding 
both combinational cycles and output conflicts. In 
our function-oriented modeling methodology, such 
tion between infinite input and output sequences. We compositions are expressed as-recursive systems of 
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in which the defined variables Xij are all distinct, 
each 7, is the name of a behavior table or other com- 
position, and the outputs V, and internal connec- 
tions Wij are all simple variables coming from the 
set {Vi} U {Xjk}. 
Provided they are well formed, deterministic sys- 
tems are readily animated in modeling languages that 
allow recursive stream networks to be expressed [lo]. 
As long as each register has an initial value, the 
streams are constructed head-first as a fixed-point 
computation. Translation to event-based simulation 
languages is also relatively straightforward for sys- 
tems expressed over concrete types. 
A synchronous semantics is simple and suited to 
the clocked implementation models most high-level 
synthesizers use. In fact, behavior tables will acquire 
a range of semantics, depending on their applications, 
just as HDLs and programming languages do. Even 
with a variety of interpretations, their inherent struc- 
ture helps reduce the mathematical bookkeeping that 
often obscures semantic definitions. 
5 Examples of behavior tables 
The behavior table shown in Figure 1 describes a pro- 
cess that computes the Fibonacci function: The in- 
puts are control signal go and data input in; the 
outputs are control signal done* and the data signal 
v. The ‘*’ is a notational convention for distinguish- 
ing combinational signals from state-holding regis- 
ters. Three other representations in Figure 1 depict 
various aspects of the design. The labeled transition 
diagram is keyed to the table’s rows; its labels consist 
of a condition under which the transition is taken, the 
outputs associated with the transition, and an update 
to the data state; the same information as a row of 
the table. The control automaton is represented in 
the table by the now register. Throughout this paper, 
we reserve the name now for this purpose. A timing 
diagram shows the interface abstraction. The textual 
expression of the algorithm at the lower left of Figure 
1 describes is the well-known iterative computation 
of f ib(%),  where 
fib@) = o  
fib(1) = l  
f ib(k + 2) = f ib(k)  + f ib@ + 1) 
The behavior table in Figure 2 describes the 
garbage collector of a list processing computer [2]. 
It is representative of the tables we work with in our 
case studies. Its level of specification is more ab- 
stract, with two of the registers of type memory. An 
implementation of this table was realized in about 
5,000 ACTEL FPGA cells, of which 1,500 Qinput 
MUX elements compute the behavior. A behavior ta- 
ble for the same computer’s CPU is about twice as 
big, when expressed at a level where garbage collec- 
tion is an abstract operation. A table closer the the 
register transfer level, as in Figure 2, would be more 
than ten times larger, but even at that scale the tables 
are useful in our derivation methodology-and would 
be even more useful with better display automation. 
As these examples may illustrate, behavior tables 
are not the best representation for understanding the 
specification of an algorithm. However, they seem 
(in our experience) to serve well as a bridging no- 
tation for simultaneously contemplating control and 
architecture. Furthermore, studies (e.g. [16]) suggest 
that complicated control functions are clearer when 
presented as decision tables. In hardware design, the 
intuitive sense of control flow is quickly overwhelmed 
when processes are composed. 
6 Table manipulations 
Let us explore some basic transformations, starting 
with the table in Figure 1. As in any derivation, 
the order of presentation is not necessarily the or- 
der in which the transformations were conceived. In 
practice, backtracking is involved as the architectural 
goals develop and concrete representations are intro- 
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This example was carried out and formatted by 
hand, but Tuna was able to mimic the entire deriva- 
tion [12] using the DRS mechanized transformation 
.- , -. I 
now I go I u=O 11 now I done* I u I v I w I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
now go u=o nov done* - 
1 ti tl done* T g o  i n  0 1 
I* 
t 
u=o v tj 
u=o u-1 w v+w 
O h 1  
" ti 0 
await go; 
while (u # 0) do 
u, v, w := inp?Lt(in), 0 , l ;  
u,v,w := 2L - 1,w,v + w ;  
{V = fib(in0 - u) A w = f ib( in0 - u + 1)) 
outp?Lt(v) ; 
assert done* 
90 
done 
out in ~ N n J  
to 11 
Figure 1: A behavior table and related diagrams 
duced. The final derivation is just a residual proof of 
the design. I (go, in) --f (done*, v) j 
functional expressions. That exercise exposed one 
significant error in the manual derivation. 
The now and done* columns suggest an assignment 
of concrete values 0 to work and 1 to w a i t .  To reduce 
clutter, let us also assign 1 to t r u e  and 0 to false. 
I (go, in) -+ (done*, v) 
[now I go 1 u=O 11 now I done* I u I v I w I I 
With these changes, the first and second rows have 
become identical up to don't-cares, so we can merge 
them to obtain 
The predicate go has become irrelevant will be re- 
moved. We note in passing that the last two rows 
could be merged by replacing the term for v with 
se l ec t  (u=O , v, w> . Behavior tables seem especially 
useful for this kind of interplay between control and 
computation-all the more so with the provisions for 
indirection discussed in Section 7. 
Next is a scheduling transformation on the third 
row that puts the arithmetic terms u-1 and v+w into 
different computation steps. The goal is to assign 
these operations to a single arithmetic component. 
[ go, in -+ done*, v 
now I u=O 11 now I done* I u I v I w J 
107 
108 
The newly created control token, ‘2), induces a type 
mismatch with boolean done* in the now column. 
This is a problem to be resolved by underlying type 
inference system. In addition to implicit coercions, 
this transformation’s validity depends both on the 
fact that the sequence of two steps preserves the orig- 
inal computation and the fact that the surrounding 
synchronization protocol is preserved. Verifying the 
latter of these conditions is not automatic, in general. 
In this case, we are relying on the interface specifica- 
tion of Figure 1, which says that the result is ready 
only when done* is asserted. 
The next table is a simple example of system fac- 
torization, a decomposition technique that is central 
to the derivation formalism. As desired, terms u-1 
and v+w are allocated to a single combinational arith- 
metic component, called ALU. 
ao add 11 x+y I done’ v ao 
sub 1 1  X-y + +  
A system factorization encapsulates a set of subject 
terms in a new table and generates residual interface 
signals [ll]. Here, the interface signal x* generates 
instruction tokens, sub and add, telling ALU which 
operation to perform. The transformation tool keeps 
track of the connectivity. In particular) factorizations 
preserve well-formedness even when one of the factors 
is entriely combinational, as is ALU in this case. 
To finish the example, we make some assignments 
to the don’t-care entries whose ultimate effect is to 
isolate control. As a second example of system fac- 
torization, we decompose into a control process gen- 
erating an encoded command signal, cmd, to the data 
path DP, as shown in Figure 3. 
7 Directions 
We are encouraged by the number of recent papers 
centering on tabular specification languages. It is 
usually reported that such tables are a good “engi- 
neering notation,” and they seem also to be relatively 
easy to represent formally. If this consensus grows, 
the most urgent task may be the mundane one of 
building tools to manipulate table syntax. It is our 
hope that such graphics tools will be general enough 
to accommodate the range of applications tables are 
finding in the design community. 
At this stage, we are investigating a number of ad- 
ditions to and variations of behavior table syntax. 
7.1 Assertions 
Both Tablewise and TDTs (Section 2 have provisions 
for assertions that are not yet in our behavior tables, 
but which should be included in any graphics sup- 
port. Tablewise incorporates type-declarative fields 
that we would defer to a background type system 
in our applications. TDTs contain time parameters 
used in optimization. In Tablewise the primary in- 
tent seems to be the verification of invariant proper- 
ties, but assertions could also be used to state con- 
straints, measures) and, for that matter) computa- 
tional actions. 
The algorithmic specification in Figure 1 contains 
a loop invariant that might be attached to row 4 of 
the corresponding behavior table. It is interesting 
to contemplate how subsequent manipulations, es- 
pecially decompositions, might affect this assertion. 
Since system design verification often involves live 
ness, safety) and other eventualities, assertions would 
likely take the form of temporal logic predicates on 
the current state (i.e., row). 
7.2 Decompositions 
Our notion of system factorization, involving both 
data abstraction and interface specification) has yet 
to be fully reflected in our behavior tables. The un- 
derlying ideas are more general than the example 
shows, having evolved over several years of research. 
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DP: (ad. in,  ao) 
cmd 11 u I v I w I y* I z* 
4 (a, v. y*, z*) 
I ALU:(x,y,z) -+ ao* I 
ao* 
2 
2 
Figure 3: Final decomposition of the example 
add I i n  hold + in 
sub I i n  hold - in 
As an illustration, let us consider a two-phase ALU 
that takes operands sequentially. 
We wish to use ALU2 to determine a factorization of 
the table below, a variant of the specification in Fig- 
ure 1. A reset input, r, has been added to illus- 
trate why tables are sometimes better than algorith- 
mic languages at expressing features of global control 
flow. Row 1 of the table says that whenever r is as- 
serted the FSM moves to state A. 
[ FIB:(r, go, in) 4 (d*, v) I I I I now I go I u=O 11 now I d* I u I v 1 w 1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
A targeted factorization has to instantiate the proto- 
col ALU2 expects, synchronizing with its phases, and 
presenting the operands sequentially. First, we seri- 
alize the arithmetic as before: 
I FIB:(r. go, in) --f (d*. v) 
1 r I now I go I ut0 11 now 1 d* I u I v I w I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5a 
5b 
To decompose according to ALU2, add a wait state to 
get into phase and graft the addition and subtraction 
paths into the control flow. One possible factoriza- 
tion is shown in Figure 4. We have have investi- 
gated several constructive approaches to this family 
of decompositions [21, 23, 30, 29, 241. We cannot yet 
claim a universal construction, but we do have trans- 
formations general enough to handle many common 
interface specifications [22]. Performing simultane- 
ous decompositions-which is necessary for practical 
application of formal derivations-remains a topic of 
research. 
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I FIB:(r, go, in) + (d*. v) I 
2 
2 
ALU2:(op,in) -+ (phase, out*) 
phase I op 11 phase I hold I out* 
1 I h I I  2 1  i n 1  b 
add 1 in hold + in 
sub 1 in hold - in 
+- 
FIB:(r, go, in, ph, alu) + (d*, v, op, opd) 
r I now \ go I u=O 1 ph 11 now I d* I u I v I w I op I opd 
1 
2a 
2b 
3 
6 
4 
5aa 
5ab 
5ba 
5bb 
Figure 4: The factorization developed in Section 7.2 
n3 
7.3 Other syntax 
The tabular languages we have seen exhibit a great 
variety of abbreviation techniques. Typically, these 
serve to condense decision conditions by specifying 
sets of values. BLIF-MV, for example, allows sub- 
range, subset, and complementation expressions in 
its table specifications 1151. 
We have added syntax for bounded indirection 
which often significantly reduces the size of action 
tables [25] and is novel for hardware description lan- 
guages. If T is a signal or register, then #r denotes 
a token referring to T .  If register s contains such a 
token, then Qs denotes the entity to which s refers; 
that is, 
@s G case s of . . . #T: T .  . . 
constraint by assigning particular transition to each 
event, subject to the constraints [26]. As the example 
of Section 6 suggests, one row of an action table can 
represent a number of transitions at a finer time scale. 
However, BFSMs are more expressive than behavior 
tables in the sense that unstructured programs are 
more expressive than structured ones. This suggests 
to us that action tables may need provisions to relax 
their output behaviors. 
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Abstract 
Languages based on hierarchical finite state ma- 
chines, such as, Statecharts, SCR (Software Cost 
Reduction), and the Requirements State Machine 
Language (RSML), are suitable for specification of 
software for embedded systems. The languages are 
relatively easy to use, allow automated verification 
of properties such as completeness and consistency, 
and support execution and dynamic evaluation of 
the specifications. However, the support to rigor- 
ously specify and analyze the communication between 
physically distinct components in a system is cur- 
rently not well- supported in any of the approaches. 
We know that the interfaces between the software 
and the embedding environment are a major source 
of costly errors. For example, Lutz reported that 20% 
- 35% of the safety related errors discovered during 
integration and system testing of two spacecraft were 
related to the interfaces between the software and the 
embedding hardware. 
In this paper we introduce a formal approach to the 
specification of system level inter-component commu- 
nication and show how this formalism can be used to 
prove safety constraints and a limited notion of live- 
ness constraints. The interface definitions and the 
constraints are translated to PVS (Prototype Ver- 
ification System) proof obligations, and the proofs 
of compliance with the constraints are performed in 
the PVS domain. To demonstrate the feasibility of 
the approach we have implemented a prototype tool 
and used the tool to prove some desirable properties 
of the inter-component communication of an avionics 
system. 
'This work has been partially supported by NSF grants 
CCR-9624324 and CCR-9615088, and University of Minnesota 
Grant in Aid of Research 1003-521-5965. 
1 Introduction 
Writing and validating software requirements for em- 
bedded systems present particularly difficult prob- 
lems, for example, the software is required to interact 
with a variety of analog and digital components in its 
environment, the software must be able to detect and 
recover from error conditions in the environment, and 
the software is often subject to rigorous safety and 
performance constraints. 
Languages based on hierarchical finite state ma- 
chines, for instance, Statecharts [9, 10, ll], SCR 
(Software Cost Reduction) [15, 171, and the Require- 
ments State Machine Language (RSML) [20], are 
powerful modeling languages suitable for specifica- 
tion of software for these types of systems. The lan- 
guages are relatively easy to use, allow automated 
verification of properties such as completeness and 
consistency, and support some execution and dy- 
namic evaluation of the specifications [7, 8, 11, 14, 
15, 17,201. However, the support for rigorous specifi- 
cation and analysis of the communication between 
physically distinct components in a system is cur- 
rently not well supported in any of the approaches. 
We know that the interfaces between the software 
and the embedding environment are a major source 
of costly errors. For example, Lutz reported that 20% 
- 35% of the safety related errors discovered during 
integration and system testing of two spacecraft were 
related to the interfaces between the software and the 
embedding hardware [22,23]. The problems often in- 
volve, for example, misunderstandings about how the 
hardware operates, failure to detect and respond to 
inputs outside the normal operating regime, and fail- 
ure to prevent undesirable outputs from being gener- 
ated [18, 19, 22, 23, 241. Thus, it is imperative that 
a requirements specification for an embedded soft- 
ware system rigorously captures the interfaces and 
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the communication between the software and its em- 
bedding environment. 
The specification of high-level inter-component 
communication poses many interesting challenges. 
Since the components may represent software, dig- 
ital hardware components, or analog hardware com- 
ponents, the interface descriptions must be able to 
capture, for example, expected arrival rate, expected 
minimum and maximum values, and the unit the 
value represents. Furthermore, a specification lan- 
guage should support encapsulation of communica- 
tion specific aspects of a model. Encapsulation in 
this context serves two purposes, (1) it helps shield 
the rest of the model from the inevitable changes in 
the embedding system and (2) it captures commu- 
nication related properties in one place for ease of 
inspection and ease of analysis. 
In this paper, we introduce a formal approach 
to the specification of system level inter-component 
communication and show how this formalism can be 
used to prove certain types of safety and liveness con- 
straints related to the communication. The formal- 
ism is influenced by our previous experiences with 
using RSML to capture the requirements of a large 
avionics system 1201. We encapsulate information 
about the physical properties of the communication 
in an interface specification, for example, properties 
such as timing assumptions, and encapsulate the def- 
inition of how-incoming and outgoing messages are 
treated in communication handlers associated with 
the interfaces, for instance, under which conditions 
we are allowed to  generate a specific output. 
The formality of the specification allows us to au- 
tomatically verify certain types of communication re- 
lated constraints. Since many of the properties re- 
lated to communication are encapsulated in the in- 
terface definitions, we attempt to prove that the con- 
straints are satisfied by only considering the infor- 
mation in the interface definitions. This approach 
greatly simpliies the proofs of safety constraints and 
simple liveness constraints in complex state-based 
models. 
The interface definitions and the constraints are 
translated to PVS [6, 25, 261 proof obligations and 
the proofs of compliance with the constraints are per- 
formed in the PVS domain. To demonstrate the fea- 
sibility of the approach we have implemented a pro- 
totype tool and used the tool to  prove some desirable 
properties of the inter-component communication of 
an avionics system called TCAS 11. TCAS I1 is an 
airborne, collision-avoidance system required on all 
commercial aircraft carrying more than 30 passengers 
through U.S. airspace. 
1.1 Previous and Related Work 
Both SCR and RSML allow a specification to be auto- 
matically checked for consistency (there are no con- 
flicting requirements) and a notion of completeness 
(all possible input scenarios are handled by the spec- 
ification) [14, 151. Although this analysis has been 
used to detect problems in large specifications, the 
analysis procedures are rather limited. For exam- 
ple, the procedures used to determine if large Boolean 
formulas are mutually exclusive do not interpret the 
terms in the formula and, thus, may generate large 
numbers of spurious error reports. To overcome such 
problems, many approaches to static analysis en- 
force restrictions on the modeling language to facili- 
tate accurate analysis, such as restricting variables to 
Boolean [4, 51 or enumerated types [16]. Recently, we 
have addressed this problem in RSML by using PVS 
for the analysis and in that way enable interpreta- 
tion of all terms in the Boolean expressions, includ- 
ing terms using linear and non-linear arithmetic. In 
our work we want to avoid enforcing unnecessary con- 
fining restrictions on our modeling language. RSML 
was successfully used to model a complex avionics 
system [20] and our experience from that effort con- 
vinced us that enforcing restrictions, such as the re- 
strictions mentioned above, will limit the usability of 
the modeling language to a point where practitioners 
will find the language too restrictive to use. 
Nevertheless, the approaches discussed above only 
address the issues of completeness and consistency 
in state-based models. To assure that more com- 
plex properties hold in a specification, more power- 
ful analysis approaches are needed. Several groups 
have attempted to apply model checking techniques 
to RSML and SCR. 
Atlee et al. reported success with applying the 
SMV model checker to SCR style specifications [3,2]. 
In a similar effort, Anderson et al. have applied the 
SMV model checker to a part of the TCAS I1 RSML 
specification 111. Both efforts, however, either limit 
the analysis to models only containing enumerated 
input and output variables or limit the analysis to 
subsets of the model not involving, for example, arith- 
metic expressions. 
In this investigation we take a different approach 
to analysis. We encapsulate some behavior related to 
communication in the input and output interface defi- 
nitions, define assertions we are interested in verifying 
in an easy to read notation, and automatically gen- 
erate proof obligations for PVS. If the specification 
is properly structured, the assertions can be proven 
by only considering the communication specifications 
and we can disregard the rest of the model. 
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This approach to enforcement of constraints is not 
unique to our work. Leveson et al. discussed the use 
of a safety kernel to enforce safety policies in safety 
critical systems [21]. The kernel centralizes the en- 
forcement of safety policies and detection / recovery 
of safety violation in one small easily verifiable com- 
ponent. The notion of safety kernels responsible 
for policy enforcement has been further discussed by 
M J i  and Knight 129, 301. These approaches, how- 
ever, mainly address the design and implementation 
stages of development and do not discuss verifica- 
tion of safety properties in the high-level specification 
stage. 
Rushby has provided a detailed and formal discus- 
sion of the suitability of a kernel approach for safety 
enforcement [27]. He concluded that a kernel archi- 
tecture is most suited to enforce negative properties, 
for example, that certain actions are not taken in 
some situations. A kernel approach is more limited 
when it comes to enforcing positive properties, for 
instance, that an action is always performed under 
certain conditions. The work presented in this paper 
uses the communication definitions as a simple ker- 
nel architecture and is largely inspired by Rushby’s 
discussion. 
Our approach is built on our previous work using 
PVS to prove consistency and completeness in RSML 
specifications [13]. In that project we developed a 
tool that automatically generates PVS proof obliga- 
tions for the completeness and consistency criteria in 
RSML. In the project described in this paper, we have 
extended our tool to accept assertions related to the 
communication with the external world and to gen- 
erate proof obligations to verify that the assertions 
hold in the RSML specification. These assertions can 
express both safety constraints, for example, that a 
certain output can never be produced under certain 
conditions, and simple liveness properties, such as, 
that a certain input will always lead to a shutdown 
event. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section 
provides an overview of RSML. Section 3 presents our 
approach to system-level inter-component communi- 
cation and Section 4 outlines how safety and sim- 
ple liveness constraints can be expressed and verified. 
Section 5 illustrates how we generate PVS proof obli- 
gations from the RSML specification and from the 
constraints. Section 6 provides a summary and con- 
clusions. 
2 RSML Overview 
RSML was developed as a requirements specification 
language specifically for embedded systems. The lan- 
guage is based on hierarchical f i d e  state machines 
and is in many ways similar to David Harel’s Stat- 
echarts; for example, RSML supports parallelism, 
hierarchies, and guarded transitions borrowed from 
Statecharts (Figure 1) [9, 121. 
controller I 
Parallel-1 
Atomic-I 
X[C2YY 
’ 
Superstate-1 -J 
; Parallel-:! 
I 
I 
1 
I 
Figure 1: An example of an hierarchical state ma- 
chine. 
One of the main design goals of RSML was read- 
ability and understandability by non computer pro- 
fessionals such as, in our case, pilots, air frame man- 
ufacturers, and FAA representatives. During the 
TCAS project, we discovered that the guarding con- 
ditions required to accurately capture the require- 
ments were often complex. The prepositional logic 
notation traditionally used to define these conditions 
did not scale well to complex expressions and, thus, 
quickly became unreadable. To overcome this prob- 
lem, we introduced a tabular notation for defining 
the guarding conditions (Figure 2). We call these 
tables AND/OR tables. The tables are read column- 
wise and were found to be very readable. To further 
increase the readability of the specification, we intro- 
duced many other syntactic conventions in RSML; for 
example, we allow expressions used in the predicates 
to be defined as mathematical functions (e.g., Other- 
Tracked-Relative- Alt-Ratef-ZdG), and familiar and fre- 
quently used conditions to be defined as macros (e.& 
100-Ft-Crossingm-195)1. A macro is simply a named 
AND/OR table defined elsewhere in the document. A 
detailed description of the full notation can be found 
in [20]. 
lThe subscript is used to indicate the type of an identifier 
(f for functions, m for macros, and v for variables) and gives 
the page in the TCAS I1 requirements document where the 
identifier is defined. 
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Location: Own-Aircraft D Effective-SL,30 
Trigger Event: Auto-SLEvaluated-Event~2~g 
Condition: 
Output Action: Effective-SL-Evaluated-Event,+27g 
Figure 2: A transition definition from TCAS I1 with the guarding condition expressed as an AND/OR table. 
U 
Figure 3: The components and channels in an avion- 
ics system. 
In RSML we view a system as a collection of physi- 
cally distinct components communicating over unidi- 
rectional communication channels. The components 
represent physically separate pieces of the system, for 
example, a software controller, sensors and actuators 
(analog or digital), and physical processes. A graph- 
ical representation (using the RSML notation) of a 
collection of system components and communication 
channels can be seen in Figure 3. We define the be- 
havior of the components in the system using the 
state machines discussed above. The same language 
can be used either to  capture the required behavior 
of a component, for example, the TCAS component, 
or it can be used to model assumed behavior of com- 
ponents, such as, altimeters and display units com- 
municating with the software. 
The components are connected to the channels 
through interfaces and can send messages over the 
channels. A message is a collection of fields holding 
the atomic pieces of information communicated be- 
tween the components. 
In the next section we provide an overview of the 
communication mechanism we are using in in this 
investigation. 
3 Communication Model 
In our formal definition of the RSML communica- 
tion mechanisms we use a layered approach. We use 
Alan Shaw’s Communicating Real-Time State Ma- 
chines [28] to define the semantics of a collection of 
low-level RSML communication primitives. We then 
provide a high-level notation that supports the en- 
capsulation of the inter-component communication in 
interface specifications. Due to space constraints, we 
cannot included the full definition of all primitives; 
we are limited to showing how interrupt driven com- 
munication is defined. 
3.1 Low-Level Foundation 
Shaw’s notation is based on communicating finite 
state machines. Transitions in the state machines are 
defined as guarded commands; the guard is a Boolean 
expression and the command is an IO event (send or 
receive data) or an internal command (variable as- 
signment or computation, see Figure 4). The guarded 
commands and synchronous communication mecha- 
nism are simplified versions of CSP. The communi- 
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expr e 5bTemp(expr)! 
/ 
Figure 4: Synchronous communication example. 
cation occurs through channels between components. 
The channels are considered perfect (no loss and no 
propagation delay) and model 1-1 communication be- 
tween two state machines. The guarded commands 
used to control the state transitions have the syntax 
(guard) + (command) 
where (guard) is a Boolean expression and (command) 
can be an input, output, or internal command. A 
transition is taken if the guard evaluates to true and 
the command can be executed. The (command) may 
be coupled to a time-limit. The time-limit is ex- 
pressed as (command)[tl,t2], meaning that the com- 
mand must be-performed at the earliest tl time units 
after it was enabled and at the latest t 2  units after it 
was enabled. Input and output are synchronous and 
modeled directly after CSP. An input command has 
the syntax: 
(channel-name) ((target))? 
where (channel-name) is a channel and (target) is a 
list of input variables that is compatible with the 
fields in the message passed over the channel. Output 
has the syntax: 
( channel-name) ( (message-components) ) ! 
An IO event can occur only when the names of 
the communication channels match and the mes- 
sage components are compatible with the variable(s) 
in the target. For example, M I  sends an out- 
put Temp(expr)! and M2 issues an input command 
Temp(x)? (see Figure 4 ) .  This communication is pos- 
sible if x and expr are of the same type. Note that 
any of the machines may have to wait until communi- 
cation is possible. The result of the IO is equivalent 
to x := expr in the input machine M2. 
Relationship to Hierarchical State Machines: 
RSML has a trigger[condition]/action defining the se- 
mantics of the transitions (as described in Section 2). 
The guarded command notation in Shaw’s model can 
be used to model the trigger[condition]/action seman- 
tics. The events can be viewed as Boolean variables, 
and the trigger[condition]/action transition predicate 
rewritten as (trigger A condition) 4 action in Shaw’s 
notation (assuming that we always can perform the 
action). Thus, we can use the well understood com- 
munication mechanisms from Shaw and CSP to define 
the semantics of the directed inter-component com- 
munication in RSML. 
Inter-Component Communication in RSML: 
Two basic types of communication are commonly en- 
countered in physical systems. First, asynchronous 
communication with a non-blocking send and no 
buffering. Second, asynchronous communication 
with non-blocking send but with the information be- 
ing persistent on the channel. That is, the sender can 
send data at any time, the data is buffered (buffer 
size one), and the receiver can read the data from 
the buffer at any time. With these two basic com- 
munication mechanisms we can implement any other 
communication scheme we may be interested in, for 
example, stimulus response. This paper is limited to 
the discussion of the first communication mechanism. 
In RSML, we are using two primitives to model 
non-persistent (or interrupt driven) communication; 
SEND( (channel), (message)) and RECEIVE( (channel), 
(message)). In terms of RSML’s and Statecharts’ 
trigger-action semantics, SEND is an action that sends 
the message (message) over the channel (channel). 
RECEIVE is a trigger event that occurs when the mes- 
sage (message) is received over the channel. The use 
of these two primitives is illustrated in Figure 5. The 
behavior of the SEND-RECEIVE pair is defined using 
Shaw’s formalism (Figure 6). The constant d defines 
how long the message is available on the channel and 
can be arbitrarily defined depending on the system 
being modeled. 
3.2 Readable Communication Specifi- 
cations 
The RSML communication primitives introduced in 
the previous section, together with the other con- 
structs in RSML, are adequate to fully model system 
level inter-component communication. Indiscrimi- 
nate use of the communication primitives, however, 
may lead to unstructured and difficult to understand 
models. A state-based model that has its communi- 
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Figure 5: The SEND-RECEIVE action-event pair. 
Receiver I Sender 
Figure 6 SENDRECEIVE formally modeled using 
Shaw’s notation. 
cations with the environment distributed throughout 
the model can be very difficult to understand and 
maintain. Thus, the communication with the envi- 
ronment should be encapsulated in well defined com- 
munication modules within each component. For ex- 
ample, in TCAS II, all communication with the RA- 
Display should be confined to a small state machine 
dedicated to this task. By encapsulating the commu- 
nication in dedicated state machines, the main parts 
of an RSML specification will be shielded from the in- 
evitable changes in the embedding environment (Fig- 
ure 7). 
To facilitate ease of specification and encapsula- 
tion we supply a high-level language based on our 
communication primitives. As a high-level interface 
description language we chose to use simple textual 
forms (Figure 8). Leveson et d. succesfdly used 
a similar approach when specifying the communica- 
tion mechanisms for TCAS II[20]. The definitions in 
this paper are an extension and refinement of their 
approach. 
Main RSML 
specification modeling 
the behavior of the 
control software 
~~~ - -  jJ 
for Display-channel 
Figure 7: Dedicated communication state machiies 
shield the RSML specification. 
, 
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3.3 Send-Receive Communication 
The interface definition in Figure 8 is adopted from 
TCAS 11 and defines how the TCAS box communi- 
cates with the pilot’s display. 
Interface definitions consist of two parts, (1) a 
physical interface definition that captures properties 
related to the physical aspects of the communication, 
for example, the channel name and simple timing as- 
sumptions, and (2) a collection of handlers that de- 
termine under which conditions we can send/receive 
messages over this channel (the example in the figure 
only has one handler, the example will be extended 
to three handlers later in the paper). The physical 
interface definition is used to assure that components 
connected together have compatible properties, for 
example, that the expected arrival rate at the RE- 
CEIVE side is greater than or equal to the expected 
send rate at the SEND side. 
Our interface definition is an abstraction of a sim- 
ple state machine using the basic RSML communi- 
cation primitives. Figure 9 shows how the textual 
definition in Figure 8 is defined with a state machine. 
Naturally, the state machine could be directly used 
to specify the inter-component communication. But , 
since the state machine is very simple and only adds 
visual noise to the graphical RSML model, we have 
chosen to use a purely textual notation to  abstract 
away the simple state machines defining the commu- 
nication. Also, the textual notation forces encapsula- 
tion of all communication information in the textual 
interface definitions. 
The output interface in Figure 8 is interpreted as 
follows. When a state machine in the main part of the 
specification generates the interface’s trigger event 
and the h a d e r  guarding condition is satisfied, the 
output action in the handler is performed. In this ex- 
Output Interface: Display-Unit-Interface 
Channel: Display-Channel 
Trigger: Send-Traffic-Event [i] 
Max Separation: 1.2 second 
Min Separation: 0.8 second 
Handler-1 
Condition: 
For all j in {1..30}: 
8 
Action: SEND(Advisory-Code[) 
Figure 8: Original definition of the communication with the pilot’s display. 
Display-Unit-Interface I 
u 
Send-Traffic-Event(i1 [guard-1]/ 
SEND(Disp1ay-Channel, Advisory-Code[i] 
Figure 9: Definition of the communication with the 
pilot display using an RSML state machine. 
ample taken from TCAS 11, the state machine model 
was required to model 30 intruding aircraft (mod- 
eled with state machines named Other-Aircraft). The 
model of each Other-Aircraft contains a state ma- 
chine called Traffic-Display-Status. When TCAS has 
detected an intruder and has determined that the pi- 
lot needs to be notified, the state machine Traffic- 
Display-Status associated with that intruder will en- 
ter the state Waiting-To-Send. This indicates that 
TCAS is ready to send an advisory regarding this 
particular intruder to the pilot’s display2. If TCAS 
tracks several intruders and needs to notify the pilot 
about more than one intruder (more than on Other- 
2An advisory is a notification to the pilot, for example, if 
the intruder is very close a resolution advisory will be displayed 
Aircraft model is in state Waiting-To-Send), the in- 
truder model with the highest priority (Traffic-Score) 
takes precedence. The advisory relating to an in- 
truder is contained in the variable Advisory-Code. 
The communication handler in Figure 8 is parame- 
terized. Any Other-Aircraft model can generate a 
trigger event for this handler. The handler will sim- 
ply be instantiated with the index of that intruder 
(the index is indicated with the i in the definition). 
Thus, the interface in Figure 8 tells us that Other- 
Aircraft[i] can only send an advisory to the pilot if 
there are no Other-Aircraft models ready to  send (col- 
umn 1) or there are no Other-Aircraft models with a 
higher traffic score (column 2). 
4 Constraints and Constraint 
Verification 
Since all communication is encapsulated in the inter- 
faces, the guarding condition in a handler is effec- 
tively a precondition for the handler’s communica- 
tion to take place. This encapsulation acts as a sim- 
ple kernel architecture; through these preconditions 
we can assure that no undesired outputs leave our 
model and that no damaging inputs enter our model. 
The formality of the communication definition allows 
us to (1) assure that the input and output deh i -  
tions are consistently and completely defined and (2) 
prove that communication related safety assertions 
and simple liveness assertions hold in the model. 
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4.1 Completeness and Consistency 
In a previous investigation, we defined a collection of 
analysis procedures that assures that an RSML spec- 
ification is complete and consistent [14]. The notion 
of completeness and consistency extends to the inter- 
face definitions. In this paper it suffices to state the 
completeness and consistency rules informally: 
1. Within an interface definition, every pair of han- 
dlers must have mutually exclusive guarding con- 
ditions; exactly one handler can be used at any 
time. 
2. The logical OR of the guarding conditions on all 
handlers within an interface definition must form 
a tautology; if an input arrives on a channel, it 
is always defined how this input will be handled 
Analysis procedures assuring that the criteria are sat- 
isfied are straightforward to automate: the guarding 
conditions on any two distinct handlers must be con- 
tradictory and the disjunction of the guarding condi- 
tions on the handlers within each interface must form 
a tautology. Clearly, the interface in Figure 8 is in- 
complete since it only handles the case when we are 
actually allowed to send an advisory. On the other 
hand, the interface is by definition consistent since 
there is only one handler. A refined interface defini- 
tion that is both complete and consistent can be seen 
in Figure 12. Our tool automatically generates the 
proof obligations for completeness and consistency. 
This, however, is not the focus of the paper and the 
interested reader must be referred to [13, 141 for a 
rigorous treatment of this topic. 
D 
4.2 Safety and Liveness Verification 
In TCAS, a safety constraint may be that we cannot 
remove a Resolution-Advisory from the pilot’s display 
as long at the intruder that caused the advisory to be 
generated is declared to be a Threat (Other-Aircraft 
in state Threat)3. An intruding aircraft is declared 
to be a threat when a near mid air collision (NMAC) 
is considered imminent. We may, however, display a 
Resolution-Advisory against an intruder that is not 
a threat. An example of such a situation would be 
when a resolution advisory has only been displayed 
for a short time, the intruder passes and is no longer 
considered a threat, but we want to keep the advisory 
for a few more seconds to provide a sense of continuity 
to the pilot. 
The safety constraint above can be formalized as in 
Figure 10. Informally, the constraint states that if we 
Advisory-Code[i] = Resolution-Advisory 
3Note that, although a reasonable constraint, this con- 
straint was created for illustration only. 
Output Invariant: 
The following output: Advisory-Code[i] 
can only be sent if 
Condition: 
OR. 
Figure 10: Safety constraint limiting when we can 
remove a resolution advisory from the pilot’s display. 
attempt to output an advisory regarding an intruder 
that is a threat to our own aircraft, that  advisory 
must be a resolution advisory. If all interactions with 
the environment are encapsulated in the interfaces, 
we will be able to verify constraints of this type by 
only considering the interface specifications. 
The verification approach progresses in two simple 
steps. First, we determine which handlers that can 
output the variable we are interested in. Second, we 
show that the guarding condition (9) in those han- 
dlers imply the constraint (c),  that is, that  (9 + c). 
A similar approach can be used to prove simple 
liveness constraints. For example, if a certain input 
arrives and its value is outside the expected bound- 
aries, we may always want to initiate a system shut- 
down or some recovery procedure. An example of 
a liveness constraint derived from TCAS I1 can be 
seen in Figure 11. All aircraft are supposed to have 
a unique transponder identification number known 
as the Mode-S-Address. The address is assigned 
by a central regulatory agency before an aircraft is 
taken into operation. Unfortunately, some aircraft, 
for example, prototypes in test flight, may not have 
a proper address and fly with the default address as- 
signed to the transponder by the manufacturer. This 
default address is commonly all zeros or all ones (0 
or MaxID). If such an aircraft is detected, it should 
always receive special treatment. The invariant in 
Figure 11 captures this simple liveness property; if 
TCAS receives an invalid Mode-S-Address, it will al- 
ways generate an exception event. This is an ad- 
mittedly weak assertion, but we found places in the 
TCAS I1 specification where such assertions would 
have been helpful. In fact, failure to properly detect 
and handle invalid Mode-S-Addresses was a problem 
with early TCAS I1 implementations. 
Verification of liveness is similar to the verification 
of the safety constraints discussed above. In this case, 
however, we want to show that all handlers that have 
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Input Invariant: 
The following input: Mode-S-Address$] 
when 
Condition: 
D Other-Mode-S-Addressti] = MaxID 
Action: Invalid-Intruder-ID-Event 
Figure 11: Safety constraint indicating that when we 
receive an invalid Mode-S-Address we must always 
raise an exception. 
Mode-S-Address as an input and have a guarding con- 
dition g that is implied by the constraint c always 
generate the Invalid-Intruder-ID-Event as an action 
To evaluate our approach, we have augmented an 
existing execution environment and analysis tool for 
RSML with the capability to take communication re- 
lated safety and liveness assertions as input. The 
tool generates proof obligations based on the rules 
discussed in this section. We generate proof obliga- 
tions in the PVS specification language and use the 
PVS theorem prover to perform the proofs. The next 
section gives ag example of the translation approach. 
(c * 9) 
5 Generating Proof Obliga- 
tions for PVS 
The Prototype Verification System (PVS) is a veri- 
fication system that provides an interactive environ- 
ment for the development and analysis of formal spec- 
ifications [25,26]. PVS consists of a specification lan- 
guage, a parser, a type-checker, an interactive theo- 
rem prover, and various browsing tools. 
To illustrate our approach, consider the interface 
definition in Figure 8 and the assertion in Figure 10. 
Clearly, we cannot prove the assertion from the infor- 
mation provided in this interface specification. Fur- 
thermore, as mentioned above, the interface is incom- 
plete. Figure 12 shows the same interface extended 
to handle the normal case when we are allowed to 
send an advisory, the case where we are not allowed 
to send an advisory, and the case where we have a 
safety violation. The rest of this section illustrates 
how we prove that this interface complies with the 
assertion. 
Our tool generates a PVS theory for each handler 
and assertion in an RSML specification. We do this 
in a two stage process. First, we define each predicate 
in the AND/OR table as a predicate in the PVS spec- 
ification language4. Second, a predicate representing 
the full guarding condition (or assertion) is built from 
the individual predicates defined in the first stage. In 
PVS, the assertion in’Figure 10 would be defined by 
the theory shown in Figure 13. The constants in the 
system are defined as a separate theory and imported 
to the theory defining the assertion (or handler). 
Since we are interested in proving that an 
Advisory-Code[i] with the value Resolution-Advisory 
can only be generated under certain circumstances, 
our analysis algorithm will identify Handler-1 in Fig- 
ure 12 and generate the PVS theory in Figure 14. 
The actual proof obligations are generated based 
on the criteria described in the previous section. Fig- 
ure 15 shows the proof obligation for this example. 
In this case we want to show that the precondi- 
tion (guarding condition) for the communication im- 
plies that the assertion is true (Figure 15). PVS 
proved this property automatically with one prede- 
fined strategy. 
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6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we discussed a formal approach to the 
specification of inter-component communication in 
RSML specifications. The approach is based on com- 
municating finite state machines. The formalism al- 
lows encapsulation of communication related prop- 
erties in well defined interface specifications. The 
encapsulation enables us to use the interface speci- 
fications as simple safety kernels and enforce certain 
safety and liveness constraints in these kernels 
Furthermore, we described how safety and liveness 
constraints related to inter-component communica- 
tion can be formalized using a simple and easy to  
understand constraint language. To formally verify 
that the constraints are satisfied in an RSML model, 
we attempt to prove that the constraints are satisfied 
by only looking at the interface specifications. If the 
constraints are enforced in the interface definitions, 
the proofs are relatively small and easy to perform. 
If we did not encapsulate the communication related 
properties in the interfaces and instead had the com- 
munication distributed throughout the model, veri- 
fication of the constraints could be overwhelmingly 
complex. We illustrated the approach with an exam- 
ple from TCAS 11. 
To evaluate the potential of the approach, we 
4A predicate in PVS is a function with return type Boolean. 
Output Interface: Display-Unit-Interface 
Channel: Display-Channel 
Trigger: Send-Traf€ic-Event [i] 
Max Separation: 1.2 second 
Min Separation: 0.8 second 
Handler-1 
Condition: 
For all j in {1..30}: 
TrafEc-Sco~e(0 ther-A&aft [i 1) 2 Traffic-%core (0 ther- Aircr aft lj 3 )  
' Other-Aircraftk] in state Threat 
4 D 
D 
' 
11 # 1 I 
i # j  
TrafFic-Display-St at us [i] in state Waiting-To-Send 
-Traffic-Display-Statuslj] in state Waiting-To-Send 
TrafFic-Score(0ther-Aircraft[i]) 2 Traffic-Score( Other-Aircraftlj]) 
Other-Aircraft[i] in state Threat 
Advisory-Code[i] = Resolution-Advisory 
- I  .I 
Traf€ic-Display-Status[i] in state Waiting-To-Send 
~afFic-DisDlav-Statusljl in state Waiting-To-Send 
D Advisory-Code[i] = Resolution-Advisory . 
Action: SEND (Advisory-Code[$ 
Handler-3 
Condition: 
Figure 12: Modified definition of the communication with the TCAS display. This description is complete, 
consistent, and enforces the assertion in Figure 10 
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Output-Invariant : THEORY 
BEGIN 
IMPORTING TypeDefs 
AdvisoryCode: VAR AdvisoryCodeType 
OtherAircraft : VAR OtherAircraftType. 
i: VAR i-type 
predl?(OtherAircraft, i): bool = Threat?(OtherAircraft(i)) 
pred2? (AdvisoryCode , i) : bool = ResolutionAdvisory? (AdvisoryCode (i) )
OutputInvariant? (AdvisoryCode, OtherAircraft , i) : bool = 
( NOT predl? (OtherAircraft , i) 
OR ( predl?(OtherAircraft , i) & pred2? (AdvisoryCode, i) ) ) 
END Output-Invariant 
Figure 13: A PVS theory for the safety assertion in Figure 10. 
have looked at the interfaces and possible safety con- 
straints in TCAS 11. Rom this limited study we iden- 
tified several cases in TCAS I1 (two of which are men- 
tioned in this paper) where the capability to capture 
and prove simple communication related assertions 
would have been helpful. 
Although we believe the approach holds great po- 
tential, there are several questions that must be ad- 
dressed. First, a more thorough investigation is 
needed to determine how useful the assertions we are 
capable of expressing really are. As mentioned above, 
our experience with TCAS I1 indicate that they are 
quite useful, but a more thorough case study is clearly 
needed. Second, since the assertions must be enforced 
in the interface definitions, the interface definitions 
may become unnecessarily complex. We do not want 
to sacrifice readability, clarity, and ease of use of the 
interface definitions for the sole purpose of verifica- 
tion. The effect of encapsulation of communication 
constraints in the interfaces is currently not clear and, 
again, further case studies are needed. 
In summary, we believe the verification approach 
outlined in this paper will be effective, useful, and 
practical. However, we need to conduct further case 
studies to better evaluate the expressive power of the 
constraints and the effect of the encapsulation of the 
communication constraints on the overall readability 
of RSML specifications. 
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Handlerl-OutputInterface: THEORY 
BEGIN 
IMPORTING TypeDefs 
AdvisoryCode: VAR AdvisoryCodeType 
TrafficDisplayStatus: VAR TrafficDisplayStatusType 
OtherAircraft: VAR OtherAircraftType 
Trafficscore: VAR TrafficScoreType 
j: VAR int 
i: VAR i-type 
predl?(i, j): bool = NOT (i = j) 
preda? (Traff icDisplayStatus , i) : bool = WaitingToSend? (Traff icDisplayStatus( i) ) 
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Figure 14: A PVS theory for the fist handler in Figure 12. 
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OutputInterf ace : THEORY 
BEGIN 
IMPORTING TypeDefs, Handlerl-OutputInterface, 
Output -Invariant 
AdvisoryCode: VAR AdvisoryCodeType 
TrafficDisplayStatus: VAR TrafficDisplayStatusType 
OtherAircraft: VAR OtherAircraftType 
Trafficscore: VAR TrafficScoreType 
i: VAR i-type 
Handlerl-implies-OutputInvariant: CONJECTURE 
Handlerl? (AdvisoryCode , Traf f icDisplayStatus , 
OtherAircraf t , Traf f icScore , i) 
IMPLIES 
Output Invariant? (AdvisoryCode , OtherAircraf t , i) 
END OutputInterface 
Figure 15: A PVS theory the proof obligation for the constrint in figure 10. 
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Abstract 
Domain-specific automatic program synthesis 
tools, also d e d  application generators, are playing 
an ever-increasing role in software development. 
However, high-performance application generators 
require difficult manual construction, and are very 
difficult to verify correct. This paper describes 
research and an implemented system that transforms 
program synthesis tools based on deductive synthesis 
into high-perfomawe application generators. 
Deductive synthesis uses theorem-proving to 
construct solutions when given problem 
specifications. The verification condition for a 
deductive synthesis tool is essentially the soundness 
of the implemented inference rules. 
TOPS (theory operationalization for program 
synthesis) synergistically combines reformulation, 
automated mathematical classification, and 
compilation through partial deduction to decision 
procedures. It transforms general-purpose deductive 
synthesis, with exponential performance, into 
efficient special-purpose deductive synthesis, with 
near-linear performance. This paper describes our 
experience with and empirical results of PD(TH) - 
theory-based partial deduction - in which p h a l  
deduction of a set of first-order formulae is performed 
within the context of a background theory. The 
implemented TOPS system currently performs a 
special variant of PD(TH) in which the compilation 
process results in the transformation of a set of first- 
order formulae into the theory of an instantiated 
library decision procedure augmented by a compiled 
unit theory. 
1. Motivation 
Application generators have been used for over a 
decade to greatly improve the speed and productivity 
of software development. As early as the mid 
nineteen-eighties, over half of the COBOL code 
generated annually was synthesized by application 
generators. The source language of these tools target a 
narrow application domain, as opposed to a general- 
purpose compiler-based language. Visual 
programming front-ends typically facilitate end-user 
development of the source specifications. The output 
of these tools is usually code in a general-purpose 
language (e.g., C, C++, or COBOL). Examples of 
these application generators include database 
application development tools (also called fourth 
generation languages) and GUI builders. Application 
generators are also being increasingly used in 
aerospace applications. As just one example, several 
NASA space projects, such as the Delta Clipper, m 
using the MatrixX code generator to synthesize 
control system software. 
The current generation of commercial application 
generators suffer from two defects. The first defect is 
the difficulty of constructing high-performance 
application generators. Application generators which 
perform significant semantic transformations or 
optimizations from source to object level require 
extensive expert hand-coding. This limits the cost- 
effective use of these tools to stable application 
domains with a large number of potential users. 
Tools for building application generators themselves 
(ie., application generator-generators [3]) are limited 
in the semantic power of the source-to-object level 
transformations they can be used to develop. The 
second, more important defect is the reliability of the 
application generators themselves, thereby limiting 
the level of assurance of the code they generate. This 
is particularly a problem for high-assurance domains 
typified by the aerospace industry. In these domains, 
where test and validation consume over half of 
software costs, the potential of application generators 
to increase software productivity is limited by the 
lack of verification of the code-generator. 
We have been pursuing research to address these 
limitations of commercial application generators. 
Program synthesis tools based on automated theorem- 
proving (i.e., deductive synthesis) are intrinsically 
high-assurance, but have been l i t e d  by their 
inefficiency. As source specifications grow linearly, 
the time required to generate a solution usually grows 
exponentially. Deductive synthesis tools are in 
principle easy to construct, because the semantics of a 
129 
domain can be expressed declaratively. Furthermore, 
in principle, the semantics of a domain can be built 
up out of reusable components related to 
mathematical abstractions. In practice they are quite 
difficult to construct, because considerable expertise 
in general-purpose theorem proving is required even 
to formulate the semantics of a domain in a manner 
that makes deductive synthesis feasible. The paradigm 
employed by most users of general-purpose theorem 
provers consists of problem specification followed by 
an iterative activity in which an expert reformulates 
the background theory and tunes parameters of the 
theorem prover. The behavior of the theorem prover 
is observed on each iteration to make adjustments for 
the next iteration. This can be an extremely difficut 
and time consuming process that often yields less 
than satisfactory results. 
We have developed a suite of domain-oriented 
deductive synthesis systems generically called 
AMF'HION. These systems can be used by non- 
programmer end-users, with no experience in 
automated theorem proving, to generate programs 
consisting of hundreds of lines of code. In the past, 
AMPHION systems have been constructed by experts 
in deductive synthesis, with substantial tuning of 
deductive synthesis for each new domain (but no 
additional tuning for new problems). In the future, we 
anticipate these systems will be constructed by 
domain experts using META-AMPHION [ 111, which is 
a suite of tools for generating AMPHION systems. 
The major imp-ent for domain-expert construction 
of an AMPHION system is the tuning of deductive 
synthesis. The TOPS (theory operationalization for 
program synthesis) tool automates this tuning by 
transforming an easy-to-validate but inefficient 
deductive synthesis system based on general-puxpose 
inference rules into an efficient program synthesis 
system based on decision procedures. Decision 
procedures are special-purpose inference rules, which 
can be implemented very efficiently precisely becaus 
of their limited applicability. 
The research described in [ 161 has resulted in new 
algorithms for TOPS; empirical results are presented 
in this paper. These algorithms are based on an 
enhanced theoretical understanding of the search 
interaction of decision procedures for deductive 
synthesis. By exploiting properties specific to 
deductive synthesis, as opposed to automated theorem 
proving in general, known difficulties in using 
decision procedures have been circumvented. In 
particular, there are sufficient conditions, which m 
less restrictive than those in [15], under which 
exponential search in deductive synthesis can be 
avoided through decision procedures. A new algorithm 
to compile decision procedures from a domain theory 
has been developed based on these sufficient 
conditions. In addition to generating decision 
procedures, this algorithm reformulates parts of the 
domain theory to achieve separation of decision 
procedures. This seperation limits the potentially 
combinatorial interaction between decision procedures 
and hence avoids exponential search. New empirical 
results are presented in this paper that demonstrate 
these algorithms result in more efficient program 
synthesis tools than expert manual tuning of a 
deductive synthesis system. 
2. Background 
AMPHION is a generic program synthesis system 
that greatly facilitates end-user use of domain- 
oriented software libraries. AMPHION enables a user 
to state a problem in an abstract, domain-oriented 
vocabulary using a graphical notation; rather than 
requiring the user to construct a solution by manually 
composing software components. AMPHION 
automatically generates a program consisting of calls 
to library components that implements a solution to 
a problem specification. On average, it takes an orrler 
of magnitude less time for a user to develop a 
domain-oriented problem specification with 
AMPHION than to manually generate and debug a 
program. Equally important, a user does not need to 
leam the details of the components in a software 
library, thereby removing a significant b d e r  to the 
use of software libraries. Three AMPHION systems 
have been developed at NASA, for the domains of 
space science observation geometry, space shuttle 
navigation, and computational fluid dynamics. 
AMPHION is described in detail in ([10,17]); an 
overview is presented here as background to 
understanding the search control issues and empirical 
results. 
AMPHION consists of a specification acquisition 
subsystem and a program synthesis subsystem, both 
of which are generic across domains; and a domain- 
specific subsystem. The graphical user interface 
enables a user to interactively build a diagram 
representing a formal problem specifkation in first- 
order logic. Diagrams are equivalent to specifications 
of the following form : 
'd(inputs) 3 exists (outputs) 3 (intemdiares) 
matrix 
The matrix is expressed in the absmt 
specification language (see below), except for atoms 
which express the relation between concrete 
inputloutput variables and the abstract variables they 
represent. 
The program synthesis subsystem consists of an 
applicative program generator and a translator into the 
target programming language. An applicative 
program is generated through deductive synthesis 
1121. AMPHION uses the SNARK resolution theorem 
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prover [17], to generate a proof that the specification 
is a theorem of the domain theory. During a proof, 
substitutions are generated for the existential variables 
through unification and equality replacement. The 
substitutions for the output variables are constrained 
to be terms in the target language whose function 
symbols correspond to the components of the library. 
The applicative program is translated into a target 
programming language, such as F O R M  or C++, 
through program transformations. 
The domain-specific subsystem consists of a 
domain theory and theorem-proving tactics. An 
AMPHION domain theory has three parts: an abstract 
theory whose language is suitable for problem 
specifications, a concrete theory that includes the 
target component specifications, and an 
implementation relation between the abstract and 
concrete theory. The implementation relation is 
axiomatized in the style of Hoare [6], through 
abstraction maps. The following commutative 
diagram provides a useful way of visualizing 
AMPHION domain theories, specifications, and later 
in this paper, generated decision procedures: 
Abstmct Input Abstract Output 
c 
Concrete hput Concrete Output 
Figure 1: Basic AMPHION Commutative 
Diagram 
The vertical mows are abstraction maps between 
the concrete level and the abstract level. An 
AMPHION problem specification is formulated at the 
abstract level, augmented with abstraction maps from 
the definitions of the concrete inputs and outputs 
(i.e., the representation and format of data for the 
input and output variables). The lower horizontal 
arrow is not defined in an AMPHION problem 
specification. In essence, AMPHION generates this 
lower horizontal arrow through deductive synthesis: 
this arrow is the desired progmm that maps the 
concrete inputs to the concrete outputs such that the 
whole diagram commutes, i.e., the generated program 
is correct with respect to the specification. The 
generated decision procedures described later in this 
paper perform special-purpose deductive synthesis 
@e., fills in the lower horizontal arrow); each over 
small portions of the domain theory. 
The theorem-proving tactics for any particular 
AMPHION domain theory guide SNARK from 
abstract, specification-level constructs towards 
concrete, implementation-level constructs. The tactics 
are implemented in part by defining an agenda 
ordering function, which is used to choose the next 
descendent of the goal (specification) clause to operate 
on in an overall set-of-support strategy. The tactics 
are highly effective, reducing program synthesis times 
from hours (sometimes days) to minutes. The graph 
below shows the time (in seconds) quired for 
deductive synthesis plotted against the number of 
literals in a problem specification. The tactics do not 
need to be tuned for individual problems, but often do 
require expert manual tuning when a domain theory is 
modified. In figure 2, the white boxes are deductive 
synthesis times using generic abstract-to-concrete 
tactics that have not been manually tuned to the 
particular domain theory (in this case, the domain of 
space observation geometry). As the number of 
literals in a specification increase, computation times 
(in seconds) grow exponentially and preclude finding a 
solution in accepti3ble times for specifications 
exceeding forty literals. In contrast, the black boxes 
are deductive synthesis times after manual tuning of 
the tactics for the space observation geometry domain 
theory. Computation times scale well with increasing 
numbers of literals in a problem specification. 
13 1 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
literals vs total cpu time 
m 
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Figure 2: Performance of Tuned versus 
Untuned Theorem-Proving Tactics 
Some of the AMPHION domain theories have gone 
through dozens of major revisions. Manually tuning 
the tactics when a domain theory is modified can be 
quite difficult, since the tactics interact significantly 
with the formulation of a domain theory. It requires 
significant e x p e h e  and labor to experiment with and 
adjust the tactics. This is a large impediment to 
transitioning AMPHION from a few application 
domains in the research laboratory to a plethora of 
application domains in the field. 
One approach around these difficulties would be to 
automatically learn or generate theorem-proving 
tactics, through techniques such as genetic 
programming or machine learning for control rules, 
as exemplified by Multi-Tac 1131. However, we 
believe the approach of automated induction of tactics 
is limited in its ability to scale up, due to the 
complexity of the tactical knowledge required to 
efficiently guide general-purpose inference rules 
through long deduction chains. We note that tactics 
can be quite complex, in fact, tactical complexity was 
the original motivation for many of the innovative 
language features of ML. 
A promising alternative to the tactic approach that 
is achieving increasing success in automated 
deduction is to specialize the behavior of a theorem 
prover by interfacing special-purpose decision 
procedures to the general-purpose theorem prover 
[1,4,5,9,17]. This approach has the advanqe of 
identifying decision procedures to use based on 
axioms present in the domain theory, rather than 
tuning tactics based on the observed @ormance of 
the theorem prover. For example, axioms for linear 
arithmetic can be subsumed by a decision procedure 
for linear arithmetic. As a result, the identification of 
appropriate decision procedures is often much easier 
than developing tactics that guide general-purpose 
deduction. As reported in this paper, identifying and 
specializing the appropriate decision procedures can be 
automated through a process closely related to 
deductive synthesis, and hence is correct by 
construction (assuming the CofTeCmess of the library 
of parameterized decision procedures). Furthermore, 
once the original AMPHION domain theory is 
validated, then the automatically specialized synthesis 
system is also valid. 
A difficulty with the decision procedure approach is 
that interfacing a decision procedure to a general- 
purpose theorem prover can be an ad-hoc and very 
difficult design and development project in its own 
right. Hence, even though identifying decision 
procedures that can speed theorem proving can be 
straightforwad, interfacing those decision procedures 
to the theorem prover can be problematic, and in 
previous efforts has led to the loss of efficiency [l]. 
We have circumvented these difficulties by exploiting 
the particular context of deductive synthesis in 
AMPHION, specifically the separation between the 
specification level and the implementation level, as 
described in section 4. 
3. Empirical Results of TOPS 
TOPS automatically operationalizes a domain 
theory for efficient deductive synthesis. The approach 
is analogous to applying AMPHION at the meta-level: 
given a meta-theory of program synthesis and a 
domain theory for a particular application domain, 
TOPS constructs an efficient deductive synthesis 
system by composing and instantiating pammeterkd 
decision procedures from a library and then 
instantiating the generic AMPHION architecture. The 
meta-theory axiomatizes the applicability conditions 
of the decision procedures, which replace axioms in 
the domain theory. This meta-theory is a hierarchy of 
parameterized theories that describe applicability 
conditions of decision procedures. The decision 
procedures are similar to ones previously developed 
for DRAT [20,21], but for deductive synthesis have 
been extended to include a parameterized portion 
which is compiled by TOPS. The algorithms reposed 
in [16], which compile an instantiation for the 
parameterkd portion of a decision procedure, are 
significant adaptations and extensions of partial 
deduction algorithms [8]. 
132 
The compilation is highly effective, and produces 
results that are better than manual tuning of theorem 
proving tactics. This section describes experimental 
results of applying TOPS to one release of the NASA 
NAIF domain theory. The NAIF domain theory is 
continuously being augmented, and thus provides a 
good real-world example for testing the effectiveness 
of our approach to domain theory maintenance and 
operationalization. The release of the NAIF domain 
theory consists of 330 axioms in first order logic that 
collectively define: 
1. An abstract specification language for space 
observation geometry, which is essentially an 
augmentation of Euclidean geometry. 
2. Axiomatizations for pre- and post-conditions for a 
set of FORTRAN routines in the NAIF 
(Navigation and Ancillary Information Facility) 
tool kit. These routines access data formats 
defined by NAIF (such as trajectory data for 
planets and spacecraft) and routines in analytic 
geometry (such as the intersection of a ray 
denoting an observation vector with an ellipsoid 
denoting a planet). 
concrete sorts and abstract sorts. 
3. Definitions of abstraction mappings between 
The search that is incurred during deductive 
synthesis through resolution refutation is due to the 
resolution inference rule and the paramodulation 
inference rule. Each of these rules counts as one step 
in the search tree. SNARK performs a full term 
simplification (demodulation) with each of these 
rules. Likewise, when SNARK is augmented with 
decision procedures compiled by TOPS, the theory 
resolution interface runs the decision procedures to 
quiescence with each resolution or paramodulation 
step. The total amount of CPU time is thus roughly 
linearly proportional to the total number of resolution 
and paramodulation steps. 
To test the TOPS algorithms, we used three 
configurations of the AMPHION system for the NAIF 
domain: SNARK with just the generic abstract-to- 
concrete tactic, SNARK with an augmented manually- 
tuned tactic specific to the NAIF domain, and SNARK 
with decision procedures compiled by TOPS (and the 
generic abstract-@-concrete tactic). A set of 
specifications of varying number of literals were 
developed to test these configurations. 
Figure 3 plots the time it takes (in seconds, the y- 
axis) for each configuration to synthesize programs 
from specifications with varying numbers of literals 
(the x-axis). The diamonds labeled Series 3 are data 
points for the configuration with only a generic 
tactic, while Series 1 are the data points for the 
manually-tuned tactic. The series 2 triangles are the 
data points for the configuration generated by TOPS. 
Note that the generic tactic results in exponential 
performance, while the manually-tuned and TOPS- 
generated configurations scale well. At this scale for 
time, the latter two are indistinguishable. 
total cpu time vs. search 
2000 
j500 t 
1000 t 
500 
0 
0 20 40 60 
A Series2 
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Figure 3: Plot of CPU times for 3 
Program Synthesis Configurations 
Figure 4 blows up the scale for manually-tuned and 
TOPS-generated configurations, and also substitutes 
the total number of resolutiodparamodulation steps 
for the time axis. Figure 4 demonstrates that the 
decision procedures effectively eliminate much of the 
search engendered by the resolution inference rule and 
the paramodulation inference rule. 
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Figure 4: Total steps in Proof Search 
versus Literals in a Specification 
4. Summary 
Commercial application generators are limited by 
both their level of assurance and their ability to be 
adapted to a changing target domain. Historically, 
program synthesis tools based on deductive synthesis 
are high assurance but have been severely limited by 
their inefficiency and inability to scale up to larger 
specifications. Manual methods for increasing their 
efficiency by tuning of tactics and strategies makes it 
very difficult to maintain them in the context of a 
changing target domain. 
The use of decision procedures for general 
automated theorem proving has in the past had mixed 
results for increasing efficiency. It can be difficult to 
sufficiently separate the decision procedures from each 
other and the theorem prover to avoid a very high 
overhead in communication, thus largely negating the 
efficiency of the decision procedures. Classical 
sufficient conditions for achieving separation [ 141 are 
overly restrictive in the context of deductive 
synthesis. 
Building on past work, in this paper we describe 
empirical results based on more relaxed sufficient 
conditions for separation of decision procedures that 
are specific to the context of deductive synthesis in 
AMPHION-structured domain theories. Using these 
results, we overviewed an implemented improved 
algorithm for automatically compiling domain 
theories into decision procedures. This algorithm is 
validated experimentally, and re 
deductive synthesis systems whose efficiency is 
superior to manually-tuned deductive synthesis 
systems. We believe this paradigm is suitable for 
generating high-assurance high-performance program 
synthesis systems for changing target domains. This 
hypothesis will be validated in future work. 
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Abstract 
We present a technique for automating the discovery 
of loop invariants based upon the analysis of failed 
proof attempts. Previously we have shown how fail- 
ure analysis may be used productively in the search 
for inductive proofs. This work had direct applica- 
tion to the verification of functional programs. Here 
we show how these ideas can also play an important 
role in the formal verification of imperative programs. 
While presented as an automatic technique we believe 
that our approach may be easily integrated within an 
interactive proof environment. 
1 Introduction 
The notion of an invariant is a well established tech- 
nique for specifying the behaviour of computer pro- 
grams. The discovery and verification of suitable in- 
variants remains, however, a significant challenge to 
the formal verification community. While some be- 
lieve that the challenge is too great [9] we feel there 
is still significant progress to be made in terms of 
mechanizing the wealth of heuristic knowledge which 
exists within the programming methodology litera- 
ture [l, 8, 16, 221. 
We focus here on the problems of reasoning about 
imperative programs, and in particular, the search 
control issues associated with the discovery and ver- 
ification of loop invariants. In terms of formal veri- 
fication the discovery of a loop invariant is typically 
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+ A ,  IrelandQhu. ac .uk 
tjamie@cee.ha.ac.uk 
EPSRC grant GR/L/11724 and ARC grant 438. 
seen as a eureka step. This is reflected in the fact 
that some of the foremost verification environments, 
e.g. GYPSY [12] and PENELOPE [17], rely on the user 
to supply all loop invariants. 
We build upon proof plans [3], a meta-level rea- 
soning technique for automating proof search. The 
technique is implemented in the CLAM theorem prov- 
ing system [5]. Given a conjecture, CLAM attempts to 
automatically generate a LCF style tactic [15] guided 
by its available proof plans. If successful then the tac- 
tic is used to control proof construction in an object- 
level theorem prover. Currently CLAM is coupled to a 
tactic based theorem prover called  OYSTER^. By ex- 
plicitly separating the meta- and object-levels, CLAM 
provides an effective framework for developing and 
sharing proof strategies. That is, CLAM can poten- 
tially be used to support proof construction in any 
theorem proving environment which supports a tac- 
tic or proof script mechanism, e.g. LARCH [ll] and 
H O L ~  [13]. 
Our approach to discovering loop invariants is 
based upon the analysis of failed proof attempts. 
Proof critics [19], an extension to the basic idea of 
a proof plan, support the analysis of proof failures. 
Previously this approach to automating formal rea- 
soning has been applied very successfully within the 
context of inductive proof [20, 211. This success ex- 
ploited the constraints of rippling [4], a proof plan 
designed to guide step case proofs. The systematic 
analysis of partial success of rippling enabled us to 
~ 
IA Prolog implementation of NUPRL [7]. 
2Currently CLAM is being coupled to HOL through a col- 
laborative research project between the Artificial Intelligence 
Department in Edinburgh and the Computer Laboratory in 
Cambridge funded by EPSRC grant GR/L/14381. 
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bridge gaps within the formal reasoning process, e . g .  
to automate the discovery of missing lemmata and 
generalizations. 
Firstly, we 
demonstrate that rippling can also play a role in au- 
tomating the verification of loop invariants. Secondly, 
we show that the critics developed for inductive proof 
provide a basis for automating the discovery of loop 
invariants through the analysis of failed verification 
proofs. 
Background material on reasoning about the be- 
haviour of imperative programs is covered in $2 where 
we focus in particular on the while-loop construct. 
Building on the close connection between induction 
and iteration we show in $3 how a generalization of 
the ripple method enables its application to loop in- 
variant proofs. Exploiting this connection further, 
we demonstrate in $4 how an existing generalization 
critic developed for inductive proof can be used as a 
basis for guiding the discovery of loop invariants au- 
tomatically. Our implementation and experimental 
results are described in $5. Related work and future 
extensions are discussed in 96 and $7 respectively. 
Our contribution here is two fold. 
2 Reasoning about programs 
We consider the problem of reasoning about the be- 
haviour of imperative programs in the context of a 
Floyd-Hoare-style logic [lo, 181. Specifications in this 
logic take the form of a triple, Le. {P}C{Q),  where 
P and Q denote first order assertions which express 
the pre- and post-conditions with respect to C, an im- 
perative program. To illustrate, consider expi given 
in figure 1 for computing exponentiation3. Note that 
we adopt the convention of using calligraphic letters 
to denote values while lower case letters are used to 
denote program variables. The process of verifica- 
tion is typically divided into three steps as described 
below: 
1. Assertion propagation: using the given as- 
sertions and the axiomatic definition of the lan- 
guage constructs, intermediate program asser- 
tions are calculated. To illustrate, consider the 
rule defining the while-loop: 
k { P A S }  c { P }  
I- { P }  while S do C {P A -S} 
3Definitions are given in appendix A. 
Note however that in order to apply this rule we 
must discover some property P which is invari- 
ant with respect to the execution of C, the body 
of the loop. In the case of the exponentiation al- 
gorithms an appropriate loop invariant takes the 
form: 
* * e z p ( z ,  Y) = e z p ( X ,  Y )  (1) 
This choice of P, in the case of expi, gives rise 
to the following intermediate assertions: 
(* * ezp(z,  Y) = e z p ( X ,  Y )  A Y > 0) 
begin 
7 : = * * 2 ;  
y : = y - l  
end 
{* * e z p ( z ,  Y) = e z p ( X ,  Y ) }  
Propagation of assertions is complete once all 
atomic program statements are assigned pre- 
and post-conditions. 
2. Verification condition generation: given the 
pre- and post-conditions for an atomic program 
statement a purely mathematical statement of 
partial correctness is extracted. Such statements 
are called verification conditions. The verifica- 
tion condition generated by the assignment com- 
mand, ie. 
takes the form P + Q[E/V.] Based upon this 
schema the verification condition generated for 
the loop-body given above takes the form: 
{P}V := E{Q} 
* * ezp(z, Y) = e z p ( X ,  Y )  A (Y > 0) 4 
(* * z) * e 4 z 7  (Y - 1)) = e z p ( X , Y )  (2) 
3. Theorem proving: verification of the overall 
program is based upon the verification of the 
atomic program statements. The verification 
task requires a theorem prover which can deal 
with implications such as (2). 
In terms of calculating intermediate assertions a loop 
invariant represents a major bottle-neck to the for- 
mal verification process. Once the propagation of 
assertions is complete the generation of verification 
conditions is mechanical. Our overall approach is to 
use failure productively at step 3 in order to refine the 
choice of intermediate assertions, i. e. loop invariants, 
at step 1. 
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expl: { x = X A y = Y }  exp2: { z = X A y = Y }  
r := 1; T := 1; 
while ( y  > 0) do while ( y  > 0) do 
begin begin 
T := r * x ;  
y : = y - 1  
if odd(y) then T := T * x ;  
y := y diu 2; 
end x : = x * x  
{T  = e v ( X ,  Y ) )  end 
1. = e w ( X ,  Y > l  
Figure 1: Algorithms for computing exponentiation 
3 Verifying loop invariants 
Proofs which share commonality of structure will also 
share common methods of proof. This is the premise 
on which the notion of a proof plan is based. Loop 
invariant proofs and the proofs of inductive conjec- 
tures share commonality of structure. Schematically, 
proving a loop invariant gives rise to a goal of the 
form 
P -+ P[E/V] 
where E denotes the term assigned to the variable V .  
Now compare this with the schematic structure of a 
step case goal, i e .  
- ... P +  P[E/V] 
vv. P(V) 
where E denotes the induction term and V the in- 
duction variable. Note that in both goals there exists 
a strong syntactic similarity between antecedent and 
consequent. The method of proof known as rippling 
was designed for step case goals. The commonality 
between step case and loop invariant proofs observed 
above led us to investigate the role in which rippling 
may play in guiding loop invariant proofs. Below we 
outline rippling and illustrate its applicability to step 
case and loop invariant proofs. 
rewrite rules. In particular it identifies term struc- 
ture within the goal which prevents a match with the 
target. Such term structures are called wave-fronts. 
Conversely any term structure within the goal which 
corresponds to the target is called skeleton. In gen- 
eral, embedded within each wave-front will be parts 
of the skeleton term structure, these are known as 
wave-hoZes. 
Wave-fronts, wave-holes and skeletons are meta- 
level notions. Given a schematic goal of the form 
then c(. . .> denotes a wave-front. We use a box and 
an underline to represent wave-fronts and wave-holes 
respectively, e.g. an annotated version of the goal 
given above takes the form: 
f (g (c (x ) , y ) ,  2) and a target of the form f ( s ( z ,  Y ) ,  .)
The arrow is used to indicate the direction in which 
a wave-front can be moved with respect to the skele- 
ton term structure. Directed wave-fronts enable the 
termination of rippling to be guaranteed [2]. The 
movement of wave-fronts is performed by wave-rules, 
a syntactic class of rewrite rule which preserves the 
skeleton while making progress to eliminating wave- 
fronts. Wave-rules are derived automatically from 
definitions and lemmata. Example wave-rules are 
provided in the following sections. Proofs guided by 
rippling can be classified in terms of the direction 3.1 Rippling: the general pattern _ -  - 
Rewriting often involves the manipulation of a goal in which wave-fronts are moved with respect to the 
formula so that a target formula, e.g. a hypothe- skeleton term structure. The three basic strategies 
sis or previously established result, can be applied. for rippling are summarised in figure 2. For a com- 
Rippling exploits syntactic similarities between the pletely formal account of rippling see [2,4]. In general 
goal and target in guiding the selective application of a proof may require a hybrid form of rippling. The 
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rippling-out : 
t I Cn(fI(. .(fn(. . .)) - - . ) ) I  
before after 
rip prig-sideways : 
rippling-in: 
before after 
Figure 2: The three basic rippling strategies 
notion of sideways and hybrid rippling is crucial to b and c within (5) denote sinks since they correspond 
our work on invariant discovery. We begin by illus- to the universal variables B and C within (4). The 
trating how rippling can guide both step case and Proof of (5) guided by rippling is given below: 
loop invariant proofs in the following sections. 
3.2 Rippling for step cases 
Consider the following inductive conjecture: m ~ a ,  L ~ I  , [E~J = (j..Lbl+aj') + 1. 
(3) mnlt(a, lb]  , VA, B, C : nut. muZt(A, B,  C )  = ( A  * B )  + C 
where * and-muN are defined in appendix A. Note 
that mu& is tail-recursive. A proof Of (3) may be 
constructed by structural induction on A giving rise 
to a step case goal in which we have an induction 
hypothesis of the form: 
Note that by instantiating B and C to b and b + 
respectively then (4) and (6) match which completes 
the proof. The wave-rules which are required4 for 
this proof are as follows5: 
V B ,  C : nut. mult(a, B ,  C) = ( a  * B)  + C (4) 
The annotated version of the associated conclusion 
A winning strategy in 'his 'Ontext Wave-rules (7) and (9) ripple the right-hand-side and sideways. The motivation for rippling-sideways in wave-rule (8) is used on the left-hand-side. Here this context is to direct wave-fronts towards term 
structures within the conclusion which correspond to wave-ru1es (7), (8) and ('1 are derived from equa- 
universally quantified variables in the hypothesis. We tions (23), (25) and (26) 
sorb" wave-fronts through the specialization of the automatic+ derived and stored by 
induction hypothesis. We delimit sinks by the meta- 5we use j to denote rewrite 
level annotation 1. . .] . Note that the occurrences of implication. 
such term structures since they may "ab- 4Note that for a given theory d l  possible wave-&es are 
and + to denote logical 
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3.3 Rippling for loop invariants 
We demonstrate the applicability of rippling to loop 
invariant proofs by considering verification condition 
(2) which gives rise to an invariant hypothesis of the 
form: 
T * e z p ( z ,  Y) = e z p ( X ,  Y )  (10) 
The associated annotated version of the conclusion 
takes the form: 
Again the winning strategy involves rippling-sideways. 
However, in the context of loop invariant proofs there 
are no universally quantified variables within the invari- 
ant hypothesis to exploit. The absence of such quan- 
tification precludes the use of the meta-level notion of a 
sink but not sideways rippling. Here the motivation to 
ripple-sideways is to achieve a match with the invariant 
hypothesis through wave-front cancellation, i. e. destruc- 
tive interference. The proof of (11) guided by rippling is 
as follows: 
r * e z p ( z , y )  = e z p ( X , Y )  (12) 
Note that (10) matches (12) and completes the proof. The 
wave-rules required for the proof of (11) are as follows: 
Wave-rule (13) comes from (27) while (14) is derived 
from (24), the definition of ezp. Note that (14) pro- 
vides the destructive interference of wave-fronts men- 
tioned above and is an example of a hybrid wave-rule. 
3.4 Generalizing rippling 
Two alternative preconditions for rippling-sideways 
were demonstrated above. While sinks do not play a 
role within loop invariant proofs the notion of wave- 
front cancellation is applicable to both domains. For 
instance when proving an inductive conjecture in 
which both constructor and destructor style defini- 
tions are intermixed then wave-front cancellation will 
be crucial. Consequently, a more general precondi- 
tion, than described in [4], is required which takes 
into account the potential for term cancellation and 
hypothesis specialization. This is reflected in the gen- 
eralized version of the rippling preconditions given in 
figufe 3. 
4 Discovering loop invariants 
The full benefits of a proof plan become apparent 
when a proof attempt fails. The declarative nature 
of method preconditions provides a basis for using 
failure productively. As mentioned in $1 we anal- 
yse failure by means of proof critics. Experimental 
evidence demonstrating the merits of this approach 
within the context of inductive proof can be found 
in [21]. This work documented a family of critics as- 
sociated with the ripple method. Here we focus on 
one of these critics, a critic for generalizing inductive 
conjectures. In the same way that rippling has been 
shown to be applicable to loop invariant proofs we 
now show how the generalization critic can be trans- 
ferred to this new domain. 
4.1 A generalization critic 
The generalization critic is triggered by the failure of 
precondition 4 of rippling (see figure 3). In the con- 
text of a step case proof this corresponds to a miss- 
ing sink. To illustrate consider the following modified 
version of conjecture (3): 
(15) VA, B : nut. muZt(A, B, 0 )  = A * B 
Consider an attempt to  prove (15) by structural in- 
duction on A. Using rippling to guide the associated 
step case proof we obtain an induction hypothesis of 
the form: 
V B  : nat. mult(a, B,O) = a * B 
Using wave-rule (7) the annotated conclusion ripples 
to give: 
mult(le+ll', b, 0 )  = Ja+b+b/' (16) - -
blocked blocked 
No further rippling is possible on either side of the 
equation. Wave-rule (8) fails to apply on the left- 
hand side because of a missing sink. This suggests 
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Input sequent: 
Method preconditions: 
1. there exists a subterm T of G which contains wave-front(s), e.g. 
2. there exists a wave-rule which matches T, e.g. 
3. the wave-rule condition follows from the context, e-g. 
H I - C  
4. resulting inward directed wave-fronts are potentially removable, e.g. 
. . .I c3(f2( 1. . .J)) r. . . (sinkable) or 
. .I c4(f3(/r))]. . . . (cancellable) 
Output sequent: 
Figure 3: Generalized preconditions for rippling 
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- ~ 
Blockage: 
Critic preconditions: 
e preconditions 1, 2 and 3 of rippling succeed, i.e. 
1. there exists a subterm which contains wave-front(s), e.g. 
m u l t ( P f ,  p] ,O) 
2. there exists a wave-rule which matches, e.g. 
mult([X+1f, Y, Z) * rnult(X, Y, p q )  
3. the wave-rule condition follows from the context, e.g. 
no condition 
e precondition 4 fails, i .e. 
4. resulting inward directed wave-fronts are potentially removable, e.g. 
-mult(a, [bJ ,lGf) 
v 
no sink 
Patch specification: 
Coerce precondition 4 by introducing a new universally quantified variable into the conjecture, e.9. 
where FI denotes a second-order meta-variable. 
Figure 4: Patch: introduction of sinks (primary) 
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Blockage: 
...=la*L4l+bl( 
Critic preconditions: 
0 precondition 1 of rippling succeeds, i.e. 
1. there exists a subterm which contains wave-front(s), e.g. 
[-f 
0 precondition 2 of rippling partially succeeds, ie. 
2. there exists a partial match with a sideways wave-rule, e.g.  
Patch specification: 
Coerce precondition 2 by introducing additional skeleton term structure into the conjecture such that pre- 
conditions 3 and 4 will also potentially succeed, i e .  
where Fz denotes a second-order meta-variable. 
Figure 5: Patch: introduction of sinks (secondary) 
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patching the proof by introducing a sink occurrence The coqesponding verification condition gives rise to 
within the third argument position of mult. On the an annotated conclusion of the form: 
right-hand side no wave-rules match. The blocked 
wave-front, however, does match with the wave-front lr+zj'*ezp(z, Y )  = ezp(X,  Y )  
associated with (9). This partial match with a side- - 
blocked ways wave-rule suggests patching the proof by intro- _ _  
ducing additional skeleton term structure which con- No rippling is possible. The pattern of this failure is 
tains a sink occurrence. We previously referred to almost identical to the generalization given in 
these as primary and secondary ripples t2o1. The a s  figure 4. The patch differs in that we introduce rn op- 
spectively. The resulting patches give rise to the fol- critic is presented in figure 6 where the patch speci- 
lowing schematic induction hypothesis: fied gives rise to a schematic invariant hypothesis of 
sociated critics are Presented in figures 4 and 5 re- posing wavefront rather a sink occurrence. The full 
V B ,  C : nut. mult(cr, B, F l (C) )  = F~(u * B, C) 
and a schematic conclusion of the form: 
where F1 and F2 denote second-order meta-variables. 
Space prevents us from providing the complete proof, 
however, the constraints of rippling instantiate F1 to 
be XX.X and F2 to be XX.AY.X + Y. For a detailed 
description of the constraint mechanism see [20]. The 
result of this patched proof attempt is to generalize 
(15) where the generalized conjecture corresponds to 
(3). 
4.2 A loop invariant critic 
The basic ideas underlying our generalization critic 
can be used to suggest loop invariants. We show how 
each of the failure patterns presented above maps 
onto a heuristic for discovering loop invariants. 
Consider again expi given in figure 1. Previously 
we verified that (1) is invariant with respect to the as- 
sociated while-loop. We now consider how this prop- 
erty can be discovered automatically. 
4.2.1 Replacing constants by variables 
As our starting point we use the following equation 
a s  a first approximation6 to the loop invariant: 
T * ezp ( z ,Y )  = e z p ( X , Y )  
6This kind of invalid invariant might be supplied by the 
user of a development environment. The ability for a theorem 
prover to correct invalid invariants automatically would be of 
great benefit in such a context. 
the form: 
T * ezp(z ,  B ( r ,  2, Y)) = ezp(X, Y )  (17) 
The rippling of the associated schematic conclusion 
proceeds as follows: 
As before the proof is achieved by wave-rules (13) 
and (14). However, as a side-effect of this ripple, 
FI is instantiated to be XX.XY.XZ.Z. Note that the 
wave-front annotations are used to constrain the in- 
stantiation of the second-order meta-variables. Prop- 
agating this instantiation through (17) gives rise to 
a revised invariant hypothesis which is identical to 
( l ) ,  the required invariant. Note that this form of 
invariant patching corresponds to the replacement of 
constants by  variables heuristic which appears in the 
literature (16, 221. 
4.2.2 Tail-invariants 
We now use the given post-condition for expl (see 
figure 1) as our first approximation to the loop in- 
variant, i. e. 
7 = ezp (X ,  Y )  
The corresponding verification condition gives rise to 
an annotated conclusion of the form: 
blodced 
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Blockage: 
13'* ezp(z ,  Y )  = . . . 
Critic preconditions: 
e preconditions 1, 2 and 3 of rippling succeed, i .e.  
1. there exists a subterm which contains wave-front(s), e.g. 
lf*211* ezp(z ,  Y )  
2. there exists a wave-rule which matches, e.g. 
JXrY]1*z*x*IY+Zp 
3. the wave-rule condition follows from the context, e.g. 
no condition 
e precondition 4 fails, i e .  
4. resulting inward wave-fronts are potentially removable, e.g. 
[=G$ -
no opposing wave-front 
Patch specification: 
Coerce precondition 4 by introducing new structure into the conjecture which contains an opposing wave- 
front, e.g. 
where Fl denotes a second-order meta-variable. 
Figure 6: Patch: replacement of constants by variables 
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Blockage: 
Critic preconditions: 
precondition 1 of rippling succeeds, i.e. 
1. there exists a subterm which contains wave-front(s), e.g. 
* precondition 2 of rippling partially succeeds, ie. 
2. there exists a partial match with a sideways wave-rule, e.g. 
11:*zI’ 
[PI(* z * x *[mf 
Patch specification: 
Coerce precondition 2 by introducing additional skeleton term structure into the conjecture such that pre- 
conditions 3 and 4 will also potentially succeed, i e .  
where Fl denotes a second-order meta-variable. 
Figure 7: Patch: tail-invariant 
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Again no rippling is possible. This pattern of failure 
corresponds to the generalization critic given in figure 
5. As previously the patch differs in that we intro- 
duce additional skeleton term structure in which an 
opposing wave-front rather a sink occurs. The com- 
plete critic is presented in figure 7 where the specified 
patch gives rise to a schematic invariant of the form: 
F1(r,z,y) = ezp(X,Y) (19) 
The rippling of the associated schematic conclusion 
takes the form: 
second-order unification. We build upon the tech- 
nique described in [20] which uses rippling to con- 
strain the unification process. Here we have gener- 
alized the technique so that it can deal with hybrid 
wave-rules. Previously it could deal with only single 
wave-fronts. 
Our initial testing of the proof critics for loop in- 
variant discovery have provided some promising re- 
sults which are documented in table 1. We draw 
the reader's attention to the branching rate statistics. 
These statistics clearly show the significance of rip- 
pling in constraining the search space when rewriting 
in the presence of second-order meta-variables. 
r * l z * p z ( F r , z , [ F f ) [  = ezp(X,Y) 
r * ezp(z, Y) = ezp(X, Y )  
As before this proof exploits wave-rules (13) and (14). 
This time, however, rippling instantiates FI to be 
XX.AY.XZ.X * F2(X, Y, 2) while F2 is instantiated to 
be AX.XY.AZ.ezp(Y, 2). Propagating these instan- 
tiations through (19) gives rise to a refined invari- 
ant hypothesis which again is identical to ( l ) ,  the 
required invariant. This property is a special case of 
what is known as a tail-invariant. Tail-invariants ex- 
ploit the strong connection which exists between tail- 
recursive functions and while-loops. Although e x p  
is not tail-recursive, as Kaldewaij [22] observes, any 
function definition which fits the following pattern 
strongly suggests the need for a tail-invariant: 
b(z)  +g(z) = a 
TX.1 --t g(z) = N z )  g (d (z ) )  (21) 
where @ is associative. Note that (21) gives rise to a 
hybrid wave-rule, i .e .  
+ ~ h ( z )  @dm 1 =+ dz) (22) 
which is exactly the form of wave-rule required in 
order to achieve a successful sideways ripple in the 
context of a loop invariant proof. 
5 Implementation and results 
The work presented here has been implemented 
within the CLAM proof planner [5]. The implemen- 
tation makes use of the higher-order features of X- 
Prolog [241. For our amlication we reauire onlv 
6 Related work 
Early research into Automatic Programming inves- 
tigated heuristic based methods for discovering loop 
invariants. Wegbreit 1251 developed an approach in 
which a candidate invariant was incrementally refined 
using both domain-independent and domain-specific 
heuristics. The choice of refinement was guided by 
the satisfiability and validity of the current candidate 
invariant. The theorem proving and heuristic compo- 
nents were only loosely coupled. This was reflected 
in other heuristic approaches at the time [23]. Weg- 
breit hinted, however, that a closer relationship be- 
tween the heuristic guidance and the theorem prover 
would be desirable. The proof planning framework in 
which our heuristics are expressed enables this close 
relationship to be exploited. 
Our approach, like all heuristic based techniques, 
is not complete. A complete approach has been de- 
signed [6] based upon a novel unskolemization tech- 
nique for deriving logical consequences of first-order 
formulae. Completeness, however, comes with a 
price. In practice this means that any inductive lem- 
mas required for a particular verification task must 
be provided by hand. A strength of our approach 
is that we can attempt to automate the discovery of 
such inductive lemmas. I return to this point in 57. 
As noted above the patch specified in figure 7 cor- 
responds to the tail-invariant heuristic found in the 
1iteratu.re. The heuristic is based upon observing 
recursive definitions which match the form of equa- 
tion (21). Such definitions provide exactly the hybrid 
form of wave-rule which is required to achieve a suc- 
cessful sidewavs ripple. Wave-rules are not restricted, 
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Algorithms expi and exp2 are given in figure 1. The sum algorithm computes the summation 
of a natural number while sumd computes the sum of the digits of a natural number using the 
quotient and remainder operators for integer division. Repeated subtraction is used as the basis for 
div which computes integer division while f ac uses repeated multiplication to compute factorials. 
The loop invariant columns show the candidate invariant as supplied to CLAM and the invariant 
resulting from the proof patching process. The candidates either correspond to the overall program 
post-condition or are potentially the result of user interaction. The critic columns refer to the z) 
replacement of constants by variables and ii) tail-invariant patches respectively. Non-definitional 
equations -used in discovering invariants are indicated in the lemma column. The branching rate 
columns compare the applicability of wave-rules and rewrite rules with respect to the schematic 
conclusion generated by an invariant critic (see (18) and (20) in the case of expi). Note that the 
branching rates relate to the first step in each proof attempt. The MW and TW columns give 
the number of wave-rule matches and the total number of wave-rules respectively. The MR and 
TR columns give the same information for rewrite rules. Note that in some cases the MR value is 
greater than the TR value. This occurs because some matches give rise to multiple unifiers. This 
is not the case with rippling since it provides greater constraints on the matching process. 
Table 1: Results for Loop Invariant Critics 
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however, to recursive definitions. Properties such as 
associativity and distributivity are also a rich source 
of wave-rules. Consequently our rippling critics can 
be seen as a generalization of the tail-invariant heuris- 
tic described by Kaldewaij. To illustrate this point 
more precisely consider exp2 given in figure 1. For 
this algorithm the definition of e z p ,  which provides 
wave-rule (14)' does not suggest an appropriate tail- 
invariant. The suggestion comes instead from (29), 
a property of e x p  which gives rise to the following 
hybrid wave-rule: 
Using this rule our technique discovers 
invariant automatically7. 
7 Future work 
Building on the results presented here we are plan- 
ning to undertake larger scale verification case stud- 
ies. To achieve this goal we have begun to generalize 
our strategies to deal with nested loops and arrays. 
As discussed in $4* the work described here is based 
upon the generalization critic developed for inductive 
proof. Other critics developed for inductive proof 
may also prove useful in guiding the discovery of loop 
invariants. For instance there exists a strong connec- 
tion between the induction revision critic [21] and the 
replacement of constants by  terms  heuristic [16, 221 
which we plan to investigate. 
As hinted in $6 and demonstrated in [21] our 
heuristic approach provides the potential for au- 
tomating the discovery of inductive lemmas such as 
(29). We aim to exploit this potential in future work. 
Our long term aim is to develop new proof meth- 
ods and critics for guiding the synthesis of impera- 
tive programs building upon the wealth of heuristic 
knowledge which exists within the literature. 
8 Conclusion 
A loop invariant represents a key eureka step in the 
verification of an imperative program. By generaliz- 
ing the preconditions of rippling we have shown how 
'This example is based upon an exercise presented in [14] 
where the loop invariant is provided as a hint to the reader. 
it may be used to guide the verification of loop in- 
variants. 
Building upon critics developed for induction we 
have demonstrated how rippling can also be used to 
guide the discovery of loop invariants automatically. 
Second-order meta-variables play an important role 
in a critic's attempt to patch a proof. This new appli- 
cation has led to a generalization of the mechanism 
we use .for constraining the instantiation of second- 
order meta-variables . 
More generally, a major benefit of developing 
strategies within the proof planning framework is 
that our work will readily transfer to any formal de- 
velopment environment which uses a tactic or proof 
script based theorem prover. 
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Appendix: definitions 
O * Y  
( X + l ) * Y  
x = 0 -+ s u m ( X )  
x = 0 + f a c ( X )  
x > 0 -+ f a c ( X )  
mult(0, y, Z )  
mult(X + 1, r, Z )  
x < Y + div(X,  Y )  
x >= Y + div(X,  Y )  
( X + Y ) + Z  
( X *  Y )  * z 
s ( X )  + y 
x = 0 + sumd(X)  
x > 0 + sumd(X)  
X > 0 + s u m ( X )  
Y = 0 + ezp(X,  Y )  
Y > 0 + ezp(X,  Y )  
odd(B)  -+ ezp(A,  B )  
0 
0 
0 
1 
Z 
0 
( X * Y ) + Y  
x + sum(X - 1) 
x * fac(X - 1) 
X * ezp (X ,  Y - 1) (24) 
mul t (X ,  r, Y + Z )  (25) 
1 + div(X - y, Y )  
X + ( Y + Z )  (26) 
x * (Y * Z )  (27) 
x + s(Y) (28) 
0 
( X  mod 10) + sumd(X div 10) 
A * ezp(A * A,B diu 2 )  (29) 
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Abstract 
We present a verification tool PV (Protocol Verifier) 
that checks next-time free linear time temporal logic 
(LTL-X) properties using a new partial order reduc- 
tion algorithm called T w o  phase. Two phase signifi- 
cantly reduces space and time requirements on many 
practically important protocols on which the partial 
order reduction algorithms implemented in previous 
tools [5,8,13] yield very little savings. In some cases, 
such as one version of the invalidate directory pro- 
tocol of the Utah Avalanche multiprocessor, current 
tools did not finish their search while Two phase fin- 
ished and discovered a bug that was missed by the 
unfinished runs of existing tools. Two phase’s per- 
formance is largely due to the fact that it does not 
employ a run-time proviso such as used in other tools. 
In [ll], we motivated the problems caused by the 
proviso, presented Two phase, and proved that it pre- 
serves next-time free safety properties. In this paper, 
we provide a proof that the Two phase algorithm also 
preserves all next-time free LTL (LTL-X) properties. 
We also characterize the type of protocols that ben- 
efit from the Two phase search strategy and provide 
experimental evidence showing the advantages of its 
search strategy. 
Keywords: Finite system verification, Explicit 
enumeration, Partial order reductions 
1 Introduction 
With the increasing scale of hardware systems and 
the corresponding increase in the number of concur- 
rent protocols involved in their design, formal verifi- 
cation of concurrent protocols is an important practi- 
~ 
Supported in part by ARPA Order #B990 Under 
SPAWAR Contract #N0039-95-C-0018 (Avalanche), DARPA 
under contract #DABT6396C0094 (Utah Verifier), and NSF 
MIP MIP-9321836. 
cal need. Explicit state enumeration methods [3,4,7] 
have shown considerable promise in verification of 
real-world protocol verification problems and have 
been used with success on many industrial designs 
[15]. Using most explicit state enumeration tools, 
a concurrent system is modeled as a set of concur- 
rent processes communicating via shared variables [4] 
and/or communication channels [7] executing under 
an interleaving model. An important run-time op- 
timization called partial-order reductions [5, 13, 141 
helps avoid having to examine all possible interleav- 
ings among processes, and is crucial to handling large 
models. For example, if two transitions 2 and y are 
“independent” (to be defined precisely in the Section 
2), then from any state S it is sufficient to execute 
the two transitions in the order c,y or y,z. Partial 
order reductions attempt to explore only one of the 
above two orders. 
In our research in system-level hardware design, 
specifically in the verification of cache coherence pro- 
tocols used in the Utah Avalanche multiprocessor [l], 
we observed that existing tools that support partial- 
order reductions [5,8] failed to provide sufficient re- 
ductions. We traced this state explosion to their 
use of run-time provisos (explained later) in decid- 
ing which processes to run in a given state. This pa- 
per presents a new partial-order reduction algorithm 
called Two phase that, in most cases, outperforms 
all comparable algorithms, and is part of a new pro- 
tocol verification tool called PV that finds routine 
application in our multiprocessor design project [l] .
In some cases (e.g., the invalidate protocol considered 
for use in the Avalanche processor), not only did PV’s 
search finish when others’ didn’t, but it also found 
some bugs which the others missed in their incom- 
plete search. In an earlier paper [ll], we showed that 
Two phase preserves safety properties. In this paper, 
we prove that Two phase preserves all next-time free 
linear time temporal logic (LTL-X) properties. We 
also provide experimental results of running PV on a 
number of examples. 
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2 Background 
Two phase and other partial order reduction algo- 
rithms depend on commutativity of transitions in the 
system to reduce the time and memory requirements 
of the verification job. Commutativity of transitions 
depends on the communication primitives provided 
by the modeling language. Typical communication 
primitives include shared memory (global variables), 
bounded buffers, unbounded buffers, and rendezvous 
communication. The PV tool supports communica- 
tion through shared memory and bounded buffers. 
In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that there is exactly one shared variable (implicitly 
named g), and that there is no other means of com- 
munication. If there are multiple global variables in 
the model, logically they are grouped into a single 
global variable g. The Two phase algorithm and the 
proofs presented in this paper can also be easily modi- 
fied to work when the processes communication using 
bounded buffers. 
A process pi is a tuple ( ~ i ,  f ,  f ,  Pini t ,  C, ginit) 
where Qj is a finite set of states that Pi can assume, 
E Qi is the initial state of Pi, C is the range 
of an implicit global variable g, and qnit E C is the 
initial value of g. f is a relation from ~i to ~i 
indicating a set of local transitions of Pi, i.e., the 
set of transitions that do not depend on g in any 
way. The relation f from Qi x C to Qi x C is a 
set of global transitions, i.e., the set of transitions of 
Pi that readlwrite the global variable g. For conve- 
nience, we write ( q ,  a)-$(q’, 6‘) to indicate that (a) 
q 7 q  A u = 6’ or (b) (q ,  a ) f (q ’ ,  6’). We also assume 
that the domains of f and -$ are disjoint and that 
1 9 
the union of the two domains is Qil. 
To find the full state space generated by interleaved 
execution of processes PI, P2, . . . , P,, referred to as 
the graph Gf = (Vj , Ef), following graph traversal 
algorithm can be used: 
l g  
1 
9 
i ’  
9 
1 2  
0 (qinit ,  ginit, . . . > qinnit, ginit) E V, , 
0 if Q = ( q 1 7 q 2 . * * , q i , * * .  t q n . 7 ~ )  E 
V, and (q i ,g )&(q; ,u‘ )  then Q‘ = 
( q 1 , 9 2 , * - .  ,q;,- ,qn,a‘) E Vf and 
(Q, Q’) E E!. (Q’ is called a Pi successor 
of 9). 
‘Domains of &and &are disjoint means that if in a non- 
deterministic state some of the transitions depend on g and 
while others do not, then we treat as though all transitions 
depend on g. 
1 9  
NOTATION: To simplify presentation of the algo- 
rithm and proofs, we write “Q + Q‘” to indicate 
that (Q,Q’) E E j  and “Q +” to indicate the 
set {Q‘I(Q,Q’) E Et}. Similarly, for any graph 
G = (V,E), we write << Qo,Q1, ... ,Qn >>E E 
to denote (Qi,Qi+l) E E for i E {O..n - 1). If 
Q = ( ~ 1 , 9 2 , . . .  , q i , . . .  ,qn,o), Qi(Q) = qi and 
C(Q) = 6. 
As mentioned earlier, partial order reductions de- 
pend on the notion of commutativity of transitions 
to obtain a subgraph G, of Gf while preserving the 
properties of interest. In particular, we note that all 
transitions in f commute with all the transitions in 
&and &( j # i) . If two transitions li E & and gj E -$ 
1 9 I 9 
are enabled from a given state S, then the partial or- 
der reduction algorithm may execute li from S and 
postpone the execution of gj from S. Of course, spe- 
cial care must be taken to ensure that gj is not perpet- 
ually postponed (referred to  as “ignoring problem”). 
1 
DEFINITION 1 (LOCAL) A state q E Qi is said to be 
local if it is in the domain o f f ,  Le., there is at least 
one q’ such that q f q ’ .  When Pi is in a local state, all 
of its transitions commute with transitions of other 
processes. 
1 
1 
DEFINITION 2 (DETERMINISTIC) A state q E Qi is 
said to be deterministic if it is local and the image 
of q via -$is singleton, i.e., if q f q ’  and q f q ”  then 
q‘ = q”. In this case, refer to q’ as next(q). While 
other partial order reduction algorithms depend on 
the notion of local to reduce the graph, the Two phase 
algorithm uses deterministic. 
Definitions of local and deterministic are extended 
to a concurrent system as follows: 
1 1 1 
DEFINITION 3 (LOCAL) A process Pi is said to be 
local in state ( q 1 , 4 2 , .  . . , qi,  . . . , qn, 6) iff qi is local in 
Pi. 
DEFINITION 4 (DETERMINISTIC) A process Pi is de- 
terministic in Q = (q1 ,q2 , .  . . , q i , .  . . ,qn,u) iff qi 
is deterministic in Pi. In this case, we write 
deterministic$,&). In this case, we use next(i ,Q) 
to indicate the state generated by moving Pi, i.e., if 
next(qi) = a:, next(i,Q)=(ql, ~ 2 . .  . ,q i ,  . . . , qn, 6). 
next (i ,Q) is called deterministic successor of Q. 
Note that if a process Pi is local in Q, then execut- 
ing a process Pj (j # i) does not affect Pi in anyway. 
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DEFINITION 5 (GLOBAL PROPERTY) A global 
the global variable g. Example: 009 = 1. We are 
interested in preserving the truth value of all such 
LTL-X properties. 
Related Work 
To determine whether a global property of the above 
form is true or not, many times it is not necessary 
property is a LTL-X formulae that involves only ; s1 --p+j) 
I 53 
P1; 
t  con truct the entire Gj, which can be extr mel  is I .  P2
large. Partial order reductions attempt to gener- 1 .  
ate a much smaller subgraph of Gj ,  called reduced 
graph is satisfied G,, that by Gj.  satisfies As mentioned the property earlier, iff the these property algo- ik rithms [5,11,13,14] attempt to generate Gr by ex- ploiting the fact that when a process Pi is in a local state, its transitions commute with the transitions of L -  Sn 
Pj ( j  # i). When Pi is local from a state S that 
is about to be expanded by the graph generating al- 
gorithm, the Partial order algorithm may, for exam- Figure 1: An algorithm that uses proviso generates 
ple, select to expand transitions Of process Only, the thick transition while the two-phase algorithm 
and postponing transitions of all other processes. Of generates the dotted transitions. 
course, special care must be taken to ensure that no 
enabled transition is indefinitely postponed. 
every state in the path 5’1 . . . S,. Partial order reduc- Previous algorithms such as [5] and [13] use tion algorithms that employ proviso may postpone proviso2 to ensure that no transition is indefinitely the transitions of P3 between SI and Sn-l, but not postponed (“ignoring problem”). Both these algo- 
at S,. In other words, proviso forces the algorithm rithms (as well as Two Phase) use a stack to maintain to take the thick transition from S, to & instead the list of states currently being expanded. At every of resetting the state of PI by executing the dotted step, the algorithm chooses the subset of the transi- 
transition from Sn to SI. In this example, the al- tions that need to be expanded from the current top 
gorithm generated & instead of R1, but in a more of the stack. [5] and [13] algorithms require that the complex situation where the proviso gets invoked of- subset of transitions selected to explore do not result 
ten, not only does algorithm generate both R1 and in a state that is already on the stack3. This condi- &, but it also generates many other states that are tion, referred to as proviso, in some cases, causes G, equivalent except that state of one or more processes to be quite large (approaching the size of Gj )  even 
is not reset, causing the G, to be quite large. Our though a much smaller G, can be computed Ell]. The two-phase algorithm avoids generating such equiva- Two phase algorithm attempts to rectify this problem 
lent states by not taking the thick transition, but by by avoiding the proviso and using a different search 
taking the dotted lines from Sn to SI and from SI strategy. 
to R1. This strategy, in many examples, reduces the A simple scenario highlighting the difference be- size of G,. tween the Two phase algorithm and other partial or- 
der reduction algorithms is shown in Figure 1. 5’1 
is the initial state of the system; and processes P1 
and P2 engage in a loop between SI and Sn, and all 
these moves of P1 and P2 commute with moves of The two phase algorithm is shown in Figure 2. Unlike another process P3. P3 has one enabled transition at 
previous algorithms, this algorithm does not use pro- 
2The provisos differ slightly depending on whether they pre- viso. Instead its execution is divided into two phases. 
serve LTL-X or safety only. In phase I, the algorithm executes transitions of de- 
3The proviso used in the two algorithms differ slightly be- terninistic processes. In ,.his phase, the algorithm 
maintains a list of states visited in variable list. 
Without this variable, if a process is in a determinis- 
I 
I 
I 
Rn 
3 Two Phase Algorithm 
cause [5] preserves only next-time free safety properties while 
[13] preserves LTL-X. However, the effect of proviso is very 
similar on performance of both algorithms. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
init stack to contain initial state 
init V, to @ 
init E, to 0 
Two-phase0 
s := topktack); 
list := {s}; 
/* Phase I: partial order step */ 
4 
for i := I to nprocesses { 
while (deterministic(i,s)) { 
/* Execute the only enabled 
Er := Er + ((5, next(i,s))}; 
s := nextci, s); 
if (s E list) goto HEXT-PROC; 
list := list + {s}; 
transition of P, */ 
1 
BEXT-PROC: /* next i */ 
1 
/* Phase 11: classical DFS */ 
if (s $? V,) then { 
V, := V, + list; 
for each succ in s+ { 
if (succ$?V,) then { 
Er := Er + {(s,t) I s+t}; 
pushbucc, stack) ; 
Two-phase ( ) ; 
pophtack) ; 
1 
1 
} else { 
1 
assert(s+ C V,); 
V, := V, + list; 
1 
Figure 2: Two-phase() avoids proviso using a differ- 
ent execution strategy. 
tic loop, the while loop in the first phase would not 
terminate (see Lemma 4.) In the second phase, l i s t  
is added to the V,. In phase 11, the algorithm first 
checks if s is already in V,. If it is not in V,, s is fully 
expanded (lines 19-25). If s is already in V,, then ei- 
ther s has already been expanded or a deterministic 
successor of s has been expanded. Hence, it is not 
necessary to explore s (line 28) and the recursive call 
terminates. 
As an example, consider the protocol shown in Fig- 
ure 3(a). On this protocol, the state space generated 
by an algorithm using the proviso [13] (implemented 
in SPIN [9]) is shown in Figure 3(c). As can be seen, 
when the search reaches the state <Si, SO>, due to 
the proviso, the algorithm selects process P2 and gen- 
erates <Si, Si>. In fact, since state <SO, SO> is in 
the stack until the entire graph generation is com- 
pleted, proviso is invoked many times, causing the 
algorithm to generate all states in the system (though 
not all edges). 
Two phase avoids this problem by completely 
avoiding the proviso. Instead, it depends on de- 
terministic states such as S1 and S2 in P1 and P2 
to bring the reductions. The reduced graph con- 
structed by the Two phase algorithm on the same 
protocol is shown in Figure 3(b). In this proto- 
col, the initial state <SO, SO> is not deterministic 
with respect to either of the processes. Hence no 
states are generated in Phase I of the algorithm. In 
phase 11, <SO, SO> is completely expanded, resulting 
in four states <Si, SO>, <S2, SO>, <SO, Si>, and 
<SO, S2>. Then Two-phase is called on all these 
four states. Let us consider the case of expanding 
<Si, SO>. Expansion of other states is similar. Pro- 
cess P1 is deterministic in <Si, SO>, and hence P1 
is executed in phase I, resulting in <SO , SO>. At this 
point because neither P1 nor P2 is deterministic in 
<SO, SO> phase I terminates, and in phase 11, the al- 
gorithm would discover that <SO, so> is already in 
V, , and the recursive call terminates, resulting in the 
state graph shown in Figure 3(b). As can be seen, 
Two phase generates a much smaller graph as a di- 
rect result of avoiding the proviso. 
In Figure 2 all intermediate states are added to 
l i s t  on line 11. Note that the only reason for main- 
taining l i s t  is to ensure that the while loop in Phase 
I terminates. Instead of adding all the intermediate 
states, we can add only a subset of the intermediate 
states to l i s t  and still guarantee that the while loop 
terminates. For example, one can add s to l i s t  only 
when the new value of s is bit-wise smaller than the 
value of old s. In this case, of course, line 8 also 
has to be modified so that E, does not contain edges 
between states that are not present in V,. This tech- 
nique constitutes a simple form of selective caching, 
which is also supported by PV. 
4 Proof of Correctness 
To show the Two phase algorithm preserves all 
global properties (Definition 5), we show that when 
the algorithm postpones execution of a transition 
x of Pi from a state So, there is a sequence << 
SO, SI,. . . , St,  S' >>E E, such that 
x is executed from St resulting in state S' 
each Si is obtained as a deterministic successor 
of Si-1 (i E (1 . .  . t ] ) ,  and hence the value of the 
global variable g is same for all the states in this 
sequence 
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n 
PI 
rn SI s2 
P2 
(a) Best case (b) State space by 2 phase 
(c) State space generated by SPIN tool 
Figure 3: Best case protocol. (a) The protocol. (b) State space that generated by the Two-phase algorithm. 
(c) State space generated by SPIN. The dotted line in (c) show one of the transitions that were not attempted 
due to the proviso. The thick line in (c) shows one of the transitions that would be taken by the algorithm, 
and truncated since the state (SO, Sl) has already been generated. 
Note that, if executing the transition x from SO re- 
sults in a state R, sequences << SO,. . , st, s' >> and 
<< SO, R >> satisfy the same global properties. 
LEMMA 1 The assert statement (line 26) in 
Two-phase holds. Due to the assignment on line 18, 
during the construction of the reduced graph, E, may 
contain edges of the form (2, y) where y is not yet in 
V ,  , at the time of termination y is added to V,, and 
hence E, V, x V,.  
Proof: To prove that the assert statement 
holds, we note that in every iteration, list con- 
tains top(stack), and list is added to V, in ev- 
ery call to Two-phase. Thus, at the end of each 
call, top(stack) is in V,. Since the recursive calls 
to Two-phase in the for each loop (line 19) make 
each member of s + that is not already in V, to be 
the top of the stack, the assert statement holds. 
LEMMA 2 Let S = ( q l , * * -  ,qi-l,qi,qi+1>... , q n , c )  
be a member of list that is added to V,  on line 17. 
If x = (qj,cr)-$(q:,c')  is a transition of P; then af- 
ter executing line 18, 3 < SO, S I , .  . . , St, St >>E E, 
such that (a) SO = S, (b) Qj(S0) = Qi(S1) = ... - 
Qj(St) = q i ,  (c) &(So) Xi(&) = . . = Cj(St) = 6, 
(d) Qi(S') = q: and C(S') = 6' &e., S' is a Pj suc- 
cessor of St, S' is generated by the transition x from 
St). In other words, every change in g along with the 
change of the state of every process Pi from q j  to qi 
in the full state space Gf is reflected in the reduced 
state space G, if S is added in line 17. 
This situation is shown in Figure 4. 
Proof: In phase I, list is constructed starting 
from top(stack) by examining only deterministic 
processes. Let ro =top(stack), and the order of 
the states added to list in the while loop of phase 
I be r1, r2, . . . , r,=S. In the then clause of phase 11, 
all elements of list, viz. ro, r1, . . . , r,, are added to 
V,. Let S = rj for some j E (0 . . . m} (see Figure 4). 
There are two cases to consider. (i) Pi is executed 
while generating the sequence << rj ,  rj+l, . . . , r, >>E 
E, (this corresponds to the case where the dashed 
transition from r k  of Figure 4 is added the reduced 
graph), and (ii) Pi is not executed while generating 
the sequence < rj ,  rj+l, . . . , r, >>E E, in phase I 
(this corresponds to the case where the thick tran- 
sition from r, is added to the reduced graph.) In 
the first case, since Pi is executed in phase I, we can 
conclude that Pi is deterministic in rj. Let Pi be 
first executed at state r k  E { r j ,  .. . , rm-l} resulting 
in state rk+l. In this case, the lemma holds with 
<So, Si, . . . , St, SI>> = <rj, rj+1, . . . , r k ,  rk+l>>. 
If Pj is not executed while generating the se- 
quence << r j ,  rj+l,. . . , r, >> we will show that 
the lemma holds with < SO,SI,. . ,St,S' >>=< 
rj ,  rj+l,. . + , r,, S'>> where S' is generated from r, 
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rk= 6 Qk+l-Pi 
rk+l=@ 
Figure 4: State SO is added to V,  on line 17. 
The dashed edge from SO is in the full graph. << 
SO, SI . . . rm >> is in E,. and all these states are in 
l is t  when So is added to V,.. Lemma 2 shows that 
after executing line 17, either the dashed edge from 
r k  to Tk+1 or the thick edge from rm is present in the 
reduced EraDh. 
tl- -2 
Figure 5: State SO is added to V, on line 28. The 
dashed edge from SO is in the full graph. Case 2 
of Lemma 3 shows when SO is added to V,, the << 
so,s1. . .Trn,tl, .   .tk >> is in E, and states rj . . .r, 
are in l is t ,  and the thick edge fromtk to 5’‘ is present 
in the reduced graph. 
by x. Since Pi is not executed while generating 
rj+1, ... , rm,  and g is not assigned in Phase I, we 
can conclude that rj and rm agree on the ith com- 
ponent of the state (i.e., Qi(Tj) = Qi(rm) = qi ) ,  and 
on g (i.e., C(rj)  = C(r,) = u). Since s =rm = St 
is fully expanded in phase I1 (lines 19-25), x is ex- 
ecuted at s. S‘ is obtained by executing x from St. 
Due to the assignment to E, on line 18, the edge 
in (St,,”‘) are in E,. Due to the assignment to E, 
on line 8 Thus in this case the lemma holds with 
<<SO,Sl, . . .  ,St,S‘>>=< rj ,rj+l, . . .  ,rm,S‘>>. 
LEMMA 3 Let S = (~1,. .. ,GI, q i , q i + l , .  . . , qn, c) 
be a member of l is t  that is added to V,  on line 28. 
If x = ( q j ,  c)f(q:, a‘) is a transition of Pi then when 
S is added to V,,  (a) 3 << So, SI,. .. , St, S’ >>E E, 
(a) SO = S, (b) Qi(S0) = Qi(S1) = . . . = Qi(St) = 
(d) Qi(S‘) = ql and C(S) = ut (i.e., 5’’ is a Pi suc- 
cessor of St, S’ is generated by the transition x from 
This is the similar to Lemma 2 except that it deals 
qi ,  (c) Ci(S0) = &(SI) = ... = %(St) = u, 
St). 
with the states added in the outermost else clause. 
Proof: The proof is based on the induction on the 
call at which the S is added to Vr. 
Induction basis: During the first call to Two-phase, 
the outer then clause of phase I1 is executed. Since 
line 28 is not executed, the lemma holds vacuously. 
Induction hypothesis: Let the states added in the 
else clause during the first I calls of Two-phase sat- 
isfy the lemma. 
Induction step: Let S be added during the Z+lth call. 
If the then clause is executed in this call, the lemma 
holds vacuously. Otherwise, let list contain states 
top(stack)=ro, T I , .  . . , r,=s at the end of phase I 
of I +  lth call. Let S = rj for some j E {~-.-rn). 
There are two cases to consider. 
Case(i): Pi is executed while generating the se- 
quence << rj, rj+l,. . . , rm >>E E, By reasoning as 
in the first case of Lemma 2, we can show that this 
lemma holds. 
Case(ii) (Figure 5): Pi is not executed while gen- 
erating the sequence << rj ,  rj+1,. . . , rm >>E E, in 
phase I. Since the global variable g is not assigned in 
phase I, C(rm) = C(rj = S)  = u. Since the else 
clause is executed, s =rm must have been added to 
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V, either in the then clause of a previous call or in 
the else clause of a previous call. If it was added 
in the then clause, by Lemma 2 we can find a se- 
quence << to , t l , .  . . ,tk, St >> where t o  = r,. On 
the other hand, if it was added in the else clause, 
by induction hypothesis, we can find sequence << 
to, t l , .  . . , t k ,  St >> where t o  = rm. In both cases, 
the lemma holds with << SO,&, .  . ,St,St >>=e 
rj,rj+i,. . . , rm,ti , .  . . , t k ,  St>.  
LEMMA 4 (TERMINATION) Two-phase terminates 
after a finite number of calls. 
Proof: There are two parts to the proof of termi- 
nation: (a) eventually no new calls to Two-phase 
are made, and (b) the while loop in the phase I 
terminates. To prove (a), note that new calls to 
Two-phase are made only in the body of the outer 
“if’ statement in the second phase. Before these 
calls are made, all elements of list are added to 
V,. The precondition to execute the “if” statement 
is that s is not in V,. By construction of list, s is 
in list. Thus the number of states in V, increases 
at least by one as a result of adding list to V,. In 
other words, if number of states in V, before the ith 
level call of Two-phase is made is k, then the number 
of states in V, before i + l th  level call of Two-phase 
is made is at least IC + 1. Thus the maximum depth 
of calls to Two-phase cannot exceed the number of 
states in the protocol, which is finite. To prove (b), 
note that one-new state is added to list in each 
iteration of while loop. Again, since the number 
of states in the protocol is finite, eventually no new 
states can be added to list, thus the while loop 
terminates. 
DEFINITION 6 (EQUIVALENT TRACES) Two traces 
T and TI are said to be equivalent iff they satisfy 
the same set of global properties (Definition 5 ) .  In 
other words, T and TI are stutter equivalent when 
they are projected on to the global variable 9. 
Let T =<< SO, ... ,SI >> be a trace (of G, or G f  
depending on the context) where each Si is obtained 
by executing a transition Sj from Si-1 (i E {l..Z}). 
The trace T may be equivalently represented by the 
transition sequence “<< SI, . . . , SI >> starting from 
So”. Unless there is any confusion, we refer to both 
the state sequence and its transition sequence repre- 
sentation as simply “sequence”. 
Note that if two transitions x,y appear adjacent 
to each other in the transition sequence of T ,  x and 
y are independent of each other (i.e., at least one of 
the two transitions is local and they belong to differ- 
ent processes), and TI is identical to T except that 
the order of x and y is interchanged, then T and TI 
are equivalent traces. Similarly, if z is a deterministic 
transition that never appears in T, and TJ  is obtained 
by prepending x to T ,  then also T and TI are equiv- 
alent. We use these two properties to show that the 
reduced graph G, satisfies a global property iff the 
full graph G f  does. We show this by demonstrating 
that for every trace Tf of GI there is an equivalent 
trace T, in G,. 
THEOREM 1 (LTL-X) The graph constructed by 
Two-phase, G, = (V,,E,)y satisfies a LTL-X prop- 
erty P involving only the global variable g iff G f  sat- 
isfies P. 
Proof: We show that for every sequence Tr of G,, 
we can find an equivalent sequence Tf in G f  and vice 
versa. It is easy to see that G, is a subgraph of G f .  
Hence, every trace of G, is also a trace of G f .  
Now, we will show that for every trace in G f  , there 
is a corresponding trace in G,. First, we observe that 
at the time of termination, initial state is in V,. From 
Lemmas 2 and 3 we can conclude that any sequence 
of changes in g that is present in G f  is also present 
in G,. Together, they imply that every trace of G f  
is also a trace of G,. 
A formal proof that for every trace Tf in G f  there 
is a corresponding trace T, in G ,  is a little more in- 
volved. For simplicity, we first show that for every 
fair path [lo] of G f  there is an equivalent trace in 
G,. Let Tf be a fair path in G f  . By Lemmas 2 and 
3, we can conclude that no transition is indefinitely 
postponed. Hence, by reordering the transitions in 
T f ,  we can obtain an equivalent sequence T, in G,. 
Hence, both G, and G f  satisfy the same fair LTL-X 
formulae. 
If Tf is not fair, we may not be able to construct 
T, by simply reordering the transitions in Tf .  This 
happens, for example, when a state S that appears in 
both TI and Try  x is a deterministic transition of Pi, 
x is enabled in S, that Pi is not executed at all after 
S in T f ,  and x is executed at S in Phase I of Two 
phase. In this case all traces of G, starting from S 
contain x. But since Tf does not contain x, we can- 
not construct T, by simply reordering the transitions 
in T f  . T, , instead, is obtained by prepending x to Tf 
and then reordering the adjacent independent tran- 
sitions in T f .  Hence for every Tf we can construct 
an equivalent T, by adding deterministic transitions 
to T f  and reordering independent transitions. Thus 
we can conclude that Two phase preserves all LTL-X 
properties involving only g. 
159 
5 Experimental Results 
The Two phase algorithm outperforms the proviso 
algorithm 1131 and a similar algorithm implemented 
in PO-PACKAGE4 [5] when the proviso is invoked 
often. In most reactive systems, a transaction typi- 
cally involves a subset of processes. For example, in 
a server/client model of computation, a server and 
a client may communicate without any interruption 
from other servers or clients to complete a transac- 
tion. After the transaction is completed, the state of 
the system is reset to the initial state. If the par- 
tial order reduction algorithm uses the proviso, state 
resetting cannot be done as the initial state will be 
in the stack until the entire reachability analysis is 
completed. Since at least one process is not reset, 
the algorithm generates unnecessary states, thus in- 
creasing the number of states visited. In other realis- 
tic systems also the number of extra states generated 
due to the proviso can be high. Two phase does not 
use the proviso, thus avoiding generating the extra 
states. 
Table 1 shows results of running the [13] algorithm 
implemented in SPIN [9], Two phase with selective 
state caching disabled, and Two phase with selec- 
tive caching enabled on various protocols. This table 
shows number of states in V, and time taken in sec- 
onds to complete the graph construction on a Super 
Sparc 20. All verification runs are limited to 64MB 
so that the entire graph would fit in physical memory. 
Protocols B5-B7 are best case protocol in Figure 3 
with N=5, 6, and 7. Protocol W5-W7 is example 
of a protocol that runs better with SPIN search algo- 
rithm. On this protocol, the proviso is never invoked, 
and this protocol has no deterministic states. As a 
result the Two phase degenerates to full state space, 
while SPIN reduces the number of states appreciably 
(from 3n states to 2n+1 - 1 states for where n=5, 6, 
or 7). 
Mig and inv are two cache coherency protocols used 
in Avalanche [l]. On inv, SPIN fails to complete 
the graph construction in 64MB of memory. On the 
other hand, PV tool finishes comfortably generating 
255,781 states (without selective caching) or 135,404 
states (with selective caching). SC is a server/client 
protocol. This protocol consists of n servers and n 
clients. A client chooses a server and requests for 
a service. A service consists of a two round trip 
messages between server and client and some local 
computations. As can be seen, SPIN cannot handle 
4 servers and 4 clients; it aborts search after gen- 
4PO-PACKAGE uses a weaker form of proviso along with 
sleepsets [6], but it preserves only safety properties. 
erating 260,928 states, while PV finishes generating 
59,436 states (without selective caching) or 14,173 
states (with selective caching). 
Pftp and snoopy protocols are provided as part of 
SPIN distribution. On pftp, SPIN generates fewer 
states than PV without state caching. The reason 
is that there is very little determinism in this pro- 
tocol. Since Two phase depends on determinism to 
bring reductions, PV generates a larger state space. 
However, with state caching, the number of states in 
the graph goes down by a factor of 2.7. On snoopy, 
even though PV generates fewer states, the number 
of states generated SPIN tool and PV (without selec- 
tive caching) is very close to obtain any meaningful 
conclusion. The reason for this is two-fold. First, 
this protocol contains some determinism, which helps 
PV. However, there are a number of deadlocks in this 
protocol. Because of this, apparently, the proviso is 
not invoked many times. Hence the number of states 
generated is very close. 
6 Conclusions 
We presented a new partial order reduction algorithm 
called Two phase and showed that it preserves LTL- 
X properties. By avoiding the proviso and using de- 
terministic transitions to bring the reductions, the 
algorithm can bring better reductions than other al- 
gorithms on a number of practical protocols. Two 
phase algorithm is implemented in PV. Source code 
for PV may be obtained by contacting the authors. 
Currently, we are planning to verify the proofs pre- 
sented in this paper using PVS [12] similar to the 
work done by Chou and Peled [2]. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes the use of deductive methods 
for the verification of invariance properties of parallel 
systems. We show how a combination of proof rules, 
invariant generation techniques and abstraction tech- 
niques integrated to a theorem prover can be used ef- 
fectively to prove invariants of systems given as a par- 
allel composition of sequential processes with infinite 
data types. We present an implementation of these 
various techniques in our tool the Invariant-Checker. 
The Invariant-Checker is build as a front-end for the 
Pvs theorem prover. The tool is an extension of the 
Pvs specification language to handle the notion of 
transition systems describing the parallel composi- 
tion of sequential processes. The PVS prover is also 
extended with a new proof scheme corresponding to 
the combination of our proof techniques. 
keywords: Computer-Aided verification, Combi- 
nation of formal methods, theorem proving, PVS, in- 
variants proofs, automatic generation of invariants, 
abstraction techniques. 
1 Introduction 
Formal verification methods form a set of more or less 
automatic verification techniques for hardware and 
software computing. Since the use of formal methods 
is in constant growing, tools for the computer-aided 
verification supporting formal methods are needed 
and encouraged. A large variety of formal methods 
techniques is available, such as Model-checking , the- 
orem proving, programs and circuits synthesis, re- 
finement, abstraction techniques, simulation, testing, 
etc. Some of these techniques like model checking are 
used with a lot of success as they are fully automatic 
but are restricted to finite state systems, whereas oth- 
ers like theorem proving are generally considered la- 
bor intensive, which may sow doubts about their use 
in real life situations. The aim is then to combine 
several methods and techniques in order to comple- 
ments them and to take advantage of the benefits of 
each of them. 
Theorem proving has been applied to program ver- 
ification with relatives success1, specially systems like 
[5], [16], [9] and [6]. The use of theorem proving as 
a computer-aided verification technique consists in 
the validation of a set of logical formulas expressing 
the facts that the specification satisfies some prop- 
erties. Higher order logic which is the specification 
language of most of the known theorem provers is a 
rich specification language allowing the definition of 
usual mathematical objects such as types, sets, func- 
tions and propositions. Mathematical objects can be 
constructed as set of previously declared objects or 
lsee [7] for many examples of the use of PVS. 
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as functions mapping previously declared objects to 
previously declared objects. 
Other verification methods like model checking are 
used with success due to complete automatization. 
Model-checking consist in the exhaustive enumera- 
tion of all the states of a system and to check whether 
all theses states satisfy the desired property. While 
model-checking is restricted to the verification of fi- 
nite state systems, theorem proving can deal with 
both finite and infinite state systems, but with loss 
of complete automatization and with permanent user 
guidance. Combination of Model-Checking and The- 
orem proving is one of the most promising combina- 
tion of verification techniques since it took benefits 
from the automatization of model-checking and the 
powerful of theorem proving. 
Many works have been achieved to integrate theo- 
rem proving to other verification techniques. In [12] 
Model checking is used to prove abstract models of 
specifications, while theorem proving is used to prove 
that the abstraction relation used is a “good” ab- 
straction which preserve some desired properties. In 
[13] Theorem proving is used in order to prove the 
correctness of systems given as a parallel composition 
of processes by means of compositional rules embed- 
ded as inference rules in a theorem prover, while the 
correctness of each components is established using 
model checking. In [7] the PVS specification lan- 
guage is extended to support duration calculus syn- 
tax, and a set of proof rules dedicated to duration 
calculus logic are implemented. In El], the PVS the- 
orem prover is integrated to an environment for the 
verification of hardware specifications. It is used dis- 
charge verification conditions in order to test whether 
two specifications are equivalents modulo some equiv- 
alence relation. 
In this work we are interested in the verification 
of invariance properties of parallel systems given as 
a parallel composition of sequential process with infi- 
nite data types. Such systems can not be verified by 
model checking. The verification techniques we con- 
sider are deductive model checking and abstraction 
techniques. Deductive model checking [lo] consist 
in computing inductive invariants of a system by fix 
point calculation using a deductive proof rule. This 
proof rule reduces the problem of finding an appro- 
priate invariant to the validity of first order formu- 
las. Techniques for the automatic generation of in- 
variants [2] are used to accelerate convergence. In 
the case where the proof rule fails to find an appro- 
priate inductive invariant, abstraction techniques [ 111 
are used to construct automatically an abstract state 
graph of the original system. The construction of the 
abstract state graph requires also to discharge first 
order formulas. An abstract state graph can be seen 
either as a finite state system on which model check- 
ing techniques can be applied, or as a more precise 
control structure of the original system. 
The goal of this work is to show how to design in a 
fashion and an effective way tools for the computer- 
aided verification by combining techniques such as 
theorem proving, model-checking and abstraction in 
order to verify invariance properties of parallel sys- 
tem. We also show how theorem prover as a general 
framework can be a bootstrap for a combination of 
formal verification techniques. We choose for this 
purpose the PVS theorem prover developed at SFU to 
discharge the generated formulas. 
This paper is organized as follow: in section 2, we 
present the principles of the verification techniques 
used such as deductive proof rules and abstraction 
techniques. In section 3 we present our approach 
to implement these methods and how they can be 
automated in an efficient way. In section 4, we de- 
scribe our tool the Invariant-Checker implementing 
these methods. Finally in section 5, we sketch about 
our use of the Invariant-Checker and some examples 
we have studied. 
2 Deductive Methods 
We are interested in using deductive methods to ver- 
ify invariance properties of parallel systems. This 
methods consist in applying a set of proof rules to 
establish that a property P expressed as a first or- 
der formulae is an invariant of a system S, that is, P 
remains true in every state of the system S, starting 
from its initial state. 
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2.1 Preliminary definitions 
We consider systems which are parallel compositions 
Of processes, where we consider parallel composition 
by interleaving and synchronization by shared vari- 
ables as in Unity [3]. 
As a model of parallel systems we use transition 
systems. This notion is one of the simplest one used 2 e 2  
to describe states of a system and elementary steps 
(transitions) modifying its states. Also, every se- We use the simple invariance proof rule (Figure 1) 
quential process including classical algorithmic con- which states that a predicate P is invariant of a 
struction such as loops, tests and assignments can be system s, if it exists a predicate P’ stronger than P ,  
translated into a transition system. Transitions are such that P’ holds at the initial state and is preserved 
guarded commands where each guard is a boolean by all the ~ransitionS Of the System. 
expression indicating the condition under which the 
transition is enabled. 
2. post{ri}(P) is the strongest postcondition of the 
predicate P with respect the transition rj and 
is defined QS the set of states which can not be 
reached from Q state satisfying + via a transi- 
tion ri. 
I~~&anCe Proof rule 
+ Init  + P’ 
Definition 1 (transit ion system) + P’*P 
A transition system S is a tuple S = < Y , T  = I= Qrj. P’(rj}P’ 
j r1 , . . . , rn} ,L ,  Init >, where Y is (I set of system 
variables, T a set of transitions or actions, L a set 
of control locations and Init  an initial state. Prog OP 
Each transition ri is a guarded command Figure 1: Invariance proof rule 
1; : guardi + v1 ::= e l , .  - .  , vk ::= ek goto lj 
the predicate Qri. P{ri}P can be expressed using 
where { w ~ , . - - , V k }  E Y and {li,lj} 
Each guard guardi is the guard of the transition ri. 
Each variable is assigned with an expression ej of a 
compatible type. Locations li and l j  are respectively 
We also give the following informal definition of the 
weakest precondition and the strongest postcondition We propose to use the predicate transformer E, 
predicate transformers. since its application does not introduce existential 
quantifications which are not easy to eliminate. 
Definition 2 (predicate transformer) 
L. the predicate transformer E and post as follow: 
0 AZ1(P * E { r i ) ( P ) )  
the source and target location of the transition 7;‘. 0 A;=i(Post{ri}(P) * P )  
1. @(ri}(P) is the weakest precondition of the 2.3 
predicate P with respect the transition Tj and is 
defined OS the set of states from which it is not This rule does not tell how to find an appropriate 
possible to reach via Q transition ri Q state satis- PI, but many techniques are used to find a P‘ by 
fying -P. refining the predicate P.  The most used one is the 
E { r i } ( P )  is defined CIS the predicate strengthening method which consists in finding the 
greatest inductive invariant (implied by all the other 
inductive invariants of S) implying the predicate P. 
Strengthening techniques 
guardi P[el/Vi,  * - .  ,ek/vk] 
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That is to find in a model checking like manner the 
greatest solution of the equation: 
QT~ . P’{ c} P’ 
The strengthening method consists in instantiating 
PI successively by a sequence PO, + - . , P, of predicates 
such that: 
e P o = P  
9 pk+l = p k  /\:=I e { r i } ( p k )  
At each kth step the second premise of the proof rule 
is trivially true, and only the two others premises are 
checked, that is the predicates: 
In fact it is not necessary to consider at each new 
instantiation the predicate Pk A b ,  j j % { q } ( P k ) ,  but 
only the predicate Pk A;=, ={?-j}(Pk) where the 
transitions rj are those for which the verification con- 
dition Pk{Tj}Pk is not proved valid. 
Figure 2 illustrates this fix point calculation known 
as the backward analysis using the predicate trans- 
former i3G. The dual analysis method is the For- 
ward analysis which consist in the computation of the 
reachable states from the initial state of the system 
S iteratively as a fix point using the predicate trans- 
former post, and than to check whether the reachable 
predicate Reach implies the predicate P .  
Figure 2: Fixpoint calculation 
These two dual techniques may not terminate when 
the state space of the analyzed system is infinite. 
Moreover, when one may terminate the other may 
not. Also, in the forward analysis the generated VCs 
have no more quantifiers than the predicate P ,  how- 
ever in the forward analysis, the generated VCs are 
existentially quantified formulas. This makes the use 
of forward analysis technique more difficult than the 
backward technique due to the quantifier elimination 
problem. 
2.4 Refined strengthening techniques 
The drawback of the proposed strengthening tech- 
niques is the growing size of the predicates Pk com- 
puted at each iteration. To avoid this problem, other 
strengthening rules have been proposed. In [12] it 
is proposed to instantiating P’ successively by a se- 
quence Po, . . . , P,, of predicates such that: 
e P , = P  
p k + 1  = /$=1(Pk * E { r j } ( p k ) )  
The idea behind the use of this rule is the following: 
If the proof of the validity of the verification condi- 
tion Pk 3 ={Ti ] (&)  fails, it is tried to prove the 
validity of the simplified form of this VC in the pro- 
gram and not in every model. However, this rule does 
not accelerate convergence any more. This is due to 
the fact that at each iteration not all the state from 
which it is possible to reach a state satisfying 7 P  are 
eliminated. 
In [2] a refined strengthening technique is pro- 
posed. It consist in using the following rules: 
Instantiate PI successively by 
where Q is the “simplified” form of Pk 3 
e { q } ( P k ) .  This rule is equivalent to the first one 
since the predicate Pk+l are equivalents in both tech- 
niques: 
p k  A ( p k  * = { r i } ( p k ) )  %’ pk A%{r i } (pk)  
This method is used to avoid the size increasing 
of expressions due to the multiple applications of the 
strengthening techniques. However in practice it does 
not give interesting results. This is essentially due to 
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the proof strategy used to have a “simplified” form 
of the considered VC. In fact this strategy should not 
create additional subgoals. Furthermore since the re- 
sult of the application of this strategy will be consid- 
ered in the next step, this strategy should not change 
significantly the current goal to prove by increasing 
its size. Thus, proof strategies such as rewriting, in- 
duction may not be used. Also, if a non appropriate 
proof strategy is used such as rewriting a bad instance 
of a function symbol or an induction on a non rele- 
vant variable may create non relevant subgoals which 
are propagated along the iteration process. 
2.5 Automatic generation of invari- 
ants 
The application of the proof rule in the case of infinite 
state systems may lead to an infinite computation. 
Also, when the computation terminates, convergence 
is often slow. Convergence can be accelerated using 
some already proved invariants of the system. Let Z 
be a conjunction of such invariants. The verification 
conditions generated by the proof rule can be weak- 
property we want to verify can be easily checked by 
model checking techniques. Most abstraction tech- 
niques used in program verification are based on ab- 
stract interpretation of programs [4]. The main con- 
cern of abstract interpretation is the construction of 
descriptions of concrete systems by “mimicking” the 
effect of concrete operations with suitable operations 
defined over descriptions. The construction of an ab- 
stract system requires the definition of an abstract 
state space, where each abstract state represent a 
possibly infinite set of concrete states. 
In [I13 we define a particular abstraction scheme, 
where an abstract state is defined as a valuation of a 
set of predicates ‘pl, ..., “pe on program variables and 
the valuation of the concrete control variables. The 
construction process starts by defining the initial ab- 
stract state of the system. This can be done by check- 
ing the possible valuations of each predicate ‘pi in the 
concrete initial state. The successors of an abstract 
state are computed as follows: 
1. Select all the possible transitions ~i from the ab- 
stract state. 
ened by Z, that is by generating at each lCth step the 2. For each such transition the valuation 
of each predicate pi after the execution of ~i , 
that is whether ‘pi or 7pi is a postcondition. The 
successor s‘ of a valuation s is then equal to: 
following VCs: 
Z A Init j Pk 
kth step { z A pk * Ay=l E ( r i } ( p k )  
In [2] we present techniques for the automatic genera- 
tion of inductive invariants by static analysis. These 
techniques allows us to generate invariants of a se- 
quential process as well as for a system given as a 
parallel composition of sequential processes. The in- 
variant Z represents an upper approximation of the 
set Reach of reachable states. The proof rule allows 
us to combine backward and forward analysis, since 
the backward analysis considers only states satisfying 
2. 
2.6 Abstraction techniques 
false if s j - t g u a r d i  
t if s * iGG{~i}(p~) 
T otherwise 
f if s * E { ~ i } ( ~ c p i )  
In the case where T is a postcondition of a predi- 
cate p i ,  two successors are created corresponding to 
the case where ‘pi or ’‘pi is a postcondition. t and f 
are the boolean values true and false. The successor 
false is interpreted as the empty set, that is no SUC- 
cessor exists for the considered abstract state via the 
transition Ti. 
In the case where the combination of the proof rule Using these rule an abstract state graph can be 
and the invariant generation techniques fails to prove constructed. This graph is an upper approximation 
the property, it is useful to construct a correspond- of the global reachable state of a system and can be 
ing finite state system called an abstraction where the used to prove any property involving the predicate 
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‘pl , . . . , pl using model-checking techniques. Also this 
state graph gives a more precise idea about the be- 
havior of a system given as a parallel composition of 
processes by eliminating non reachable global control 
configuration. Thus from a practical point of view it 
is useful to include in the set pl, ..., ‘pi of predicates 
the literals appearing in the guards of each transi- 
tion of the system and the literals appearing in the 
property we want to  verify. The presented proof rules 
of the previous sections can then be applied on the 
system defined by this abstract state graph which is 
a system with only one component. Notice that our 
abstraction technique is also based on the proof of 
a set of first order implications, which can also be 
weakened by the invariant 1. This allows us to com- 
includes uninterpreted types, sub-typing and recur- 
sively defined data types. Four sorts character- 
ize this language: Theory, Type, Expression( tern) , 
Formula (proposition). Any Pvs specification is 
structured into parameterized theories. A Theory is a 
set of Type, variable, constant, function and Formula 
declarations. The theorem prover or proof checker 
implements a set of powerful tactics with a mecha- 
nism for composing them into proof tacticals. Some 
of these tactics such as assert and and bddsamp in- 
voke efficient decision procedures for arithmetic and 
boolean expressions. Pvs has emacs as user interface. 
3.2 A first approach 
bine proof rules, invariant generation and abstraction 
techniques in a same framework based on discharging 
verification conditions. 
We investigated two approaches to implement the de- 
scribed techniques using the PVS theorem prover. A 
first approach consists in encoding the proof rule in - -  - 
the specification language of the prover. This ap- 
proach is the “classical” one adopted when a theorem 
3 Automated deductive meth- prover is used in formal verification. 
ods 
We propose to implement the proof rule of figure 1, 
the techniques for the automatic generation of invari- 
ants and the abstraction techniques we have defined. 
A tool implementing such techniques must have two 
essential features: a powerful specification language 
allowing the describtion of transition systems with 
infinite data types, a verification condition genera- 
tor for each proposed techniques and finally a proof 
engine to discharge all the generated VCs. A theo- 
rem prover seems to be an appropriate tool for our 
verification techniques. We choose the PVS theorem 
prover for this purpose. 
3.1 PVS 
Using the PVS specification language, a system S 
can be described in a PVS theory. Given a predicate 
P, we express the invariance property S+ CIP as a 
theorem: 
th : THEOREM 
is-invariant?(S,P) 
where is-invariant? is a recursive function defined 
on the structure of the system S. 
The strengthening techniques can also be defined 
using a recursive functions parameterized by the 
maximal number of iteration allowed. 
We found this way of proving invariants using a 
theorem prover not satisfactory for many reasons: 
1. The syntax is not adapted to describe systems 
easily. 
P V S  is an environment for writing specifications and 
developing proofs. It consists of a specification lan- 
guage integrated with a powerful and highly inter- 
active theorem prover. pvs Uses higher order logic 
as a specification language, the type system of PVS 
2. The proofs =e too long, which is due to many 
unnecessary rewriting steps. 
3. A lot of user interaction is required and few au- 
tomatization is provided. 
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3.3 Our approach 
To deal with the weakness reported previously, we 
choose to built a verification system using the PVS 
theorem prover as a back-end where the verification 
conditions are generated automatically and submit- 
ted to the PVS prover in a fully automatic way. The 
objectives of this approach are the following: 
0 Full automatization whenever it is possible. 
0 Use all the power of the PVS specification lan- 
guage and the PVS prover. 
0 Extend the PVS verification system with new 
features, including our particular proof scheme. 
Following these objectives, we have designed our tool 
the Invariant Checker [lo, 191. The system is de- 
signed as a front-end for the Pvs [q theorem prover. 
The Invariant Checker can be seen as an extension of 
the Pvs verification system to handle the notion of 
transition systems and invariants as well as the usual 
mathematical objects. These extensions appears at 
two different levels: the PVS specification language is 
extended with the notion of a system, or a parallel 
composition of transition systems. The Pvs prover is 
also extended with the deductive proof rule we use. 
This type of invariant verification makes a different 
use of theorem proving from the “classical” one where 
program’s semantics are encoded in the prover’s spec- 
ification language (usually higher order logic or set 
theory). In this “classical” approach the proof pro- 
cess is complicated due to the heavy encoding of se- 
mantics and the unnecessary rewriting of semantics 
definitions, while usually the most important and dif- 
ficult part of the verification process is the reasoning 
about the program variables and their values. Also, 
it requires too much user interaction. The objective 
of our tool is to provide more automatization and 
less user intervention using a set of features. The 
principals of our tool are illustrated in Figure 3. To 
extend the prover with our particular proof schemes 
and techniques, a front end is required, where VCs 
are only submitted to the prover without user in- 
teraction. Notice that this extension scheme is gen- 
eral and can be applied to any verification scheme 
where discharging first order assertions is required. 
Of course the verification process can be completely 
automatized under the condition that the generated 
VCs are decidable predicates. 
Front end Theorem Prover 
Decision Techniques 
Figure 3: Design principal 
4 A verification tool: The 
Invariant4 hecker 
4.1 Design Philosophy 
As reported previously, the objective of the design 
of such tool is the complete automatization of the 
verification process whenever it is possible, and also 
to take advantage of the Pvs specification language 
and its rich type system and the PVS prover and its 
powerful proof strategies. 
In order to be efficient it is only necessary to in- 
teract automatically with PVS, and then to generate 
VCs in a format acceptable by the prover. Systems 
can then be described in any other specification lan- 
guage, but in order to have an efficient integration 
with PVS we decided to use the PVS specification 
language to describe systems. However it was neces- 
sary to extend this language to support the definition 
of transition systems in a syntax close to the one de- 
fined in section 2.2. Thus, the manipulated variables 
can be defined as PVS variables and the manipulated 
expressions as Pvs expressions. The typechecker is 
also extended in order to parse and to typecheck spec- 
ifications written in this syntax. This allow us to use 
all the power of the PVS specification language with 
a suitable syntax. It is also necessary to consider a 
new notion of proof status of a system, that is which 
are the assumed invariants (axioms) of the consid- 
ered system and which are the already proved in- 
variants and the non yet proved ones. The following 
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correspondence scheme gives the design philosophy 
of the tool where PVS is extended with the notion of 
system, invariant and invariant proof : 
PVS Invariant - Checker 
Theory t) System 
Theorem c--) Invariant 
Proof c--) Invariant proof 
4.2 Features 
Figure 4 describes the general scheme of the 
Invariant-Checker. In this section we explain the role 
of each component of the tool and how the proof pro- 
cess is organized. 
Syntax: Systems can be described in a Simple Pro- 
gramming Language (SPL), close to the one used in 
[17], but with the rich data types and expressions 
definition mechanism available in PVS. Our SPL 
language includes common algorithmic constructions 
such as single and multiple assignments statements, 
conditionals If-Then-Else and loop statements. We 
also allow parallel composition by interleaving and 
synchronization by shared variables as in Unity [3]. 
Systems described in SPL are translated automati- 
cally into guarded commands with explicit control. 
Program variables can be of any type definable in 
Pvs, and can be assigned by any definable PVS ex- 
pression of a compatible type. Also, it is possible 
to import any defined PVS theory. Figure 5 shows a 
simple example of a system given as a parallel compo- 
sition of two processes Process-1 and Process-2. this 
system is knows as the bakery system. It guaran- 
tees the access to the critical section 3 in a mutual 
exclusion between the two processes. The example 
is given in the concrete syntax allowed for transition 
systems2. Reqi, Ini ,  Outi are labels of the tran- 
sitions of Process-i. 
Figure 4: The Invariant Checker Architecture 
2The example is presented in the generated B'l)$X format 
for guarded commands. Variables pcl  and pc2 are respectively 
the control variable of Processl and ProcessZ. 
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bakery: SYSTEM 
BEGIN 
compl : PROGRAM 
y l :  V A R n a t  
BEGIN 
Req-1 
1: TRUE + yl:=y2+1 GOTO 2 
I n l  
2: y 2 = 0  V y 1 5  y2 + S K I P  GOTO 3 
Out-1 
3: TRUE + y l  := 0 GOTO 1 
END COmpl 
II 
comp2 : PROGRAM 
$ 2 :  V A R n a t  
BEGIN 
ReqZ 
1: TRUE + y2 := yl-I-1 GOTO 2 
InZ 
2: y l = O  V y 2 2 y 1  + S K I P  GOTO 3 
O u t 2  
3: TRUE + y2:=0 GOTO 1 
END COmp2 
END bakery 
Figure 5: Bakery transition system 
Typechecking: Typechecking concerns only sys- 
tems described as a parallel composition of guarded 
commands since the translation of an SPL system 
into a transition system is only a syntactical transfor- 
mation. Typechecking a system consists in checking 
that every guarded command is well typed according 
to a typing context. This typing context consists of 
all variable declarations and may be some imported 
Pvs theory. Since the manipulated expressions are 
PVS expressions, typechecking a system may lead to 
the generation of type correctness conditions (TCCs). 
In Pvs a generated TCC must be proved before prov- 
ing any assertions of the corresponding theory. This 
is due to the fact that a theory is a logical specifica- 
tion and a generated TCC indicates some correctness 
criterion of the specification. 
Our description of systems can be seen as a de- 
scription at a hight (specification) or at a low (im- 
plementation) level. They are not logical specifica- 
tion. Therefore the generated TCCs are predicates 
that guarantee “absence of run-time errors” (division 
by zero, application of the tail function to the empty 
list...). Moreover, these predicates have to be proved 
as invariants and not as valid formulas as it is the 
case of TCCs generated for a Pvs theory. It is just 
required that they are valid in the model generated 
by the system and not in every model. In the case 
where they cannot be proved, absence of run-time 
errors is not guaranteed but this does not affect the 
proof of any invariant. 
Consider the following transition where x is de- 
clared as a positive integer: 
i :  x > O  + x : = t - l  GO TO^ 
The expression x - 1 is assigned to x and should be of 
a compatible type, that is x - 1 2 0. This constraint 
is not required to be true at any moment of the ex- 
ecution of the program but only when a transition 
is activated, that is only when the program counter 
equals i and the guard x > 0 is true. Thus the fol- 
lowing TCC is generated: 
Tcci : OBLIGATION 
p c = i  A c > O  + % - 1 > _ O  
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this TCC is trivially valid and can be discharged us 
ing the PVS arithmetics decision procedures. 
Of course, one can encode the semantics of guarded 
commands within the PVS specification language, 
and then use the “classical” PVS typechecker to gen- 
erate such TCCs. However they must be proved as 
invariants. The generated TCCs can be used in this 
case to prove other invariants of the considered sys- 
tem, and can also be proved using some other invari- 
ants, which is not the case of TCCs generated for a 
theory, which must be proved independently of any 
other assertions. 
Internal representation: PVS is implemented in 
LISP. every object manipulated in PVS such as a the- 
ory, a theorem or a proof is represented as an instance 
of a predefined object class. We have defined for 
all the abject manipulated in the Invariant-Checker 
an internal representation which is also a class such 
as: system, process, transition, invariant and 
proof. An important aspect in these structures is 
that they are independent from the PVS internal 
structures and make our implementation independent 
from the possible changes in the PVS internal repre- 
sentation. However the expression manipulated and 
the verification condition generated are represented 
as Pvs expressions and Pvs obligations. This is nec- 
essary for the automatic interaction with the prover 
we want to achieve. 
Static analysis As it is shown, any known aux- 
iliary invariant Z of a system can be used to accel- 
erate convergence. Static analysis consists in a set 
of techniques for the automatic generation of such 
invariants. Theses techniques are based on propa- 
gation of guards and assignments through program 
control points. two kinds of invariants are generated: 
local invariants for each process and global invariants 
of the parallel composition. The techniques we used 
are described in [2]. These invariants are added au- 
tomatically to the invariant database. For example, 
the following global invariants are automatically gen- 
erated for the bakery system: 
pcl = 1 * y1 = 0 
p c 2 = 1 *  yz=o 
pc2 = 2 * 3 (Yl) : y2 = y1+ 1 
PC2 = 3  * 3 (Yl) : y2 = yl + 1 
Proof manager: The proof manager is the module 
which coordinates the proof process by applying the 
proof commands invoked by the used. This module 
controls the number of iterations, controls the valid- 
ity of each VCs and invokes the proof rule whenever 
it is necessary. 
VC generator: Each application of a proof rule 
leads to the generation of a set of first order formulas 
to discharge. For a predicate P and a system S only 
non trivial VCs are generated. For example no VC 
is generated when a transition does not affect the 
free variables of P.  Also, for every generated VC, a 
set of relevant generated invariants is automatically 
selected to achieve the proof. 
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Proof session: A proof session starts with type- 
checking the system and the property we want to 
verify. The system is then translated into an internal 
representation which will be used by all components 
of the tool. One can then apply static analysis to 
the system in order to extract invariants during the 
static analysis . The user can then start the proof 
by indicating to the proof manager, which strategy 
he wants to invoke. That is for example the maximal 
number of strengthening steps, the automatic use or 
not of some of the invariants in the data base. At 
each call of the proof rule, a set of VCs is generated 
and submitted automatically to the prover. If the ap- 
plied proof strategy fails to prove some of them, the 
user can either prove them interactively or automat- 
ically strengthen the invariant and apply the proof 
rule again. Non provable assertions are considered as 
non valid. 
Automatic theorem proving: The generated 
VCs are submitted automatically to the Pvs prover, 
where automatic proof strategies combining auto- 
matic induction, automatic rewriting, boolean sim- 
plification using Bdds and decision procedures can 
be applied. The user can defined such strategies, by 
combining predefined Pvs strategy and user defined 
ones. We have defined a set of powerful proof strate- 
gies which allows us to discharge non trivial goals, 
especially using heuristics for the automatic induc- 
tion. 
Invariants data base The invariant data base 
contains the invariants generated during the static 
analysis. The user can always enrich the invariant 
data base with some invariants. With each invariant 
a status is associated which may change during the 
proof. The status has three possible values: 
“assumed” : assumed invariants are user defined 
and no proof is required for them. They play the 
role of axioms, and can therefore lead to incon- 
sistent proofs. 
“unproved” . 
e “proved”: with each proved invariant its proof is 
associated. It consists of the applied proof strat- 
egy and the invariants used during the proof. If 
some invariant is removed from the data base, all 
the already proved invariants whose associated 
proof depends on the removed invariant, become 
“unproved”. 
Automatic abstraction The abstraction tech- 
nique we use in our tool are those described in [ll] 
and explained in section 2.6. Given a set of predicates 
pl, ..., pt on the variables of a system, an abstract 
state graph (where states are valuations of pl, ..., cpe) 
is constructed in an automatic way using user defined 
proof strategy. 
An abstract state graph can be used in many ways: 
0 It can be used as a global control graph from 
which stronger invariants can be generated and 
added to the invariants data base. 
e It can be minimized modulo strong equivalence 
using the ALDEBARAN tool [8]. The reduced 
graph defines a new system with a single com- 
ponent, on which we can prove the property we 
want to verify using the implemented proof rule. 
0 It is possible to prove a temporal formula in- 
volving ‘pl, ..., pt using the model checker of 
A L D ~ B A R A N .  
The abstract state graph of figure 6 is obtained using 
the predicates appearing in the guards of the bakery 
transition system, that is the predicates yl = 0, y2 = 
0, y1 5 y2 and y2 < y1. The control configuration 
pel = 3 A pc2 = 3 indicating violation of the mutual 
exclusion property is not reachable. 
User interface: PVS has emacs as user interface. 
We found convenient to use the same user interface 
for our prototype. All the functions of the tool can 
be invoked by some emacs command. 
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Figure 6: Abstract state graph for the bakery system 
5 Experiments with the 
Invariant-C hecker 
Using the Invariant Checker we verified various clas- 
sical mutual exclusion algorithms [lq, a read and 
write buffer using complex data types [lo]. The mu- 
tual exclusion property of the bakery system has been 
proved using the proof rule and using abstraction 
techniques in a fully automatic way. The use of ab- 
straction techniques allow us to prove in a fully au- 
tomatic way an alternating bit and a bounded re- 
transmission protocol [ll] developed by Philips and 
used in one of its commercial products. This exam- 
ple has been already proved using theorem proving 
techniques, but a big amount of user interaction has 
been necessary to provide powerful enough auxiliary 
invariants. We have also used successfully the Invari- 
ant Checker tool for the verification of parameterized 
networks following the techniques described in [15]. 
Additional information can be found on our experi- 
ences using the tool in the Invariant Checker home 
page 1141. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper describes a tool supporting the automated 
formal verification of invariance properties of parallel 
processes. It shows how the use of theorem proving 
techniques can be done in an effective and efficient 
way with a combination of other verification tech- 
niques such as model checking and abstraction. It 
shows that automatization of deductive methods can 
be effective and leads to effective proof tools. This 
work can be extended to other verification techniques 
which can be combined with theorem proving. The 
first step of the combination process is to allow differ- 
ent specification languages in the same tool. The sec- 
ond one is to allow different verification techniques. 
The verification process can be than a combination 
of such techniques and can be decomposed into dif- 
ferent steps. Our design philosophy is a consequence 
of the following remarks: Effective verification sys- 
tems requires generally an enough powerful specifica- 
tion language and adequate and powerful verification 
techniques, but only the combination of formal veri- 
fication techniques and tools can lead to effective use 
of formal methods. We found that a theorem prover 
can play a crucial role, by bootstrapping the combi- 
nation process. The different specification languages 
can be formally defined using the Pvs specification 
language. The PVS prover can then be used partially 
or totally in the verification process. It can also be 
used to prove that the combination process is cor- 
rect. 
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Abstract 
Practical formal verification of complex computer 
systems requires proof robustness and efficiency to 
protect against inevitable mistakes and system spec- 
ification and design changes. PVS is a theorem- 
proving system based on higher-order logic with 
which we demonstrate the kind of robust code proofs 
needed for verification of realistic-sized computing 
systems. 
1 Introduction 
Computer system correctness can be difficult to es- 
tablish. Formal proofs about formal models of com- 
puter systems have the potential to improve the re- 
liability of computer system designs, but they have 
several drawbacks. Formal proofs about computer 
systems are often very complex and hard to get right, 
and the social process that is usually counted on 
to certify mathematical proofs is ineffective because 
particular computer system designs are often propri- 
etary and in any case not of general interest. Me- 
chanical theorem provers can help overcome both of 
these problems with formal proof: proofs generated 
with computer programs can be easier to produce and 
more reliable. 
PVS is a verification system for “specifying and veri- 
fying digital systems” [12, 13, 161. It supports a spec- 
ification language that is based on a simply typed 
higher-order logic, and provides a large number of 
prover commands that allow machine-checked reason- 
ing about expressions in the logic. There is support 
for automating reasoning in PVS, namely a simple 
rewriting system and a facility for constructing new 
proof commands, although the emphasis in PVS is 
on building clear specifications and supporting user 
proof with domain-specific decision procedures. 
The Rockwell AAMP5 and AAMP-FV are proces- 
sor designs with microcoded instruction sets. Partial 
microcode correctness of these processors has been 
established using PVS [9, lo]. The hardware that 
executes microcode has been formalized in the PVS 
logic, and proofs that the microcode correctly im- 
plements some of the processor instruction sets have 
been constructed. While the application of PVS to 
realistic-sized processors in the AAMP5 and AAMP- 
FV projects led to a partial verification of their mi- 
crocode, the experience of building these proofs led 
the developers to the pragmatic realization that prac- 
tical computer systems proofs must be robust [9]. 
That is, computer system proofs must be able to 
demonstrate correctness with minimal human assis- 
tance despite modest system or specification changes. 
Mistakes in proof development and changes to system 
design and specification are inevitable for realistic- 
sized verifications. For example, during the AAMP- 
FV verification effort a change was made in the for- 
mal model related to memory address decoding [9]. 
This change caused every previously-constructed in- 
struction correctness proof to fail even though the 
change had little to do with the substance of most of 
the proofs. Large programming projects use software 
engineering techniques to make software robust de- 
spite inevitable changes. So too must large machine- 
checked proof projects use techniques to develop ro- 
bust proofs. 
Various projects besides the AAMP5 and AAMP-FV 
verifications have established computer system cor- 
rectness using mechanical proof. A Piton [ll] pro- 
gram that plays the puzzle-game Nim is proved to 
play optimally [17]. Compiled routines from the C 
string library and elsewhere targeted to the Motorola 
68020 are proved to meet their specifications 151. Mi- 
crocode for the Motorola CAP processor is proved to 
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implement several algorithms useful for digital signal 
processing [6]. Others verifications involve a stack of 
verified systems [2], an operating system kernel [l], 
code for simple real-time systems [18], and floating- 
point microcode [6, 151. Each of these projects em- 
ployed the theorem proving system Nqthm 131 or its 
successor ACL2 [SI. 
The logics supported by Nqthm and ACL2 are weaker 
than that supported by PVS: they do not conve- 
niently support higher-order functions and quantifi- 
cation. The style of proof encouraged by the the- 
orem proving system is also quite different: Nqthm 
and ACL2 provide several automatic proof techniques 
that are programmed by the user by proving theorems 
and adding them to the theorem prover database. A 
considerable amount of strategic planning is required 
to coopt the Nqthm and ACL2 proof heuristics to 
prove interesting theorems. However, the style of 
proof of these efforts has an important benefit: proof 
robustness. Since the proofs are “automatic” - at 
least in the shallow sense that the same proof heuris- 
tics are applied for every proof albeit with different 
rules databases - even dramatic changes in the system 
or the specification typically do not render old proofs 
obsolete. For example, when the verified processor 
FM8501 was redesigned to increase its wordsize the 
Nqthm proof of the modified processor correctness 
theorem worked with minimal human assistance [ll]. 
Theorem provers based on first-order quantifier-free 
logic have been successful on larger system correct- 
ness problems in part because their mostly-automatic 
approach to guiding the theorem prover. 
This paper explores how to  use PVS to reason about 
computer systems in a robust style. We do this by 
adapting the computational specification style of the 
Nqthm/ACL2 verifications and by developing a speci- 
fication and proof methodology that allows relatively 
automatic PVS proofs about code execution. The 
proofs employ some of the techniques used in the 
Nqthm/ACL2 proofs plus some PVS-specific tech- 
niques. The use of interpreters to define languages 
and the automation to improve proof resilience tran- 
scend particular theorem provers. However, this ap- 
proach does not require that we forego the use of the 
full PVS language and prover in other proofs: we 
can use our theorems about code execution to prove 
whatever we wish using the full PVS logic and prover. 
In the next section we present a formalization of a 
simple computing system in order to aid the exposi- 
tion of this paper. Section 2 outlines our approach 
for proving code in PVS, using a simple computing 
system to illustrate our technique. Section 3 gives an 
example of how the full PVS language can be used 
for specification in concert with our robust proofs. 
Section 4 presents some brief conclusions. 
2 Reasoning about Program 
Execution 
We describe in this section how to specify and reason 
about code in a robust way. We introduce a simple 
machine formalized in the PVS logic with which we 
illustrate our approach. Two example programs for 
this machine are presented for which we construct 
code execution correctness statements. The proofs of 
these correctness statements are very simple owing 
to the creation of some simple reasoning support we 
have built into PVS and some simple conventions we 
follow in the expression of code correctness. The style 
of proof is similar in some respects to other verifica- 
tion projects, particularly [5, 11, 171. These proofs 
are less sensitive to changes and therefore more ro- 
bust. 
2.1 A Simple Machine Interpreter 
In order to make the ideas of this paper concrete we 
introduce a PVS computing machine formalization 
that supports examples in later sections. We present 
sm, a slightly modified version of John Rushby’s 
formalization of Bob Boyer’s and J Moore’s simple 
machine-level language [4, 141. 
An s m  state is composed of five elements: a pro- 
gram counter, a stack containing subroutine call re- 
turn addresses, a data memory that maps natural 
number addresses to natural number values, a flag 
whose boolean value indicates whether the processor 
is halted, and a program memory that maps natu- 
ral number addresses to instructions. We fix both 
instruction and data memory size at 100 elements 
which limits the valid addresses for the memories to 
values less than 100, and represent an sm instruction 
as a record containing one of 13 opcodes and two ad- 
dresses. The instructions are described informally in 
Figure 2.1. 
The PVS function step defines precisely the effect 
of executing the instruction pointed to by the pc, 
thereby providing a formal version of the instruction 
descriptions of Figure 2.1 with which we can reason 
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move a b store value at location b in location a 
movei a n move value n in location a 
movewind a b store value at location b in location 
moverind a b store value at the location stored at 
add a b store sum of values at locations a and b in 
sub a b store in location a the greater of 0 and the 
incr a increment value at location a 
decr a decrement value at location a 
jump n store value n in pc 
jumpz a n store value n in pc if value at location a 
is 0. 
call n store (incremented) pc on the stack and store 
value n in pc 
ret store a value popped from the stack in pc 
halt set the halt flag 
stored at location a 
location b in location a 
location a 
difference of a and b 
Figure 1: The sm Instructions 
about programs. We define a function sm that re- 
turns the state resulting from running n instructions 
starting in state s. 
sm(s: state, n: nat): RECURSIVE state = 
IF n = 0 THEN s ELSE sm(step(s1, n - I) EIDIF 
MEASURE n 
This computing machine is considerably simpler than 
formalizations of actual machines but it provides 
enough complexity for sufficiently interesting exam- 
ples. The specification style of sm is similar to  many 
Nqthm and ACL2 efforts, but one difference that ex- 
ists between sm and those other models illustrates 
an important difference between the styles encour- 
aged by Nqthm/ACL2 and PVS. While sm memory 
is represented by a function, memory in the Nqthm 
and ACL2 code proof interpreters is represented by 
a particular datastructure implementation. For ex- 
ample, memory in the formal model of the FM9001 
is represented by a binary tree of memory elements 
[7]. This style difference stems from a difference in 
proof system functionality. NqthmlACL2 provides 
execution of definitions and encourages concrete, effi- 
cient models. (An ACLZ interpreter for a commercial 
processor executes microcode programs faster than 
the executable processor model being used for mi- 
crocode development [SI.) PVS cannot conveniently 
address 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
code 
move 2 0 
move 3 0 
move 4 1 
sub 4 2 
jumpz 4 12 
incr 2 
moverind 4 2 
moverind 5 3 
sub 5 4 
jumpz 5 2 
move 3 2 
ret 
jump 2 
Figure 2: sm min subroutine 
simulate machine execution but provides higher-order 
logic and encourages specification unburdened by ir- 
relevant detail. 
2.2 An sm Program and Specification 
We mainly use two features of PVS to prove pro- 
gram properties: automatic rewrite rules and strate- 
gies. We use example sm code to illustrate our ap- 
proach to code correctness proofs. Figure 2 presents 
a “min” program that returns in register 3 the loca- 
tion of a least element of the array whose bounds are 
contained in registers 0 and 1. 
We specify the behavior of this program using a PVS 
function that calculates the result using the same al- 
gorithm as the sm program. 
least (max, cur, low, mem) : RECURSIYE nat = 
IF (cur < max) 
THEN least(max,cur+l, 
IF mem(cur+l) <mem(lov) 
THEN cur+l ELSE low ENDIF,mem) 
ELSE low ENDIF 
MEASURE max(O.max-cur) 
For convenience and readability we define functions 
to return the value of registers, so for example RO(s) 
for s m  state s returns the value of mem(s> (0). Also 
for convenience we define functions write, goto, and 
updatestk which update respectively the memory, 
program counter, and call stack of an sm state. 
We write a function that calculates the number of 
instructions that are processed during execution of 
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the subroutine. For the min subroutine example, this 
function is min-clock. The structure of the "clock" 
functions parallels the structure of the blocks of code 
in the program and is used to guide the proof. The 
function c lockqlus  is equivalent to natural number 
plus and is used in clock function definitions to keep 
the PVS prover from simplifying the expressions. The 
constant N is the size of s m  data memory. 
min-loop-once-clock(s):nat = 
mem(s) (R2 ( s +I 1 <men( s (R3 (S 1 1 
if R2(s)+l<N AND R3(s)<N AID 
THEN 10 ELSE 8 ENDIF 
min-loop-clock(s) : RECURSIVE nat = 
if pc(s) = 2 AND defs(s1 = program 
AND NOT haltedb) 
AND 5<RO(s) AND RO(s)<=RS(s) AND R3(s)<=R2(s) 
AND R2(s)<Rl(s) AND Rl(s)<N 
clock-plus (min-loop-once-clock(s), 
THEN 
min-loop-clock(sm(s,min-loop-once-clock(s)))) 
ELSE 3 ENDIF 
MEASURE max(0, R1 (s)-R2 (s) 
min-clock(s): nat = 
clock-plus (3, 
clock-plus (min_loop_clock(srn(s,3)), 1)) 
We have chosen a specification style that relies on 
specifying the -complete result of a computation be- 
cause it simplifies the task of automating proofs in- 
volving code. A drawback of this philosophy is that 
unimportant but hard-to-describe elements must be 
specified too. We specify the value of these irrele- 
vant state elements using functions defined with the 
interpreter function in a manner that allows us to 
specify conveniently the entire state resulting from a 
computation. 
An example of this kind of state element occurs in the 
min subroutine loop. After each iteration register 5 
contains the difference between the least element so 
far encountered and the current value being checked. 
Although we could of course specify the final value 
of the loop for register 5, we would prefer to ignore 
it since the ultimate value of this temporary register 
is unimportant. We define a function that calculates 
the final value of the register using the interpreter: 
min,loop-unspecified-R5(s):nat = 
R5(sm(s ,min,loop-clock(s))) 
min-correct-unspecif ied-R5(s) :nat = 
min-loop-unspecif ied_E(sm(s, 3) 1 
Using this function to specify the final value of regis- 
ter 5 eases the proof of the correctness theorem, since 
the final value of that register is specified to be what- 
ever the interpreter produces. This is of course not 
very helpful, but it allows us to follow the convention 
that we specify the entire resulting state while not 
bothering very much with irrelevant state elements. 
We are now ready to state a theorem about the ef- 
fect of executing the min subroutine on an sm state. 
The PVS terms def s (SI is the program memory and 
halted&) is the halted flag of state s. The PVS 
terms op(i) and argl(i.1 are the opcode and first 
argument of an instruction i. We use the constant 
program to represent the programs we wish to exe- 
cute - it is an array of instructions that contains the 
min program listed in Figure 2. 
min-correct: LEMMA 
op(defs(s>(pc(s))) = call 
AND argl(defs(s)(pc(s)))= 0 
AND defs(s) = program AND NOT halted(s) 
AND 5 < RO(s) AND RO(s) <= Rl(s) AND Rl(s) < N 
=> 
sm(s, min-clock(s) 1 = 
goto(inc(pc(s)), 
write(2,Rl(s), 
write(3,least(Rl(s), Rob), RO(s), mem(s>), 
write (4,0, 
write(5, min-correct-unspecified-R5(s) ,SI)) 1) 
2.3 Correctness Theorem Proof 
PVS proofs of code correctness theorems like min- 
correct are relatively straightforward. We build 
the proof by proving lemmas about the constituent 
blocks. As suggested in the previous section, the 
structure of the clock functions guides the proof. 
Straightline code is proved using a PVS strategy. 
The strategy expands to a PVS "grind" command 
that uses a standard set of lemmas applied as auto- 
rewrite rules to execute the code symbolically. Loops 
are proved using a second PVS strategy that expands 
into a sequence of PVS commands that set up the ap- 
propriate inductive argument and simplify as needed. 
Some lemmas about specification functions like least 
are typically needed for the proof to complete success- 
fully. In particular, theorems pertaining to  the type 
of the specification functions and how the specifica- 
tion functions relate to each other must be proved. 
The use of PVS rewrite rules and PVS strategies 
aids the development of proofs about code execu- 
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address 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
code 
move 6 0 
move 5 1 
sub 5 6 
jumpz 5 42 
move 0 6 
call 0 
moverind 5 3 
moverind 4 6 
movewind 3 4 
movewind 6 5 
incr 6 
jump 31 
ret 
Figure 3: sm sort subroutine 
tion. By following our restrictive conventions about 
how to express code correctness lemmas these sim- 
ple PVS strategies work quite well. However, even 
more importantly they provide a kind of proof re- 
silience. Since the proofs are mostly automatic, mod- 
est changes to the code or specifications do not re- 
quire that a wholly new proof be constructed. 
2.4 A Second Example 
We present a second example of an sm subroutine to 
emphasize that our approach is indeed largely auto- 
matic. Figure 3 presents a subroutine that sorts the 
array whose bounds are contained in registers 0 and 
1. It is implemented using the min program described 
previously, and its proof is an example of how to build 
on other subroutine correctness theorems. We auto- 
mate reasoning about code that calls subroutines as 
much as possible, and a subroutine correctness theo- 
rem of the form we have described does just that. By 
applying min-correct we can reason about s m  code 
that calls min just as we reason about code that em- 
ploys builtin s m  instructions. 
In order to specify the behavior of the sort subroutine, 
we define a function sort that sorts an array in the 
manner of the subroutine. 
sort(cur, max, SI: RECURSIVE state = 
if (cur < max) 
THEN let least=least(max, cur, cur, mem(s)) I N  
sort (cur+l ,max ,mite(cnr ,mem(s> (least) , 
write(least,mem(s) (cur) ,SI)) 
ELSE s ENDIF 
MEASURE max(0,max-cur) 
We prove a theorem 
sort subroutine call. 
sort-correct: LEMMB 
op(def s(s) (pc(s) 1) 
about the effect of executing a 
= call 
AND argl(def s (s) (pc (s) 
AND defs(s)=program AND NOT halted(s) 
AND 6<RO(s) AND RO(s)<=Rl(s) AND Rl(s)<N 
= 30 
=> 
sm(s, sort-clocls(s>) = 
goto(inc(pc(s>), 
write(0,if RO(s)<Rl(s) THEN Rl(s)-1 
write(2,if RO(s)<Rl(s) THEN Rib) 
arite(3,sort_unspecified-~(s), 
write(4,sort-unspecified-R4(s). 
write 6 0 ,  
write(6,if RO(s)<Rl(s) THEN Rl(s) 
sort (RO(s) ,R1 (s) ,s))) ))I 1) 
ELSE RO(s) ENDIF, 
ELSE R2(s) ENDIF, 
ELSE RO(s) ENDIF, 
The proof of sort-correct has the same structure as 
the proof of min-correct. Each constituent block of 
code is specified and proved, and the PVS strategies 
for straightline and loop code are employed. The min- 
correct theorem is used to reason about the call to the 
min program, just as with any builtin sm opcode. 
3 Reasoning About Specifica- 
tions 
Largely automatic proofs of programs as described 
in the previous section are robust in the sense we 
need them to be. A change to a program or even 
to the language semantics defined by the interpreter 
would require minimal changes in the proofs. How- 
ever, these kinds of specifications are unsatisfactorily 
unclear and complex. The specifications reflect the 
algorithm used by the code and do not effectively 
convey the needed program functionality. 
To use our mostly automatic approach in code proofs 
we limit ourselves by avoiding existential quantifiers 
and using a (primarily) first-order, recursive style. 
But our specification need not be so constrained. For 
example, what we really want to know about the sort- 
ing program is that it produces a sorted permuta- 
tion of the original array without disturbing irrele- 
vant memory elements. A good specification of the 
sorting program is: 
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sort-works: LEMMA 
op(defs(s)(pc(s))) = call 
AND argl (def s (s) (pc (s) >= 30 
AND defs(s)=program AND NOT haltedb) 
AND 6<RO(s) AND RO(s)<=Rl(s) AND Rl(s)<N 
=> 
let s2= sm(s, sort-clock(s)) IN 
X array is sorted 
(FORBLL (i , j : subrange (RO(s) $1 (SI)) : 
i<j => mem(s2)(i)<-7nem(s2>(j)) AND 
X array is permutation 
(EXISTS (f : (bijective?Csubrange(RO(s) ,Rl(s)), 
subrange (RO (s) , Rl (s) )I : 
(FORALL (i : subrange (RO (s .R1 (s) 1 ) : 
mem(s2)(f(i)) = mem(s>(i>)) AND 
X irrelevant memory is unchanged 
(FORALL (i: address): i>6 AND (i<RO(s) OR i>Rl(s)) => 
mem(s) (i)=mem(s2) (i)) 
The proof of this lemma is relatively straightforward, 
although like most PVS proofs involving the higher- 
order language capability of PVS the proofs are less 
automatic than the proofs in the last section. By ap- 
plying the lemma proved in the previous section sort- 
correct, we reduce this theorem to one that does not 
involve our program or even - except hidden in the 
“unspecified” functions - the s m  interpreter. We sat- 
isfy the remaining proof obligation involving desired 
properties and the specification function in conven- 
tional PVS proof style. 
4 Conclusion 
The automation of proofs about computer systems 
increases robustness and aids formal verification of 
realistic-sized computer systems. Recursively-defined 
interpreters can be used to define computer system 
behavior in a clean and simple way. The usefulness 
of these techniques transcends the particularities of 
different theorem proving systems. 
Realistic proofs require robustness and PVS is capa- 
ble of a proof style that fosters resilience in proofs 
about computer systems. The approach relies in part 
on restricting the manner in which we describe code 
execution, but the full PVS logic and prover may be 
used in concert with our automatic approach. 
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We describe how guards can be used to ensure that 
formulas in a partial logic are meaningful, and how 
guards and guarded formulas can be proved using 
classical logic. In addition to this theoretical util- 
ity, guards are useful in practice as a simple means of 
exposing flaws in specifications. We illustrate this use 
of guards with several examples in the Z specification 
language, using Z/EVES. 
1 Introduction 
Z [ll, 16, 20, 221 is a formal specification language 
based on typed set theory, originally developed at 
Oxford University in the early 1980s. Z has been 
used in a variety of situations [l, 81 and has become 
The Z/EVES system 219, 131 is a formal methods 
tool that can be used for analysing Z specifications 
in several different ways, including syntax and type 
checking; domain checking; schema expansion; pre- 
condition calculations; and general theorem proving. 
Z/EVES is built on top of the EVES system [5], 
which provides a theorem prover for classical first- 
order logic (and, in particular, for ZF set theory). 
There is a technical hurdle to overcome in using a 
prover for classical logic to deal with Z: the Z lan- 
guage allows for “undefined” terms while classical 
logic does not. In this paper, we show how guard 
conditions can be generated for parts of Z specifica- 
tions; how these conditions guarantee that the use 
of classical logic is sound for Z; and how these con- 
ditions are not just a technical necessity but in fact 
help uncover flaws in a specification. 
fairly populax. 
‘This work was sponsored by the United States Department 
of Defense under contract MDA904-95-C-2031. 
2 The Z Notation 
The Z specification notation is based on standard 
mathematical notions and notations for discrete 
mathematics. Z specifications are intended to be 
readable and understandable: standard notations are 
used (e.g., the normal logical symbols A, =$, and so 
on; the standard set notations E, z, U, and so on); a 
“mathematical toolkit” defines a solid basis of famil- 
iar notions of discrete mathematics (such as relations, 
functions, and sequences). As is common in the de- 
velopment of discrete mathematics, relations are sets 
of ordered pairs, and functions are relations satisfying 
a certain property. 
Z introduced a special construct, the schema, for 
use in models. Schemas collect together a set of vari- 
ables used in the model and a set of predicates de- 
scribing the possible observations of the modelled sys- 
tem. There are several aspects of the schema nota- 
tion and “schema calculus” that allow quite complex 
systems to  be described in a compact and structured 
way. We will not, however, delve into the details of 
schemas here; interested readers can consult the Z 
books (e.g., [16, 20, 221). 
Z, while based in standard ZF set theory, imposes 
a system of types, and specifications are rejected if 
they violate the type checking rules. Each basic 
“given” set in a specification has an associated type, 
and types are built from these primitive types by the 
formation of power types, cross-product types, and 
binding types (which are analogous to record types). 
Variables are declared to range over sets, rather than 
types, and the type of the variable is then the ele- 
ment type of the set. Thus, declarations x : M and 
x : Z both determine that x is of integer type (but 
the first declaration also constrains x to lie in the set 
of non-negative integers). 
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3 Undefined Terms in Z 
2 breaks from mathematical tradition in allowing for 
undefined terms (although, to be honest, the mathe- 
matical tradition is not very well codifled). Undefined 
terms arise in two possible ways: first, by the appli- 
cation of a function to a value outside its domain. 
Recall that functions in Z are simply sets of pairs. 
The type system cannot guarantee that the applied 
value is even a function, or that the argument is in its 
domain. Examples of undefined terms are 1 div 0 and 
S(l), which have arguments outside the domain of 
the function, and (Z x Z)(O), where the applied value 
is not even a function. Second, an undefined term 
can arise from the use of a definite description where 
there are no possible d u e s  (as in p x : Z I 0 < x < 1) 
or where there are two or more possible values (as in 
p x : Z I x > 0). (The notation “px : S I P” denotes 
the unique element of S satisfying property P.) 
Philosophers and logicians have struggled with un- 
defined terms, without attaining any general agree- 
ment on the most suitable treatment of such terms. 
Many possible approaches to the issue have been for- 
mulated [2, 3, 4, 6, 14, 17, 211. Different Z authors 
have adopted different positions on undefinedness in 
2: 
0 Spivey [20] states that any atomic predicate 
containing an undefined term is indeterminate, 
meaning that it has a truth value (so classical 
logic applies) but he has chosen not to tell us 
whether it is true or false. 
0 The draft IS0  standard for Z [9] specifies that an 
atomic predicate containing an undefined term 
is false. However, the draft is not definitive on 
which terms are undefined; the semantics leaves 
open the possibility that, say, p x  : Z I x > 0 
may or may not have a value. Furthermore, 
undefinedness is not inherited in all expression 
contexts, e.g., if 1 div 0 is undefined, the set 
{x : -1 .. 1 0 1 div x> is defined and has the 
value { -1, l), as any undefined value is simply 
ignored in a set comprehension. 
0 Some authors (e.g., [22]) use “strong equality”, 
which is true if both arguments are undefined or 
if both arguments are defined and equal. 
So, the proper treatment of undefinedness in Z is 
not clear. In any case, it is clear that normal mathe- 
matical reasoning might not be applicable. Consider, 
for example, the formula 
a E {a ,  b ) .  
This is always true in classical ZF set theory; it can 
fail in Standard Z if, say, a is defined and b is unde- 
fined (as then ( a ,  b )  is also undefined). 
4 Guards 
Our treatment of undefined terms in Z/EVES is 
based on the notion of guards. A guard formula for 
a given formula has two properties: first, it is never 
itself undefined if all its free variables have values; 
and second, if the guard is true (and all free variables 
have values) the given formula is defined. (A guard 
thus represents the presupposition [3] of a formula, 
that is, whatever must be true in order for the for- 
mula to have meaning.) As described elsewhere [MI, 
provided the partial logic meets certain criteria, if 
a formula and its guard can be proven in classical 
logic, then the formula is a theorem of the partial 
logic. As it turns out, these criteria do not apply to 
the “semi-classical” semantics proposed by the draft 
Z Standard. Fortunately, however, the criteria apply 
to a variety of more stringent ways of handling unde- 
finedness, as described below. So, we apply guards for 
a stringent handling of undefinedness. Any theorems 
of the more stringent logic are theorems of the “semi- 
classical” logic, so we retain soundness. Of course, we 
lose completeness in doing this, but are not terribly 
bothered for two reasons: first, in a mechanical theo- 
rem prover (like Z/EVES) , theoretical completeness 
is not as interesting a property as the practical abil- 
ity to prove theorems (even provers using complete 
techniques may fail to find a proof due to time or 
space constraints). Second, we are not convinced that 
the “semi-classical” handling of undefinedness is the 
most appropriate. It was chosen (we believe) to pre- 
serve as much classical reasoning as possible, rather 
than for the appeal of its semantical interpretation. 
There is some evidence that the “Kleene” semantics 
(described below) is the most satisfactory from a the- 
oretical standpoint. 
We have identified (among others) two different 
systems of partial logics [18]: the strict system, where 
any undefined subterm or subformula makes its con- 
taining term or formula undefined; the Kleene sys- 
tem, which does not insist on strictness but requires 
monotonicity (so that making any part of a term or 
formula more defined makes the overall meaning more 
defined), and has its connectives as defined as possi- 
ble subject to the monotonicity requirement. So, in 
the Kleene system, the disjunction of a true predicate 
with an undefined predicate is true, and a quantifica- 
tion like 3 x : Z 0 1 div x = x is true because there is 
a satisfying value for 3: (namely 1)-the fact that the 
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body of the quantification is undefined for x = 0 then 
does not matter. However, Vx, y : H y*(xdivy) x 
is undefined. 
Guard formulas are defined with respect to a par- 
ticular system of logic. For example, guards for the 
strict logic differ from guards in Kleene’s logic. In the 
strict logic, the guard for a disjunction requires that 
both disjuncts are defined. For Kleene’s logic, one of 
the disjuncts may be undefined if the other is true (as 
then the disjunction as a whole is defined and true). 
The strict system of partial logic is unsuitable; its 
guards are too stringent and it is difficult to write 
meaningful assertions. For example, the formula 
Vx, y : iz o y > 0 =$ y * (x/y) = x is undefined. 
To write some defined formula expressing that prop- 
erty¶ it is necessary to use some awkward formulation 
like V 2, y : Z y > 0 =$- y * (rc/mux(l, y)) = rc. 
The Kleene system is quite usable, as terms and 
formulas are defined whenever possible. However, we 
found that the guards are, in general, too complex. 
Suppose P and Q are predicates, with guards Gp and 
GQ respectively. Then the guard for P V Q is 
This quickly becomes awkward; for example, the 
guard for ( P  V Q) +- R is (after some simplifica- 
tion!) 
G p ~ P ~ G ~  
V GQ A Q A GR 
V Gp A GQ A ( P  V Q S- GR) 
V GR A R. 
The guard for quantification is also somewhat awk- 
ward; the guard for V x  : T P is the formula 
(V x : T Gp A P )  V (3 x : T 0 Gp A 7 P). 
In our application of this approach in Z/EVES, 
we therefore looked for a system intermediate be- 
tween the strict and Kleene systems. We therefore 
use a “left-to-right” system of interpretation for the 
Boolean connectives (e.g., the left argument must be 
defined; the right argument need not be if the value of 
the left argument is enough to determine the overall 
value), and a strict interpretation of the quantifiers. 
Thus, for P V Q we have the guard 
GP A ( P  V GQ) 
and for ( P  V Q) 3 R we have the guard 
Gp A ( P  V GQ) A ( P  V Q +- GR). 
For the quantification V x  : T P , we have the guard 
V x  : T 0 Gp. These guards are not too complex, 
and scale up well for complex formulas. Furthermore, 
our experience has been that specifiers write formu- 
las that are meaningful in the left-to-right reading (if 
they are meaningful at all). 
People sometimes object that the left-to-right in- 
terpretation of the connectives is flawed because of 
the assymetry, and that not all expected proposi- 
tional manipulations are valid. This is only partly 
true in our approach. When guards are generated, 
the order matters; the guard for P V Q differs from 
the guard for Q V P. All our proofs, however, are 
done in classical logic, where the connectives are com- 
mutative (and indeed have all their familiar proper- 
ties). 
5 Examples 
We claimed above that guards provided a useful er- 
ror screen. In this section, we present a few examples 
that we encountered in using Z/EVES to analyse var- 
ious specifications. 
5.1 A POSIX specification 
Z is being used to specify the facilities defined in the 
POSIX 1003.21 specification [7]. Early in that speci- 
fication we have the definitions of time 
Time == H, 
and of priority 
Priority ::= iprio((N1)) I dprio(( Time)). 
(This is a “free type” definition, which specifies that 
the set Priority is composed of values of the form 
iprio(i) for i E NI or of the form dprio(t) for t E 
Time, that these values are distinct, and that there 
are no other values in the set. Nl is the set of positive 
integers (1,2,3,. . .}.) 
Comparisons between priority levels are then de- 
fined: 
o p +  qU i > j A p k  q # i > j ) V  
0 p t q tj s < t A p 2 q e s 5 t )  
(3 s ,  t : Time I p = dprio(s) A q = dprio(t) 
This is a Z “axiomatic definition” that declares two 
functions (above the line) and states their properties 
(below the line). 
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(- + -) E Priority c) Priority 
A (- 
A p E Priority 
A q E Priority 
+ ( V i : &  j : N e  
-) E Priority c) Priority 
i E domiprio 
A ( p  = iprio(i)  + j E domipr-io)) 
A (  (si-O:& j-O:Ne 
p = iprio(i-0) 
A q = iprio(j-0) 
A p + q # i-0 > j-0 
A p  2 q # i-0 > L O )  
s E dom dprio 
A (p = dprio(s) 
V (Vs :  Time; t :  Time 
+ t E dom dprio))). 
An application of the Z/EVES “rewrite” command 
reduces this to the simpler 
(- * -) E Priority f) Priority 
A (- 2 -) E Priority f) Priority 
A p E Prior-ity 
A q E Priority 
+ ( V i : N  j : N o  
i > 1 A  (p =iprio i + j  2 1)) 
This is obviously not a fact; i and j might be zero. 
The declaration should have constrained i and j to 
range over N1 (the set {1,2,. . .}) instead of N (which 
includes 0). With this change, the “rewrite” com- 
mand reduces the new guard to true. 
The P O S E  specification has been revised since 
this analysis; this and several other guard failures 
have been eliminated. 
5.2 Jackson’s “views” specification 
Jackson’s paper [lo] describes a useful structuring 
technique for Z specifications. In it, as part of a 
specification of an editor, we have the following para- 
graphs. (In fact, to save space Jackson omits these 
preliminary definitions, but they are easily inferred 
by the reader.) 
The edited data is composed of atomic characters: 
[Char] 
(This is a Z “given set” declaration that states that 
Char is some set.) 
Carriage return and space characters exist: 
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Z/EVES accepts the definitions of Time and 
Priority without comment. For the specification of 
+ and t, it generates the formidable guard 
1 cr ,  spc : Char 
as well as a maximum line length 
I muxlen: ~1 
The “grid view” assembles the edited data into a 
sequence of lines, each a sequence of characters, and 
gives row and column coordinates for the cursor: 
lines : seq(seq Char) 
X , Y  :N1 
y E domlines 
x E dom( lines( y)) 
V 1 : ran lines e 
#15 muxlen 
A last(l) E {spc, cr} 
A cr ran(front(1)) 
The set seqX is the set of sequences whose elements 
lie in the set X; in Z, these are partial functions from 
1.. n to X,  for some n. Functions dom and ran give 
the domain and range of a function, respectively. #S 
is the cardinality of finite set S. 
The guard condition for this paragraph concerns 
the term # 1 ,  which requires 1 to be finite, and the 
terms last ( 1 )  and front (1 )  , which give the last element 
of 1 and the sequence of all but the last elements, 
respectively, and which are defined for nonempty se- 
quences only. After rewriting, the guard condition is 
reduced to 
lines E seq(seq Char) 
A x E Z  
A x 2 1  
A y E Z  
A y 5 #lines 
A x E dom(lines(y)) 
+ (V1 : ranlines e 
( # I  
A ( # l ~ m u x l e n  
A Y 2 1  
maxlen + 1 1 = ()) 
A (last(1) = cr V lust(1) = spc) 
* 1 = 0)) 
There is clearly a problem here, as nothing prevents 
lines = (0) (that is, a single line containing no char- 
acters), which would make the guard fail. Lines must 
have nonzero length according to this specification. 
This fact might be of some significance to the speci- 
fiers, implementors, and users of the system! Indeed, 
we might now wonder how an empty file would be 
represented, or whether it can be distinguished from 
a file containing a single carriage return. 
The “delete lime” operation is specified as 
Grid-delLine 
r A G r i d  
lines’ = (1 . . y - 1) a lines 
(y  + 1 . . #lines) a lines 
X’ = 1 A y‘ = y 
(When f is a function, X a f is the “domain restric- 
tion* of f  to X; function appends two sequences.) 
The intention in this definition is to form a new 
sequence of lines by concatenating the lines before 
the current line and the limes after the current lime. 
(The most recent version of the Mathematical Toolkit 
as described by Spivey [20] has additional sequence 
functions that make this easier.) Unfortunately, this 
plan fails. The guard is 
AGrid 
A ( (1 . .  y - 1) a lines, 
+ lines E dom# 
(y + 1 . . #lines) a lines) E dam(- -) 
which the “rewrite” command reduces to 
A Grid 
A 7 I-+ y 5 1 
A 7 #lines < 1 + y 
+ 1 + y > #lines, 
which, while somewhat torturous, shows that there is 
a problem if y is in the range 1.. #lines. Indeed, the 
formula that takes the part of the sequence after the 
yth element, (y + 1. . #lines) a lines, returns a partial 
function whose domain runs from y + 1 to #lines. 
The argument of concatenation, however, must be a 
sequence (i.e., a partial function whose domain runs 
from 1 to n €or some n). 
This error is one that would not likely disturb 
a reader; the author’s intention was certainly clear 
enough. Correcting the error is, however, an impor- 
tant prelude to formal manipulation of the specifi- 
cation. In formal manipulation, the incorrect term 
could be copied to a context where the intended in- 
terpretation would no longer be clear, and incorrect 
conclusions might be drawn. 
5.3 Signalling System No. 7 
There are many examples of 2 specifications in Wood- 
cock and Davies’ book Using 2 [22]. We have anal- 
ysed only a few. Here is an example from Chapter 
20, which describes a signalling system. In this spec- 
ification, it is necessary to define a “pairwise con- 
catenation” operation, which takes two sequences of 
sequences and returns a new sequence, each element 
of which is the concatenation of the corresponding el- 
ements of the original sequences. The definition given 
is 
- - : seq(seqX) x seq(seqX) 
+ seq(seq X )  
V s, t : seq(seq X)  I #s = #t  e 1: (se t)(i) = ( s  i )  ( t  i )  V i  : doms e 
The guard condition can be rewritten to 
(- R -) E seq(seq X)  x seq(seq X)  
+ seq(seq X)  
A s E seq(seqX) 
A t E seq(seqX) 
A #s = #t  
i E dom(s R t )  
A s ( i )  E seqx  
A t( i)  E seqx)  
j (V i  : 1.. #s e 
The last two conjuncts of the conclusion are in fact 
true, (and can be shown with further proof steps). 
The first conjunct is not necessarily true; the spec- 
ifiers have forgotten to tell us (formally) what the 
length of s t is. It would thus be useful to add the 
conjunct 
V s ,  t : seq(seq X)  I #s = #t e #(s t )  = #s 
to the definition. 
6 Relationship to Other Work 
To our knowledge, no other tool for Z has adopted 
a similar approach to undefinedness. However, other 
theorem provers and formal methods tools have anal- 
ogous mechanisms. 
6.1 ACL2 
The ACL2 prover [12] implements a quantifier-free 
first-order logic for a subset of Common Lisp. The 
logic of ACL2 is classical and all functions are total. 
Common Lisp functions, in contrast, are partial. The 
semantics of ACL2 functions are totalizations of the 
corresponding Common Lisp functions. ACL2 defines 
a notion of guards; if the arguments to a function 
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call satisfy its guards then the call can be evaluated inconsistency, omitted cases, and unintentional un- 
in Common Lisp without error, and the result of the derspecification. Tools l i e  Z/EVES, which support 
evaluation agrees with the ACL2 logical value of the formal manipulations of specifications, can be helpful 
function application. in analysing specifications to ensure that these types 
The significance of guards in ACL2 is quite differ- of errors do not occur. 
ent than their sigdcance in Z/EVES; guards allow 
the partial Common Lisp functions instead of their 
(total) ACL2 counterparts to be used in executing 
specification expressions, and allow some run-time 
checks to be omitted* guards concern 
execution and evaluation only, and play no logical 
role. 
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Abstract 
The development of programmable logic devices 
(PLDs) has introduced programming as a primary 
tool in the development of digital circuits. This work 
attempts to create a generic verification environment 
in which designs can be specified and verified using 
the Prototype Verification System (PVS). This is 
accomplished by providing library support for 
general hardware constructs. The environment is 
intended for use with any PLD and any PLD 
programming language. The goal of the environment 
is to allow the easy translation of digital designs to 
PVS and provide sufficient support to make 
verification possible without a great deal of effort. 
1 Introduction 
The design of digital hardware has become 
increasingly a programming exercise. As such, it is 
unsettling -to see the design practice become a 
repetitive effort of code development followed by 
compilation and simulation to determine the 
soundness of the implementation. Programming is 
extremely difficult to develop without bugs which 
must then be removed to produce a final product as 
bug-free as possible. However, this approach is not 
acceptable at the hardware level where future patches 
cannot be readily released to fur bugs found by users. 
Therefore, a process is proposed in this paper to 
augment hardware development to verify certain 
design aspects prior to simulation, and to handle 
situations which are difficult or impractical to test by 
simulation. 
Programmable logic devices (PLD) are generally 
programmed by use of a hardware description 
language such as VHDL or PLDasm A description 
of the hardware activity is described in the language 
which is then compiled for simulation and to 
program the appropriate device. The designs are 
characterized by a set of equations to define 
combinational logic, a set of modular devices to be 
used in the design (counters, registers, memory, etc.), 
and a description of a state machine to drive the 
design. 
Other work in the field includes [l], [2] and [7]. 
However, general work has focused on either 
demonstrating how basic digital logic can be specified 
in a formal logic [l], or how to formally verify a 
hardware description language [2]. This work focuses 
on the specification of digital systems which are 
defined in an arbitrary hardware description language 
and then mapped into an appropriate formal logic. 
Thus the focus is not so much on low level logic or 
languages, but rather on the general specification of a 
digital system and the support to assist in the 
verification of a design. The design is studied, not the 
actual implementation (translation errors are not 
considered). 
This paper focuses on the use of the Prototype 
Verification System (PVS) [3] to formally define a 
design and to verify certain characteristics about a 
design. The process can verify that a design meets 
certain specifications and that it satisfies some basic 
requirements of digital design. The work is divided 
into three parts: 
the development of a support environment 
for the definition of digital circuits by 
introducing constructs in PVS for 
management of hardware devices such as 
buses, tristate devices, and open collector 
devices, 
the development of MSI building blocks for 
digital design such as counters, multiplexers, 
and decoders, 
the development of a process for verifying 
state machine design. 
The end result is the initial environment for the future 
development of programmable hardware. The p m s  
is not proposed to replace simulation as it does not 
address issues such as timing, but rather to augment 
1. 
2. 
3. 
'Work completed under NASA Grant NAS-1-19858 Task #84. 
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the design process to eliminate as many errors as 
possible as early in the design cycle as possible. The 
process is language independent, which 
unfortunately requires the user to translate a design 
from the implementation language to th PVS 
language. 
2 PVS 
PVS is a verification system that provides 
support for general purpose theorem proving. The 
specification language is a higher order logic 
augmented with dependent types. Theories can be 
parameterized, and the dependent type mechanism 
allows for stating arbitrary constraints on theory 
parameters. The type system of PVS includes 
predicate subtypes and is therefore undecidable. 
PVS fiequently generates proof obligations to ensure 
that expressions are well typed. PVS has powerful 
decision procedures, so many proofs involving 
simple arithmetic expressions can be discharged 
automatically. In addition, PVS provides a collection 
of pre-proven results in the prelude. Also 
included with PVS are libraries providing support for 
bit-vectors and finite sets. A more complete 
description of PVS can be found in [3]. 
3 Digital Constructs 
3.1 Bit Vectors 
Bit vec-tors [4] were selected as the underlying 
logic representation. Since library support already 
exists, the majority of work is therefore complete. 
The library includes theories to handles bits as well 
as bit vectors. All the necessary logic functions are 
included, as well as useful mappings to integers and 
naturals. The theories map easily to the necessary 
line and bus logic for digital devices (with a bit 
representing a line and a bvec, or bit vector, 
representing a bus). They do not, however, handle 
tristate devices and open collector devices as easily, 
but theories for those devices are presented below. 
3.2 Tristate Devices 
Tristate devices are a class of devices whose 
outputs can be connected together provided that only 
one device is asserting an output at a time while all 
other devices are in a high impedance state. This is 
a convenient mechanism for bus management. 
The theory tristate defines a tristate line. The 
theory is parameterized by the natural number N to 
define the number of devices whose outputs are 
connected to the tristate line. This is crucial since a 
tristate line is actually handled like any other digital 
device as will be demonstrated. The key benefit to the 
theory is that the user of the theory is forced to verify 
that only one device may drive a tristate line at a time. 
A tristate line is defined as a digital device which 
has a set of values applied to the line and a set of 
control signals indicating which driving devices are 
active. The tristate line then takes on a value based on 
the set of control signals and the output for the 
appropriate driving device. The set of outpus which 
can drive the line have the type: 
tristate-outputs : type = bvec[N] 
tristate-control : type = 
{c : bvec[Nl I 
count[N,bitl (c,l) <= 1) 
The line is then defined by: 
tristate-line : type = 
{tsl : [tristate-control, 
tristate-outputs -> bit] I 
forall (0 : tristate-outputs, 
c : tristate-control, 
i : below(N)) : 
c (i)=l => tsl (c,o)=o(i) )
such that if a control line c(i) is 1, the tristate line 
takes on the value of the corresponding device driving 
the line. Note that the case where no control line is 
set, the tristate line is undefined. This corresponds 
with the high impedence state where the output is 
undefined. 
A tristate bus is then defined to be a set of tristate 
lines, all with common control. A bus with N output 
devices driving the bus and M lines on the bus is 
defined as: 
tristate-bus-out : type = 
[below (M) -> tristate-outputs] 
tristate-bus : type = 
{tsb : [tristate-control, 
tristate-bus-out -> 
bvec[Mll I 
forall (c : tristate-control, 
o : [below(M) -> 
i : below(N) ) : 
forall ( j  : below(M)) : 
tristate-outputs], 
c(i)=l => 
tsb(c,o) ( j )  = o ( j )  (i) 1 
3.3 Open-Collector Devices 
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Open-collector devices are conceptually similar 
to tristate devices. A line driven by open-collector 
devices is viewed as a device itself which takes the 
set of outputs placed on the line and derives the 
appropriate value for the line. An open collector line 
is defined by: 
open-collector-output : type = bit 
open-collector-line : type = 
{ocl : [bvec[Ml -> bit] I 
forall (bv : bvec[Ml) : 
ocl(bv) = and-rec( bv)} 
The function and-rec computes the and of all 
the bits in the bit vector bv. Also, a type has been 
defined for an open-collector-oqut to differentiate 
it from a standard lTL device with an output bit. 
Then an example of an open collector device is: 
and-oc (il, i2 : bit) : 
open-collector-output = il and i2 
and all other open-collector devices are defined 
similarly. 
3.4 Sequential Components 
Sequential components are defined based on the 
inputs to the component and the current state of the 
componentto compute outputs and next states. This 
is demonstrated with simple JK flip flops. 
A function is designed for a type of sequential 
component. However, each component of a given 
type in a circuit is distinctly different from others of 
the same type as differentiated by its current state 
information. For a flip flop, its current state is 
maintained in a variable of type 
FF-state : type = bit 
A different variable is defined for each instance 
The function of the component in the circuit. 
defining a JK flip flop is: 
JK-FF (J, K : bit, CLR, SET : bit, 
CS : FF-state) : 
NS : FF-state # I  = 
[#  Q, Oinv : bit, 
let 
JK-cond = 
if (J = 0 & K = 0) then CS 
elsif (J = 0 & K = 1) then 0 
elsif (J = 1 & K = 0)  then 1 
else not(CS) % (J=1 & K=l) 
in 
( #  
Q := CLR and (SET or CS), 
Oinv := nOt(CLR and (SET or 
NS : = CLR and (SET or JK-cond) 
CS) 1 , 
# )  
Note that the outputs are a function of the current state 
and the asynchronous inputs CLR and SET. The next 
state determines the state of the flip flop after the next 
clock transition, 
The axiomatic definition of the JK flip flop in 
Figure 1 might appear as: 
in3 - 
Figure 1. 
Jin, Kin, CLRin : var line 
SETin, Qout, Qinvout : var line 
JK1 : var signal[FF-statel 
JKl-connect : axiom 
Qout(t) = 
Q( JK-FF( Jin(t), Kin(t), 
CLRin(t1, SETin(t1, JKl(t)) & 
Qinvout(t) = 
Oinv ( JK-FF ( Jin (t ) , Kin (t) , 
CLRin(t), SETin(t1, JKl(t) ) & 
JKl(t+l) = 
NS( JK-FF( Jin(t), Kin(t), 
CLRin(t1, SETin(t), JKl(t) ) 
where t is defined to have type time (a natural 
number) and line defines the type signal [bit] 
where signal allows a type to vary with time (a 
strategy adopted from [7]). The time relationship 
between Qout, Qinvout, and JKI reflects the current 
outputs versus the next state information. 
4 MSI Specification in PVS 
Given the definition of basic digital devices, it is 
standard practice in digital design to use “building 
blocks,” or standard components which are pieced 
together in a design. This is true both in classical 
digital design and with progmmzible logic devices. 
Several basic building blocks are presented here to 
demonstrate how they are specified in PVS as 
behavioral entities where the inner specifications are 
not of concern, but rather an implementation is 
developed and then verified against the behavioral 
system. Two sets of examples are presented: 
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I 
encoders and decoders to demonstrate combinational 
circuits, and registers and counters for sequential 
circuits. 
4.1 Combinational Logic: Encoders and 
Decoders 
The theory encoder-decoder is defined for 
multiplexers, demultiplexers, encoders, and 
decoders. 
encoder-decoder 
[N : {p:posnat jexists (n:posnat) 
THEORY 
BEGIN 
: 2% = PI] : 
bv-lib : library = "bitvectors" 
importing bv-lib@bv-top 
n : var nat 
M : {p : posnat I exp2(p) = NI 
bv : var bvec[Nl % input or output 
s : var bvecIM1 % select lines 
b : var bit % input or output bit 
v : var bvec[Ml 
% lines 
mux (bv,s) : bit = bv( bv2nat( s ) )  
demux (b, s )  : bvec[Nl = 
(lambda (n : below(N) ) : 
if n = bv2nat ( s) then b 
else 0 endif) 
decode ( s )  : bvec[Nl = 
(lambda (n : below(N) ) : 
if n = bv2nat ( s)  then 1 
else 0 endif) 
mux-demux : lemma 
let n : below(N1 = bv2nat ( s)  in 
demux( mux( bv,s), s)  (n) = bv(n) 
demux-mux : lemma 
mu( demux( b, s ) ,  s )  = b 
decode-mu : lemma 
(v = s => 
(v /= s => 
mu( decode( s ) ,  v) = 1) & 
mux( decode( s ) ,  v) = 0) 
decode-count : lemma 
count (decode (s )  ,1) = 1 
END encoder-decoder 
a power of 2 number of inputs and outputs (due to the 
binary encoding of the select lines). This theory 
demonstrates the real benefit of using the bit vector 
library with the ability to convert bit vectors to natural 
n u h r s  and vice versa. 
The multiplexer function m u  is an excellent 
example where the select lines s are converted to a 
natural number which is then used to index the inputs 
to select the appropriate output value. The 
demultiplexer function demux demonstrates how 
each output is specified using a lambda function 
where an element of the output bit vector is equal to 
the input b if the natural number representation of the 
select lines equals the index of the element in the 
output vector, else it is 0. A decoder is defined 
similarly. Then several well know properties of 
encoders and decoders are verified. The lemma 
decode-count is particularly useful when dealing 
with control of tristate devices where the selected 
device is encoded as a binary value which is then 
passed through a decoder to select the appropriate 
device. Since at most one device can drive the line at 
a time as encapsulated in the type 
tristate-control, then when a decoder is 
applied as the selection device for tristate lines, this 
theory easily discharges the type condition on 
tristate-control. 
4.2 Sequential Logic 
4.2.1 Registers 
Registers are presented as a sequential circuit 
building block. A register can be easily defined given 
state information: 
reg-state : type = bvec[Nl 
and the function: 
ts-bus : type = 
[below(N) -> tristate] 
register (invec : bvec[Nl, 
load, clr, OE : bit, 
CS : reg-state) : 
[ #  outvec : ts-bus, OE-out : bit, 
( #  
NS : reg-state #I = 
outvec := CS, 
OE-out := OE, 
NS := if clr then bv0 
elsif load then invec 
else CS endif 
# I  
It is assumed that all encoders or decoders will have 
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Note that this register has a synchronous clear as 
opposed to the JK flip flop which had an 
asynchronous clear and set. Therefore, the output 
vector is simply a function of the current state and 
the clear signal only has an affect on the next state. 
Variations of the register and other registers such 
as shift registers can be similarly specified. 
4.2.2 Counters 
A binary counter is introduced. The counter 
handles N-bit quantities with a carry in generating a 
carry out and a next count value. The counter also 
has parallel load capabilities: 
counter 
(count, par-load : bvec [NJ , 
carry-in, load : bit) : 
next-count : bvec # I  = 
[ #  carry-out : bit, 
let 
n : below(exp2 (N) ) = 
m a x  : boo1 = (n = exp2 (M) -1) in 
carry-out := 
bv2nat (count), 
( #  
if (load = 0)  and max and 
(carry-in = 1) 
then 1 else 0 endif, 
next-count := 
if load = 1 then par-load 
elsif max and (carry-in = 1) 
then bvec0 
elsif carry-in = 1 then 
nat2bv( n+l) 
else count endif 
# )  
The value of count is the current state information, 
and is not part of the external circuit. The other 
inputs are actual inputs to the counter. The counter 
is then be verified to operate as a natural number 
counter modulo 2Y 
counter-binary-lemma : lemma 
bv2nat ( next-count ( 
counter-binary( count, 
mod( bv2nat ( count) + 1, 
payload, 1, 0 )  ) 1 = 
em2 (N) 1 
This is now a general purpose tool to use in a 
digital design. An example use (using an axiomatic 
definition of the circuit) would be: 
% current count state 
current-state : var bvec[N] 
% circuit description: 
linel, linea, line3 : var bit 
busl, bus2 : var bvec[Nl 
counter1 : axiom 
bus2 = next-count( counter( 
current-state, busl, linel, 
line21 ) & 
current-state, busl, linel, 
line21 ) 
line3 = carry-out( counter( 
4.4 Example: Registers with outputs on a 
common bus 
An example is given which demonstrates the use 
of sequential logic, combinational logic, and tristate 
devices. The circuit is a simple four register system 
connected to a common bus for data transfer shown in 
Figure 2. Control of the registers is provided by three 
2-bit control buses (bus-sl, bus,s2, bu-3)  and two 
control enable lines (Znl, Zn2). Bus-sl selects which 
register will load its value from the common bus cbus 
and the control is enabled by Znl. Bus-s2 selects 
which register will be cleared and ln2 enables the 
signal. Bu.-s3 selects which register will drive the 
common bus cbus. 
t : var time 
% register states 
RO, R1, R2, R3 : var reg-state 
% decoder outputs 
bus-bl, bus-ba, bus-b3 : var bus[41 
% decoder control 
bus-s1, bus-sa, bus-s3 : var bus121 
cbus : var busE161 % common bus 
lnl, 12 : var line % demux inputs 
% tristate control 
tsc : var signal[ 
% outputs to tsb 
tsb-out : var signal[ 
% tristate bus 
tsb : var tristate-bus 14,161 
% control for load 
demuxl-connect : axiom 
tristate-control[411 
tristate~bus~out[4,1611 
bus-bl(t) = demux( lnl(t), 
bus-s1 (t) 1 
% control for clr 
demux2,connect : axiom 
bus-b2 (t) = demux( ln2 (t) , 
bus-s2 (t ) 1 
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% control for output enable 
decode-connect : axiom 
bus-b3 (t 1 = decode ( bus-s3 (t ) ) 
RO-connect : axiom 
tsb-out (t) (0 1 = outvec ( 
register( cbus(t), bus-bl(t) (O), 
bus-b2 (t) (01, bus-b3 (t) (01, 
RO(t))) & 
tsc(t) (0) = OE-out( register( 
cbus(t1, bus-bl(t) (O), 
bus-b2 (t) (01, bus-b3 (t9 (01, 
RO(t1)) & 
RO(t+l) = NS( register( cbus(t), 
bus-bl(t) (01, bus-b2 (t) (01, 
bus-b3(t)(O), RO(t))) 
Rl-connect : axiom 
tsb-out (t) (1) = outvec( 
register( cbus (t) , bus-bl (t) (11, 
bus-b2 (t) (11, bus-b3 (t) (11, 
Rl(t))) & 
tsc(t) (1) = OE-out( register( 
cbus (t) , bus-bl (t) (1) , 
bus-b2 (t) (11, bus-b3 (t) (11, 
Rl(t))) & 
bus-bl (t) (11, bus-b2 (t) (11, 
bus33 (t) (11, Rl(t) 1 )  
R1 (t+l) = NS ( register ( cbus (t) , 
R2-connect : axiom 
tsb-out(t) (2) = outvec( 
register ( cbus (t) , bus-bl (t ) (2 ) , 
bus-b2 (t) (21, bus-b3 (t) (2), 
R2(t))) & 
tsc(t) (2) = OE-out( register( 
cbus(t1, bus-bl(t) (21, 
bus-b2 (t) (21, bus-b3 (t) (21, 
R2(t))) & 
R2(t+l) = NS( register( cbus(t), 
bus-bl(t) (21, bus-b2 (t) (21, 
bus33 (t) (21, R2 (t) 1 )  
R3-connect : axiom 
tsb-out (t) (3) = outvec ( register ( 
cbus(t), bus-bl(t) (31, 
bus-b2 (t) (31, bus-b3 (t) (31, 
R3(t))) & 
tsc(t) (3) = OE-out( register( 
cbus(t), bus-bl(t) (31, 
bus32 (t) (31, 
bus,b3 (t) (31, R3 (t) 1 )  & 
R3 (t+l) = NS ( register ( cbus (t) , 
bus-bl(t) (31, bus-b2 (t) (31, 
bus-b3 (t) (31, R3 (t) 1 )  
tristate-connect : axiom 
cbus(t) = tsb(tsc(t) ,tsb-out(t)) 
Due to the type of the tristate bus, PVS typechecking 
requires the verification that only one of the output 
enable lines will be active at a time. This is 
accomplished using the lemma decode-count. 
5 State Machine Specification 
State machine design is the core of digital design. 
A classic digital design is composed of an architecture 
4 .' , 4  I tsblcbus 
OE 
In Clr 
RO 
Load Out 
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h 
Figure 2. 
and a controller with the controller providing 
commands to the architecture and the architecture 
providing status information to the controller. Each of 
these is frequently defined as a state machine. The 
process of development of a state machine is 
comprised of two parts, the state machine definition 
and the state machine implementation. The first 
component must be performed, while the second may 
be automatic depending on whether the hardware 
programming system can generate the appropriate 
design directly from the state machine definition. 
Certain components of a sequential design should 
be verified prior to implementation. In particular, the 
design should account for all possible input 
cambintations to generate appropriate state transitions 
and state transitions should be to valid states. Also, 
all valid states should be reachable given a reset 
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condition and a set of input conditions. Several 
theories are presented which force the designer to 
verify these properties. The theories have been 
designed such that they are independent of the 
implementation logic. The example given is based 
on using bit vectors as previously used, but the 
theories are not specified using bit vectors, but rather 
the implementation type is passed as a parameter to 
the theory. There are four theories: 
Theory State-Verification-1 : 
Given a set of states, a set of valid states, a reset 
function, a state transition function, and input 
conditions, verify that: 
a) the reset function maps from a state to a valid 
State. 
b) given a valid state, the state transition function 
maps to a valid state. 
c) all states are reachable after a reset. 
Theorystate-Implementation-1: 
Given a mapping function to map from the state 
space to state variables and a state equation function 
to define the state transitions in terms of state 
variables, verify that the mapping function is unique 
and that the state equations behave in the same 
manner as the state transition function from 
State-Verjfication-1. 
Theorystate-Verification-2: 
Theory State-Verification-2 is the same as 
Stateverification-1 except that the state 
transition function must map all states to a valid 
state. This is particularly useful in the development 
of systems for use in unpredictable environments 
where a power surge could result in the circuit 
transitioning undesirably into an undefined state. 
Theory Stat e-Implement at ion-2 : 
Theory State-Implemenation-2 is the same as 
State-Implementation-1 except that the state 
machine must satisfy State-Verif ication-2. 
State-Verification-1 and 
State-Implementation-1 are demonstrated 
here and the others are just minor modifications of 
these two. 
5.1 Abstract State Machine Verification 
transition function is handled by: 
The verification of the properties of the state 
% given: set of states, set of 
% valid states, reset function, 
% a state transition function, 
% verify that: 
% a) reset function maps from a 
% state to a valid state 
% b) given a valid state, the 
% state transition function 
% maps to a valid state 
[state : type, 
valid-state : setof[statel, 
logic-type : type, 
Nic : nat, %# of input conditions 
input-condition-type : type, 
state-transition : 
[(valid-state), 
input-condition-type -> 
(valid-state)], 
reset : (valid-state), 
reset-value : logic-type1 : 
Theory 
Begin 
% This theory is simply a 
% mechanism to make sure that a 
% state machine designer maintains 
% certain necessary conditions for 
% the state machine. Importing 
% this theory will verify that the 
% functions have the appropriate 
% structure. 
Assuming 
Importing signal 
states : var signal[statel 
reset-signal : var 
signal [logic-type] 
input-conditions : var 
signal[input-condition-type] 
t : var time 
S : var state 
state-transition-assumption : 
assumption 
valid-state ( states (t) 1 => 
states (t+l) = 
if (reset-signaltt) = 
else state-transition( 
reset-value) then reset 
states(t1, 
input-conditions(t) 1 endif 
reachable : assumption 
exists (ti : time) : 
reset-signal(ti) = reset-value 
exists (input-conditions, t) : 
=> 
states(t) = S 
State-Verification-1 
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EndAssuming 
End State-Verification-1 
Stat e-trans i t ion-as sump t ion states how 
the system should behave: given a valid state, the 
system will either reset or will transition to a new 
state. Then reachable verifies that all valid 
states are reachable, i.e. there exists a set of input 
conditions which will transition the current state to a 
given state. 
5.2 State Machine Implementation Verifica- 
tion 
The implementation of the state machine is 
verified to satisfy the state machine by the theory 
State-Implementation-1. The theory accepts the 
same parameters as State-Verification-1 with the 
additional parameters: 
state-imp1 : type, 
mapping : [state -> state-impll, 
state-equations : [state-impl, 
input-condition-type -> 
state-imp11 
The basis of the theory are then an assumption that 
the mapping from states to state variables must be 
unique which is handled for states S and T: 
mapping-unique : assumption 
mapping(T1 /= mapping(S) 
T /= S <=> 
and the function state-equations properly implements 
state-transition: 
state-equations-correct : 
as sump t ion 
state-equations( mapping(V),I) = 
mapping( state-transition(V,I)) 
These assumptions assist in the development of 
correct implementations of state machines. 
5.3 State Machine Example: Local Bus 
Controller 
An example of a bus controller as taken from 
PLDshell Plus/pLDasm User's Guide V4.0 [5] is 
provided. The problem is specified in PLDasm as 
(the PLDasm code is shown to demonstrate the ease 
of mapping the definition into PVS): 
;define defaults 
OUTPUT-HOLD LOCAL MEMORY INTACK 
DEFAULT-BRANCH SO 
;state assignments 
SO = /Q3 * /Q2 * /Q1 * /QO 
S1 = /Q3 * /Q2 * /Q1 * QQ 
S2 = /Q3 * /Q2 * Q1 * /Qo 
53 = /Q3 * /Q2 * Q1 * QO 
54 = /Q3 * 42 * /Q1 * /Qo 
55 = /Q3 * Q2 * /Q1 * QO 
56 = /Q3 * Q2 * Ql * /QO 
57 = /Q3 * Q2 * Q1 * QO 
S8 = Q3 * /Q2 * /Q1 * /QQ 
;state transitions 
SO := MEM_REQ -> S1 ;S1 on local 
;memory request 
+ INT-REQ -> S3 ;S3 on inter- 
; rupt request 
; no-op (SO) if no request 
;memory cycles 
S1 := VCC -> S2 ;one fixed wait 
S2 := BUS-CONT -> S7 ;S7 if ready 
+ BUS-WAIT -> S2 ;stay if not 
;state 
; ready 
;interrupt cycles 
s3 := BUS-CONT -> S4 ;S4 if ready 
+ BUS-WAIT -> S3 ;stay if not 
; ready 
s4 := vCC -> S5 ;jump to s5 - fixed 
s5 := VCC -> 56 ;jump to S6 - fixed 
56 := BUS-CONT -> S7 ;jump to S7 if 
;interrupt done 
; done 
;wait 
;wait 
+ BUS-WAIT -> S6 ;Stay if not 
;cleanup and idle cycles 
S7 := VCC -> S8 ;cleanup, then 
58 := VCC -> SO ;jump to SO, 
;jump to S8 
;ready to start 
;transition outputs 
SO.OUTF := LOCAL*/MEMORY*/INTACK 
S1.OUTF := /LOCAL*MEMORY*/INTACK 
S2.0UTF := /LOCAL*MEMORY*/INTACK 
S3.0UTF := /LOCAL*/MEMORY*INTACK 
S4.OUTF := /LOCAL*/MEMORY*/INTACK 
S5.0UTF := /LOCAL*/MEMORY*/INTACK 
S6.0UTF := /LOCAL*/MEMORY*INTACK 
S7.0UTF := /LOCAL*/MEMORY*/INTACK 
S8.0UTF := LOCAL*/MEMORY*/INTACK 
STATE MOORE-MACHINE 
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CONDITIONS 
MEM-REQ = M-IO * /INT,CYC * /A20 
INT-mQ = /M-IO * INT-CYC * /A20 
BUS-CONT = /READY 
BUS-WAIT = READY 
The PVS specification of the state machine 
(theory bus-controller) starts with the 
assumption that MEM-REQ and INT..REQ cannot 
both be true at the same time: 
ASSUMING 
bv-lib : library = "bitvectors" 
importing time, signal, bv-lib@bv, 
registers 
t : var time 
: bit = 
MEM-REQ (M-IO, INT-CYC, A20 : bit) 
M-IO AND NOT (INT-CYC) AND 
NOT (A20) ; 
INT-REQ (M-IO, INT-CYC, A20 : bit) 
NOT(M-IO) AND INT-CYC AND 
NOT(A20) ; 
: bit = 
MEM-INT-REQlemma : assumption 
INT-REQ ( M-IO ( t ) , INT-CYC (t ) , 
A20(t)) /= 1 OR 
MEM-REQ ( M-IO ( t ) , INT-CYC ( t) , 
- A2O(t)) /= 1 
ENDASSUMING 
If this were not the case, then the state transition 
from SO is not well defined and the following PVS 
specification would not be accepted. 
The following types are then defined: 
states : type = {SO, S1, S2, 53, 
input-conditions : type = 
S4, S5, 56, S7, S8) 
{ic : signall [below(3) -> bitl I 
forall (t : time) : 
(ic(t) ( 0 )  = MEM_REQ( M-IO(t)r 
(ic(t) (1) = INT-REQ( M-IO(t) , 
INTCYC(t), A20(t))) & 
(ic(t) (2)  = not(READY(t))) 
INT-CYC (t) r A20 (t) ) ) & 
The type stares defines all of the states in the system. 
As the example does not wony about invalid states 
for the state machine, neither does the PVS 
specification. Thus the set of valid states equals 
states. The type inpurs-cunditions encapsulates the 
three conditions MEM-REQ, I . - R E Q ,  and 
BUS-CONT from the PLDasmdefinition (BUS-WMT 
is just the inverse of BUS-COW. 
Then the variables 
LOCAL, MEHORY, INTACK : 
var signal [bit] 
define the system outputs and the variable 
input-cond : var input-conditions 
defines the set of input conditions or state qualifers. 
The state S is a variable of type srates. Then the 
inirial-state is defined as SO and the reset input and 
reset state are defined as: 
reset : var signal [bitl 
reset-state : states = 
initial-state 
From these, the state machine can now be defined. 
state S and input conditions input-cud as: 
The state transition function is then defined for 
let 
in 
cases 
so : 
s1: 
52 : 
s3 : 
s4 : 
s5 : 
S6 : 
s7 : 
S 8  : 
transition (S,input-cond): states = 
MEM-REQ = input-cond(0) = 1, 
INT-REQ = input-cond(1) = 1, 
BUS-CONT = input-cond(2) = 1 
s of 
if MEM-REQ then S1 
elsif INT-mQ then S3 
else SO endif, 
if BUS-CONT then S7 
if BUS-CONT then S4 
S2 r 
else 52 endif, 
else 53 endif, 
s5 I 
S6 r 
if BUS-CONT then S7 
else S6 endif, 
S8 1 
so 
endcases 
This is practically a direct translation of the PLDasm 
specification. The state transitions are then managed 
by the axiom 
state-transition-axiom : axiom 
if (reset(t) = 1) then 
else transition( state(t), 
state(t+l) = 
initial-state 
input-cond ( t ) ) endi f 
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represent the four state variables. 
Note that the reset condition could have been 
encapsulated in the state transition function, but as 
digital designers rarely include it since it simply 
complicates the function and is generally managed 
separately, it is kept separate in this example. 
Now the state machine is ready for verification 
with relationship to the theory Stute-Verification-I. 
This is done by fmt defining a predicate vuZ&state? 
which accepts a state and always returns true since 
the complete state space is encapsulated by states. 
Then Stute-Verification-1 is imported by 
importing 
State-Verification-l[ states, 
valid-state?, bit, 3, 
input-condition, transition, 
reset-state, 11 
This results in several TCCs, with the ones of 
interest being: 
IMPORTING2-TCC1: OBLIGATION 
(FORALL 
(xl: [states, input-condition], 
yl : [ (valid-state?) , 
ic(0) /= 1 OR 
ic(1) /= 113 ) : 
{ic: [below(3) -> bitl I 
(TRUE AND 
valid-state?(PROJ-l(xl))) AND 
valid-state?(transition(xl))); 
IMPORTING2-TCC2: OBLIGATION 
valid-state?(reset-state); 
IMPORTING2-TCC4: OBLIGATION 
(FORALL 
(reset-signal: signal [bit], 
states: signal[statesl): 
EXISTS (ti: time) : 
reset-signal (ti) = 1 
=> FORALL (S: states): 
states(t1 = S) ; 
EXISTS ( input-condi t ions, t ) : 
The fmt two obligations simply assert that the reset 
and transition functions must result in a valid state. 
Each of these is straightforward to prove. The last 
TCC is the primary concern. It stipulates that all 
states in S must be reachable. This requires a 
somewhat tedious proof which is discharged by use 
of a case analysis to handle the various states. 
Given the state transition definition, the 
implementation is then defined. First the concept of 
state variables is introduced as a 4-bit vector to 
state-variables : type = bvec [ 41 
Then two mapping functions are defined to map 
between states and state variables. The first, 
state-var-of, maps from a state to a set of state 
variables. 
state-var-of (S : states) : 
Cases S of 
state-variables = 
SO : lambda (i : below(4)) : 0, 
S1 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
if i = 0 then 1 else 0 endif, 
S2 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
if i = 1 then 1 else 0 endif, 
S3 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
if (i = 0) or (i = 1) then 1 
else 0 endif, 
S4 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
S5 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
if i = 2 then 1 else 0 endif, 
if (i = 0 )  or (i = 2) then 1 
else 0 endif, 
S6 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
if (i = 1) or (i = 2) then 1 
else 0 endif, 
S7 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
S8 : lambda (i : below(4)) : 
if i = 3 then 0 else 1 endif, 
if i = 3 then 1 else 0 endif 
EndCases 
Then the set of valid state variables, 
valid-state-var?, 
valid-statevar? 
(CS : state-variables) : boo1 = 
exists (S : states) : CS = 
state-var-of( S) 
is mapped to states by 
state-of (CS:(valid-state-var?)) : 
states = 
if CS = 0 then SO 
elsif CS = 1 then S1 
elsif CS = 2 then S2 
elsif CS = 3 then S3 
elsif CS = 4 then S4 
elsif CS = 5 then S5 
elsif CS = 6 then S6 
elsif CS = 7 then S7 
else S8 endif 
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The syntax for state-of has been modified to be 
more readable. 
Given the mappings, the state equations are 
defined by: 
state-equations 
(CS : (valid-state-var?), 
ic : input-condition) : 
(valid-state-var?) = 
let S8 = S8?(state_of(CS)), 
S7 = S7? (state-of (CS) I , 
S6 = S6? (state-of (CS) ) , 
55 = S5? (state-of (CS) 1, 
S4 = S4?(state_of(CS)), 
S3 = S3? (statepf (CS) , 
S2 = S2? (state-of (CS) 1 , 
S1 = Sl?(state-of(CS)), 
SO = SO? (state-of (CS) 1, 
MEM-REQ = ic(0) = 1, 
INT-REQ = ic(1) = 1, 
BUS-CONT = ic (2 )  = 1 in 
if S7 then 1 else 0 endif 
lambda (i : below(4)) : 
if i = 3 then 
elsif i = 2 then 
if ((S3 or 52 or S6) & 
BUS-CONT) or 54 or S5 or 
(56 & not BUS-CONT) then 1 
else 0 endif 
elsif i = 1 then 
if (53 & not BUS-CONT) or 
(SO & INT-REQ) or S1 or 52 
or S5 or S6 then 1 
else 0 endif 
if (SO & (MEKREQ or INT-REQ) ) 
else 
or (52 & BUS-CONT) or 
(S3 & not BUS-CONT) or S4 
or (S6 & BUS-CONT) then 1 
else 0 endif endif 
The set of state equations must perform the same 
function as transition. This is verified by 
importing State-Implementation-1 with the 
parameters: 
importing 
State-Implementation-l[ 
states, valid-state?, bit, 3, 
input-condition, transition, 
reset-state, 1, 
(valid-state-var?), 
state-var-of, state-equations1 
This results in the set of TCCs: 
IMPORTING3-TCC1: OBLIGATION 
(FORALL (xl: states, yl: states): 
(valid-state-var?) 
(state-var-of(x1))); 
IMPORTING3-TCC2: OBLIGATION 
(FORALL (S: states, T: states): 
T /= s <=> state-var-of(T) /= 
state-var-of (SI 1 ; 
IMPORTING3-TCC3: OBLIGATION 
{ FORALL ( I : input-condi t ion , 
V: (valid-state?)): 
state-equations(state-var,of(V) ,I)= 
state-var-of(transition(V, I))); 
The first TCC ensures that the mapping function 
state-var-of results in avalidstatevariable. The 
second TCC requires the proof that the mapping of 
states to state variables is unique. The last TCC states 
that the state equations must implement the state 
transition function. Each of these is a straightforward 
proof. 
6 Futurework 
Future work is focused in three areas: advanced 
clocking structures, support for VHDL, and 
application of the theory to meaningfid problems. ?he 
advanced clocking structures is necessary to permit 
gated clocks and multiphase clocks (this work is 
currently funded). The support for VHDL will be in 
the form of libraries to support IEEE standard 
libraries. Finally, the system will be tested against a 
real design. Current plans are to verify the design of 
a divider, thus testing both the combinational and 
sequential components. 
7 Conclusions 
The bus controller example demonstrates the ease 
with which a system specified for a PLD in an 
arbitrary hardware description language can be easily 
defined in PVS. While the transation process may 
introduce errors, the purpose of this work is to verify 
properties of the design, not of the actual 
implementation. Then the supporting environment 
assists the designer in verifying certain properties of 
the design. 
What was not demonstrated in this paper (but has 
been done) is that the behavior of the system can be 
described as a set of conjectures which are then 
verified. This is done at the state level and not the 
implementation level, but then as the implementation 
is verified to meet the state machine definition, this is 
sufficient. This process revealed an error in the 
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original description of the bus controller example [5] 
where the memory cycles were not properly 
managed. The example presented in this paper has 
been corrected based on those results. 
As this process is applied to larger problems and 
the kinks are worked out, it is believed that this 
process can become a valuable tool to the developers 
of digital circuits, not just PLDs, but all digital 
circuits (a benefit of the fact that there is no 
dependence on one hardware description language). 
In fact, it is envisioned that this process could be 
incoxporated into a computer engineering curriculum 
as a means to teach students how to specify 
problems, even if the verification process is not 
performed, or can be fully automated through use of 
strategies. 
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